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ABSTRACT  
In intractable conflicts the feelings and claims of  victimhood are as mature and well-entrenched as the conflict 
itself. The longer a conflict is waged, the more the geopolitical reasons for victimisation shift to the psychological. 
This gradually blurs the difference between facts and perceptions, rendering the conflict harder to resolve (e.g. 
Coleman 2003; Bar-Tal 2013). The general assumption in this study is that due to unique historical and political 
circumstances, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict draws heavily — perhaps more than other conflicts — from past and 
present victimisations to rationalise, justify, and perpetuate the status quo. The study seeks to examine the extent to 
which the narratives of  victimhood add to intractability and therefore hinder settlement. It mainly but not 
exclusively draws on Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework of  collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective 
emotional orientations to guide the discussion. First, the study proposes that Israel’s victimhood draws much of  its 
validity from the Jewish collective memory, especially the Shoah. That among other things gave rise to ethos that 
established the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of  the Jewish continuum of  suffering, and not entirely as a 
political struggle with defined geopolitical causes. It is also proposed that collective memory and the current 
conflict have established certain emotional responses ranging from soft emotions like guilt and shame, which have 
subtle but significant reverberations, to strong emotions like fear. Building on Bar-Tal’s claims (2001) that fear 
dominates Israel’s emotional sate, it is suggested that fear also represents a main force behind Israel’s 'hyper 
security,’ which is seen as the most destructive manifestation of  Israel’s victimhood narratives. Second, it is argued 
that even though Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish victimhood narratives are socio-psychologically similar, there are 
factors mainly determined by the conflict power hierarchy which make certain aspects of  Palestinian victimhood 
different and more salient. Whilst Israel’s collective memory is premised on the fear of  annihilation, Palestinian 
memory is mainly centred on the fear of  being forgotten. And, whilst Israel’s dominant emotion is fear, Palestinian 
emotional orientation is largely steered by a sense of  collective humiliation. The conflict ethos, as a result, seems to 
excessively focus on muqawama (resistance) as a reformative measure against humiliation. Even though the societal 
beliefs about victimhood in Israel or Palestine are not completely homogenous, they are prominent enough to have a 




BACKGROUND: PERSONAL NARRATIVE 
I was born and lived my entire childhood in a humble household in the heart of  Al-Shati Camp, Gaza’s third 
largest refugee camp on the Mediterranean. My family, like everyone else in the camp, were refugees from 
villages and towns in what became Israel. Through the intensely idealistic and profoundly reminiscent 
anecdotes of  my grandparents, I learned about a vanished homeland. I imagined my grandparents’ village as 
a utopian society with leafy footpaths, lines of  olive trees evanescing into the horizon, and fields embellished 
with countless poppies. I visualised it — as Said (1992) once described it — as 'a mythologised spot of  land,’ 
one that stood in stark and brusque contrast to life in the camp. At an early age, you learn about loss, a 
concept that would grow clearer and more intense with age. You also internalise immense nostalgic feelings 
for a piece of  land that you never physically set foot in.  
During the First Intifada (1987-1993), I witnessed first-hand the Israeli army’s abusive policies, the almost 
daily house break-ins, and the repeated curfews. It was the time when my grandparents’ utopia started to 
grow ever more remote, yet more desperately needed. I did not then understand the intricacies of  politics, but 
like most of  my peers, while lacking the proper term, I had little trouble recognising a victimiser.   
Early in life, you realise that being a Palestinian “…serves to remind you that you can never take who you are 
for granted. It is a destiny which you can negotiate a space of  your own but from which you cannot 
escape” (Suleiman 2016, p.5). You learn that you have no choice but to embrace your loss and create a proud 
identity out of  it. At times, nonetheless, I surrendered myself  to taboo self-monologues; I wondered perhaps 
with bitterness and confusion, why was I born to this people? Why not in a normal country where the very act 
of  existing did not feel like an accusation? I was not ambitious, I just imagined a perfectly normal place that 
looked like our camp, only its inhabitants were not scattered over three planes of  being: a mythological past, 
an unpalatable present, and a helplessly Sisyphean future. But as our primal survival instincts had it, we 
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would soon resettle into a mode of  hesitant acceptance. You learn to create a private space in the illusion we 
called normality.   
Victim is a default Palestinian mindset, a non-negotiable identity, and sometimes, Jayyusi (1992) reflects, a 
means of  arrogant defiance, and a lens though which we see the world. Everywhere you turn, in art, 
literature, and academia, the narratives of  victimhood overshadow all other aspects of  Palestinian self-
awareness. It is also a ‘purgatorial’ state of  mind; you are trapped between the desire to escape and the 
inability give up the victim status. As a result, immersed in the moral and political advantages of  our suffering 
(Neslen 2011), we ended up perpetuating our traumas and locking ourselves in a rigid, one-sided perception 
of  reality. 
  
My transition from viewing our victimhood as unparalleled to beginning to see something of  a victimhood 
narrative amongst Israeli-Jews was slow, reluctant, and somewhat confusing. For most of  us, a military 
uniform was everything that represented Israel, seeing beyond this image needed a special paradigm shift. 
The first was leaving Palestine, which helped me step outside the circle and view the conflict from a clearer 
vantage point. The second was the events that followed — two incidents in particular: the 2010 Israel’s attack 
on Navi Marmara and a Channel-4 interview during the 2014 Gaza onslaught.   
In May 2010, the IDF attempted to thwart a peace flotilla headed for Gaza to ‘symbolically’ break the Israeli 
blockade. The raid soon turned bloody with the death of  nine Turkish activists. I was puzzled by Israel’s 
indignation at the international community for criticising the lethal raid. I struggled to understand why 
instead of  a serious soul-searching about the morality, let alone the legality, of  soldiers raiding a ship in 
international water, many Israeli-Jews were engaged in a Kafkaesque conversation in which the military 
attack on the civilian ships was characterised as a legitimate “act of  self-defence” (Cook 2010).  
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I saw how Israel’s mainstream media depicted the soldiers as victims of  bullying by the activists. Yedioth 
Ahronoth (Ben-Yishai 2010), for instance, described the raid as “ambush for the Israeli commandos.” 
Netanyahu reportedly called it “lynching of  our soldiers” and “a clear act of  self-defence.” I felt that the 
Israeli rhetoric was something of  blaming the victim or an act of  ‘shooting and crying.’ It appeared like an 
attempt to clear one’s conscience without admitting responsibility.   
The second instance was during Gaza’s third onslaught in 2014, otherwise known as Operation Protective 
Edge. As televisions around the world aired footage of  destroyed neighbourhoods and hundreds of  dead 
Palestinian civilians, Israeli media was occupied with depicting the offensive as a pure act of  self-defence and 
the Operation as a full-blown war between equals. The message was that the IDF’s excessive use of  firepower 
was justified not only to protect Israel’s citizens against Palestinian rockets, but also to preserve the country’s 
very existence.  
I recall an interview on Channel 4, titled “Mothers of  Israel and Palestine” (2014). On one side of  the screen 
stood a Palestinian mother from Gaza, wearing a ‘Press’ marked bullet-proof  vest and helmet. Behind her 
was the pitch black Gaza City. On the other, appeared an Israeli-Jewish mother, dressed in neat summer 
clothing with no protective gear. Behind her was the vibrant scene of  Jerusalem’s streets — a visual statement 
of  the paradoxical realities between the conflict rivals.  
Initially, both women engaged in expressions of  motherly worries. However, confronted by presenter Jackie 
Long’s statement that Palestinians so far lost l400 people to Israel’s attacks yet there were no Israeli civilian 
casualties, the Israeli-Jewish mother dismissed it as numbers and semantics. She claimed that 80% of  the 
dead were Hamas fighters. “Do you look across to Gaza, see children dying…being buried?”, asked Long. 
The Israeli-Jewish mother answered, “Some of  those pictures are horrific, there is a question of  how we can, 
in fact, counter that in the media.” 
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 The Israeli-Jewish mother appeared aware of  the horrific scenes coming out of  Gaza, but seemingly wanted 
to suppress them in order to win the who-suffered-more competition with Adeem. Her  reference to the 
soldiers “as our children, whom I kissed goodbye,” seemed like an Abrahamic immolation ritual (Svirsky 
2014), perpetuating motherhood as a national mission — almost indistinguishable in spirit from a seemingly 
compos mentis Palestinian um al-shaheed (martyr’s mother). Although not fully comprehensible at the time, that 
appeared like an attempt to affirm the IDF’s innocence; an Israeli soldier, albeit armed and protected, is 
equal in his victimhood to hundreds of  Palestinian civilians whose homes were turned into rubble over their 
heads. 
To see parallel, I attempted to divorce myself  from the conflict, to expel the ghosts of  Ben-Gurion, Shamir, 
Sharon, and Netanyahu, and cleanse my soul from the burden of  victimisation. Like Nassri Al-Sayegh (2005) 
in his ambitious book If  I were a Jew, I wanted to foist an identity crisis upon myself  and try to be the Other. 
But, like Al-Sayegh again, it was extremely challenging to fully disjoin my consciousness from the Palestinian 
collective. Similarly but on the other side, Yossi Klein Halevi in Letters to My Palestinian Neighbour (2018) tried to 
engage in self-reflexive, empathic communications with an imaginary Palestinian across the segregation wall. 
In them, he explained his reasons as an Israeli-Jew and  attempted to show understanding to Palestinian 
suffering. But, like us, he remained undetachable from his collective. His very ‘neighbourhood’  on the 1
hillside in East Jerusalem where he wrote his letters and from which he looked at that Palestinian neighbour — 
and declaratively empathised — was no more than a settlement on an occupied land. Nevertheless, my overly 
ambitious and borderline arrogant strife to ‘fully identify’ has yielded some understanding. Full identification 
requires emotional investment, but as I came to learn, emotions in conflict may be too precious a commodity 
to share. Understanding is nevertheless affordable. It can be a first step not only to see the self  in the Other, 
but also to reexamine one’s own identity — the victim identity.  
 French Hill is a Jewish settlement in northern East Jerusalem. 1
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Zooming backward and forward and sifting through my emic and etic perspectives on what I initially thought 
was a preposterous victimhood claims by an oppressive occupier, I managed to capture some logic behind 
those claims. The Israeli-Jewish mother’s lack of  apparent empathy was perhaps not sinister or overly 
conscious. When she reduced Palestinian deaths to ‘semantics’ and a ‘numbers game,’ she may have been 
motivated by an aggressive desire of  self-preservation closely tied to the historical Jewish fear of  annihilation. 
The fear of  hurt, although disproportionate to the existing physical harm, was great, no doubt. But the fear 
of  Israel appearing as an aggressor was perhaps greater. It seemed to me that only by depriving the people of  
Gaza of  their victimhood, or by condemning the Turkish activists on board the flotilla, was Israel able to 
maintain her self-image as the perpetual victim. It would otherwise fly in the face of  everything that Jewish 
memory holds dear.  
That made me wonder about what it meant to be a victim and opened my eyes to the nature of  narrative in 
intractable conflict. Through learning about the victim claims of  the Other, my thoughts and feelings about 
my people’s victimhood narratives were disrupted. This disruption encouraged me to question our experience 
and engage in self-critique. It remains a fact, however, that being on “the wrong side of  power,” to quote Said 
(in: Bayoumi & Rubin 2000), I might not achieve full empathy with the Other, but possibly a sympathetic 
understanding. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT   
The narratives of  victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contribute to intractability and hinder settlement.  
Moving from one level of  intractability to another, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to invite 
considerable critical attention. Abundant literature, often reflecting a particular view or another, has been 
published on the historical and political causes of  the conflict and its tortuous chain of  deadlocks (see: e.g. 
Said & Hitchens 1988; Said 1992; Segev 2000; Morris 2001; Dershowitz 2003; Finkelstein 2005; Tilley 2005; 
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Pappé 2006; Khalidi 2006; Sa’di & Abu-Lughod 2007; Sand 2009). In what might be considered a leap 
forward in conflict studies, there is now a tendency to attribute the conflict complexity to a set of  interwoven 
and interconnected dynamics (see: Coleman 2003; Coleman et al. 2010, 2011; Vallacher et al. 2010). Although 
this approach has facilitated the incorporation of  psychology in conflict studies, the core scholarship remains 
largely focused on the geopolitical interpretations.  
To date, only a few researchers, although growing in number, began to look at the socio-psychological side of  
the conflict, slowly but effectively deconstructing its complex understructure (e.g. Kelman 1987, 1999; 
Northrup 1989; Coleman et al. 2010; Volkan 1989, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2013a/b; Bar-Tal 2000b, 2001, 2004, 
2007, 2011, 2013; Halperin et al. 2010; Shavit 2014; Halperin & Pliskin 2015). An important understructure 
that received little attention is the narratives of  victimhood. Most researchers who looked at victimhood did 
so without exploring its specifics and generally viewed it as a secondary byproduct of  conflict, and not as a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon that can affect the conflict trajectory. Volkan (e.g. 2001, 2004, 2006), for 
example, approached victimhood through the notion of  ‘chosen trauma’ and ‘transgenerational 
transmission.’   
Bar-Tal and colleagues came close to identifying and conceptualising victimhood as a barrier to peace (Bar-
Tal & Halperin 2009, 2013; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998a). Developing the notion of  ‘siege mentality,’ or what 
he and Antebi (1992a/b) originally called ‘the Masada Syndrome,’ Bar-Tal et al. (2009b) highlighted the 
subjective nature of  victimhood and argued that Israeli-Jews because of  their past coupled with the current 
conflict indeed felt victimised. Bar-Tal’s hypothesis was expanded and developed in his work on the socio-
psychological foundations of  intractable conflict (2013). Bar-Tal is no doubt a scholarly authority in the field, 
but his views on victimhood, although advanced, are still lacking in certain areas. His seemingly unavoidable 
and sometimes useful emic Israeli-Jewish perspective makes some of  his views somewhat one-sided. Also, the 
little attention in his work to the conflict asymmetries ignores the core reason that makes many of  Israel’s 
victimhood claims against the Palestinians questionable. 
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This study does not question the legitimacy of  the feelings of  victimisation amongst Israeli-Jews or the Jewish 
history of  persecution, but argues that given the geo-political landscape, many of  Israel’s victimhood claims 
vis-à-vis the Palestinians lack contextual validity. They lock many Israeli-Jews in a state of  siege mentality and 
produce aggressive military and security policies that serve to perpetuate the conflict. Because of  the power 
hierarchy, Palestinian victimhood may be contextually understandable, at least as a face-value, but it too 
becomes problematic when it disregards Palestinian agency and defines every aspect of  Palestinian life in 
terms of  pure suffering, especially if  those aspects are not directly related to Israel’s occupation. The clash 
between the two narratives enlarges the political and psychological cracks between the two peoples and 
makes any form of  settlement very difficult.  
PURPOSE & OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of  the study is to explore, describe, and critique how victimhood has and continues to be a 
salient component in the master narratives of  Israel and the Palestinians. And, how that serves to reinforce 
intractability and hinder settlement.  
Against the backdrop of  the available literature on conflict intractability, its geo-political and socio-
psychological foundations, and the multi-angled scholarship on victimhood (e.g. Said 1979; Burton 1987; 
Northrup 1989; Zerubavel 1991, 1995, 2002; Segev 1993; Falk 1993, 1996, 2004; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 
1998a/b; Volkan 2001, 2004, 2006, 2013a/b; Deutsch 2002; Grosbart 2003; Rouhana 2004; Bar-Tal 2007, 
2009a/b, 2013; Vallacher et al. 2010; Peleg 2015), this study seeks to analyse the motives, assumptions, and 
behaviours that constitute the various aspects of  victim identity, as well as explain its various manifestations. 
Approached narratively, the study looks at the historical, political, and ideological factors that shape Israel’s 
victim identity — and how this identity is defined by and itself  has redefined Israel’s collective memory, 
conflict ethos, and emotional orientations. By judging Israel’s victimhood against the Palestinian situation, the 
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study seeks to assess Israel’s victimhood as a possible component in the conflict intractability. Analogously, 
aided by the abundant literature (mostly on Israel) on trauma, memory, beliefs, identity, and emotions (e.g. 
Kelman 1999; Margalit 2004; Volkan 2006; Lentin 2010; Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Oren & Bar-Tal 2014; 
Masalha 2015), as well as through my personal observations as a member of  the Palestinian collective, the 
study investigates what is viewed as contentious aspects of  Palestinian victimhood and assesses their effect on 
intractability.  
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND OVERALL APPROACH 
This work is humanities based and its prime goal is to generate verstehen (intimate understanding) whilst being 
engaged in an inductive process, advancing concepts and emergent hypotheses, not a theory. It focuses on the 
subjective experience but without disregarding the external factors that shape it. It seeks to provide an 
insightful, critical and philosophical image of  what is on the other side of  the glass pane, and asks 
fundamental questions of  value, purpose, and meaning in a rigorous and critical way. To this end, it uses an 
eclectic synthesis of  doctrines, paradigms, and insights from various disciplines of  thought without necessarily 
adopting the whole parent system for each discipline (Paterson, in: Given (ed.) 2008).  
 A humanities approach also means interpretive and flexible methodologies (ibid.). This study implements a 
narrative research method. The multiple data used throughout are largely treated as narrative and analysed 
using a ‘categorical-content’ approach, one focused on understanding the latent content and meaning units. 
Reflexivity is also utilised as both a narrative source and a tool of  analysis.  
ASSUMPTIONS AND PERSONAL CONVICTIONS 
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There are variations in the roles and positions that researchers take up in relation to the research 
phenomenon and settings and the ways a researcher’s social identity and location are interpreted (Ravitch & 
Carl 2016). In this study, two fundamental personal convictions define this author’s relationship with the 
research subject-matter. First, the occupation is a fact and Zionism [in Palestinian eyes] is a form of  settler-
colonialism. Therefore, what might have the face-value of  a polarised or binary standpoint may spring from 
a) an overall post-colonial perspective characterised by unbalanced power relations, or/and b) a subjective 
outlook due to unresolved emotionality towards a conceivably oppressive occupier. Second, the feelings of  
victimisation — no matter how debatable — are valid for the assumed or self-defined victims, Israeli-Jews 
and Palestinians alike. Nevertheless, part of  this author’s perception of  Israel’s victimhood remains 
contextually swayed by the Palestinian experience.  
LIMITATIONS 
Not including the inherent limitations in qualitative research (reproducibility, ambiguity, subjectivity, or bias), 
there were physical and conceptual restrictions that dictated this study’s information gathering, analysis and 
methodology.   
This work primarily uses conceptualised secondary sources. Access to Israeli archives or interviews with 
Israeli officials, for instance, would have benefited the study’s scope greatly. But being of  Palestinian descent 
comes with certain logistical and political limitations. It was not going to be easy, if  at all possible, to travel to 
Israel or access Israeli archival materials.  Also, conducting interviews with Israeli officials was not going to be 2
without sensitivities. I nevertheless contacted the IDF Arabic spokesman Avichai Adraee for an interview. 
While he was initially responsive, it was a long-winded process and eventually nothing materialised. I also 
spoke with Shimon Peres’ office manager, only few months before Peres’s passing in September 2016, but 
 The Home Office advises that British nationals of  Palestinian origin may be denied entry into Israel. See the Home Office website, 2
travel advice, entry: Israel — https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/israel/entry-requirements
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scheduling an interview was not successful. Busy schedule was also an issue with ‘Arab' and Jewish members 
of  the Knesset.   
The thesis did not heavily engage with Arabic literature from non-Palestinian sources. This is not on the 
ground of  scarcity but because many of  these sources often had ideological purposes and for the large part 
lacked the ‘lived experience’ element that Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian sources — although ideological at 
times — usually provided. For the general Arab populations, reflects Barari (2009), writing on Israel becomes 
a matter of  struggle and strife rather than a means of  exploration.  
This work mainly focuses on the common denominators: it examines a variety of  the most occurring narratives 
amongst the majority of  Israeli-Jews and Palestinians. The Israeli-Jewish or Palestinian societies, however, are 
not deemed strictly monolithic or completely homogeneous. Counter-narratives, especially from Israel, are 
frequently used to support and expand the argument.  
RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
  
The central question is: to what extent do the narratives of  victimhood hinder settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? 
The question is broad and to provide a satisfactory answer it is perhaps important to start at the top by asking 
questions about the place of  victimhood in intractable conflict and its possible socio-psychological nature and 
the ramifications of  that. This also raises important questions about its manifestations, the most salient of  
them, and which ones are most discernible in Israel and among the Palestinians. The multi-angled 
exploration leads to an understanding of  the extent to which victimhood adds to intractability and therefore 
hinders settlement. 
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RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE  
Zionism won the legitimacy battle over Palestine in the international community partly due to the 
representations, rhetorics, and images it attached to the conditions of  European Jews (Said & Hitchens 1998). 
Palestinians placed much of  their legitimacy claims to Palestine on being the indigenous population and 
European Jews as foreign invaders. The Jews saw themselves as returning to Zion after two-thousand years of  
exile. Although a Jewish State was supported by Britain and some Western countries from the outset, it was 
the Nazi crimes against Europe’s Jews however that gave the Jewish State endeavour in most of  the 
international community a sense of  urgency and the Jewish claims to Palestine a boost of  legitimacy 
(Kanafani 2017). This among other things resulted in the Palestinian grievances being disregarded, and the 
resistance to Israel’s occupation was soon separated from the context of  Palestinian victimhood. A significant 
aspect of  this study is its attempt — largely from a Palestinian perspective — to analyse Israel’s victimhood, 
and by doing that it also calls attention to the several hardly discussed aspects of  Palestinian victimhood. It 
challenges the common orthodoxies of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and opens up new paradigms for 
understanding its complex dynamics. This should add to knowledge and may eventually contribute to the 
production of  peacemaking models. 
Victimhood is often studied as a stand-alone, independent phenomenon. Little is said about its varied 
manifestations. This study expands the range of  manifestations, increasing the angles from which victimhood 
can be studied and developing the understanding of  its effect in conflict. Here, the manifestations are 
presented and filtered through collective memory, conflict ethos, and emotional orientations. Security, for 
example, is usually viewed as a geo-political or psycho-political phenomenon, or is measured in international 
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relations terms. But in the study it is seen as one of  the most significant manifestations of  victimhood — and 
is analysed as such.  
The study is particularly important because it advances the knowledge about the understudied Palestinian 
victimhood. Dissimilar to other studies on the Palestinian struggle, where the Palestinian situation is often 
approached politically or tackled as zero-sum: David-versus-Goliath or mindless terrorism, this study, among 
other things, assesses Palestinian victimhood on the basis of  ‘agency.’ Even though Palestinians are viewed 
largely as the conflict underdogs, the study still questions some aspects of  their entrenched ‘ideal victim’ self-
identity (see: Christie 1986). It seeks to explain the make-up of  Palestinian victimhood and that mainly 
includes the fear of  memoricide, humiliation, and the conflicted national character which the ethos about 
muqawama helps create. By trying to hold the mirror up to Palestinians and thinking of  the Palestinian 
experience critically and reflexively, this study to some extent presents a counter-narrative from within to the 
Palestinian victimhood narratives. This is a rarely seen endeavour in Palestinian society.  
KEY TERMS 
• Amalek: An ancient nation described in the Hebrew Bible as the enemies of  the Israelites. In the 
modern sense, Amalek represents those perceived as enemies of  the Jewish people and reflects Israel’s 
trans-generational/transhistorical sense of  fear. 
• Arab: If  emphasised or used between two quotes, ‘Arab’ or ‘Arabs,’ it usually refers to Israel’s description 
of  the Palestinians. The term is problematic as it helps sustain the Zionist denial of  Palestinians as an 
independent identity and culture. If  there is no distinct Palestinian identity, goes the rationale, then there 
is no such thing as Palestine, and therefore Israel is not an invader or an occupier. Although these days 
mainstream media in Israel refer to Palestinians as Palestinians, social media platforms show that 
‘ordinary’ Israeli-Jews still refer to Palestinians as ‘Arabs' more than they do ‘Palestinians.’ That could 
indicate that the majority of  Israeli-Jews still regard the conflict as a Jewish-Arab conflict (Gilad 2015). 
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The term also falsely suggests that the Arab world is a single entity that displays uniform attitudes and 
policies vis-à-vis the Jews, Zionism, and/or Israel (Caplan 2009), and Israel is standing alone, surrounded 
by tens of  millions of  antagonistic Arabs. 
• Ashkenazi: Jews who originated in Eastern Europe (Western Jews).   
• Common Denominator: The majority of  Israeli-Jews or Palestinians who adhere to certain narratives.  
• Conflict: The word conflict conjures a sense of  parity, of  two equal parties who disagree (Abdullah 
2015). Conflict is a more appropriate word to describe the relation between Israel and some Arab states — 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, but not the situation between Israel and the Palestinians. Not least because 
describing the situation between Israel and the Palestinians as a conflict is to disregard the distinction 
between the “occupier” and the “occupied.” Although this study continues to use the term, it should be 
noted that this author continues to view it with skepticism and uneasiness.   
• Galut: (He.) The Jewish Diaspora/Exile. 
• Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement, founded by Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 
1987 and is currently the second largest Palestinian party and the de facto ruler of  Gaza.   
• Intifada: (Ar.) Literally means shake-off  — the Palestinian uprising(s) against Israel’s occupation. There 
were two main Intifadas: the First Intifada 1987-1993 (the stones Intifada), and the Second Intifada 
2000-2005 (Al-Aqsa Intifada).  
• Israeli-Jew: A Jew who lives in Israel and/or holds Israeli citizenship or identify as Israeli and generally 
adheres to the Zionist worldview and ideology. It may not include Zionist Jews who are not Israelis or 
Israeli Jews who do not identify with Zionism such as the ultra-Orthodox groups Neturei Karta and Satmar 
Hasidim. When the term ‘Israeli’ only is used, it refers to the state bodies or policies, like saying: ‘Israeli 
policies, or Israeli army.’ This is a power structure that most non-Jews in Israel do not take part in. Those 
non-Jews are mostly Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and they represent 20% of  Israel’s population. 
Israel officially defines them as ‘Arab’ citizens of  Israel (MFA 2013).  They are the Palestinians who 3
 According to the Israeli Central Bureau of  Statistics (CBS) (2013), the ‘Arab’ population is approximately 1.658 million residents 3
(20.7% of  total population).
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remained in their homes after Israel’s establishment in 1948. The majority do not serve in the IDF and 
like the rest of  Palestinians, they consider Israeli-Jews foreign invaders (Rouhana 1997). 
• Isteshhadi: (Ar.) Literally ‘would-be-martyr’ — suicide bomber.  
• Likud: Israeli centre-right to right-wing political party, founded in 1973 and came to power in 1977 with 
Menachem Begin as prime minister. 
• Mechabel: (He.) Literally ‘saboteur’ — it generally means ‘terrorist’ and is used by Israel to describe 
Palestinian dissidence.   
• Meta-narrative / Master Narrative: The overarching national narrative that defines the common 
societal beliefs and the ideological and cultural infrastructure of  the state institutions.  
• Mizrachi: Jews who originated in the Middle East and North Africa (Oriental Jews / Arab Jews).  
• Muqawama: (Ar.) resistance, mainly to Israel’s occupation.  
• Nakba: (Ar.) The Palestinian exodus and dispossession of  1948. The word began to establish itself  
amongst Arabs in 1948 onwards as a means of  underscoring the gravity of  the hazima (defeat) (Manaa’ 
2013). It was broadly circulated by Arab nationalist Qustantine Zureiq in a pamphlet titled “the Meaning 
of  the Nakba” (1948). Ma’ajam Al-Ma’ani Arabic Lexicon (2016) defines it as “A painful catastrophe that 
befalls man’s family/clan, or fortune.” Today, however, it has become almost exclusively ‘a Palestinian 
word’ — usually preceded by a definite article al (the) — al Nakba. It has become an abridged word for a 
series of  disasters that commenced with the first Zionist Congress in 1897 and peaked in 1948, up until 
now. It suggests a ‘fierce unexpectedness’ on the part of  the Palestinians who failed to foresee the 
inevitability of  the Zionist project (Dawood 2011). In the Palestinian popular memory the Nakba 
commenced lamma ajjo al yahud (When the Jews came), to borrow the common expression of  the Nakba 
generation (Eqeiq 2011). 
• New Jew: The Zionist notion of  an independent, self-sufficient, and free Jew in a Jewish homeland.  
• Palestinian Authority (PA): The Palestinian administrative body governing parts of  the West Bank and 
Gaza, formed in the wake of  the Oslo Accords in 1994.  
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• Paradigm Shift: A radical change in or a challenge to the accepted belief  system. It is also reflected in 
the term ‘cognitive dissonance’ (see: Festinger 1957).  
• PLO: The Palestine Liberation Organisation, founded in 1964 as a coalition of  various Palestinian 
factions.   
• Power Asymmetry, Balance, Structure, Hierarchy: Refers to the steep disparity in military, political 
and economic power between Israel and the Palestinians.   
• Occupied Territories (OT) or Palestinian Territories (PT): The remainder of  historical Palestine 
that Israel occupied in 1967 -  Gaza and the West Bank.   
• Sabra: (He.) Arabicised Hebrew which means ‘cactus’ and refers to the rooted, tenacious Jew in the pre-
Israel Palestine. See: Yishuv below.  
• Shabak / Shin Bet: (He.) Israel’s Internal Security Agency.  
• Shaheed: (Ar.) Martyr, comes from Isteshhad or shahada (martyrdom).  
• Shoah: (He.) The Jewish Holocaust. Shoah is an ethnicised designation which defines the Holocaust with 
specifically Jewish dimensions. It is purely Jewish and purely secular (Novick 2000), or as Rosenfeld (1999) 
explains, it satisfies those who wish to retain an exclusive claim to “their” Holocaust. The word Holocaust, 
on the other hand, is ‘heavily connoted’ and not neutral (Ashcar 2010, p.13). In the Greek Old 
Testament Holocaust means ‘a burnt sacrificed offering dedicated exclusively to God’ (Evans 2001). The 
Jewish genocide, however, was not an expiatory offering to God, but rather a genocide ‘in the name of  
ethnic purity’ (ibid.; Kamins 2005; Aschar 2010). The term was also used by Churchill and some 
contemporary writers to refer to the Armenian genocide in the early twentieth-century (Fisk 2007; also 
see: Warsch 2006). Its universalist connotation makes it less suitable for the purpose of  this research.  The 4
term ‘Jewish genocide’ will occasionally be used.  
• UNRWA: UN Relief  and Work Agency, founded by the UN General Assembly in 1949 to aid Palestinian 
refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.  
 Most recently, the onslaught in Aleppo was also called a holocaust. Sky News [October 2016]: Aleppo mayor blames West for doing 4
nothing over 'holocaust' in city, BBC [Ancil & Young, November 2016]: Syrian conflict: Surgeon says life in Aleppo 'like a holocaust’, 
Time of  Israel [Sales 2016a]: Arab Israeli newscaster: Aleppo onslaught is ‘a holocaust’
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• We / Us / Ourselves: The Palestinian collective and is indicative of  the author’s positionality and 
reflexive input. When they is positioned against the we, us, or ourselves, it should mean Israel or Israeli-Jews. 
• I / me / myself: Variants of  the auto-ethnographic ‘I’ and are often used to indicate the author’s 
reflexive thoughts and auto-ethnographic unfolding of  personal experience in relation to the research 
question.  
• Yishuv: The Pre-state Jewish settler communities in Palestine (1882-1947).  
• Zionist Entity: Derogatory term from Arabic al-kayan al-sohiyoni, and is designed to question Israel’s 
legitimacy. The phrase emphasises Zionist, showing that the Arab rhetoric was against the Jewish state, 
not the Jewish presence (Tilley 2005).  Also, attaching ‘entity’ to ‘Zionist’ adds a sense of  temporariness 5
and rootlessness to Israel — a comforting notion for many Palestinians. In this research, ‘Zionist entity’ is 
only used if  quoted or cited, or if  needed for the context.  
TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION  
Several Arabic and Hebrew terms are used in this work. Some had already been translated and transliterated 
by other authors and are used as such. The rest are done by this author. Had an Arabic/Hebrew texts been 
translated by other authors that I was not aware of, it is possible that my phrasing and vocabulary would 
differ slightly, but the general meaning is likely to remain similar. The transliterated Arabic and Hebrew 
terms follow a simplified form of  romanisation,  no diacritics or special characters are used.   
  In fact, the expression ‘Zionist entity’ goes all the way back to 1917, and was first stated during a Friday prayer’s sermon by the 5






The purpose of  this study is to explore the role of  victimhood narratives in sustaining the intractability of  the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and consequently hindering settlement. In reviewing the literature, an overview of  
intractable conflict’s definitions, geo-political foundations, and socio-psychological nature is first provided. It 
is used as a means to better understand the landscape in which the narratives of  victimhood emerge and 
develop (Lederach 2005). The study then reviews and critiques the available yet limited scholarship on 
victimhood as a socio-psychological phenomenon. While the study benefits from the contributions of  several 
scholars, it more than others examines and critiques Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological work on intractable 
conflict, focusing mainly on collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations. These 
represent the broad framework through which the narratives of  collective victimhood are analysed (see Fig. 
a.1.0). The chapter thereupon proceeds to discussing the limitations in the current victimhood literature and 
how they are addressed in this study. Finally, a conclusion is provided reiterating the core literature and 
elaborating on the conceptual framework that will guide the thesis throughout.  
INTRACTABLE CONFLICT  
A large and growing body of  literature has investigated how and why conflicts occur and why some conflicts 
become intractable while others do not (Coleman and Goldman 2005). The literature, however, remains 
largely fragmented on the exact causes (Vallacher et al. 2010).  
Northrup (1989) maintains that some conflicts are likely to evolve over time, seeing changes that are either 
relatively idiosyncratic to each conflict situation, or may be conceived as occurring in a fixed sequence. This 
opinion is shared by Kriesberg (1991; 1998; 2011), who presented a ‘stage theory,’ pointing out that conflicts 
move through a series of  stages and acquire new characteristics (becoming protracted, violent, perceived as 
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irresolvable, and demands extensive investment) that may form a recurrent cycle whose outcome is the basis 
for a new conflict. Similarly, Azar (1986; Northrup 1989) criticises the international relations theory for its 
tendency to regard conflicts as discrete actions with clear delineated time period, implying that conflicts are 
subject to development and changes over time, and are therefore fluid.   
There seems to be a general agreement however that intractable conflicts are defined in terms of  persistency, 
longevity and destructiveness (Kriesberg 2005). Burton (1987, in: Coleman et al. 2014) referred to “deep 
rootedness” as key to intractability. Azar described ‘protracted social conflicts’ — a term he coined to refer to 
intractable conflicts — as “on-going and seemingly unresolvable” (Reimann 2002; Crocker et al 2004, p.191). 
Goertz and Diehl (1993) proposed the concept of  “enduring rivalry,” suggesting that intractability occurs as 
an outcome of  accumulative and persistent disputes between states.   
Deutsch (2002) defined intractable conflicts in terms of  incompatible activities, which Vallacher et al. (2013) 
described as preventing, obstructing, and injuring. According to Bar-Tal and Halperin (2013), conflicts break 
out when two or more groups believe that their goals or interests are in direct contradiction and decide to act 
on this basis. Hence the traditional belief  that resolving conflicts is realised through the elimination of  the 
incompatibilities between goals and interests. Such belief  may have been influenced by the literature from the 
realist schools of  political theory and international relations (e.g. Kennan 1951; Aron 1967). It defined 
conflict in terms of  ‘causal logic’ and downplayed the role of  beliefs, needs, and ethos. It attributed political 
behaviours to primarily conscious interests, which could to some extent help explain events like failed peace 
and instability (Mearsheimer 2001; Betts 2004; Sorgenfrei 2009). Frankel (1996, in: Legro & Moravscik 1999) 
suggested that material interests in this case constitute a fundamental ‘reality’ that exercises an exogenous 
influence on state behaviour no matter what states seek, believe, or construct.   
Vallacher et al. (2010) speculated that defusing a conflict is tantamount to eliminating the perceived 
incompatibility and creating conditions that foster common goals and values. This, in theory, suggests that a 
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conflict with no end in sight serves the interests of  very few people, drains both parties’ resources, wastes 
energy, and diminishes human capital. Therefore, it becomes urgent for the conflict parties to seek a solution 
by removing the incompatibilities. However, in practice, simply removing the incompatibilities may not truly 
end the conflict. Mitchell (2014) reflects that over the course of  a conflict what adversaries do to one another 
often widen the gap between them, causing the underlying incompatible goals to give rise to an additional set 
of  goals. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has gone through multiple phases since the late nineteenth-century, 
therefore the perceived incompatibilities have repeatedly begotten other incompatibilities, further 
complicating and occasionally redefining the original geo-political essence of  the conflict  
For the most part, antagonistic encounters stemming from incompatible interests and worldview(s) could be 
short-lived and run their course without causing irreparable damage to either party (Vallacher et al. 2010). 
Only a small number of  conflicts become excessively complex and, ultimately, intractable. Coleman (2011) 
argues that only five percent (out of  11,000 interstate rivalries between 1816-1992) become resistant to 
traditional methods of  conflict resolution and, therefore, intractable. Bercovitch, on the other hand, identified 
seventy-five serious interstate conflicts out of  309 occurring in the period of  1945-1995, which were violent 
and lasted for at least 15 years (2005, cited by Bar-Tal 2014, p.222). Regardless of  the difference in 
quantitative data, intractable conflicts tend to share common characteristics: long-lasting, enduring without 
cessation for years, and show no signs of  solution in the foreseeable future.   
GEO-POLITICAL TO SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRACTORS  
Overstepping the limitations in traditional literature on intractability and attempting to establish a unified 
meta-framework, several scholars have pushed for a dynamical approach to intractable conflict. Ricigliano 
(2011) proposed that intractable conflicts should be treated as complex systems similar to cells, ant colonies, 
or cities. The purpose is to help scholars move from a fragmented analysis to a more comprehensive 
understanding of  conflict and also generate a portable analysis that can be fed into strategy, program 
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development, and monitoring and evaluation. This approach was further substantiated by the introduction of  
the concept of  ‘attractors’ (Coleman 2003, Vallacher et al.2010, 2013), which referred to the interaction of  
both existing and new elements, which — together — created a higher level of  complexity in a conflict. As if  
to say that intractability occurs when many different conflict components collapse together into one mass, 
into one very simply ‘us versus them’ story that effectively resists change (Coleman 2011a, 2015). The more 
entwined elements a conflict comprises, reflects Peleg (2015), the more likely it will fall into intractability. In 
this case, intractable conflict acquires a new dimension where it can be further described as complex, 
dynamic, nonlinear system with a core set of  interrelated and mutually influential values (Coleman 2003).  
In the process of  developing the concept of  ‘attractors,’ Coleman (2003) identified fifty-six variables 
associated with the persistence of  destructive conflicts. These variables include but are not limited to political 
instability, power asymmetry, survival, dignity, deep symbolism and ideology, zero-sum collective identities, 
emotionality and trauma. Aiming to establish a unified system, Coleman in cooperation with Vallacher, 
Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska introduced the Dynamical Systems Theory (2009).  The theory’s central premise 
was to help individuals and institutions understand the relationship between elements which promote, 
sustain, or deepen conflicts, recognise patterns that lead us into or away from intractability, and reveal and 
influence the underlying forces that give rise to conflict. 
The dynamical system seems to suggest that some of  the essential features of  intractable conflicts  are indeed 
tangible and have a discernible causality. Other features, however, such as viewing the conflict as existential, 
irresolvable, and zero sum (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013a) are socio-psychologically driven and might not 
necessarily reflect the conflict geo-politics. This is in line with Northrup's (1989) original thoughts that most 
factors at all levels of  conflict have both subjective and objective components. Separating the external and the 
cognitive-emotional, he suggested, is an artificial distinction. Similarly, emphasising the dynamical nature of  
conflict as a basic starting point in conflict resolution, Mnookin and Ross (1999) suggested that a conflict has 
three interactive barriers: the tactical/strategic, the organisation/institutional/structural, and, more 
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importantly, the psychological. Burton (in: Kriesberg 1991) remarks that conflicts originally erupt over 
material resources and interests in which basic human needs such as identity and security become central to 
the conflict and their resolution. In Coleman’s view (2003), what initially starts off  as geo-political issues such 
as borders and security could under certain circumstances evolve into deep symbolic meanings and 
narratives. Put differently, over time a conflict acquires a socio-psychological character (Gray et al. 2007).  
Nowadays, acknowledging the dynamical, non-linear nature of  intractable conflict, several scholars began to 
adopt a dominantly socio-psychological approach to conflict studies. This is based on the general notion that 
to most people the socio-psychological landscapes of  intractable conflict feel terribly real. That is, as the 
conflict rages on, the psychological forces begin to take control, creating simplistic narratives about the 
conflict that are devoid of  nuance and serve to lock people into a rigid belief  system that might not 
correspond with the tangible, geo-political complexities on the ground (e.g. Vallacher et al. 2010; Coleman 
2011a; Kelman 2007, 2010; 2015; Bar-Tal 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009, 
2013; Halperin & Shavit 2015; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998; Bar-Tal & Rouhana 1998; Volkan 2001, 2004, 
2006, 2009, 2013a; Jones 2015).  
For Israeli-Jews and Palestinians, what started off  as a geo-political dispute has now become ladened with 
socio-psychological meanings. Ramsbotham (2011) speculates that those meanings and narratives, unlike the 
geopolitical interests, are ontological in nature and, therefore, non-negotiable. Think of  the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks as an example. Neither the negotiating parties nor the mediators seemed to fully appreciate the 
psychological burden of  ‘the other side.' Gross (2004) speculated that they merely attempted to solve some of  
the problems of  the 1967 disputes. Israel’s obsession with security and Palestinian ‘overpowering demands for 
justice’ (Peleg 2015) were generally understood within the limited terms of  geo-politics. This is hardly 
surprising considering that the negotiation methods of  the mid to late 1990s were influenced by the scholarly 
work of  the time — mainly the ‘principled negotiation theory’ (Fisher and Uri 1991) — which saw the 
success of  the negotiations in detaching the people from the conflict problems and focusing them on finding 
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mutual interests. This is an approach chiefly dependant on integrative or interest-based bargaining (Spangler 
2003). Aware of  these limitations, Rouhana (2004) has insisted on using ‘reconciliation’ instead of  
‘settlement’ or ‘agreement’ to emphasise the cognitive-emotional nature of  the Israeli-Palestinian relations 
and to stress — like others have hypothesised (see: Volkan 1985; Montville 2001; Coleman 2005; Staub 2006; 
Kelman 2008, 2010) — that a final status agreement may not necessarily bring about instant reconciliation. It 
would otherwise run counter to all historical experiences (Mertes & Khano 2013). 
VICTIMHOOD AS A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMIC  
Even with the acknowledgement of  the socio-psychological dynamics in conflict intractability, it remains 
difficult to generalise. Drawing on and developing Kriesberg’s conception of  intractable conflict 
characteristics, Bar-Tal (ibid., 2013a) explains that all these characteristics may evolve with time and each of  
them has its own pace of  development. Once they all appear the state of  intractability begins. Bar-Tal (2007) 
proposes that although the socio-psychological principles and dynamics seem similar, each intractable conflict 
has its unique context, content, and features. This also suggests that based on the conflict there may also be 
certain socio-psychological attractors more intense and dominant than others.  
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict victimhood is possibly one of  the most dominant socio-psychological 
attractors. There is indeed a good volume of  literature on victims and victimhood. However, traditionally but 
with few recent exceptions (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a/b; Noor et al. 2012; Vollhard 2012; Rimé et al. 2015; 
Noor et al. 2017; Bouchat et al. 2017), most of  the available literature did not view victimhood as a socio-
psychological phenomenon nor explored its collective dimension (e.g. collective memory, ethos, and emotions 
[Bar-Tal 2007]) in intractable conflict. Much of  the current scholarship seems occupied with objective 
victimhood, mostly viewing victims as synonymous with ‘physical harm’ (McDowell 2007). The Oxford 
Dictionary Online (2016), for example, defines a ‘victim’ as “a person harmed, injured, or killed as a result of  
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a crime, accident, or other event or action.” Similarly, in Collins English Dictionary Online (2016) a victim is 
defined as a person or thing that suffers harm, death…from another or from some adverse act.   
The first type of  physical harm is one viewed as caused by natural disasters (Confino 2005). A victim in this 
case is mostly defined in terms of  the deprivation of  basic human needs (see: Azar & Burton 1986; 
Ramsbotham et al. 2011) and the approach to him/her is usually humanitarian. The second type of  physical 
harm is where victims are targets of  structural and direct violence. This entails a clear-cut victim-perpetrator 
dyad and where the victim is often innocent and without agency. This is typically present in narratives 
regarding colonialism, slavery, terrorism, racism, and  genocide (Christie 1986; Bayley 1991; Meister  2002; 
Govier 2015)  and is believed to have been partly motivated and influenced by the increasing focus on human 6
rights and trauma (Noor et al. 2017).  
There is also the fact that the basic unit of  exploration and analysis in the dominant victimhood literature 
seems to be centred on the first-hand victims and their individual experiences (Bouchat et al. 2017). This may 
have had its roots in victimology and psychiatry where the focus was on the needs of  particular groups of  
‘vulnerable’ victims, such as the victims of  crimes, women and children who experienced domestic violence, 
abuse, or have been sexually assaulted (van der Kolk 1989; Zur 1994; Garkawe 2004; Dignan 2005).   7
Dealing with victimhood as mainly an individual occurrence or a product of  physical harm, however, leaves 
so much to be desired in our understanding of  victimhood in intractable conflict, not least because the victim 
is and should be viewed as a multidisciplinary subject (Jacoby 2014) with deep ties with the in-group’s 
collective memory and the conflict ethos, cognitive appraisals and emotional response tendencies (Bar-Tal 
2007, 2013; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011). 
 See next chapter for details. 6
 See next chapter for details. 7
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While not denying the tangible, geo-political events that initiated the feelings of  victimisation, the focus is 
primarily on victimhood as an experience-based dynamic (Bouchat et al. 2017). One way to view it, as a 
concept and practice (attitudes, behaviours, and perceptions), victimhood has a meaning primarily within the 
context of  human relations (Kelman 2008), which Zur (1994) further argues, happens within the context of  a 
certain environment or culture. Challenging the stereotypical ‘rationality’ narratives in the study of  world’s 
politics (Tetlock 1998) where victims are the product of  tangible circumstances, victims in conflict can also be 
affected by intangible experience related to identity, trauma, loss of  security, and even — speculates Confino 
(2005) — loss of  the old self. In other words, Garkawe (2004) sees, victimhood is not only an objective 
occurrence, but is also based on a subjective experience. This premise has encouraged some scholars to shift 
much of  their attention to the experienced events in their study of  victimisation. Aquino & Byron (2002), for 
instance, referred to ‘self-perception of  having been the target of  harmful actions.’ This at the very least 
suggests that a socio-psychological view of  victimhood should be concerned — as a basic starting point — 
with how victims perceive themselves ‘as victims,’ not only as others see or define them. Accepting that 
premise has induced a significant psychological dimension to the conceptualisation of  victimhood. Zur 
(1994), for instance, emphasised elements in victims’ psychology that emerge as a result of  the harmful 
action, such as the feeling of  helplessness and hopelessness, self-pity, low self-esteem, guilt, distrust, and loss 
of  sense of  control.  
  
Using the above as a point of  departure, it can be argued that since victimhood is largely a socio-
psychological dynamic, its role in intractable conflict may belong to those psychological-hypothetical 
constructs, which reside in the human mind, as other beliefs and feelings are (Bar-Tal and Jacobson 1998). 
This leads one to assume that there may not actually be a close correlation between the ‘tangible’ indicators 
of  victimisation (e.g. the degree of  physical harm) often associated with the history of  a specific group and 
‘perceptual’ victimisation held in the narratives that shape collective memory and which can easily distort 
reality. The connection between victimhood and tangible social reality, scilicet, may be indirect and 
metaphorical (Baumesiter & Hastings 1997, in: Bouchat et al. 2017; Assmann & Conrad 2010; Rimé et al. 
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2015). Above all, as it will be elaborated on in the next sections, this premise allows one to view victimhood or 
the perceptions of  victimisation more broadly and deeply by tying it to collective memory, ethos, and 
emotional responses that are both byproducts and attractors of  intractable conflict.  
VICTIMHOOD IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT  
The above assumptions have informed and motivated several discussions and theorisations about 
victimisation in the Israeli-Palestinian context (e.g. Falk 1993, 2004; Ochs 2006; Rose 2007; Enns 2007, 2012; 
Burg 2008, 2014; Navon 2009, 2015; Pappé 2010; Benbassa 2010; Noor et al. 2012; Vollhard 2012; Peleg 
2015; Gratch 2015; Noor et al. 2017). Only few scholars — each with their own agendas and intellectual 
orientations — struck close to home (of  victimhood) as intended in this study or introduced a certain socio-
psychological context that could aide the development of  the research question. The most important 
contributions came from Daniel Bar-Tal. However, to advance the understanding of  victimhood in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this study also draws some inspiration from Kelman’s early observations on 
identity and Volkan’s conception of  ‘chosen trauma.’ These add to Bar-Tal’s broad and encompassing socio-
psychological framework, particularly in regard to collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional 
orientations, which will largely guide this study. 
Kelman: negative identity   
In line with the growing literature on the dynamical nature of  intractable conflict (see above), Kelman argued 
for the subjective aspects of  conflicts and their impact upon conflict resolution (Kelman 2007, 2008), 
emphasising that the socio-psychological methods were especially effective once the conflict has taken its 
course. Like Coleman (2003) and also in keeping with Burton’s basic human needs theory (1990), he claimed 
that in conflict the psychological forces would seem more fundamental than the material ones and, therefore, 
the conflict becomes inescapable from the daily lives of  the conflicting parties. This is a notion that Bar-Tal 
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and Halperin (2009) later identified as the “culture of  conflict” and Volkan (2006, 2013b) incorporated into 
his ‘large-group identity.’  
Kelman’s thoughts on conflict identity are of  a particular interest. Based on his involvement in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, he maintained that the collective identity of  each group in the conflict was bolstered by 
national narratives that are reliant on threat and the negation of  the other’s identity (Kelman 1999). This is 
particularly true when each people’s collective identities are woven into their ‘sense of  victimhood’ (see: Bar-
Tal et al. 2009b). Kelman described that as ‘negative interdependence’  (Kelman 1987, 1999), viz., a victim 8
identity is only valid if  the opponent’s victim identity is not. In different ways, he says, both Palestinians and 
Israeli-Jews have lived on the edge of  national oblivion. The themes of  destruction, physical annihilation, and 
nonexistence play a central role in their national self-image, (Kelman 1987, p.354) and ultimately their sense 
of  collective identity. When positioned against the opponent’s identity, society members’ desire to be 
identified as victims becomes even more profound (Marker 2003). Think of  the Palestinian Nakba narratives; 
the fact that they are ignored or denied by Israel makes Palestinian cling to them even more and increasingly, 
if  not existentially, become the trademark for a legitimate, exalted victim identity. Stretching Kelman work 
outside its ostensible boundaries, it may also be argued that victim identity locks the parties into a 
reactive  narcissism  that prevents them from seeing the others’ suffering (Schimel et al. 2001 & Stosny 
2010).  This is regulated through ego-defence mechanisms such as denial, rationalisation, self  
aggrandisement, and sense of  entitlement (Brown 1997; see: Bar-Tal’s framework below). The result is 
possibly more obstacles to settlement.  
Because Kelman mainly focused on the psychological underpinnings of  national identities for conflict 
resolution purposes, he seemed to disregard some of  the fundamental differences between the two peoples’ 
narratives, at least in terms of  history and the conflict power hierarchy. This influenced Kelman’s 
conceptualisation of  identity in several ways. Accepting that both peoples have equal responsibility in the 
 The term ‘negative identity’ is also used in this work to refer to the same concept. 8
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making of  their negative identity may suggest that the cognitive-emotional evaluations of  the conflict, much 
less those connected to collective memory, are equal. The overall psychological perception of, say, the Nakba 
and the Shoah as chosen traumas (e,g, Volkan 2001, 2004) may produce similar cognitive appraisals and 
accordingly elicit specific emotional response tendencies such as distrust, fear, anger, or hatred (Lazarus 1991; 
Frijda et al., 2000; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011). However, the hierarchal nature of  the 
conflict suggests that the experiences of  Israeli-Jews and Palestinians are significantly different and, therefore, 
the cognitive and emotional evaluations and responses are, too, different — some are more salient than 
others. Fear may steer Israel’s security (see: Bar-Tal 2001), but for Palestinians the feelings of  humiliation are 
probably more dominant (see Chapter Seven). There is also the fact that when Kelman highlighted the role 
of  negative identity in hindering conflict resolution he did not pinpoint what exactly in that identity that 
primarily impeded conflict resolution, a limitation that Volkan and, specifically Bar-Tal, each in their own 
way, sought to address.  
Volkan: chosen trauma and trans-generational transmission   
Like Kelman, Volkan did not specifically focus on victimhood as an overarching signifier in his 
conceptualisations of  intractable conflicts. He, nevertheless, established trauma as an important context 
through which the socio-psychological dynamics of  conflict, and by default victimhood, may be viewed, 
studied, and analysed.  
There is abundant literature on trauma in a large spectrum of  topics, especially in the fields of  clinical 
psychology and psychoanalysis. That includes but is not limited to natural disasters (e.g. Escobar et al., in: 
Elliot 1997), child sexual abuse and the resulting suppressed or false memories (e.g. Williams 1994; Elliot 
1997), physical assault (e.g. Resnick et al. 1998), and post-traumatic stress disorder relating to armed conflicts 
and political distress/processes (see: e.g. Fassin & Rechtman 2009). Volkan’s overview of  trauma is not in its 
overall approach unique. However, its inclusion of  the social context and the transition from the classic 
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individual-based trauma to the examination of  the collective trauma has created a broader context through 
which the various manifestations of  victimhood can be studied.   
Taking Kelman’s hypotheses on identity to the next level, Volkan (2001, 2013b) has formed the concept of  
large-group identity. The term is possibly a re-utilisation of  the “large group” from the literature of  
psychoanalysis (e.g. Freud 1921).  But in Volkan’s work, large-group identity refers to a collective subjective 9
experience of  tens of  thousands or millions of  people, who share certain feelings of  sameness. The main task 
of  the members of  that large-group is to protect and maintain their group identity. To Volkan, a ‘chosen 
trauma,’ represent a primary component in the formation of  that identity. 
Volkan (2001, 2004, 2013a, 2013b; also see: Ainslie 2015) defined ‘chosen trauma’ as the shared mental 
representation of  a massive trauma that the group's ancestors suffered at the hand of  an enemy. When a 
large group regresses, its chosen trauma is reactivated in order to support the group's threatened identity. 
This reactivation may have dramatic and destructive consequences. The possibility of  reactivation suggests 
that a ‘chosen trauma’ is tightly entwined with the collective emotional orientations of  society (see: Bar-Tal 
2001, 2007, 2013a) and is therefore never completely dormant. Volkan argued that this is due to the inability 
of  the group to mourn its past, being virtually stuck in what Bar-Tal came to call the ‘freezing of  beliefs’ (Bar-
Tal 2001). In point of  fact, this was the essence of  Israeli-Jewish psychoanalyst Avner Falk’s thesis (1993, 
1996, 2004). He argued that Israel’s victim mentality may have been a result of  the Jewish people’s inability 
to mourn or reconcile with the past. In order to overcome the socio-psychological barriers in conflict, the 
group needs to properly mourn the past and learn to see their identity in a new light and in a new 
 When Sigmund Freud (1921) imparted his theory of  large group psychology, he did not specifically use the term ‘identity’; instead, 9
he used the term ‘ego ideal.’ Freud’s theory nevertheless was based on his observation that large-group dynamics paralleled those seen 
during an individual’s oedipal phase. Freud dealt primarily with leader-follower interactions, from which he concluded that any 
hostility between a member of  a large group and its leader had to be transformed by other members into a type of  loyalty to the 
leader. Just as a son identifies with his father once the oedipal conflict has been resolved, the group members identify with the 
‘idealised’ leader as a superego figure. The members of  the group are then connected to one another through their devotion to that 
leader. Following Freud, psychoanalysts continued to write about large groups from the perspective of  what the group means to the 
individual. For Volkan, the narratives of  shared traumas (or triumphs) provided points of  strong collective identification. [see: Volkan 
2001]
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relationship with the other (Rosenberg 2003). Mourning can be particularly difficult if  the group is still 
involved in an intractable conflict. 
A significant feature of  a ‘chosen trauma’ is its ability to be transmitted trans-generationally. The sense of  
victimisation associated with that trauma is usually passed down from generation to generation, regardless of  
whether a person has physically experienced any trauma themselves. ‘Trans-generational transmission’  may 
have its roots in Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham’s Children in War (1943, cited by Fromm 2012, p.102), 
which showed that during the London Blitz, children whose mothers were traumatised by the experience 
developed trauma symptoms themselves.  In Killing in the Name of  Identity (2006), Volkan called this process 10
the “depositing” of  own injured self-image into the child. 
Since trauma can be transmitted historically and experienced vicariously, it stands to reason to assume that 
the desire for redemption too can travel from generation to generation. For victims, redemption is meant to 
reverse the course of  history and right the historical wrongs, at least symbolically (as in the case of  
commemorations). Because this is carried on across generations, it becomes a national consciousness and 
identity. But redemption also involves the victim seeking to hold the perpetrator accountable. Whilst this can 
take the form of  legal actions, remedies, and compensations, it may also materialise as aggressive measures 
not necessarily against the original victimiser, but anyone who would pose a threat or minimise one’s 
historical suffering (e.g. Mamdani 2001). In other words, adding a further dimension to Volkan’s conception 
of  ‘chosen trauma,’ the desire to redeem the self  or one’s group may develop into actions that would turn the 
historical victims into victimisers. Drawing examples from the former 1990s Yugoslavia, several scholars (e.g. 
Anzulovic 1999; Gödl 2007; Stockdale 2009; Volkan 2013a, 2014) argued that the Serbs’ collective memory 
 Freud and Burlingham showed in their influential book, Children in War (1943) — based on their experiences in three of  WWII's 10
War nurseries in England for the Foster Parents — that during the London Blitz, nursery-age children whose mothers were 
traumatised by the experience developed trauma symptoms themselves, whereas this was not the case for children whose mothers 
were able to serve as ‘protective shields’ despite the severe nature of  the threat. The authors thus demonstrated that the potential 
effects of  trauma were mediated by human relations. They hypothesised that whenever certain essential needs are not fulfilled (as in 
the cases of  conflict or war), lasting psychological malformations will be the consequence. These essential elements are: the need for 
personal attachment, for emotional stability, and for permanency of  educational influence. Freud and Burlingham’s findings and 
speculations contributed to the understanding of  the problems of  the children of  Shoah survivors which began to appear in academic 
studies nearly thirty years later. [see: Fromm 2012]
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of  the 1389 Battle of  Kosovo — and later the traumatic events during World War II — added to the Serbian 
extreme nationalism which ignited the wars and led to horrendous acts of  revenge, mass killings and ethnic 
cleansing. Similarly, Mamdani’s significant work on the Rwandan genocide When Victims Become Killers (2001) 
has provided a deep insight into the ethics and consequences of  a traumatising history, and presented a 
remarkable perspective on how victims become victimisers. Mamdani asked (p. 34), “…What happens when 
yesterday’s victims act out of  determination that they must never again be victimised? What happens when 
yesterday’s victims act out of  a conviction that power is the only guarantee against victimhood?  
Capturing this insight, this study takes Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma’ a step further by investigating the victim-to-
victimiser dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” There is undeniably a good volume of  literature on 
the Shoah as a ‘chosen trauma’ for the Jewish people and its implications for Israel’s victimhood claims (e.g. 
Segev 1993; Niroumand 1995; Rosenfield 1999; Zertal 2005; Ochs 2006; Alam 2009; Navon 2009, 2015; 
Benbassa 2010; Ofer 2013; Miller 2014). As a matter of  fact, much of  the literature on trauma trans-
generational transmission mainly comes from the studies on the Jewish Shoah survivors and their offspring (e.g. 
Volkan 2013b; e.g. Bar-On & Chaitlin 2001; Zerubavel 2002; Fromm 2012). However, most of  it emanates 
from Israeli-Jewish, Jewish, or Western sources, which probably means that the study of  victim-to-victimiser 
dynamics have been limited in the scope of  exploration and level of  analysis (Noor et al. 2012).  
To this author’s knowledge, not many Palestinian scholars, if  any, capitalised on Volkan’s conceptions to 
examine the Palestinian victimhood narratives outside the perpetrator-victim dyad. Being ‘professional 
sufferers,’ as described by Volkan (2013a, p.61), many Palestinians give little thought to their own agency. The 
ability to hurt Israel has often been kept within the ‘ideal victim’ status (Christie 1986), blinding many of  us 
to the fact that we too can at times step outside our victim status quo to become perpetrators. The victim-to-
victimiser potential can also aid our discernment of  the future and allow us to hypothesise as to what happens 
if  the balance of  power in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shifted (see Chapter Seven: Ethos about 
Muqawama).  
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Volkan's thoughts are essential for understanding historical victimhood. By labelling trauma as ‘chosen,’ it 
may encompass two aspects of  the collective memory of  victimisation: first, ’chosen’ as an anchor point in a 
traumatic collective memory that continues to orient the cognitive-emotional dimension of  today’s conflict (as 
in conflict ethos), and second, ’chosen’ in the sense of  being a conscious instrumentalisation of  memory for 
political gains. This duality continues to be examined as the study unpacks Israel’s victimhood narratives in 
particular.   
Because Volkan’s thoughts are most focused on the relationship between the original trauma and the group’s 
current psychological make-up and identity, little attention is given to the actual process of  traumatisation 
and victim identity construction. Bar-Tal’s work seems to have addressed some aspects of  this ‘processual gap’ 
by crafting an encompassing socio-psychological framework, focusing primarily on collective memory, conflict 
ethos, and collective emotional orientations, and with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in mind. 
Bar-Tal: collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations  
In the history of  social psychology very few scholars have contributed as much to a scientific understanding 
of  intergroup conflict and group dynamics as Daniel Bar-Tal. For nearly 40 years, his writings have helped 
illuminate some of  the darkest recesses of  collective belief  and behaviour (Jost et al. 2015, p. 47). Bar-Tal’s 
characterisation of  ‘intergroup conflict’ is broad enough to encompass concepts such as, security, oppression, 
military occupation, discrimination, and stereotyping. His work in many ways began with a simple but 
powerful assumption that emerged from the classical social psychological work of  scholars like Sherif  and 
Lewin (1936, 1947, in: ibid.), which revolved around the idea of  shared societal beliefs that motivate 
prejudice, conflict, and war.   
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Not only did Bar-Tal embrace some of  the existing definitions of  intractable conflict, he significantly 
expanded and developed them. In addition to the Kriesberg’s four features of  intractable conflict (1993 in: 
Bar-Tal 2007, 1998) — protracted, violent, perceived as irresolvable, and demand extensive investment — 
Bar-Tal (2007, 2013) proposed three more: total, central, and perceived as zero-sum. These features are 
patent forces that move the conflict, energise it, maintain it, and prevent its resolution (Bar-Tal 2013). Some 
of  them may fully or partly apply to most intergroup conflicts, but in the Israeli-Palestinian case — for 
reasons related to the conflict unique structural and perceptual characteristics (see: Bar-Tal and Rouhana 
1998) — centrality, totality and zero-sum have deeper meanings especially for the in-group’s social identity 
construction (Kelman 1987; see also: Tajfel & Turner 1986). 
Bar-Tal (1998, 2000a, 2007, 2013) interprets the conflict collective beliefs within the framework of  ‘shared 
societal beliefs,’ which he defines as cognitions shared by society members on topics and issues that are of  
special concern for their society and contribute to their sense of  uniqueness. These form a socio-
psychological repertoire, which is eventually institutionalised and disseminated to become a ‘socio-
psychological infrastructure’ through which society members view and cope with the conflict.  
Bar-Tal (2013) argues that after an extended period of  time when society members have fully absorbed these 
beliefs, they begin to believe that they are leading a ‘normal life.’ He calls this the ‘normalisation’ and 
‘routinisation’ of  conflict. In the literature of  social psychology ’normalisation’ and ‘routinisation’ is a 
recognised phenomenon, and is known for making the conflict resistant to solution (Franks 2004; Capelos et 
al. 2014). Routinisation, adds Bar-Tal (2007, 2013, also see: 2001), allows society members to live in a chronic 
state of  fear with a facade of  normality. Israeli-Jews, for instance, attempting to fulfil their basic psychological 
needs for safety, knowledge, and positive identity (Burton 1990; Kelman 2007, 2008), use the Shoah and Jewish 
history of  persecution as an epistemic basis that provides justification for the conflict and its development. 
However, because the conflict has permeated all strata of  society and became a routinised system, the old 
traumas become normalised and then institutionalised, leaving little room for scrutiny. This process is purely 
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psychological as it depends on the evolution of  belief  that is not always based on reality and not necessarily 
used in the right context (Bar-Tal 2013).  
Importantly, in Bar-Tal’s conceptual framework, the socio-psychological infrastructure is broken down into 
three parts: collective memory, conflict ethos and collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2000b, 
2007, 2013; also: Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013). These should represent the core framework for this study.  
• Collective memory: Bar-Tal views collective memory as part of  the meta-narrative of  a nation and in 
terms of  its relation with what he calls ‘national ethos.’ He argues that the societal beliefs of  collective 
memory — popular or official — do not necessarily reflect the actual historical events, but they are 
socially constructed narratives which have some basis in reality, but provide a biased account of  history 
that fits the current needs of  society in conflict (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2007, 2013). This effectively establishes the 
difference between historical truth and narrative truth (Spence 1982). On top of  justifying the eruption 
and continuation of  violence, and presenting a positive self-image of  the in-group and demonising the out-
group, collective memory also emphasises the sense of  collective victimisation. Bar-Tal’s (2007, 2013) 
explains that collective memory makes Palestinians and Israeli-Jews view the conflict as black and white — 
a pure victim or a complete perpetrator. Possibly building on Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma,’ he advances the 
traumatic memories of  the Shoah and the Nakba as original markers for the victimhood narratives.  
Highlighting collective memory’s negative implications for peacemaking, Bar-Tal (2013, p.141) remarks 
that when a society relies on the past chronically and centrally, collective memory directs the focus on the 
past without providing an ability to evaluate properly the present and plan the future. It clouds judgement 
and evaluation of  the present and preparation for the future. Irwin-Zarecka (1994, cited by Cairns & Roe 
2002) once said that time collapses in a context in which historical accounts have not been settled. The 
passage of  time in this case may actually serve to increase the sense of  grievance especially in societies 
involved in conflict.  
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• Conflict ethos: When the past memory is manifested as narratives about the present, this is called 
‘ethos’ (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2000b, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Ethos provides the epistemic basis for the 
hegemonic social consciousness of  society. In conflict-inflicted societies, ethos supplies orientation, 
direction, and meaning for the in-group members. To make society members capable of  dealing with 
protracted conflict, Bar-Tal et al. (2009a, p.95) argue, ethos functions as an ideology that constitutes a basis 
for the perception and interpretation of  reality. This also suggests it influences the policies and decision-
making processes of  society leaders and institutions.  
Bar-Tal (2000a, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009a/b) identified eight themes that characterise conflict ethos: 
justness of  one’s goals; security; patriotism; unity; positive collective self-image; one’s own victimisation; de-
legitimising the opponent; and peace. Each one of  these themes has a unique content and adds to the 
holistic orientations about the conflict. Nevertheless, it may be proposed that some of  Bar-Tal’s ethos 
themes can be codependent depending on the context of  study and the nature of  conflict. It also stands to 
reason to assume that in different contexts different themes are more dominant or interrelated than others. 
As it will become evident in Chapter Six, security is dealt with as a manifestation of  victimisation and not 
an independent theme by itself. Throughout, victimhood is approached as a primary driving force for 
social cohesion and unity, and patriotism is seen as defined by threat and therefore an extension of  the 
security ethos. Bar-Tal did not propose a specific order in which these themes emerge, which possibly 
suggests that their temporal, physical, and psychological interconnectedness is bound by context.   
• Collective emotional orientations: In intractable conflict, explains Bar-Tal (2007), emotions can be 
collectively experienced and may add to the conflict complexity. Mitchell (1989) explicitly refers to 
emotions as a primary factor in conflict’s aggravation, and Bodtker & Jameson (2001) maintain that to be 
in conflict is to be emotionally charged. This has led Halperin and Pliskin (2015) to emphasise that there is 
indeed such thing as ‘emotional reality’ that drive people’s actions and perceptions in a conflict situation.  
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Subject to context, like memory and ethos themes, some emotions are more salient than others. In the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bar-Tal identified collective fear as a primary aversive emotion (2007). In an 
earlier paper, “How Fear Overrides Hope…” (2001), Bar-Tal explained that Israeli-Jews, because of  their 
collective memory of  trauma and the current conflict ethos, tend to share an acute collective awareness of  
threat, which has led to an almost permanent aggressive defensive posture. It is suggested that when the 
emotions of  fear are too strong, they act as a filter for information processing (Clore & Huntsinger 2007). 
This notion has led Schwarz & Clore (2013) to formulate the feelings-as-information theory to describe 
how emotions are used as ‘perceptual filters’ (Wendt  net al. 2012) for social reality.   
  
What distinguishes Bar-Tal from the crowd of  social psychology is that his socio-psychological infrastructure 
is quite versatile and encompassing that it allowed for the development of  the concept of  collective 
victimhood. His current work is a development of  an earlier conceptualisation that he called the Masada 
Syndrome (1986, in: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992b). It is a societal belief  stating that the rest of  the world has highly 
negative behavioural intention toward the in-group. In 1992, when the study of  collective victimhood was 
limited and sporadic, Bar-Tal and Antebi introduced the notion of  ‘siege mentality’ in order to explain the 
historical context and implications of  Jewish victimhood. ‘Siege mentality’ is a collective state of  mind 
whereby a group of  people think of  themselves as constantly attacked, oppressed, or isolated by the negative 
intentions of  a hostile world (Christie 2011, p.997). These beliefs are given a high validity and considered to 
be as true (Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a, 1992b). Attributing it to the Jewish collective memory and the current 
conflict, Bar-Tal maintained that the expressions of  ‘siege mentality’ are so rooted in the Israeli-Jewish society 
that they can be found in almost all forms of  narrative: academia, literature, films, journalism, and the Israeli 
educational system (Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992b). To him, being isolated and, by default, feeling victimised have 
serious emotional and behavioural implications for the society involved in conflict as well as the international 
community. Distrust, biased information filtering, and hyper sensitivity to criticism are amongst these 
implications (ibid., pp. 265-269). 
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In 2009, Bar-Tal cooperated with Chernyak-Hai, Schori, and Gundar (2009b) to publish a socio-
psychological study specifically focused on the conception of  collective victimhood. It was presumably the 
most detailed account to date. The study titled: “A Sense of  Self-Perceived Collective Victimhood In 
Intractable Conflicts,” for the most part drew from and built on Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework of  
collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal 2000a; 2004; 2007; 2013). 
Victimhood, the study argued, emerges as a major theme in the ethos of  conflict and is a fundamental part of  
the collective memory thereof, and is typically reflected in society’s emotional and behavioural responses. The 
study mentions that victimisation can indeed be the product of  physical harm or be experienced on the 
individual level (see above), but in many cases it is rooted in the realisation of  harm experienced. This means 
that numerous aspects of  victimhood emerge as a cognitive construction of  the situation in which the harm is 
inflicted, hence ‘self-perceived.’ Bar-Tal and colleagues suggested that the personal perception of  being a 
victim is not usually enough; it requires social recognition (see next chapter: status givers). Once one has been 
perceived as victim by society members or its institutions, she/he becomes an official victim. In intractable 
conflict this is a collective process (see also: Rimé et al. 2015; Bouchat et al. 2017; Noor 2017). More 
importantly, being of  psychological and political benefits, groups usually seek to maintain or even 
instrumentalise their victim status.  
As a socio-psychological construct, explained the authors, perceiving one’s group as a victim in conflict has 
serious impacts on how groups view the conflict in which they are involved. Societal beliefs about victimhood 
(see also: Bar-Tal 1998, 2001, 2007, 2013) help society members cope with and make sense of  the conflict, 
strengthen convictions about justness of  one’s goals, deepen siege mentality, inculcate egocentrism, 
superiority and lack of  empathy, influence information processing, reduce group-based guilt, and provide 
moral justifications. These impacts are largely similar to those found in Bar-Tal’s conflict ethos themes. This 
is probably due to the interrelated aspects in conflict’s socio-psychological foundations. Bar-Tal does not 
46
suggest a certain order for these impacts or elaborate on the causal relation between, say, siege mentality and 
victimhood, or why group-based guilt is an impact by itself  and not part of  egocentrism and lack of  empathy.  
As far as this study is concerned, there are a few things that require our attention in regard to Bar-Tal and 
colleagues’ study of  victimhood and — by extension — Bar-Tal’s conceptualisation of  collective memory, 
conflict ethos, and emotional orientations:   
• Bar-Tal and colleagues’ paper (2009b) is new and ambitious. It capitalised on Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological 
framework and to some extent drew from Volkan’s conceptions of  ‘chosen trauma’ to explain victimhood 
as a conflict attractor (see: Coleman 2003; Vallacher et al.  2010, 2013). Resultantly, the conceptual specifics 
— and difficulties — of  victimhood itself, as well as the examples used were introductory at best. The 
conceptual difficulties of  victimhood are elaborated on and analysed in the next chapter.  
• Intractable conflicts, as it was hypothesised by Bar-Tal (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2013) and re-emphasised by Bar-
Tal and colleagues (2009b), share similar socio-psychological characteristics, but each conflict is different. 
So it stands to reason to assume that the victimhood narratives (and manifestations) that emerge in these 
conflicts are, too, different. In this study, by focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict— in addition to 
examining victimhood narratives’ role in intractability — the aim is also to highlight the contextual 
specifics and perceptions of  victimisation in this conflict.   
• Importantly, Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework [also in: Bar-Tal & colleagues 2009b] approaches 
collective victimhood as a major theme in the ethos of  conflict (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013). This 
implies two things: first, that victimhood is only a symptom of  intractable conflict and, second, that 
victimhood is a self-contained unit. This study suggests that indeed victimhood is a significant theme in the 
conflict ethos but is not always a mere symptom. Jews came to Palestine already burdened with traumatic 
memories, history of  persecution, and a sense of  insecurity. The conflict with the Palestinians did not 
47
instigate the Israeli-Jewish sense of  victimhood, but it rather — repeatedly — confirmed and added to it 
and over time perpetuated it as a pronounced conflict ethos. The second argument is that victimhood is a 
fluid phenomenon expressed in multiple manifestations — which themselves are narrative expressions — 
and not necessarily a self-contained, closed unit. This study suggests that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Israeli-Jewish security, fear, guilt, shame, and Palestinian feelings of  humiliation, notions about martyrdom 
and muqawama, and the fear of  being forgotten are all — to varying degrees and subject to circumstances 
— manifestations of  victimhood. These manifestations may exist in other conflicts, but in the Israeli-
Palestinian context they appear to be more pronounced possibly because of  the unique geo-political and 
psychohistorical dimensions of  the conflict itself  (see: Bar-Tal and Rouhana 1998). 
• Bar-Tal provided a good insight into emotions in intractable conflict and the emotional components of  
victimhood as a result. But there seems to be some categorical separation between the three socio-
psychological infrastructure themes of  which emotional orientations is part. This can be found in many of  
Bar-Tal’s publications (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Halperin et al. 2008). In a paper 
titled: “Collective Memory as Social Representations” (2014), Bar-Tal attempted to address the issue of  
categorical separation by highlighting the connection between collective memory and emotions. He argued 
that collective memory serves as a foundation for shared emotions, and therefore may invoke collective 
emotional orientations. This endeavour, however, was very brief.   
One of  the points of  departure in this study is that Bar-Tal’s three infrastructure themes should be viewed 
as closely and tightly intermingled. Approaching victimhood as a socio-psychological product requires that 
the relationship between collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations be further 
utilised and unpacked. The connection between collective memory and emotions is of  a particular 
importance in the development of  this work’s argument. Inspired by some of  the thoughts common in the 
‘appraisal tendency framework,’ this study assumes that each emotion is defined by a core appraisal (Han 
et al. 2007; Keltner & Lerner 2010), or, in other words, defined by a specific context (Halperin et al. 2011). 
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A group involved in intractable conflict would appraise whether an event or situation is congruent or 
incongruent with their current societal beliefs (that steer their collective emotional orientations) (Keltner & 
Lerner 2010; see: e.g. Bar-Tal 1998, 2001, 2007, 2013) and then — accordingly — form a corresponding 
emotional response. Primarily ascribed to Jewish collective memory, fear is a powerful force in Israel’s 
‘emotional climate’ (De Rivera 1992) and is therefore quickly evoked and heightened when Israeli-Jews are 
faced by what they perceive as threatening cues in the conflict with the Palestinians or in relation to the 
surrounding countries or the world (Bar-Tal 2007). The above should contribute to the analysis of  the 
relationship between Israel’s ‘hyper security’ and Jewish collective memory (of  victimisation). Also, based 
on the assumption that specific emotions give rise to specific cognitive and motivational processes, the study 
argues that each emotion has a certain effect upon judgement and decision-making (Keltner & Lerner 
2001, 2010; Han et al. 2007), and can shape beliefs (Frijda et al. 2000). Fear influences judgement of  
certainty and risk, and may create ‘cognitive distortions.’ Practically, this should lead to anxious, fight-or-
flight decision-making process, a response tendency characterised by avoidance and the desire to create a 
safe environment (Bar-Tal 2001; Halperin et al. 2011). Israel’s extreme security and preemptive military 
actions are the result (see Chapter Six). 
• A critical limitation in Bar-Tal work and perhaps the majority of  studies on victimhood (Bar-Tal et al. 
[2009b] included) is the insufficient attention to the context of  power structure (Rouhana & Fiske 1995). 
Rouhana (2004) observes that conflicts are often analysed regardless of  the power relations of  the parties’ 
involved in them. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prototypical example of  a visibly asymmetrical type 
of  intractable conflict (Elcheroth & Spini 2015), one that defines Israel’s relationship with the Palestinian in 
terms of  dominance and control (Rouhana & Bar-Tal 1998; Rouhana 2004; Galo & Marzano 2009; 
Baukhol 2015). Typically, the two parties have differential access to resources and formal institutions and 
use different societal mechanisms to maintain the conflict (Bar-Tal 2013). In practical terms this means 
that, at least on one level, Israel has had the advantage of  controlling the narratives of  history, effectively 
placing the Palestinians as victims outside the public discourse (Desjarlais 2014). After all, Memmi (1967) 
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points out, memory is not self-reliant but rests upon the state’s power and institutions. There is also the 
argument that disregarding the impact of  asymmetrical power relations may prejudice our ‘moral 
evaluation’ and weaken our sense of  responsibility towards the weaker party in conflict — against whom 
most of  the violence is directed and against which they have little defence (Skitka & Mullen 2002; Skitka 
2010; Morgan & Skitka 2012).   
The study assesses Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian narratives on their own and against one another. It 
examines Israel’s victim self-image and analyses how and why as a discourse the asymmetry against the 
Palestinians is denied or ignored, looking — among other things — at the Jewish historical claims to 
Palestine and the very denial or support of  the occupation. For the same purpose, this study also explains 
the specifics of  Palestinian victimhood and how they differ from Israel’s. The general argument is that 
victimisation is by definition an exercise of  power by one group over another (Nadler & Shnabel 2008; 
Shnabel & Ullrich 2016) and that studying victimhood without taking into account the power relations is 
likely to produce erroneous or inaccurate understanding of  the socio-psychological dynamics of  intractable 
conflict. Here emerges the important fact that being on either side of  power comes with certain 
perceptions, expectations, and ways of  coping with and responding to the conflict. This study’s assessment 
of  Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish victimhood(s) takes this fact seriously and analyses victimhood narratives 
accordingly, not least because power structure influences which manifestations of  victimhood are most 
salient.  
• Finally, there appears to be little focus on the temporal dimensions of  victimisation. Bar-Tal and the 
majority in the field do not seem concerned with the differences in effect between victimisations that 
happened in the past — think of  ‘chosen trauma’ (Volkan 2001, 2004, 2013a/b) — and ones happening in 
the present. In this study the Nakba is not seen only as a traumatic collective memory with psychohistorical 
reverberations like the Shoah, but as a continuously physical event in the present, evident in the occupation, 
the refugee problem, and the Palestinian Diaspora.   
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CONCLUSION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
As a humanities-based study, the aim was to explore, describe, and critique how the narratives of  victimhood 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may have aggravated the conflict and eventually contributed to the deadlock 
in settlement. The current chapter scanned some of  the most relevant literature, starting at the very top by 
looking at intractable conflicts in general, both as a geo-political reality and a dynamical socio-psychological 
system. This paved the way for the discussions of  the contexts in which victimhood narratives were likely to 
emerge. It was proposed that the feelings of  victimisation in intractable conflict may have indeed started as a 
result of  physical harm or deprivation, but as the conflict raged on, it became difficult to separate the geo-
political from the cognitive-emotional.  
Traumatic past is vital to the rationalisation and justification of  today’s conflict, even if  this conflict is not 
directly related to that past (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007; Volkan 2001). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the case was 
made that the narratives of  victimhood have been particularly salient as a socio-psychological dynamic and, 
accordingly, presented a possible barrier to settlement. It was also emphasised that the focus in this study 
would be on the subjective aspects of  victimhood. The literature was scanned and analysed on this basis and 
several important socio-psychological concepts were introduced (e.g. Kelman 1987; Volkan 2001; Halperin & 
Schwartz 2010). The most important of  which was Bar-Tal’s tripartite socio-psychological infrastructure of  
collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013).   
Generally, Bar-Tal’s work draws on and develops several scholarships on the socio-psychological structure of  
intractable conflict (e.g. Sherif  & Lewin 1936, 1947, cited by Jost et al.; Kriesberg 1991, 1998, 2005; Coleman 
2003; Vallacher et al. 2010, 2013). His socio-psychological framework, nevertheless, remains broad and 
versatile enough to encompass a variety of  issues such as beliefs, security, oppression, occupation, trauma, 
stereotyping and political narratives. Of  most importance for this study is his work on collective memory, 
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conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations. Together, these represent a socio-psychological 
infrastructure, and  — complemented by other scholarly works (e.g. Volkan 2001, 2004; Halperin et al. 2011) 
— form the conceptual framework that guides this study throughout. Approaching victimhood in relation to 
memory, ethos, and emotions allows for a multi-angled exploration and critique of  victimhood not only as a 
stand-alone phenomenon, but more importantly, as a multi-faceted socio-psychological product with multiple 
manifestations (see: fig. a.1.0). The manifestations may not on the surface appear closely related or relevant, 
but the usage of  this conceptual framework should weave them together seamlessly.   
To ensure that the framework provides a good understanding of  victimhood, especially bearing in mind 
victimhood’s various manifestations, narrative research will be the chosen methodology. Its focus on 
experience and/or experiential knowledge makes it suitable for the examination of  the subjective aspects of  
victimhood. It allows for the usage of  a broad array of  narrative sources that include but is not limited to 
scholarship, news, films, fiction, and arts. Narrative analysis is done by examining the latent content in the 
narrative sources. Reflexivity is used as a form of  narrative and as an additional analytical tool.    
Finally, before closing this chapter it is worth providing a summary of  what comes next. The very next 
chapter highlights the conceptual dilemmas surrounding victimhood. It should act as an extension of  this 
chapter and smoothen the transition to the core argument. Chapter Three is dedicated to the methodology. It 
is followed by a chapter on the history of  the conflict. Israel’s victimhood is discussed next over two chapters, 
Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five examines victimhood through the Jewish collective memory, focusing 
especially on the Shoah, then on the conflict ethos with collective memory’s reverberations in mind. The next 
chapter is almost entirely dedicated to the discussion of  fear as Israel’s dominant emotional orientation and 
the core motivator for hyper security. Hyper security is seen as the physical most destructive manifestation of  
Israel’s victimhood. Chapter Seven discusses Palestinian victimhood. In this chapter the effect of  power 
asymmetry on the salience of  certain victimhood narratives becomes particularly evident. For Palestinians, 
being the weaker party in the conflict, collective memory became a struggle against memoricide and 
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therefore remembering turned into a process of  victimisation. The Nakba loss and the current occupation 
made humiliation a dominant emotional orientation, and that triggered an overemphasis on the ethos of  
muqawama (resistance). Chapter Eight discusses the counter-narratives in the conflict, focusing primarily on 
Israel’s counter-narrativists. The chapter also highlights the reasons why Palestinian counter-narrative is 
almost non-existent. The Conclusion chapter includes the findings and final thoughts. 
  
Thesis Visualisation (Fig. a.1.0) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
VICTIMHOOD: CONCEPTUAL CONUNDRUMS   
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OVERVIEW 
As it has been established in the literature review, victimhood is not only a physical component of  intractable 
conflict, it is also an inseparable part of  the ‘human factor’ that makes up the conflict’s psychology 
(Kuriansky 2006). However, despite the growing volume of  literature on the socio-psychological dynamics of  
intractable conflicts and, by default, the narratives of  victimhood (Coleman 2011a; Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Bar-
Tal et al. 2009; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009, 2013; Volkan 2006, 2013a; Vollhardt 2012; Rimé et al. 2015; Noor 
et al. 2017; Bouchat et al. 2017), the specifics and the contextual appraisals on what it means to be a victim in 
social conflicts remain under-explored.  Jacoby (2015) suggests that victimhood is an idea like any other that 
takes on contextual characteristics. Some people might define themselves as ‘victims’ in contexts that many 
others would regard as part of  their everyday life (Garkawe 2004; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). Three-quarters of  
Republicans and Trump supporters, for example, believe they are subject to religious discrimination — so did 
nearly eight out of  ten white evangelical Protestants (Green 2016). In certain social contexts victimhood is 
also used as a metaphor for perpetrators (Confino 2005). In the early years following World War II, for 
instance, Germany focused on ‘German victimhood,’ depicting the German public as Hitler’s first and main 
victims and preferring a narrative of  the war that emphasised civilian war-trauma (Schmitz 2007).  Similarly, 11
the post-war Japanese assigned the role of  victimiser to the militarist state or the vaguely defined entity called 
simply ‘the system’ (Orr 2001). In today’s conflicts, especially with the emergence of  non-state actors and the 
war on terror, the already fuzzy victim-perpetrator dyad has become even fuzzier. Complementing the 
literature review, this chapter discusses the conceptual difficulties surrounding the notion, definition, and 
contexts of  victimisation. It begins by exploring the social and philosophical nuances of  victimhood, then 
moves on to address the political side. Inspired by Bar-Tal et al. (2009b) and the literature on collective 
victimhood (Vollhardt 2012; Schori-Eyal et al. 2014; Noor et al. 2017) and intergroup dynamics and identities 
(Kelman 1999, 2001; Volkan 2001 2006, 2013b), it looks at how a victim status is acquired and what makes 
 In the recent years this narrative was abandoned in German public life. This change brought with it what Levy and Sznaider (2005) 11
call the ‘de-nationalisation’ of  German war memories.
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some victims more recognisable than others. The legal dimensions and implications of  victimhood are 
discussed and analysed next. The chapter aims to advance the understanding of  the complexities of  
victimhood narratives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and eventually contribute to answering the research 
question: to what extent do the narratives of  victimhood hinder settlement in the conflict?  
PHILOSOPHICAL CONUNDRUMS 
In her philosophical study of  victimhood Victims and Victimhood (2015), Govier observes that in a process of  
victimisation, there is usually an actor and an acted upon — a perpetrator who is distinct from the victim. 
With a straightforward distinction a clear-cut moral evaluation is formed and responsibility assigned. A 
perpetrator, being an active agent and subject, is responsible for his actions and guilty of  wrongdoing, and a 
victim, who has done nothing is seen as innocent. Bayley (1991) suggests that the victim must not only be 
acted upon but be acted upon by an identifiable agent.‘Innocence,’ Bayley believes, should be deserved. Loss, 
harm, or self-inflicted misfortunate do not automatically create victimhood. A burglar harmed by a 
householder is not a victim; simply because an innocent victim must not be guilty of  having contributed to 
their loss.   
However, this portrayal of  the perpetrator does not provide a satisfactory explanation in a real conflict 
scenario. What about individuals who brought misfortune upon themselves not through perpetration per se, 
but through miscalculation? Does the intention separate victimisation from perpetration? Is a burglar by 
nature a villainous character and the householder an honourable one?  
These questions are as old as the concept of  victimhood itself. In Greek tragedy, for instance, there is a clear 
distinction between a villainous person whose fall is seen as an appropriate punishment and does not arouse 
pity or fear — as in Bayley’s burglar — and the virtuous person whose fall is due to misfortune — as in the 
Shakespearean tragic hero. Although, unlike the classic tragic hero, today’s innocent victim needs not be of  a 
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significant stature to invoke empathy and fear. Aristotle brilliantly captured the in-between scenario where the 
‘victim’ is neither virtuous nor villainous, but rather someone who succumbs to victimisation through 
miscalculation, hamartia (see: Vernant & Vidal-Naquet 1988). In the Aristotelian rationale, the victim must 
have flaws that balance his otherwise good character (Liang 2015); that is to say, an imperfect personality that 
allows the audience to relate to him/her, hence arousing empathy.  
The burglar may deserve to be punished by the householder, but would he be considered a victim if  the 
burglary was provoked by hunger? Does motivation define or justify victimhood? Assuming the burglary is 
‘justified,’ does that make the householder a perpetrator? Questions like these raise concerns that too much 
focus on the victim’s guilt can be misused for victim blaming (Van Dijk 2009). In this case, the householder is 
‘guilty’ because he did not secure his home or because he harmed the burglar. Others, however, warned that 
extended victim rights would eventually lead to the demonisation of  the offender (Buruma 1994, in: Van Dijk 
2009). A burglar in this case is identified through wrongdoing only, not through circumstances or motivations. 
This is particularly problematic when the burglar’s actions are driven by injustice. It is significantly more 
problematic when the victimisation or perpetration in question are the product of  an intergroup social 
conflict and are collectively experienced or exercised. This gives rise to further questions about the standards 
or frameworks that may control the victim defining criteria. If  victimhood is subjective and context 
dependent (Hoffman and Graham 2006), can a structured political or legal framework be more neutral? This 
possibility is explored next.  
POLITICAL CONUNDRUMS   
Recognition and Status Givers 
In his seminal work, Christie (1986) presents the idea of  ‘the Ideal Victim,’ an individual or a group who, 
when hit by crime, most readily are given the complete and legitimate status of  being a ‘victim’ (Schwobel-
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Patel 2015). This victim must be innocent and incapable of  threatening the interests of  the offender. 
Otherwise, Schwobel-Patel (2015) comments, if  she displays agency which goes beyond asserting their 
identity as an ideal victim, say by taking up arms against the aggressor, they may quickly lose their ‘ideal’ 
status, if  not the recognition of  their victim status altogether. In reality, however, agency does not represent a 
block to ‘victim status’ as long it is recognised and acknowledged by a ‘status giver’ (McGarry & Walklate 
2015). Unlike the case in conventional crimes where victims have little difficulty publicising their fate, the 
victims of  international crimes need to ‘sell’ their suffering to the international community and media to gain 
a victim status.   
Viano (1989), places recognition as the last of  the four stages of  victimisation. First, a person experiences 
harm, second, the harm is perceived as undeserved, unfair, or unjust, then social validation is provided. The 
last stage is the external recognition, which enables the victims to gain some political and legal rights. It is at 
this stage that the concept of  ‘status giver’ becomes salient.  
However, ‘status givers’ are almost always partial and subject to a range of  dominant societal beliefs (e.g. Bar-
Tal 2001, 2004, 2007, 2013). In all conflicts these beliefs create certain affiliations that would determine 
whether the collective or individuals in society support or disregard certain victim groups, irrespective of  
their vulnerability or the justness of  their cause/goals. Van Wijk (2013) shows that in the realm of  
international crime, the victim status may be subject to the project in which the victim is engaged in, whether 
or not this victim is vulnerable. In the 1980s, for example, murdered Polish priests opposing communism 
were readily granted victim status in the US, while in countries of  Latin America of  that era, priests standing 
against US-backed dictatorships were not (Herman & Chomsky 1988, in: ibid.).  
The US involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance, shows that the common interests, 
cultural, religious, and socio-economic affiliations apply a different meaning to who should be granted a 
victim status. The consecutive American administrations variably put more emphasis on the Jewish casualties, 
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although significantly less than those of  the Palestinians, and stressed Israel’s security over Palestinian 
ongoing suffering under the occupation. An inevitable result was that the peace process, in which the US was 
a chief  broker,  became severely unbalanced. Khalidi (2013) discussed this topic at length in Brokers of  Deceit, 12
describing America as a dishonest broker whose identification with Zionism made her Israel’s lawyer in the 
negotiations with the Palestinians.  
Much of  the US identification with Israel’s victimhood claims is also driven by the American collective 
memory of  the Shoah. In addition to Israel and Germany, the Shoah in the United States has since 1960s 
become a significant part of  the country’s popular culture and historiography (Niroumand 1995). The 
‘Holocaust’ museums in the United States, the country that along with Israel received the largest number of  
Jewish Shoah survivors (Carignan 2012), are hugely diverse and often on permanent exhibition. The result of  
this interest in the US has been the ‘Americanisation of  the Shoah,’ so much so the that Shoah has become, as 
Shandler points out (in: Cole 1999), a ‘master paradigm’ in America’s national consciousness. Faber (2005) 
comments that seemingly ‘the Holocaust had become as American as apple pie.’ Cole (1999) sees that the Shoah 
is now considerably less important in Europe where it physically took place than it is in America where it has 
been embraced as a statement of  faith. It was incorporated into the country’s fundamental mythos of  
pluralism, tolerance, democracy, and human rights (ibid.). The Shoah left America with a profound sense of  
moral responsibility to ensure that what happened to the Jews under Hitler never happens again. This notion 
was expressed by John McCain who wrote that, “The Holocaust underlined the moral basis for Israel’s 
founding…In standing with Israel, we are merely being true to ourselves.” This political narrative extends to 
a large section of  the American public who view Israel’s interests as part of  their nation’s moral principles. 
When asked about assisting Israel in the event of  an Iranian attack, the majority of  Americans supported 
aids and sending troops. A similar majority also opposed foreign aid to the Palestinians (Rynhold 2015).   13
 As of  the time of  writing this, the Trump administration has recognised Jerusalem as the capital of  Israel and the occupied Golan 12
Heights as part of  Israel, cut off  funds to Palestinians, and presented its own Deal of  the Century. Palestinians have since deemed the 
US a representative of  Israel and no longer a mediator in the so-called peace process. 
 For information on the US public opinion of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see: Smith & Doherty (2016), “5 Facts About how 13
Americans View the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” — Full report: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/23/5-facts-about-
how-americans-view-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/
59
It might also be debated that while Israel’s victimhood is unconditionally upheld by the Untied States, 
Palestinian victimhood is embraced and represented by many Arab and Muslim governments who, like the 
US, may provide logistical and moral support for Palestinian acts. Although, for many Arab regimes, the 
Palestine cause is only a tactic for personal gains and to uphold their legitimacy amongst their people. 
Consider for example the recent Saudi pressure on the Palestinian leadership to accept Trump’s ‘peace 
plan’ (Aljazeera Arabic, Nov. 2017). By ‘settling’ the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Saudis seek legitimacy 
and moral acceptance in any future open ‘normalisation’ with Israel. The primary goal is to ally with Israel 
against Iran, not to help the Palestinians.    14
In summary, the key to victim status, despite agency, is mainly political recognition. However, in many cases, 
political recognition draws more from affiliation than actual victimisation, which in turn begs the question if  
a political victim is indeed a reflection of  ‘true’ victimhood. The problem does not end there; even with the 
existence of  a recognised ‘true political victim,’ the level of  identification and therefore assistance can vary 
depending on the method of  victimisation and media coverage. This is what I label ‘hierarchal recognition.’   
Hierarchal Recognition   
Not all harm regardless of  its intensity is equally guaranteed to make the sufferers universally recognised. 
Cohen (2001, pp.210-211) maintains that, “…in the eyes of  the observing audience the method of  
victimisation is more important than the actual number of  victims.” In one study run against common-sense 
expectations, American and Australian undergraduate students, when presented with various scenarios of  
human rights violation, showed more interest in the manner of  violation rather than the number of  
casualties. The sheer number of  deaths seemed less important and inspired no greater empathy than the 
 Seeing in Israel a potential ally against Iran and Daesh, some Arab countries went as far as attacking Palestinian political movements 14
such as Hamas, accusing them of  ‘terrorist’ links. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister Adel Al-Jubair, for instance, made a precedence 
when he called upon Qatar to “Refrain from supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.”[see: Aljazeera Arabic, June 2017]
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death of  far fewer people from bloodier methods. As a matter of  fact, Cohen argues, “It made little difference 
whether the victims were innocent or political dissidents taking calculated risks.”  
This brings to mind the recent debate about the US actions regarding the conflict in Syria. President Obama 
threatened to intervene in Syria after reports of  Assad using ‘chemical weapons’ against civilians, hence 
crossing Obama’s ‘red line’ (Wolfgang 2015). The daily victimisation of  Syrians by conventional weapons did 
not invoke the same level of  reaction. Because chemical weapons have a special status in international 
agreements, their victims must have had a special type of  suffering. There seems to be a similar rhetoric 
regarding the Shoah; that is, more emphasis is put on the genocide methods than the sheer number of  victims. 
During Nazi occupation of  Russia's Leningrad, the region lost around a quarter of  its population. There was 
also more than three million Russian prisoners of  war who died in German camps (Berkhoff  2001; 
Poltonowicz 2014; Barber & Harrison 2006). The Nazi crimes in Russia caused a much higher death toll 
than the Shoah, but to many, the Shoah ranks higher in the victimhood hierarchy due to its methods of  
implementation.  
The unorthodox methods of  victimisation are likely to draw more media attention and that would further 
perpetuate the victim recognition hierarchy. There is also the fact that media coverage itself  can create a 
victim hierarchy even when the methods of  implementations are not in question. This suggests that victims 
of  conflict are as recognised as the media exposure they receive. Hawkins (2008, cited by van Wijk 2013) 
notes that that death toll from conflict in the DRC is literally one thousands times greater than that in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, yet it failed to be the object of  a greater media coverage.  
LEGAL CONUNDRUMS  
The legal Victim  
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To circumvent the philosophical and political conundrums of  victimhood, a legal definition is usually 
presented as more neutral, at least in theory (Saeed 2016).  
Although victimhood traditionally did not receive the sufficient international attention, or was placed within 
legally clear frameworks, a panorama of  recognition gradually began to change globally and international 
norms related to victims and victimhood were progressively introduced (de Casadevante Romani 2010). The 
‘victim’ managed to come out of  the psychiatric clinics and the classic schools of  victimology into the 
international arena of  conflict studies. Psychologists and other mental health practitioners became aware that 
the trauma suffered by victims of  crime was on several levels similar to that suffered by victims of  wars and 
intergroup conflicts (Garkawe 2004). This became particularly evident in the growing international rights 
movements, especially the feminist movement (Dignan 2005), which established that there were similarities 
between suffering of  victims of  conventional crime and victims of  state oppression and discrimination.  
Arguably, the scope of  victimology was boosted, among other things, by the adoption of  the Declaration of  
Basic Principles of  Justice (DBPJ) by the UN General Assembly in 1985. It aimed to establish minimum 
international standards to regulate how states treat citizens and non-citizens who suffered harm or abuse 
within their Jurisdictions. Garkawe (2004) maintains that in order to specify these minimum standards it was 
essential that they define which victims were to be included in the international obligations of  states.   
The Declaration presents a broad legal delineation of  what constitutes a victim. It divides victims into two 
categories: victims of  crime and victims of  abuse of  power, stating that victims are those who suffered 
physical or mental harm, economic loss or impairment of  their fundamental rights. It also stipulates that 
there can be both direct and indirect victims, such as family members or dependents of  direct victims; and 
that persons can suffer harm individually or collectively. Both categories are defined very similarly except that 
the victims of  crime are viewed in the light of  criminal law and victims of  abuse of  power are given a 
political dimension and are defined via internationally recognised norms relating to human rights.   
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The Human Rights Perspective 
The DBPJ is not the only legal instrument that sets broad rules for who is a victim. Various other legal 
instruments have been created to eliminate or at least alleviate the grievance of  victims. These instruments 
view victims and victimhood through the principles of  human rights treaties. The Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950), for 
example, set the basic principles and guidelines for state behaviours and the remedies for gross human rights 
violations of  international human rights law and serious violations of  international humanitarian law. 
Although the UDHR, for instance, does not explicitly mention ‘victims’ or ‘victimhood’ within its set of  thirty 
rights, the outcome is nevertheless the protection of  ‘victims’ or possible ‘victims’ of  human rights violations. 
The ECHR differs slightly in being more explicit on the rights of  ‘victims.’  It even encourages member 15
states to design their domestic policies and courts to view the rights of  victims as human rights. The UK, for 
example, has introduced the Human Rights Act (1998), which  enables the victims of  the Convention violations 
to take their case to domestic UK courts. This, in effect, means that security and legislative bodies of  the 
country, at least in theory, are under the duty of  acting in accordance with the ECHR.  After all, victims’ 16
rights, like human rights, are only meaningful if  they confer entitlements and obligation on people (Wemmers 
2012). This refers us back to the notion of  ‘status givers.’ 
The rapid growth of  human rights bodies meant that in various ways the abuse of  someone’s human rights 
qualified them to be victims, leading to the view that since suffering is a violation of  human rights, it needed 
to be legitimised and codified (Humphrey & Valverde 2007). Nowadays, victims are at the centre of  human 
  Article 3415
 In principle, Brexit may not affect certain rights under the ECHR, as this comes from the Council of  Europe, not the EU. The 16
impact of  Brexit on our British equality and human rights will depend on the laws that are passed to deal with leaving the EU. 
Although, the British Government published a White Paper on a Great Repeal Bill on 30 March 2017 clarifying how equality and 
human rights concerns will be addressed, the final vision of  what the status of  current rights will be after Brexit is still not completely 
clear.  [see: Equality and Human Rights Commission, July 20 2017]
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rights thinking, and no other group of  individuals has a more sacred place in human rights law (Klug 2003), 
so much so that Garkawe (2005, in: Wemmers 2012) suggested that a specialised UN Convention on Victims’ 
Rights be created. Garkawe’s initiative suggests that notwithstanding the cultural differences between victims 
across the world, they tend to share common characteristics that may make a victim-specific legal framework 
a possibility.  Many theoretical and empirical studies conducted in nearly all the regions of  the world indicate 
that victims of  human rights violations share some common features: to begin with, they want to be treated 
with due respect by criminal justice system actors. They require access to legal instruments for remedy and, 
above all, seek recognition of  their plight (Ochoa 2013).  
Critiquing  the Legal Victim  
Theoretically, a legal framework seems without significant problems; it creates rules to be followed 
internationally and can be an instrument for reparations, remedy and transitional justice. In reality, however, 
the legal scene may not be as straightforward.  
Neither the UDHR nor the ECHR differ from the DBPJ in the exclusive, uninterrupted fashion of  viewing 
the victim. The overall impression is that the taxonomy of  victims and perpetrator through a human rights 
perspective suggests that victims and perpetrators are always two completely separate and homogeneous sets 
of  people (Borer 2003). Neither one of  the two treaties suggests that a victim can also be a perpetrator, and 
assumes that all victims are morally equal, and their victimhood is comparable. It is an assumption that most 
Palestinians, Israeli-Jews, Hutu or Tutsi might contest (Enns 2007). The other obstacle is that both the DBPJ 
and the UDHR are ‘soft laws’, which means they are non-binding and only serve as guidelines for 
governments. The DBPJ, for instance, makes it clear that its purpose is to “assist Governments and the 
international community in their efforts to secure justice and assistance for victims of  crime and victims of  
abuse of  power.”  
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The legal conceptualisation of  victimhood also suffers from contextual relativity. The legal systems emerge 
and evolve within certain cultural contexts and therefore vary significantly. It is almost unachievable to sever 
the relation between society and law (Arfman et al. 2016). Criminal justice expert Lucia Zedner (2004, in: 
Arfman et al. p.02) maintains that criminal justice can be seen as the symbolic construction of  social order, 
and the law is the instrument through which this social order is imposed. This means that by the power of  
law this social order with all the socio-economic, inequalities, injustices, and prejudices, stays in place. 
Pemberton (2015, in: ibid.) argues that a strictly legal approach of  victimhood might conceal how the law 
itself  victimises people.  
Building on the notion of  ‘status givers,’ it can be suggested that there is also the problem of  political 
influence over the legal system. The law is only a means serving the end determined by politics. Politics as a 
purpose needs to use means, which is the legal system. This broadly means that human rights law needs 
politics, perhaps more than other bodies of  the legal system. Human rights require states’ political power to 
be effective (Thouvenin & Weiss 2015). Even though law and politics complement each other, this still does 
not negate that the delicate law-politics balance could be disturbed to serve political interests, compromising 
human rights in the process. Under such politically motivated legal systems, the criteria of  victimhood 
become selective and biased.  
It can also be suggested that similar acts of  victimisation under the same legal system may vary in their 
validity based on racial, political and religious grounds. Take for example the Israeli Law of  Return of  1950. 
It declares that every Jew has the right to come to Israel and be granted Israeli citizenship upon arrival. From 
a Zionist point of  view, a Jew in Israel is safe from anti-Semitic victimisation elsewhere. Ergo, a law was 
necessary to ensure this ‘right’ will provide the state of  Israel with the legal power to protect the Jews by 
bringing them to the newly established state. However, the enactment and implementation of  this Law was 
only possible through the ethnic cleansing of  the indigenous population. Jewish victimhood, in this case, was 
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embedded into a legal framework, while the catastrophe that was brought upon the Palestinians was kept 
outside the Israeli-Jewish narrative and, inevitably, the legal system. 
The disenchantment with the ‘legal victim’ occasionally spiralled to criticism of  the legal bodies themselves. 
Take for example the case of  the International Criminal Court. Since its inception in July 2002, the ICC has 
faced two primary critiques. First, it has been inefficient, and second, it has preoccupied itself  with Africa and 
failed to equally investigate other conflicts elsewhere (Bassiouni & Hansen 2016).  
Most recently Gambia withdrew from the ICC, accusing the Tribunal of  the “persecution and humiliation of  
people of  colour, especially African” (The Guardian 2016). Gambia is one country in a queue of  African 
countries that pledged to quit the Tribunal (BBC Oct. 2016; Kuo 2016). Regardless of  whether the ICC is in 
the habit of  legally and politically discriminating against African nations, the Africans perhaps feel that the 
‘international’ legal system is swayed by the political interests of  non-Africans, particularly Caucasian nations. 
Many Africans may think of  themselves as victims of  human rights violations in their conflict-torn countries 
and also victims of  the biased international legal systems. This is how the law becomes a tool of  victimisation 
— cynically, in some cases, in the name of  rooting victimisation and establishing human rights.  
CONCLUSION  
  
 Scholars have increasingly recognised that victimhood is largely a socio-psychological product, especially in 
intractable conflict. But little was written about the variable specifics of  victimhood and how their fluidity 
and interpretability have affected the very definition of  victimisation in different social contexts. Almost every 
discipline has had its views of  what indeed constituted a victim, but none is yet to fully agree with the others 
on a unified definition. By looking at the philosophical, political, and legal views of  victimisation, this chapter, 
albeit exploratory and brief, aimed to contribute to the growing discussion that almost every aspect of  
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victimhood is contested and challenged (Ferguson et al. 2010). By doing that, it added other dimensions to the 
socio-psychological framework on victimhood discussed in the literature review.   
Applying this framework to the idea of  ‘affiliations’ that drives the victim ‘status givers,’ for example, allows 
us to see the politics of  victimhood in a three-dimensional lens: filtered through memory, ethos, and 
emotions. Using the US-Israel relationships as one example, it was proposed that apart from the US geo-
strategic interests in the region, the US’s almost unconditional support for Israel has also been swayed by 
America’s affiliation with Israel. This affiliation can be explained through the American collective memory of  
the Shoah, which in turn shaped much of  the American public’s beliefs and emotional identifications 
(characterised mainly by guilt, shame, and emotional moral reasoning) regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts.   
Affiliation makes the notion of  a victim without agency and incapable of  inflicting harm irrelevant, it 
nevertheless takes away privileges and statuses from certain, possibly more deserving vulnerable groups in 
favour of  the group with whom one may share certain commonalities. This has been known to establish a 
political hierarchal recognition that would influence what otherwise be deemed a ‘neutral’ legal system.  
Guided by the socio-psychological framework and cognisant of  the conceptual conundrums surrounding 
victimhood, the present study continues for the most part to assess victimhood as a subjective experience. 
This assumption is carried along to the next chapter where the methodology is presented. The fact that 
victimhood is a multi-faceted phenomenon with multiple social representations, and is characterised by 
experiential factors and contextual considerations, meant it could be tackled effectively through a narrative 






The study seeks to examine the extent to which victimhood narratives add to intractability and therefore 
hinder settlement. These narratives are often expressed explicitly or implicitly through multiple forms of  
textuality. This chapter explains narrative as a research methodology, beginning with narrative place in 
qualitative research and why it was used as a research method, and what constitutes narrative and narrative 
'data' in this study. Next, it describes the primary approach to narrative analysis. Acknowledging the fluidity 
of  narrative research, the chapter elaborates on the issue of  researcher’s positionality and bias, and shows 
how reflexivity — as a social self-critique and an auto-ethnographic endeavour — can address that.   
SECTION ONE: NARRATIVE RESEARCH  
Qualitative Research and Narrative   
Qualitative research is broadly based on the methodological pursuit of  understanding the ways that people 
view, approach, and experience the world and make meaning of  their experiences as well as specific 
phenomena with it (Ravitch & Carl 2016). Its principal advantage is that the generation of  data, context, 
interpretations, and understanding are reasonably flexible. This produced a variety of  standardised, non-
standardised, and mixed research strategies and methods. Despite their differences, these methods share the 
common ground that the social context in which the human experience emerge is explorable and 
interpretable (ibid.; Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Given 2008; Gilbert 2008; Blaxter et al. 2010; Patnaik 2013).  
The boundaries amongst some of  these methods are fuzzy and their purposes overlap (Clandinin & Connelly 
2000). Narrative research is one of  the methodological tools that intersect with different disciplines and 
research strategies. The overlap between narrative research and phenomenology, for instance, is particularly 
salient. Both methodologies are focused on the lived experience and both are constructionist and use similar 
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data collection apparatuses. But what distinguishes phenomenological research from narrative research is the 
context and how one chooses to call what s/he is doing and the literature used to ground one’s work. Wertz et 
al. (2011) refers to narrative research as phenomenological, and Smith et al. (2009) argues that interpretive 
phenomenological analysis draws on narrative. Depending on the research question and needs, one can 
approach, say, Anna Frank’s diary phenomenologically or as a narrative of  her lived experience and the 
socio-historical context of  her time. 
To avoid confusion, this study describes what narrative research is, presents a specific definition of  narrative 
in relation to the studied phenomenon, and explains how to expand its usability. It also highlights how 
narrative acts as both a phenomenon and a methodological instrument (Clandinin & Connelly 2000). 
Narrative Definition(s) 
Narrative is an illusive term and owing to its cross-discipline nature, each field of  study brings slightly 
different ways of  understanding to narrative study. In anthropology and social history, for instance, narrative 
refers to life study, observations, and documents. In social linguistics it is considered a discrete unit of  
discourse. And, in psychology and sociology, narrative usually encompasses long sessions of  talks and 
therapeutic conversations (Given 2008). Narrative is also seen as a ‘universal mode of  thought’ and a ‘form 
of  thinking’ (Bruner 1986: in Gilbert 2008; Nelson 2006, in: Gravis 2015). Hakkarainen et al. (2013) consider 
that from a cultural-historical perspective, narrative is a psychological tool formalising and unifying human 
thought and knowledge. Adding a sense of  causality, Andrews et al. (2000) and Berger (1997) see narratives as 
a sequence of  events in time. 
Different approaches to narrative, nevertheless, share the common understanding that narrative — as a 
phenomenon and a method —  is based on the human experience. Dewey’s theory of  experience is often 
cited as the philosophical underpinning to narrative studies. Experience, stated Dewey, has an individual and 
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social context; that is, individual’s experience cannot be understood without the social context it happens 
within and vice versa (in: Clandinin & Connelly 2000). These experiences, according to Gilbert (2008), are 
shared by a number of  individuals that tell us something about the nature of  society. Collective entities in 
society (governments, organisations, or ethnic/racial groups) transform the individual and overall collective 
experiences into a diverse body of  narratives, and perhaps as a result, into social codes (Caine et al. 2013). To 
achieve that, explains Riessman (2005, 2008), events are selected, organised, connected, and evaluated as 
meaningful for a particular audience or, occasionally, purpose. This fits Bar-Tal’s conception of  ethos (e.g. 
2004, 2007, 2009, 2009a, 2013), the network of  societal beliefs that weave together the past, present, and the 
future to provide the collective with meanings, justification, and purpose.  
Narrative Definition in this Work  
Narrative in this study is viewed as the expressions of  the in-group’s collective lived experience or chain of  
experiences, where meanings and realities accrue (Andrews el al. 2000). It is a social construct that may 
require that the researcher be positioned between the story and the people in order to capture its nuanced 
understandings (Etherington 2011, 2004). Narrative is also seen as a mediational tool for the construction and 
reconstruction of  the group’s collective memory, attribution of  meaning to the present in the form of  ethos, 
and production of  the emotional orientations concerning the in-group's future and relationship with the out-
group (see: Bar-Tal 2000a, 2004, 2007, 2013; de Luna & Rosa 2012). Broadening the definition, as it will be 
further discussed, narrative is a tool of  social representation that can be expressed through multiple forms of  
textuality — written, spoken, or visual. 
Why Narrative Research? 
Narrative is inherently agentive and is used by individuals and groups to communicate several layers of  their 
experience (McAlpine 2016). Any attempt to simplify its complexity, therefore, does not do justice to the 
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richness of  approaches and insights it has to offer. It provides the researcher with a multi-levelled outlook on 
the studied phenomenon, as well as complements the structural stance (common in applied and social 
science) by providing alternate ones (ibid.). By using narrative research in the study of  victimhood, it is 
possible to examine and bring to focus different and sometimes contradictory layers of  meaning units that 
exist in the phenomenon. Additionally, since there are no self-evident categories that strictly specify what a 
narrative is (Andrews et al. 2013), this presents an opportunity to develop and expand its parameters.   
What Constitutes Narrative data? 
Narrative research offers no overall rules about suitable materials or modes of  investigation, or the best level 
at which to study stories. It does not specify whether to look for stories in everyday speech, interviews, diaries, 
TV programmes, novels, poetry, or newspaper articles; or how to analyse them (Andrews et al. 2013). 
However, it seems that the operative word in narrative research is ‘story.’ Humans are storytelling organism, 
according to Connelly and Clandinin (1990), and to Gottschall (2013), ‘storytelling animals.’ The focus is 
usually on the production and analysis of  qualitative data which can be understood as processes whereby 
different groups of  people engage in ‘story telling’ and by doing so produce narrative accounts of  their lives 
(Gilbert 2008). 
Traditionally, stories and by default the lived experience embedded in them are usually generated and 
collected through collaborative dialogic interactions with individual participant(s) or small group(s) of  
individuals. This includes but is not limited to structured or semi-structured interviews, field notes, journal 
records, letter and autobiographical writing, transcripts/text of  own observations, procedural documents, 
and pictures (Connelly & Clandinin 1990, Clandinin & Connelly 2000; Moen 2006). The shared ground 
amongst most of  these approaches is that the data are generated primarily through direct contact with either 
the subject or the phenomenon.  
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Upon reviewing several narrative-based approaches, it became clear that the traditional narrative data 
collection methods suffered from certain limitations especially in terms of  the type and volume of  data. The 
inability to do interviews or fieldwork, for instance, meant that the researcher’s exposure to lived experience 
was limited, depriving him/her of  valuable knowledge. On the plus side, the fluidity of  narrative provides 
plenty of  room to develop and expand what is deemed narrative data. For the purpose of  this study, narrative 
data are not limited to direct interactions or oral utterances. Rather, they be can found almost in every form 
of  social representation: oral, verbal, or visual — secondhand or otherwise.   
What Constitutes Narrative 'data' in this Work?  
This study considers that every form of  representation has a type of  textuality and such textuality is narrative because 
of  the meanings — and experiential meanings — it conveys. ‘Text’ here — not in the traditional sense as 
words on a page — is deemed data. The moment we start thinking about experience, we are then using 
narrative. This usually begins internally then is sent outwardly through several forms of  ‘textual’ 
representations. One may say that in narrative research, the studied phenomenon is embarked upon with the 
belief  that there are individual, internal representations of  events, thoughts, and feelings to which narrative 
gives external expression (Andrews et al. 2013). 
If  narrative is elevated into a broad range of  textual representations delivered as external expressions and by 
which the human experience is made meaningful (Bamberg 2012), then perhaps it makes sense to argue that 
even performative and fine arts can be considered a sort of  narrative. The ‘textuality’ in performative arts, for 
example, is expressed through the artist’s bodily movements. Riessman (2005, 2008) calls this ‘stage 
metaphor.’ Consider, for instance, Palestinian Dabkeh (folklore dance). Dabkeh translates Palestinian experience 
of  victimhood into yet another expression of  identity narrative and is considered a form of  ‘cultural 
resistance.’ Historical data, which is frequently used in this study to add a historiographical dimension to 
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collective memory, can too be a form of  narrative. Despite the apparent structuralism, historical text remains 
descriptive and can therefore be influenced by the author’s experience.  
Most of  the narrative data in this study are acquired through an array of  secondary, contextualised sources. 
This means a larger set of  data and flexible selection of  methods and approaches, which will, for instance, 
facilitate the incorporation of  quantitative data (mostly third-party surveys, questionnaires, and polls) to 
supplement qualitative data and provide them with more precision (Blaxter et al. 2010).  
Nevertheless, given this is a humanities oriented study, it is very important to note that the terms 'data' or 
‘data collection’ are used only for the sake of  clarity and to adhere to the widely accepted terminology in 
social research. The word 'data' is used to identify what is collected, and ‘collect’ refers to how that 'data' 
comes to me, and ‘comes to me’ is to confirm that for most part the collected 'data' come from secondary 
sources where this author did not have an active role in making.   
In this study data collection has a free, less structured form, which allows various narrative data to interact 
with each other without a rigid system that would dictate the when and where of  their usage. Data collection 
occurs simultaneously with analysis. Some data are collected then analysed, then more data are collected and 
analysed, and so on (inductive reasoning). Each stage generates new ideas that would lead to or perhaps 
dictate a certain trajectory of  more data collection and analysis. Typically, the weight of  evidence from a 
selection of  cases on Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian victimhood permits a logical generalisation of  the initial 
hypothesis. As the research advances, initial analyses and findings are elaborated on, deepened, and 
confirmed by seeking further evidence in new cases from the wide range of  related narrative textuality. 
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Sources of Narrative Data in this Study 
Narrative data in this study come from a wide range of  sources. Most of  which fall under one or more of  
three broad ‘categories': a) scholarship, b) media, and c) arts, signs and symbols. None of  these categories is 
mutually exclusive or heavily structured, but are viewed as containing various layers of  textuality that form 
meaning units which can be approached and expanded as narrative. They are not organised or named as just 
that, ‘categories,’ but what matters is the data they contain. Such data are selected purposively and used 
strategically so they are relevant to the research question and reflective of  the themes of  memory, ethos, and 
emotions  (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2013).   
A) Scholarship: Mostly academic publications which include but are not limited to books and monographs 
examining scholarly topics, edited books, journal articles, book chapters, book reviews, and conference 
proceedings. Also, albeit less frequently, the study benefits from the writings for the public that share the 
results of  research or scholarly understanding. That includes op-eds, blogs and other informed online 
writing, columns, and other non-peer-reviewed publications such as independent self-publishing. 
The sole purpose of  scholarship in this study is to support and guide the conceptual and theoretical, as 
well as the critical, philosophical, and historical outlook on victimhood and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The academised form of  writing can be a narrative source in the sense that it can include layers 
of  descriptiveness, criticality, and persuasiveness, which implies that the personal may interfere with the 
allegedly ‘objective.’ Scholarly works carry within them the personalities, and the individual and 
collective experience of  their authors and reflect the social contexts in which they were produced and 
conceptualised.  
That said, it is the prospect of  ‘close to home’ experience/story that makes the cultural texts and artefacts 
present in the next two categories a narrative textuality intimately reflective of  society. Benziman (2011) 
calls such texts ‘more real than reality.’ They can tell us more about the experience/story than do many 
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scholarly narratives, and can also illuminate a range of  academic questions, ideas, and themes (Sucharov 
2019). Themselves byproducts of  the in-group's national narratives, cultural texts and artefacts play a 
great role in shaping and maintaining the ethos of  conflict (e.g. Bar-Tal 2013). 
  
B) Media: A highly, if  not the most, salient form of  social representation. This study is based on the 
conviction that one function of  media is to inform about certain events, phenomena, and processes in 
society, and to warn of  impending danger. This should provide a picture about society’s collective 
experience by highlighting its fears, concerns, aspirations, and thoughts. It should also reflect the process 
of  selection, transmission and reconstruction of  certain events or issues (e.g. Adoni & Mane 1984) in light 
of  this society’s collective memory, emotional orientations, and ethos. Additionally, because media reflects 
society, it is viewed as providing real-life representations of  the conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
present in scholarship.  
The most important source of  media information in this study is news. News comes in multiple forms 
and shapes, it includes news reports, articles, stories, commentaries, opinions, and official statements. 
These should reflect the general mode and experience of  society. The study uses news sources from 
across the political spectrum in both Israel and the Palestinian territories, as well as globally. It, for 
example, acquires news from Israeli centre-right papers such as the the Jerusalem Post and Yedioth 
Ahronoth, and centre and left-wing ones like The Times of  Israel and Haaretz. These papers share 
common concerns regarding Israel’s victim identity, the notion of  external threat, and the position 
toward the Palestinians. But they vary in the severity of  their views of  and identifications with these 
issues. Palestinian media sources, on the other hand, from the left to the right are more or less monolithic 
in their views of  the occupation and by default Israel. The tone and expressions concerning the 
Palestinian collective memory, the dissemination of  the conflict ethos, and the concomitant emotional 
orientations remain for the most part similar (see: Bar-Tal et al. 2009). This is also found in the majority 
of  Arabic news outlets, such as Al-Jazeera, which is frequently used as a source of  narrative in this study.  
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The other important media narrative source is visual media. It mainly includes films, TV programmes, 
ads, and documentaries. Waltz with Bashir (2008), for instance, highlights the concepts of  collective 
memory, chosen trauma, ethos, and the emotional orientations that shape Israel’s victimhood narratives 
(e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013; Volkan 2001, 2004, 2013a, 2013b; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin 
et al. 2011; Halperin & Pilskin 2015). Similarly, the Palestinian films Paradise Now (2005) and Omar (2013) 
provide us with an insight into the emotions of  humiliation that largely drive Palestinian victimhood and 
the ethos about muqawama (resistance).  
C) Arts, Signs and Symbols: This is a broad and variegated category and tends to overlap with the 
previous one. It typically includes: 1) arts: such as novels and memoirs, poetry, authors’ opinions and 
insights, music, images, visual arts, and even religious texts and wills, and 2) signs and symbols: like 
national symbols, slogans, ceremonies, rituals, commemorations, national anthems, and speeches. These 
components are not mutually exclusive. A song can be both an art form and a national symbol — as in 
the case of  national anthems. Films can be both a literary work and a visual medium — Kanafani’s 
novella Returning to Haifa (1969), for instance, has a film adaptation.   
These sources reflect experience mainly through the content hidden meanings, imagery, metaphors, and 
symbolism. By way of  illustration, the symbolism in the novel Bab Al-Shams (Gate of  the Sun) (1998) goes 
beyond simply narrating the Palestinian collective memory; it examines its most salient, if  not at times 
most unacknowledged, emotional reverberations such as shame and humiliation (see Chapter Seven). In 
a novelised narrative — same as in memoirs, authors’ opinions, insights, and statements — the storyteller 
does not tell the story, so much as she/he is told by it. The interpretation of  symbolism or intertextual 
signs in such literary works can be subject to the reader’s positionality. A non-Palestinian may read 
Ghassan Kanafani’s Returning to Haifa (1969) as a tragic story, but probably only a Palestinian can see 
through it his/her lived experience and identify the symbolism or latent meanings accordingly.   
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Narrative, especially in the case of  arts, signs, and symbols, can reflect a political process that alerts to the 
power mechanism (Gilbert 2008). Bruner (1986, in: Gravis 2015) argues that not only does that narrative 
exhibit the structures of  meaning or negotiate both individual and collective identity, it also reveals the 
structures of  power. In Palestinian novels, poetry, paintings, and even films, it is easy to see that the 
Palestinian is almost always presented as the underdog. Because narrative highlights the power 
mechanisms, it also serves as a mode of  resistance to the existing structures of  power (see: Andrews et al. 
2013; De Fina in: De Fina et al. 2015). What distinguishes Palestinian literary narratives, as it is clear in 
the works of  Ghassan Kanafani, is its muted politicised nature; partly because of  Israel’s censorship and 
not less because of  Palestinian sense of  guilt and shame over the loss of  a homeland. 
Same as in films and news and to a lesser degree scholarship, the perspectives generated and developed in 
arts, signs and symbols can become cultural values. Consider, for example, the Israeli-Jewish slogans: 
“Never again” or “the Masada shall never fall again.” On the surface, Zionism defines them in terms of  
sacrificial heroism, but embedded in them are representations of  victimhood. The same applies to 
national anthems. Both Israeli and Palestinian anthems are about ‘rising from the ashes.’ They are 
however expressed differently. Israel’s national anthem, ha tikvah (the hope), still speaks of  the ‘oppressed’ 
Jew who ‘seeks hope’ from victimisation (Grosbard 2003). The anthem is a narrative textuality that 
repeatedly revives the trauma associated with collective memory, and consequently continues to cement 
the collective’s adherence to the country’s master narrative (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). The Palestinian 
anthem, on the other hand, has a revolutionary tone which keeps with the Palestinian notions about 
honour and shame, as well as approach to victimhood. 
Signs and symbols can also have a ‘visual textuality’ that captures certain experiences/stories and conveys 
their meanings. Handhala (fig. 1.1) is an example. He is a cartoon character created by the late Palestinian 
satirical cartoonist Naji Al-Ali, and is depicted as ten-year-old boy turning his back to the viewers and 
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clasping his hands behind his back. He has a cactus-like head, wears ragged clothes and is barefoot. He 
exists in all of  Al-Ali’s cartoons. Handhala exceeds being a form of  art to being a sign and a symbol for the 
whole Palestinian experience — by being a tenacious witness to the Palestinian suffering, which he is part 
of, and a keeper of  memory, which he like other Palestinians struggles to protect. Nowadays, Handhala is 
as visually representative of  the Palestinian struggle as the Palestinian kuffiyeh (traditional headgear).  
SECTION TWO: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
  
Narrative data are interpretable based on the social/political context in which they emerge. While some of  
the data sources above can provide straightforward social representations regarding the studied phenomenon, 
they — perhaps for the most part — contain experiential clues, hints, and signals that require that the 
researcher look beyond what is obvious. In order to achieve a good understanding of  victimhood and its 
various manifestations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, narrative analysis in this study focuses on the latent 
content and meaning units in the narrative textuality, and is supplemented and enhanced by self-reflexivity.  
Gauging the latent meaning is seen as combining the categorical unit of  analysis and the content focus of  
analysis — making it a categorical-content approach. Categorical is usually concerned with shared experience and 
content focuses on the ‘content’ of  the story/experience/narrative and the underlying [latent] content. It asks 
questions such as: what are the author’s motives and intentions? What might particular items/words/
themes/phrases symbolise for the narrator and others? What are the meaning and importance of  the story? 
The attention here shifts from ‘what actually happened’ to ‘how to make sense of  what happened and to 
what effect’ (Bryman 2015) — from the ‘story’ to the experience of  that story.  
In other words, this kind of  analysis involves looking for and interpreting hints, clues, symbols, and references 
in the news, films, novels, poetry, scholarly works, and other forms of  narrative textuality. Narrative 
interpretation is influenced by several factors: what the researcher wants to find out or prove (in relation to 
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the research subject-matter and question), the researcher’s positionality and personal convictions, and the 
narrative context and background. The film Lebanon (2009), for example, depicts the Lebanon War as seen 
from the inside of  an IDF tank (see Chapter Five). The latent meaning might be inferred from the experience 
of  the tank crew. Given the study's subject-matter, the notion of  ‘enclosure’ (being trapped inside the tank) 
can be viewed as a reflection of  Israel’s siege mentality, which is a manifestation of  Israel’s victimhood 
narratives.  
To further illustrate, consider an academic article on victimhood — say by Bar-Tal (e.g. Bar-Tal et al. 2009b) 
— if  the unit of  analysis is categorical and our focus is the content, then the purpose is to look closely at the 
latent content in that article — well beyond the conceptual or theoretical framework. By focusing on the 
latent content, more information, patterns, and themes that might not be readily discernible emerge. 
Reading Bar-Tal beyond the scholarly structure (as a scholarship narrative) may uncover the author’s biases, 
belief  orientations, and reveal some of  the limitations in his scholarship — at least from a Palestinian 
perspective. Bar-Tal remains part of  his society’s narratives of  collective memory and ethos, and his 
emotional orientations may to some extent be in tune with the majority of  society members. 
When seeking the latent content or trying to understand the meaning units in a narrative textuality, it is 
important to pay attention to the narrative context and background. It might be taxing to understand the 
latent content in news stories or cultural texts and artefacts without placing them against their political, social, 
or historical context/background. One instrument for doing that is scholarship. Scholarly works can, among 
other things, provide background/context in the form of  historical data or socio-psychological 
conceptualisations. Context and background are considered based on the assumption that individuals or 
groups cannot construct their identities and worldview(s) in a void; rather, they do so by using the social and 
cultural scripts and norms available to them as a repertoire from which they choose (Tuval-Mashiach 2014). 
To view humiliation as a primary part of  Palestinian victimhood narratives, it is important to interpret it 
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against the backdrop of  the Palestinian social and political context where the concepts of  patriarchy, 
masculinity and gender identity overlap with the notion of  patriotism, resistance, dignity, and self-sacrifice.
Narrative analysis is supplemented and enriched by reflexivity. Being a member of  the Palestinian collective, I 
utilises my ‘insider involvement’ to cast lights on some of  the hows and whys of  the Palestinian conflict 
dynamics. My personal experience, memories, and collective-based emotional orientations play a role in 
determining the conclusions of  my observations. This is particularly evident in Chapter Seven.  
REFLEXIVITY  
Researchers come to research with priori knowledge and assumptions, effectively influencing their selection 
and prioritisation of  certain narrative understandings over others. Narrative analysis ergo becomes a means 
to convey a mood as well as a specific argument (Gombrich 1972). To come to terms with that, a reflexive 
outlook becomes important. In order to understand the logic behind this study’s utilisation of  reflexivity, it is 
useful to start by discussing positionality and bias.   
  
Researcher’s Positionality 
In assessing positionality a first starting point is to be aware that in this work ‘neutrality’ is not seen as  a 
statement of  fact (Witkin 2014), and to acknowledge, as a result, that the social research is subjective. 
Therefore, while remaining faithful to research rigour and methodological standards, the cloak of  ‘objectivity’ 
— the rigid, highly regulated and dispassionate examination of  social life — needs to be reevaluated (Akhtar 
2017; Hamby 2018).  
Even when in certain social fields such as journalism data is deemed ‘facts,’ the fashion in which they are 
gathered, interpreted, and presented may be subjective. The BBC (BBC Academy, updated 2013), for 
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instance, instructed its journalists to use what it deemed ‘neutral terms’ to describe ‘reality on the ground’ in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ‘Reality on the ground’ was not defined and journalists were free to assess it. 
That proved tricky especially when the said journalists were from or originally from Israel or the Palestinian 
Territories. The conflict to an Israeli-Jew or a Palestinian is largely a lived experience, a qualitatively 
determined and narratively structured one. Krieger (1991) likens this to a pot that carries its maker’s 
thoughts, feelings, and spirit. Put differently, in a social context ‘facts’ are part of  ‘narrative knowing.’ The 
reality of  lived experience is determined by one’s reflexive awareness of  it (Wolfson 2005). 
A second starting point is to be aware that before one can know what we are looking at, one has to know 
where we are looking from (Markham 2017). Finlay (2002) describes this as a ‘dialectic conversation between 
experience and awareness,’ and Gergen (2009) sees it as the ‘relational interaction’ between the self  and its 
social context. Similarly, Gough and Madill (2012) propose that an individual is inextricably linked to other 
people and tied to sets of  social, cultural, and political contexts that influence and often constrain human 
action. In “Zionism from the Standpoint of  its Victims” (1979), Said positioned himself  dialectically between 
Zionism as viewed by many Jew — an emancipatory movement — and Zionism as a colonial enterprise as 
viewed by Palestinians. As he investigated Zionism — one might say: dispassionately and systematically — 
Said remained true to the fact that to a Palestinian there was almost no alternative but to see Zionism as a 
tool of  victimisation. In this study Zionism is thoroughly investigated and attempts to mentally identify with 
its narratives are made. But like Said, I continue to be conscious that my position as a Palestinian influences 
how I see or, more importantly, feel about Zionism. This sets the tone for the study’s interpretive and 
analytical approach.  
Researcher’s Bias 
Positionality gives rise to the issue of  bias. Our ontological and epistemological positioning, methodological 
and theoretical perspectives, and the adoption of  particular research methods are all bound up not only by 
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intellectual concerns or curiosity, but also by our personal values and ideologies (Mays & Pope 1995; Gergen 
& Gergen 2000; Mauthner & Doucet 2003; Kaptchuk 2003). The researcher identity is in this case not very 
detached from the lived identity, a position that Mantzoukas (2005) called the ‘I-witness paradigm.' 
Norris (1997) concurs that because of  that, there is no paradigm solution to the elimination of  error and bias. 
But it may be argued that a researcher’s position is not always an artificial imposition or a conscious effort. 
Rather, it is perhaps an unavoidable result of  how or what things are. Coming to the research with certain 
assumptions and values is not the same as bias, unless the researcher fails to mention them from the outset 
and reflexively throughout (Malterud 2001). I choose to see my close proximity to the conflict as an 
opportunity and a legitimate benchmark for good research. At a minimum level, as Andrews et al. (2000) note, 
it is a medium where the self  can be located as a psychosocial phenomenon and subjectiveness seen as a 
discursively constructed yet still active and effective. The goal is not to fully eliminate ‘bias,’ but to use the 
closeness to the studied phenomenon as a focus for more intense insight (Frank 1997, cited by Finlay 2002). 
Implementing Reflexivity   
  
Through reflexive thoughts the ‘situated self ’ is explored and exploited while to do so remains purposeful 
(Finaly 202, 2015). In analysing narrative a researcher must remain reflexively conscious of  his/her 
positionality and — as a basic requirement for reflexivity — to analyse the self  recursively and critically 
against the backdrop of  own experience and relative to the object, context, and process of  inquiry (Mauthner 
& Doucet 2003; Markham 2017). Incorporating the self  into the research and reflecting inwardly would 
bring to consciousness some of  the author’s epistemological, ontological, and methodological premises, as 
well as the personality embedded in the writing (Humphreys 2005). This can be viewed as an integration of  
the scholarly and personal voices in the researcher’s textual representations (Maguire 2006).  
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Connecting the personal to the cultural and the experiential to the political, the reflexive undertaking in this 
study has two levels of  consciousness: the social and the personal. The social focuses on the self  as a 
participant/member of  one’s own community, whereas the personal views the self  as an autonomous subject 
and an object of  inquiry — usually framed through auto-ethnographic accounts from the researcher’s 
experience (Spry 2001; Foley 2002). 
In the ‘social’ I use reflexivity to examine critically the Palestinian collective as a member of  that collective 
with a close knowledge of  it. The pronoun ‘we’ (and its variants: us, ourselves, our) is the operative word in 
making the ‘insider’ researcher visible to the reader and emphasising his role as an active agent in the 
knowledge production and construction.  
In the ‘personal’ I focus the reflexive lens ever more closely on the personal self. Framed auto-
ethnographically, I use stories or glimpses from my personal experiences beyond the collective meta-narrative 
discourses to highlight my position relative to the research and to establish an analytical or interpretative 
connection with the research topic (see: Witkin 2014; Bochner & Ellis 2016; Lumsden 2019).  
The auto-ethnographic accounts try to answer questions such as: what led me to that perception? How did I 
get to this point? How did I know that? So what? Why am I interested in this and to what end/effect? As self-
narrating, I write in the first-person using the auto-ethnographic ‘I’ or its variants: ‘me,’ ‘myself,’ and ‘my.’ 
The use of  ‘I’ acknowledges that knowledge is contextual, situational, and specific. Auto-ethnography is after 
all a reflexive form of  textual representation that makes the researcher’s experience a topic of  investigation; 
ergo, nothing is more involved than using the first-person account (Lumsden 2019). The goal is to be visible, 
to ‘show’ — not ‘tell,’ and to seek own voice as a means to move from the inside of  the author to outward 
expression and vice versa (Maguire 2006). That helps the author make sense of  own and other people’s 
experience in a new and different light (Etherington 2004).  
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Also, engaging in auto-ethnographic self-narratives and applying them to the studied phenomenon may be 
seen, as Markham (2017) states, like looking at oneself  looking in the mirror. It is about achieving a profound 
insight of  the social context through understanding ourselves beyond our own personal experience. Ellis and 
Bochner (2016) refer to this process as transforming the private troubles into public knowledge, which can be 
both therapeutic and pedagogical. Not to mention that sharing personal accounts help enhance the author’s 
authenticity and trust, which would reflect positively on the research validity.  
RESEARCH VALIDITY AND ETHICS  
Narrative represents lived experience and can therefore be subjective and interpretable. For this reason, the 
first step in ensuring validity and rigour is to be transparent: acknowledging — as it was done in the first 
chapter — that the study’s analysis has been influenced by particular discourses, personal convictions, and 
experiences. This enables the researcher to, first, dismiss validity criteria based on realist assumptions, and, 
second, to acknowledge that different approaches can yield different analyses. The second step is to be aware 
of  the ethical dilemmas surrounding narrative research. In this study, the author’s close connection to the 
research raised questions about ‘relational ethics.’ Addressing that required implementing a reflexive 
approach. This included handling research with an introspective eye, turning inwardly to critically explore 
and increasingly understand one’s own experience (auto-ethnographically) and the self  as a product and 
interpreter of  the social context. This helps ensure that the researcher’s biases and subjectivities continue to 
be assessed throughout.   
CONCLUSION  
Narrative in this study is included in all types of  textuality that is explicitly or implicitly related to the lived 
experience [of  victimhood or/and its manifestations]. It derives data from a wide range of  sources, which 
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can be — as a way of  explanation — put under one or more of  three broad categories: 1) scholarship, 2) 
media, and 3) arts, signs and symbols. Neither one of  these categories is mutually exclusive. Narrative data 
are analysed primarily through a categorical-content approach, focusing on the latent content or ‘the 
meaning units.’ Part of  the analysis is seen as a product of  the researcher’s positionality, which raises practical 
and ethical issues, not least is the possibility of  bias. To address these issues, provide more depth, and ensure 
research validity and trustworthiness, reflexivity is used to critique the ‘situated self ’ both as a member of  the 
collective and auto-ethnographically through personal accounts.   
Fig: a.2.0 Methodology Visual Map  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ON HISTORY AND INTRACTABILITY  
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THE JEWISH QUESTION  
He was a young man of  35 when he entered the public life, promoting what he called ‘the Jewish 
cause’ (Avineri 2014). Like many Jews of  his time, Theodor Herzl  adopted a lifestyle, customs, mentality, and 
appearance that meant to make him socially indistinguishable (Kamczycki 2013). His early pictures show him 
with characteristically modelled sideburns and pointed, slightly raised, moustache tips, and a centre parting 
— resembling the style of  Franz Joseph (1830-1916), the Emperor of  Austria-Hungary at the time (see: 
Kozuchowski 2014). Beyond embracing the Viennese cultural values, Herzl appears to have sought to 
assimilate into the lifestyle of  the non-Jewish and to conceal his Jewish identity. He also distanced himself  
from the Jews whom he thought were old-fashioned or even looked different (Kamczycki 2012, 2013).  
Although the eighteenth-century Enlightenment changed the general attitude towards the Jews, it did not 
completely eradicate anti-Semitism (Beller 2007). The emancipated Jews had given up their old Jewish 
characteristics because anti-Semitism made them loathe it, but they did not become Germans or French. 
They lost the home of  the ghetto without obtaining a new home (Laqueur 2003). Likewise, Herzl’s 
assimilation did not fully hide his “Jewish physiognomy” or stop him from being insulted in the streets of  
Munich and Vienna (Kamczycki 2012). It was however the Dreyfus Affair  that motivated Herzl to seek a 17
real solution to the ‘Jewish question.’  
His thoughts on the ‘Jewish question’ and the need for a ‘Jewish homeland’ were not very different from those 
proposed several years earlier by Pinsker and Hess. They both advocated a ‘Jewish homeland’ to escape 
discrimination and anti-Semitism.  Herzl, nevertheless, was different in thinking in radical terms (Laqueur 18
2007). His political vision was initially expressed in his book Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) and later 
 Following his conviction in a public ceremony in Paris, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish french officer, was stripped of  his military insignias 17
and sword and was paraded before a crowd that shouted, “Death to Judas, death to the Jew.” To see how the accident affected Herzl, 
see: Theodor Herzl’s The 'Jewish State,  pp.11-12
 For more info, see: Leo Pinsker — Encyclopædia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/biography/Leo-Pinsker , and Moses 18
Hess — Encyclopædia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/biography/Moses-Hess
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became the core idea for the first Zionist Congress. The Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland in August 
1897 and decided that in order to free the Jews from the galut (diaspora), Zionism would seek to establish a 
homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. The movement encouraged and financed European Jews to 
immigrate to Palestine and build settlements there (Cohen 1989; Al-Messiri 1999). At the time, little did 
Herzl know that his radical solution to the Jewish question was going to redefine the Jewish identity and mark 
the beginning of  the world’s most complex intractable conflict.  
THE ROAD TO PALESTINE, NATIVISATION AND ERASURE  
To most early Zionists, the demographic realities of  Palestine were opaque. They initially saw Palestine as the 
European imperialists did, as an empty territory, 'a land without a people for a people without 
land' (Garfinkle 1991). They did not think in terms of  ‘the natives' who were overlooked or expected to 
passively accept the plans made for their land (Said 1979). The first waves of  Jewish immigrants to Palestine 
began in the late nineteenth-century and there they established settler communities, the Yishuv. From the 
outset, the Zionist Movement considered the Yishuv a territorial political entity, and a united and autonomous 
community (Barnavi 2003).   
During the British Mandate beginning in 1920, the Zionists intensified their efforts to secure the 
establishment of  a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Witnessing the large influx of  European Jews into their 
country and apprehensive about the growing militarisation of  the Yishuv, Palestinians felt that their natural 
and inalienable rights to the land were in danger. They also viewed the British support of  Zionism (the 1917 
Balfour Declaration as an example) as an infringement of  assurances of  independence given by the Allied 
Powers to Arab leaders in return for their support during the war. The result was mounting resentment and, 
eventually, resistance against the Mandate authorities, followed by violent clashes between the Palestinian 
Arabs and European Jews (see:  Sayegh 1965; Al-Messiri 1999; Pappé 2006; Sabbagh 2008; Masalha 2012).   
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To counteract the ‘foreign settler’ label and legitimise the concept of  ‘Jewish nation,' Zionism 'reclaimed' the 
land as their own and sought to create an ‘authentic’ nativised identity. They claimed to represent an 
indigenous people returning to their homeland after two thousand years of  exile. It is an ironic claim, as 
Masalha remarks (2015), considering the hard core of  Zionist activism was formed from Russian or 
Ukrainian nationals. These European Jewish nationalists had to re-invent their identity to match their state-
building goals. This gave rise to terms like sabra (from Arabic sabar, cactus),  referring to “the New Jew” who 19
was born in Ottoman or Mandatory Palestine. He was imagined as tenacious and strong as a cactus and free 
from the contaminations of  the galut (Apel 2012). Continuing the process of  indigenisation following Israel’s 
establishment in 1948, many Zionists changed their names from Russian, Polish or German to Hebrew-
sounding names. For instance, David Ben-Gurion was David Gruenin, and Golda Meir was born Golda 
Mabovitch (Masalha 2015).  
The process of  nativisation, and inevitably state building, could not have been fulfilled without mentally erasing 
the natives. In My Promised Land, Shavit (2014) explains that denial was part of  the Zionist project from the 
very beginning. He describes his great-grandfather’s tour in Palestine in 1897 and asks why Herbert 
Bentwich, then founder of  the British Zionist Federation (1899), did not see the native Palestinians. Shavit 
remarks that he did not really see that Ramleh was a Palestinian town…he did not see the Palestinian town 
of  Lydda. There were more than half  a million Arabs in Palestine in 1897, twenty cities and towns, and 
hundreds of  villages. There was a need not to see. Because seeing would have forced the settlers to turn back, 
Shavit explains.   
Mental erasure of  Palestinians facilitated their physical displacement and replacement. Israeli historian 
Benny Morris claims that Ben-Gurion was right, Palestinians had to be uprooted for a 'Jewish State' to arise. 
He admits that ethnic cleansing took place and many Palestinians were expelled from their homes, but he 
 Palestinians, too, have embraced cactus as a symbol of  rootedness, steadiness,  and resistance.19
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follows with a justification, saying that “…there are circumstances in history that justify ethnic 
cleansing” (Shavit 2004a). In the words of  Masalha (2011), first they took the land, then they made the ethics.  
COLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE  
Herzl’s Zionism is still viewed by most in Israel as an extension of  the tradition of  democratic national 
liberation movements in Europe. In reality, from the perspective of  the native Palestinians or even through 
the framework of  post-colonial scholarship, Zionism is an old-fashioned turn-of-the-century colonialism. It is 
clear from Herzl's thinking that the realisation of  a Jewish homeland in Palestine could not have been done 
unless there was a prior European inclination to view the natives as irrelevant to begin with (Said 1979).  
The Zionist Europeans supposed, without formulating any thought, that the Palestinian Arabs were passive 
and without national consciousness. Herzl, and not only Herzl, famously refused to acknowledge the violent 
force of  Zionism’s own nationalism and the Arab nationalism it would provoke (Rose 2007). In To the Promised 
Land (1994), Rabbi David Goldberg writes: “The practical demands of  creating an autonomous Jewish 
society in Palestine ready for eventual statehood took precedence over theoretical ruminations about 
coexistence with the Arab majority” (Goldberg 1996, in: Brownfeld 1998, pp.29-31). 
In a typical out-group versus in-group negative identity formation (e.g. Kelman 1991; Volkan 2006; Bar-Tal 
2013),  Jewish nationalism heightened Palestinian self-identity and national consciousness. Some of  the Israeli 
historians claim that “the Zionist movement started with the aim of  forming one national group, and it ended 
with forming two” (Nasser 2010; Pappé ed., p.220). While there might be some truth to this claim, it however 
views the Palestinian history from a Zionist perspective. It is not a recognition of  Palestinian nationalism as 
much as it is an affirmation of  Zionist legitimacy.  
91
Unlike the Zionists, the Palestinians could anchor their political struggle in an existing society that had its 
own language, culture, and a history that was deeply intertwined with the entire region. However, due to 
objective reasons, such as the disorganised and divided Palestinian elite and the British political and military 
support for the Zionist project, Palestinian nationalism was doomed to fail. 
In 1936, for instance, what started as minor Palestinian-Jewish clashes quickly flared into a widespread revolt 
that lasted virtually until the outbreak of  World War II. There were attacks on British troops and Jewish 
settlements, and sabotage of  roads and railways. The British authorities responded with curfews, 
reinforcements, mass arrests, collective punishment, and executions (Sayegh 1965; DPR 1978; Masalha 
2012). The revolt, nevertheless, did not develop into a unified political movement or held out a vision that 
spoke to and could deploy the various sectors of  society (Pappé & Hilal 2010). Israeli historian, Anita Shapira 
(1999), explains that during the revolt, the Jewish side conducted its own retaliations and reprisals. The 
Zionist leadership legitimised the use of  terror against Palestinians, and later, against the British. It was a 
Machiavellian step-up in tactics that would eventually lead to a number of  massacres and systematic 
expulsions of  the natives during and after the 1948 war.  
THE STATE 
Seeking a solution to the ‘Palestine problem,’ the British government proposed, in place of  the independence 
pledged two decades earlier, a plan to partition Palestine. In November 1948, the United Nations 
recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab State and a Jewish State (with an international 
status for Jerusalem), allocating a larger percentage of  the land to the smaller Jewish population (United 
Nations 2008). The Plan was rejected by the Palestinians opposing to being forced into having their land 
divided with those they viewed as foreign invaders. On the day Britain officially relinquished its Mandate over 
Palestine and disengaged its forces, the Jewish Agency declared the establishment of  the State of  Israel. 
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Fierce hostilities immediately broke out between the Arab Palestinian and Jewish militias. The next day, 
regular troops of  the neighbouring Arab States entered the territory to assist Palestinian Arabs. (ibid.).  
The hostilities effectively provided the Zionist leaders with political coverage and allowed their militias, soon 
to become the IDF, to commence mass expulsions and ethnic cleansing against the indigenous population. 
Nowadays, with the exception of  a small elite of  new historians who emerged in the 1980s, the mainstream 
Israeli-Jews still adhere to the official Zionist narrative which is either silent on the 1948-49 atrocities, admits 
some but justifies them, or denies them altogether. One fact still stands, nevertheless, the 'Jewish State' had led 
to the destruction of  the Palestinian society. At least 80% of  the Palestinians who lived in the major part of  
Palestine upon which Israel was established— more than 77% of  Palestine’s territory— became refugees 
(Sa’adi & Abu-Lughod 2007).   
AFTER THE STATE  
With the significant shift in power, the two peoples’ narratives began to take shape. Israeli-Jews justify the 
establishment of  a Jewish homeland, among other things, by the need for a safe haven for Jews. Today, the 
Jewish collective memory, especially the Shoah, is used as an evidential basis for this claim. Here, much of  the 
legitimacy of  a ‘Jewish homeland’ is seen through a victimhood perspective. This is clearly expressed in 
Israel’s 1948 ‘Declaration of  Independence.’ Had there been a 'Jewish State' in the 1930s, goes the argument, 
the Shoah would not have been allowed to happen (Goldberg 2006). Palestinians on the other hand see in 
Zionism a settler-colonial endeavour. The fact that so far no Palestinians from across the political spectrum 
have been willing to reconcile themselves to Zionism, shows how deep-seated the Palestinian narratives are. 
To those Palestinians that Zionism displaced, it cannot have meant anything by way of  sufficient cause that 
the Jews were victims of  European anti-Semitism (Said, 1979).   
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It would take over a decade however after the state for the clashing of  victimhood narratives to take proper 
roots and move to a higher level of  intractability. The 1967 Occupation and the rise of  Palestinian armed 
resistance were main components of  that change.  As Palestinians have sought the mantle of  victimhood, and 
indeed as Israel’s role as victimiser has become more apparent, so the attachment to the Jew-qua-victim trope 
has intensified (Navon 2009).  
In 1967 Israel occupied the rest of  historical Palestine and the Palestinian refugees who resettled in Gaza and 
the West Bank after the Nakba found themselves under a military occupation by the same party that had 
driven them out of  their homes nineteen years earlier. Whilst 1967 was viewed as a continuation of  the 
‘original sin’ of  1948, it also added another layer of  victimisation to Palestinian lives.  
The 1960s was also the decade of  the coming of  age of  the first Palestinian exile generation and who would 
later represent the core of  the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). This generation would transform 
their parents’ sense of  humiliation and passive victimisation into an alternate ego in the form of  the fedayeen 
(singular: fedayi), the honourable freedom fighters. Somewhat analogous to the Zionist notion of  the ‘New 
Jew,’ fedayeen gave rise to a new type of  identity based on the dichotomy of  victimhood and muqawama (see: 
Chapter Seven). Even though the concept of  fedayeen is no longer in common use, the very notion behind it 
continues to define every Palestinian act of  dissidence today.  
For Israel, the euphoria that followed the 1967 victory (see: Chapter Six) was short lived. Six years later the 
Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal marking what was known as the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  The war 20
eventually led to a peace agreement with Egypt and Israel’s withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai which Israel 
captured during the Six-Day War. But the post-war trauma and existential angst, enhanced by the Shoah 
memory, did not recede. This mindset would continue to define Israel’s self-image in all of  Israel’s regional 
conflicts (see: Segev 1993).  
 Also known as the October War or the 10th of  Ramadan War. 20
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In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. The invasion was preceded by a series of  Israeli attacks and limited 
incursions into Lebanese territories since the 1970s. Operation ‘Peace for the Galilee,’ as it was called by the 
IDF, was a full-scale military invasion that ultimately reached Beirut and resulted in tens of  thousands of  
Lebanese and Palestinian causalities, and finally the eviction of  the PLO from Lebanon. While this was a 
textbook war of  choice, the dominant narratives continued to mark the war as ein breira (no choice), as was the 
case for all of  Israel’s previous wars. The sense of  persecution and ethos about the IDF innocence, prevailed 
(see Chapter Five) (Matar & Harb 2013). This pattern would continue to influence Israel’s behaviours during 
the two Palestinian Intifadas in 1987 and 2000 and the sporadic peace attempts in between, and later during 
the three Gaza onslaughts between 2009 and 2014.   
INTRACTABLE VICTIMHOOD  
Looking at the whole picture, since Herzl envisioned a Jewish homeland in Palestine the clash between the 
initially European Jewish immigrants and Palestinians had gone through multiple phases, each with its own 
complexities. These complexities have now accumulated, locking Israeli-Jews and Palestinians into a severe 
form of  intractable conflict. What began as a political-colonial project developed into geo-political claims and 
then narratives to justify them. This prolonged process was eventually inundated with psychology. 
The essence of  Herzl’s vision, and of  Zionism, was to rid the Jews of  victimhood and passivity. However, 
these narratives were given more power in the name of  collective memory and have been employed to 
legitimise and justify Israel’s wars and policies against the Arabs and Palestinians, as well as to gather 
international support. Similarly, Palestinians use victimhood narratives to entertain Palestinian interests, 
justify Palestinian actions against both the Israeli army and civilians, and to win the international community. 
That said, qualitative and quantitative indicators of  victimisation weigh heavily towards the Palestinian. Since 
the first Intifada (1987-1993), the Nakba narratives began to circulate around the world and the news of  
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Palestinian suffering under the occupation increasingly found room in the world’s media. Satellite channels 
and, later, the internet have made it possible for Palestinians to convey their story to the world. Threatened by 
the loss of  the victim status, Israel had to step up her diplomatic efforts. The Shoah has been a key component 
in those efforts. The message was generally, although implicitly, that the l’olam lo od (never again) metaphor 
also applies to the Palestinians. In other words, the Shoah will not be allowed to happen again at the hands of  
the Gentiles, the Palestinians this time. Reference to the Shoah victims became a discursive instrument of  
political legitimacy, used specifically to justify military operations and to argue for Israel’s right to “security” 
on its own terms (Ochs 2006) (see: Chapters Five & Six).  
These competing narratives became the weapons in a fierce battle over public opinion  and moral 21
validation. This situation was best illustrated during the 2004 ICJ deliberations on the segregation wall at the 
Hague. Haaretz painted a cynical picture of  the scene: “On the one side, a gutted bus belonging to the 
national public transportation monopoly, and posters of  Israeli victims of  terrorism; on the other side, two 
processions of  Palestinians who have been hurt by the occupation” (Bar’el Feb 2004). Israel claims that the 
wall was meant to stop Palestinian attacks, but Palestinians argue that it is another device to appropriate 
Palestinian land. Depending on where one stands, both arguments may be valid. But beyond the geo-politics 
what stands out is the conflict psychology and particularly the emphasis by both sides on own suffering as 
instruments for legitimacy.  
Layers upon layers of  historical accumulations made the political essence of  the conflict no longer 
conceivable. Much of  the historical geo-politics had been reconstructed as subjective narratives. Yet, most of  
the conflict resolution approaches in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are still primarily centred on geo-political 
considerations. The failed Israeli-Palestinian peace attempts attest to the fact that geopolitics is only one part 
of  the issue.  
 In the thesis context, ‘public opinion’ mostly means people’s collective preferences on matters related to government and politics 21
and also the expressions  influenced by their psycho-political experience. 
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What began as a series of  secret meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by  Norway 
eventually produced the  1993 Oslo Peace Accords, a plan stipulating the elements and conditions for a 
future  Palestinian state on the 1967 Israeli-occupied territories. The Oslo Accords and the related ‘peace 
talks’ that followed, up to the 2000 Camp David Summit, have now reached a stalemate (Peleg 1997; Barari 
2004). Despite the early atmosphere of  optimism, cynicism and gloom ultimately prevailed in both societies. 
While there was initially a burgeoning over-all reconciliatory attitude in Israel towards the Palestinians, 
Israel’s day-to-day security measures and sanctions in the Occupied Territories were still tightly upheld. Also, 
Palestinians plunged into further despair following unfulfilled expectations of  prompt relief  and economic 
improvements (Peleg 2015).  
At the time, not many observers foresaw that the agreement(s) was doomed to fail because most trauma-
based grievances of  the past, especially those of  the Palestinians, were not considered. The failure of  the 
Camp David Summit later in 2000 showed that both parties were incapable of  achieving a ‘psychological 
leap.’ Faced by Israeli rejection of  the return of  Palestinian refugees, Palestinians might have believed that the 
psychological cost of  renouncing the right of  return would be greater than the physical and economic 
deprivations they suffer under the Israeli occupation (Rosenberg 2011). 
In reality, however, the return of  the Palestinian refugees will turn the Jews in historical Palestine into a 
minority and eventually the Zionist Jewish identity will probably weaken or altogether vanish. But, in our 
defence, we, Palestinians, cannot judge the situation free of  our collective memory.  In our minds, we are the 
sole victims. Not only do most of  us find it incomprehensible that many Jews in Israel cannot see our 
suffering or reconcile themselves to our story, but also more unfathomable is the fact that they think they are 
the victims in this conflict. Some of  us do not even know that Israeli-Jews have victimhood claims. How can 
the occupier be a victim?  
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This brings to mind what happened at a conference at York University in Toronto in 2009 called “Israel/
Palestine Mapping Models of  Statehood and Paths.” An Israeli academic talked about the fear that 
overwhelmed his fellow Israeli-Jews. Palestinians were angered by ‘the audacious attempt to ask them to 
understand Israel’s security needs when they are living under this country’s military occupation.’ They found 
it outrageous that the Israeli occupiers could portray themselves as a victim nation bobbling in precariously in 
a sea of  Arab hostility (Enns 2012, pp.57-58). Many of  us do not feel we bear any moral responsibilities 
towards the ones who oppress us. After all, it is us whose land is shrinking, our dignity and honour are 
violated, and our basic freedoms are confiscated. The list goes on. These perceptions are never independent 
of  the Palestinian collective experiences, which many of  us have trans-generationally internalised without 
having physically experienced all of  them. The stories and imagery associated with the events of  1948, 1967, 
and the Intifadas, and the unbroken series of  suffering in between, have galvanised and sustained political 
energy, even among the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora (Matar & Harb 2013) (see Chapter Seven).  
Similarly, many Israeli-Jews struggle to part with the ‘bleak’ identification with the Jewish past, which is 
usually activated in order to rationalise or justify the present. For some right-wing ideologues, the Palestinians 
are the last generation of  the Biblical Amaleks determined to annihilate the Jewish nation. For the general 
public, the Shoah cannot only be a universal moral compass but also a confirmation of  Jewish victimhood 
and, subsequently, a vindication for a powerful 'Jewish State.’ In this light, Palestinian attacks are blown out 
of  proportion and the threat they pose is rarely appraised without the existential implications in mind. The 
Israeli retaliation, as a result, becomes severely disproportionate and is often depicted as an Israeli retaliation 
against Palestinian aggression (ibid., p.165). The asymmetrical military power of  Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians 
is almost never mentioned, neither is the correlation between Israel’s policies and Palestinian dissidence. Even 
Palestinian non-violent resistance is sometimes seen as new anti-Semitism. Consider Israel’s reaction to the 
BDS Movement. Netanyahu said that BDS was reminiscent of  Nazi Germany’s campaign against Jews (i24 
News 2015), and Lapid, the former Finance Minister, drew a direct line between BDS’s activities and the 
Mufti’s collaboration with the Nazis in the 1940s (Shalev 2015a) (see: Chapter 5). Such worldview often 
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includes the claims for innocence and that society is being unfairly criticised by intentional organisations or 
states. This is maybe a ‘coping strategy,’ according to Oren and Bar-Tal (2014), which involves ‘modification 
in the process of  evaluation by challenging legitimacy of  other evaluation.'   
CONCLUSION 
Since the late nineteenth-century, the situation between Zionism/Israel and the Palestinians has gone 
through several phases. The intractability that was produced also created intermingled and hierarchal 
victimhood narratives and counter-narratives. The Palestinians see themselves as dispossessed, oppressed, and 
disenfranchised. Israeli-Jews see Palestinians as terrorists and aggressors and themselves as victims of  
terrorism. Palestinians see Israeli-Jews as all-powerful conquerors, and themselves as helpless victims. Israeli-
Jews look at their soldiers and see in them their precious little children. Palestinians look at the same soldiers 
and see nothing but instruments of  oppression and victimisation (Schimmel 2004). Israel insists that Israeli-
Jews have to be completely secure from victimhood before the Palestinian demands, and Palestinians see that 
such logic only defeats the very purpose of  a peaceful solution (Smulders 2013).   
The next chapter discusses Israel’s victimhood starting by focusing on collective memory and then the conflict 
ethos. The following chapter continues the endeavour by developing the concept of  collective emotional 
orientations of  fear to reflect Israel’s ‘hyper security’ as one of  the most important manifestations of  Israel’s 
victimhood. Chapter Seven is dedicated to the discussion of  Palestinian victimhood. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
VICTIMHOOD IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:  
The Case of  Israel in Relation to Collective Memory, Conflict 
Ethos, and Collective Emotional Orientations  
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OVERVIEW  
The examination of  Israel’s victimhood is spread over two chapters. The current chapter seeks to describe 
and evaluate the fundamentals of  Israel’s self-perceived victimhood mainly in relation to collective memory 
and conflict ethos (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). The next examines Israel’s collective emotional 
orientation, focusing on fear as a primary dynamic in the country’s security policies (Bar-Tal 2001, also: 
2007, 2013). 
This chapter first looks at collective memory. It opens up with the film Waltz with Bashir, highlighting the Shoah 
as a chosen trauma (e.g. Volkan 2004, 2006) and a method of  remembering. Next, the argument is broadened 
by placing the Shoah memory within the larger context of  Jewish history. The focus then shifts to describing 
and critiquing the Shoah narratives in the wake of  Israel’s inception. It is argued that in the beginning the 
Shoah memory was inconsistent with the Zionist ideals of  heroism and that the Eichmann Trial was in fact the 
launching-pad for a new memory paradigm. Developing the argument further, the chapter explains how the 
new paradigm became a defining factor in Israel’s current conflict ethos, turning trauma into a negative 
identity (e.g. Kelman 1999) and subsequently reconfiguring the perception of  Jewish history itself. Discussing 
the reverberations of  memory and ethos, the chapter, among other things, examines Israel’s nazification of  
Arabs and how that became an important psychological as well as instrumental factor in Israel’s conflict with 
the Palestinians. Using Bar-Tal’s concept of  ‘freezing of  beliefs,’ another analytical dimension is added to 
Israel’s societal beliefs about victimhood. This leads to the discussion of  the interactive relation between 
memory, ethos, and Israel’s collective emotional orientations. Paving the way to the next chapter, this chapter 
briefly discusses the emotional orientations of  guilt and shame and their manifestations, which are identified 
as: the fear of  normality, guilt and shame displacement, and identification with the aggressor. Fear being the 
most dominant emotional orientations is discussed extensively in the next chapter. In the conclusion, the 
chapter highlights how Israel’s collective memory and ethos, and the related emotional orientations, fuel 
Israel’s victimhood narratives and thus determine Israel’s approach to settlement.  
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The chapter benefits from a range of  narrative sources. Whilst scholarship establishes the conceptual 
framework (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Volkan 2006; Halperin et al. 2011), it also facilitates the understanding of  
Jewish experience. This experience, nevertheless, is more discernible in the historical and political input than 
it is in the conceptual or theoretical (e.g. Arendt 1963; Evron 1981; Falk 1993; Novick 2000; Finkelstein 2003; 
Grosbard 2003; Rose 2005; Benbassa 2010; Cohen 2014; Lustick 2015). History especially — as in the 
discussion of  Biblical history or the Eichmann Trial — is not seen as mere chronology, but also as a conveyor 
of  the human story/experience of  the time (e.g. Zerubavel 1991; Segev 1993; Al-Messiri 1999; Zertal 2000; 
Massad 2005; Sand 2009).   
It remains the enduring conviction in this work, however, that the narrative textuality in media and arts, signs, 
and symbols provides a more intimate outlook at experience. Not only do news articles, reports, 
commentaries, and statements present events/stories, they also reveal society’s thoughts, feelings, fears, and 
aspirations (e.g. Fisk 2006; Eldar 2012; Yadid 2015; Bishara 2015;  Al-Hadidi 2015; Shalev 2015b; Goldberg 
2015b; Maan News 2017; Pfeffer 2019). Visual media in the form of  films, TV programmes, and 
advertisements is the core experiential representation in this chapter. The film Waltz with Bashir (2008) adds 
significant experiential dimensions to Israel’s collective memory and the ethos associated with it. Lebanon 
(2009) delivers a similar concept but largely from the angle of  siege mentality. And the TV thriller Fauda 
(2015) reveals the power of  ethos in shaping Israel’s victim hierarchy regarding the Palestinians. The chapter 
also examines the latent content in a couple of  ads (Omega News 2011; Maor 2011), which reveal the power 
of  collective memory, ethos, and the general societal emotionality. The novel See Under Love (1989) is utilised in 
the conclusion to sum up and bring the reader through symbolism closer to the experience of  Shoah 
remembering. Analysing the narrative sources, especially media, is largely done using a categorical-content 
approach, deciphering the latent content and meaning units. The analysis is done against the political and 
historical background of  the target phenomenon, and is potentially influenced by the researcher positionality 
and research question. Reflexivity is used as both an additional analytical device and another form of  
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narrative. It is deployed when tackling the issues of  suicide, victim hierarchy, and identification with the 
aggressor. The auto-ethnographic ‘I’ and the collective ‘we’ are used as the instruments of  delivery.  
WALTZING IN BEIRUT 
Outside the camp, journalist Ben Yishai sees a group of  women, old people, and children escorted by 
Lebanese Phalangist soldiers.  Among them there was “a kid holding up his hands in the air.” The scene is 22
familiar, it was “unreal, resembling the Warsaw ghetto.” "Stop the shooting, everybody go home,” IDF 
commander, Amos Yaron calls out through a megaphone in English. The massacre comes to an abrupt end 
(Levy 2009). Suddenly, the animated scenes give way to the real footage of  the massacre, the last scene of  
Waltz With Bashir (2008).    
In the film, the protagonist, director Folman himself, interviews fellow veterans of  the 1982 Lebanon invasion 
to reconstruct his own memories of  his service in Lebanon. Folman discovers that he cannot recall much 
from that period, especially regarding the  Sabra and Shatila massacre.  Waltz is not a film with an 23
undeviating patriotic narrative traditionally associated with the genre; it is more of  a representation of  
memory conveyed through a filmed reality (Bazin 1967). Examining strands of  memory, Yosef  (2011) claims 
that the film critiqued Israel’s responsibility for Palestinian suffering and avoided acting out the Jewish-Israeli 
victimhood discourse by challenging the exclusivity of  the Shoah. However, memory as a method of  
conveyance is problematic in its fidelity. It can be psychologically loaded, and is therefore vulnerable to 
questioning especially when what is remembered is related to a collective trauma.  
 The Phalanges Party (Al-Kataeb in Arabic, the battalions) is a Lebanese Christian political party, mainly supported by Maronite 22
Christians.  
 On September 16, 1982, following the Israeli invasion of  Lebanon, the Phalange militia stormed the Palestinian Sabra and Shatila 23
refugee camps in West Beirut and began a massacre which ended in the deaths of  hundreds of  mostly Palestinian civilians. The IDF 
surrounded the camps and provided the militia with coverage, or at least turned a blind eye to what was happening [Mohamad 2017]. 
For more details on the massacre, see Bayan Al-Hout’s book Sabra and Shatila: September 1982 [2004]
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It is convenient to make an ‘anti-war’ film about a long-gone war with an ostensibly ‘redemptive’ message 
(Levy 2009). But unlike what Yosef  (2011) claims, the IDF soldier in Waltz is viewed as going through a 
process of  sacrificial victimisation that overshadows the true role of  the perpetrator (Morag 2012). The focus 
on the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre shifts the trauma memory from perpetration to just simply 
witnessing. After all, it was the Phalangists who executed the massacre, and as Israeli-Jews, the message is ‘our 
hands are clean of  blood’ (Al-Hout 2004).  
Talking to his therapist, Ori Sivan, the trauma-haunted hero quickly learns that his obsession with the 
massacre is not because of  the IDF’s involvement in it, but rather because it ‘stems from a previous massacre.’ 
We learn that his parents were in Auschwitz and he had been exposed to the Shoah memories since he was six 
[01:05]. The therapist explains that the guilt experienced by the hero is because he has been “cast in the role 
of  the Nazi against his will.” As if  to say, it is because of  the Nazis, we are what we are (Levy 2009). The 
therapist continues, “We lit up the camps, but did not perpetrate the massacre.” This is a statement of  
innocence and an implied emphasis that IDF is, as always, ‘the most moral army in the world.’ It is also a 
suppressed ‘perpetrator trauma’ (Even-Tzur 2016).  
Waltz hardly takes advantage of  the well-known ability of  animation to stretch the boundaries of  reality and 
challenge the common perceptions. Despite its critical examination of  Israel’s collective memory, imagination 
remained within the scope of  the victimised Jew. Viewed as media narrative loaded with latent meanings and 
analysed from a Palestinian perspective,, Waltz tells us that an IDF soldier’s guilt and responsibility are 
symbolically redeemed through the intimate attachment to an imagined reality of  a long-gone ‘chosen 
trauma’ and the detachment from the current physical reality. Consider, for instance, that upon receiving the 
Golden Globe for the film in 2009, director Ari Folman did not mention the war in Gaza which was at its 
peak at that point (Yudilovitch 2009). The images of  the massacre in the camps and the ones coming out of  
Gaza were eerily similar.   
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THE SHOAH AS A REMEMBERED TRAUMA     
Drawing on Bar-Tal’s conceptions of  collective memory (2007, 2013) and supplemented by Volkan’s ‘chosen 
trauma’ (e.g. 2004, 2006), it might be suggested that Waltz is a reconceptualisation of  an old logic. It tells us 
about the past in a fashion functional to the society’s present existence. It constructs a narrative that has some 
basis in actual events but is biased, selective, and distorted in ways that meet the society’s present needs (Bar-
Tal 2007). In the film, the traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of  ‘normal’ 
reality. The historical context is lost, giving way to an old trauma to be reembodied and to fit in Israel’s 
current reality. The Lebanon War led the IDF soldier to self-discovery, but the process only made sense 
through collective memory. This memory authorised a state of  over-dramatisation and invoked powerful 
emotional and psychological reactions (Benbassa 2010), that instead of  invoking grief  for the massacred 
Palestinians, it made the viewers feel sorry for the soldier. Israel in this case, Lentin (2010) remarks, mourns 
itself  rather than its Palestinian victims.   
Waltz is not unique in this respect, other films of  the era that set on challenging Israel’s memory paradigm 
ended up reaffirming the country’s master-narrative. Like in Waltz, the soldiers in Samuel Maoz’s film Lebanon 
(2009) are depicted as both victims and witnesses in a conflict that was obtruded upon them. The story takes 
place mostly inside a sweaty and claustrophobic tank, in which four young soldiers are trying to survive in an 
extremely hostile environment. Their only communication with the outside world is through the tank 
gunsight. The gunsight is important because it emphasises the soldiers’ victimhood: first, as with the usage of  
animation in Waltz, it creates a barrier between the inside and the outside of  the tank, hence dissociating and 
separating the soldiers from their actions, and second, through the concepts of  enclosure and isolation.  
In the first case, the infamous saying ‘shooting and crying’ attributed to the IDF in the first Lebanon War 
takes a life on its own. In many scenes the trauma is presented through the soldiers’ tears. Yigal, the tank 
driver, for example, is seen sobbing near the end of  the film. The gritty, ultra-realistic, and claustrophobic 
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scenes from inside the tank encourage the viewers to see the world through the soldiers’ eyes. They are meant 
to identify with the soldiers’ anxiety and claustrophobia and, by extension, their victimhood. Yosef  (2011) 
explains that, the very narrow view of  the world through the gunsight creates a certain distance between the 
viewers and the invading soldiers, on one side, and the horrors of  war endured by the Lebanese population, 
on the other. He further elaborates (p. 148) that the soldiers’ victimisation “… is heightened through the 
association of  the Arab enemy with murderousness: in one episode, Arab soldiers, their faces and heads 
covered, threaten a Lebanese mother and daughter at gunpoint and use them as a human shield. Despite the 
commander’s orders to open fire on them, Shmulik [the artillerist who represents Moaz’s personal 
experience] refuses to do so.” The real sadist in the film, however, is their guide, the Christian Phalangist 
Ashraf  who threatens to tear the Syrian captive’s body apart. In Waltz, the Phalangists massacred Palestinians 
and ‘we were innocent.’ In Lebanon it was the Phalangists who wanted to torture the Syrian captive and, once 
again, ‘we had nothing to do it.’ Like Waltz, Lebanon — through dissociation and separation — seeks to 
redeem Israel’s troubled conscience. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the only tank member to die was 
Yigal, whose Hebrew name literally means ‘he will redeem’ (ibid.).  
In the second case, the limited perspective that the tank gunsight provides means that everyone outside the 
tank is seen as an enemy (Benziman 2013). The sense of  enclosure and isolation here is perhaps a reference 
to Israel’s siege mentality. From this perspective, collective memory is reconstructed, as in Waltz, to see the 
Jewish past as a continuation of  the present, not least through depicting the war as an imposed battle for 
survival. The reference to the Shoah is not clearly present in the film as it is in Waltz, but the act of  
remembering and acting out the Jewish past is very similar.   
In a way, the above cinematic representations reflect how changes in the conflict change society’s perception 
of  it. Unlike the pre-1990s films, which chiefly focused on the heroic Zionist model (Ben-David 2009), several 
modern films did not shy away from challenging the dominant ethos about Israel’s past (also see: Beaufort 
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[2007] in the next chapter). The problem remains, however, that these films still found a way to provide the 
components that a society in conflict so desperately needs to maintain the in-group’s positive self-image and 
beliefs about the justness of  the cause and goals (Benziman 2013; see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). Even though 
Folman and Maoz sought to challenge Israel’s dominant narratives, their films variably confirmed that 
collective memory still steered and gave meaning to today’s reality.  
Bar-Tal and others (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2013, 2014; e.g. Lentin 2010; Ofer 2013) have long 
suggested that collective memory has several important functions, such as justifying the outbreak of  conflict, 
providing a positive image of  the in-group, delegitimising the opponent, and presenting the in-group’s society 
as victims of  the opponent. As a ‘chosen trauma,’ (Volkan 2004, 2006) the Shoah in today’s Israel fits this 
pattern almost perfectly. Being a victim of  the opponent, however, is maybe the most salient and at times 
most defining of  these functions, so much so it became a collective identity in itself.  
As early as the 1950s the Shoah memory started to be used as a ‘political facilitator’ in Israel’s wars with the 
Arabs and the conflict with the Palestinians. Zertal (2005) maintains that almost every war in Israel’s history 
from 1948 until the present has been conceptualised in terms of  the Shoah. The Shoah narrative also came to 
explain, to stand for, and to predict Israeli-Jewish anxiety and fear in the two Palestinian Intifadas, showing 
that the current actualities of  Israel’s military might did not necessarily bring about a parallel decrease in 
existential fear (Ochs 2006). Moreover, as it will be discussed later, the Shoah memory has been used as a 
political tool for justifying Israel’s actions and to gather support — Margalit (2002) calls this ‘Operation 
Holocaust Memory.’    
BEFORE THE SHOAH 
There is the argument that the significance of  the Shoah memory also stems from being part of  a continuum 
of  suffering (see: Benbassa 2010, Falk 1993) or what Salo Cohen labelled the ‘lachrymose’ Jewish history 
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(Steinfels 1989). Falk argued in several studies (1993, 1996, 2008) that Jewish history has been characterised 
by the inability to mourn the past, which trapped the Jews in a time bubble. Falk also thinks that today’s 
myths are in fact reproductions of  yesterday’s miseries despite the difference in context and circumstances. 
Myths like the ‘chosen people’ were invented to act as a coping mechanism in the midst of  uncertainty and 
anxiety which characterised the last 2000 years of  Jewish history. This evaluation is in line with Bar-Tal’s 
hypothesis (2007, 2013, 2014) that in a conflict situation mythical inventions are indeed required as 
(transferrable) coping tactics: to bolster the in-group’s positive self-image by showing they have coped 
successfully against the opponent.  
Adding to the existing literature on memory (e.g. Falk 1993;. Bar-Tal 2000b, 2007, 2013; Volkan 2004, 2006), 
it may be proposed that perhaps as the Shoah memory took a grip on the Israeli-Jewish collective, it did so on 
the back of  already established thinking patterns in Jewish history. These patterns acted as a quick launching-
pad for the production, reproduction and dissemination of  the Shoah memory. This may be attributed to the 
fact that, unlike most of  their contemporaries, ancient Jews were not particularly interested in historiography 
in the sense of  exploring the past (Sand 2009); rather, they focused on ‘remembering’ and assigned a decisive 
religious significance to history (Niroumand 1995). Before the Shoah, the Bible served as the most powerful 
constitutive myth of  the new collectivity (Kimmerling 2001, p.117). The word zachor (remember) appears in 
the Hebrew bible no less than 169 times, most often in the unconditional command and usually with Israel or 
God as the subject. The word is complemented by its obverse, forgetting. “Since Israel is enjoined to 
remember, so is it adjured not to forget” (Yerushalmi 1982, p.5).  
In the lives of  many Jews — religious and secular — the Biblical zachor is translated into repetitive rituals 
during the Jewish festivals of  the year. The Jewish holiday cycle commemorates the past while separating it 
from aspects of  history and chronology (Hagman 2016). This generally falls under the concept of  
commemorative memory. But part of  this memory may be non-commemorative because the past can 
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infiltrate the present through the use of  culturally loaded phrases or unconscious association with particular 
past events (Schudson 1997, in: Zandberg et al. 2012). 
Invoking a distant memory such as the Passover may be consciously manipulated for political gains, a 
deliberate attempt to shape collective memory (Mazzoleni 2015). But that can only be facilitated when the 
past is already viewed as part of  a larger mythical continuum that defies the constraints of  realism and 
immediacy. It suggests that history repeats itself  and Israeli-Jews today, just like Diaspora Jews in the past, are 
victims whose very existence is constantly threatened (Zandberg et al. 2012). In this sense, collective anxiety 
can never be the product of  an elite invention or manipulation by itself. Rather, discursive manoeuvres of  this 
kind become effective only when they respond to deep and genuine social concerns (Zertal 2000).   
The liberation of  the Hebrew slaves from Egypt, which is commemorated on Passover becomes a reminder 
of  the victimhood memory of  the galut (exile/diaspora). Every year on Passover, in many Jewish homes the 
famous passage from Haggadah  is read, “In each and every generation they rise up against us to destroy 24
us” (Seeberg et al. 2013). As a narrative textuality, the Haggadah informs and confirms that ‘in every 
generation emerges a Pharaoh who would come after us.’ Be it Haman, Nebuchadnezzar, Hitler, Nasser, or 
Ahmadinejad, all similar from a psychohistorical point of  view. It is not difficult, in this light, to understand 
how this idea repeated each year, at what is still the most widely observed Jewish festival, has profoundly 
shaped the cognitive and emotional orientations of  Israel’s Jewish imagination. Cohen (2014) comments that 
many Jews leave the Seder (festive) table convinced, once again, that they are the eternal victims, outsiders, 
never accepted, forever threatened. In this victimhood discourse, collective memory is used to reconstruct the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a linear historical continuation of  the Exodus from Egypt, the Passover, the 
hostile Amalekites, and everything in between — all the way to the Shoah.  
 The Haggadah (telling) is a book that Jews read on the first night of  Passover. It tells about the Jews’ slavery in Egypt and God’s 24
intervention to free them.
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REVERSE-ENGINEERING THE SHOAH MEMORY 
Whilst ancient history provided certain patterns for remembering, it is through the Shoah that the Jewish 
narratives of  victimhood has been confirmed and enhanced. As it will be later highlighted in the discussion 
on the Eichmann Trial and the Nazification of  Arabs, ancient Jewish history developed a new, more 
profound meaning in the light of  the Shoah. Contrary to the common belief, this did not happen 
simultaneously with Israel’s establishment or immediately after. 
With the establishment of  a Jewish homeland the Jews were meant to forget the past and live as a renewed 
people: independent, capable, and free from the galut. This notion represented a diaspora that had to be 
destroyed and forgotten (Young 1993). The Shoah was initially looked at as the climax of  centuries of  the galut 
but was yet to be deemed a ‘chosen trauma’ that redefined the core structure of  collective memory and 
identity of  the newly established state (Volkan 2004, 2006, Bar-Tal 2007, 2014; Kelman 1999). In those early 
years, Israel’s founders found little reason to remember the Shoah beyond its geo-political link to the newly 
established state (Young 1993.). Auschwitz and Treblinka were conceived as the Jewish political and cultural 
alternatives to Zionism  and the remembering of  the Shoah, when it took place at all, became a justification 25
for the ideals of  Zionism. This remembering was based mainly on the militant and power-oriented dimension 
of  the Biblical zachor (Zertal 2005).  
Zerubavel (1991) tells us that it was especially important for Zionism to present certain events in ancient and 
pre-state histories as victories, regardless of  their actual outcomes. National pride and the notion of  revolt 
was central to the Zionist thought because it symbolised the ancient Hebrews’ stands that led them to defend 
 It is argued, though, that given that Zionism predated the Nazi era by about four decades, the grand assumption that Israel’s 25
existence was conditional on the Shoah must be called into question (Ellis 1990). Should a Jewish State had been established before 
the Shoah, chances are the genocide would have happened regardless. In the beginning of  the Nazi persecution, Jews experienced 
hardships, expulsions, some murders and pogroms, but no-one envisaged such an extreme outcome. Unlikely, the leaders of  such a 
small state would have been able to forecast the destruction of  European Jewry (Oz 1983). 
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their nation’s freedom. Because much of  the outcome of  these events was questionable, the Zionist multiple 
forms of  narrative shifted the focus almost exclusively to the acts of  rebelling and heroism. 
They emphasised the initial successes, but downplayed the defeats that eventually led to the galut. It is no 
surprise then that the new established Jewish State sought to endow upon itself  a transcendental and meta-
historical character that established a quasi-official divorce from the close memory, namely the annihilation 
of  a third of  the Jewish people. The thousands of  Shoah survivors who arrived in Israel in the years 1945-55 
were the ‘absent presentees’ since it was heroes, not victims, that Zionism celebrated. It was the Sabra, ghetto 
fighters and partisans that represented the values of  the Jewish states, not those who were viewed as passive in 
the Nazi death camps (Ofer 2013; Zertal 2005; Segev 1993). 
It might be argued that in the process of  searching for roots, the Jewish past was reconstructed to transcend 
its function as a chronological phenomenon and was instrumentalised to fulfil psychological and political 
requirements. The events selected for this purpose were not all evaluated in the same way (Schwartz et al. 
1986). Possibly influenced by the ancient Biblical approach to historiography, the emphasis was placed on 
memory and remembering. But as it was established, memory is hardly a reliable source of  history (e.g. Falk 
1993/96, 2005; Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013/14; Volkan 2004; Kelman 2007/8; Lentin 2010). This practically 
meant that in order to achieve certain political purposes, history’s epistemological claims were devalued in 
favour of  memory’s meaningfulness (Olick & Robbins 1998). Myths were then invented and new but more 
suiting historical narratives were created (Flapan 1987).  
The battle of  Masada (73 A.D.), for example, was one of  the least significant and least successful events in 
ancient Jewish history, yet it was utilised to emphasise the Jewish settlers’ ‘struggle’ in the pre-Israel Palestine 
(Schwartz et al. 1986). Egyptian thinker Abdul-Wahhab Al-Messiri (1999, 2001) explains that Zionism 
historiography was selective; it said almost nothing about the other Jewish fortresses — such as Herodium — 
that at the time (70 A.D.) chose surrender to the Romans over suicide or fighting to death. Al-Messiri 
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particularly criticises the Zionist ‘glorification of  suicide.’ But, busy critiquing Zionism, he disregarded the 
fact that suicide has been glorified in Palestinian revolutionary thoughts too. We attributed suicide attacks to 
power asymmetries and argued that everyone in Israel was a soldier. We even drew analogies between suicide 
bombers and the Japanese kamikaze (see: Bishara 2001). On a self-reflexive note, during my undergrad years 
at the height of  the second Intifada the idea of  a Palestinian Kamikaze, the intellectualisation and heroisation 
of  suicide, appealed to me. In hindsight, however, I feel my prior experience and assumptions continue to 
haunt my current mindset. While I question the morality of  suicide bombing, I still feel that questioning the 
motives is unsettling for the notion of  Palestinian justice. In a similar vein, Al-Missiri, although an authority 
on Israel and Zionism, may have struggled to draw a clear line between his consciousness as an Egyptian who 
witnessed Israel’s aggression against Egypt firsthand and his scholarship. His argument as a result came out 
as an expression of  duality: our suicide is legitimate and heroic, theirs is not. This duality may stop us from 
seeing that the difference between the Jewish slogan: “Masada shall not fall again,” and the Palestinian: “We 
shall die standing like the trees” is mere semantics. 
Similar mythologisation was applied to the Bar Kokhba Revolt against the Romans (132 A.D.) and, later in 
mandate Palestine, to the so-called battle of  Tel-Hai in 1920  (Zerubavel 1991, 1995). The themes of  active 26
heroism, although in principle meant to counter-balance the themes of  victimisation, remained closely tied to 
the notion of  sacrifice. It is, in other words, victimhood without the ‘passivity’ — the warrior-victim model. 
This idea would evolve to represent and formulate the concept of  an Israeli army — a powerful army, yet ‘on 
the defence,’ hence the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).   
By linking the Shoah and Jewish history to the post-state events, a new psychological continuum of  suffering 
was established. As Israel commemorates and deepens the societal representations of  the Shoah, the list of  
Shoah victims increases every year. Every time Israeli-Jewish lives are lost to Palestinian attacks, the Shoah 
 A 1920 brief  yet fatal battle between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish settlers that took place at the Jewish settlement of  Tel Hai in 26
Northern Galilee. See: Zerubavel’s “The Politics of  Interpretation: Tel-Hai in Israel's Collective Memory” (1991)
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becomes more pronounced and the entirety of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes — increasingly — part 
of  the Jewish continuum of  suffering. As in Waltz, many in the Israeli-Jewish collective fail to see a cause and 
effect in the “conflict.” Israel’s actions are viewed as protective, redemptive, or justly retributive and 
Palestinian ones are unjust or nothing but mindless terrorism directed at Jews qua Jews (see next chapter: 
terrorism as perception). This approach to memory, as it will be elaborated in the coming sections, has 
created certain conflict ethos and collective emotional orientations that served to prolong the conflict and 
deepen the in-group’s sense of  collective victimhood  (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009a/b,).  
THE EICHMANN TRIAL   
It took a few years after the state for Zionism to embrace the Shoah as the chief  definer for the nation’s 
collective memory. It is believed that when Nazi SS officer, Adolf  Eichmann, stood trial in Jerusalem in 1961, 
the silence around the Shoah was broken (Arendt 1963; Evron 1981; Segev 1993; Loshitzky 1997; Lustick 
2015). The Israeli public were exposed to a multitude of  testimonies which brought to light the magnitude of  
trauma of  the Shoah survivors (Alexander & Dromi 2011). The trial worked as a medium between the post-
Shoah young generation and the Shoah, psychologically binding them with the Shoah survivors and their 
suffering. Segev (1993, p.361) comments that “…the Eichmann trial marked the beginning of  a dramatic shift 
in the way Israeli-Jews related to the Shoah.”   
The broken silence did not, however, mark a complete shift from the ‘New Jew’ to the post-Zionist Jew (Ben-
Ami 2010), neither did it present a memory entrepreneurship completely separate from what Yerushalmi 
(1982) called the ‘traditional Jewish memory.’ The fact that the Shoah was only partially spoken about (at least 
officially) did not mean it was not silently, but powerfully, at work. The trial, in reality, renewed the national 
attention to the Shoah (Rose 2005). The inclusion of  Shoah survivors provided the concretisation needed for 
nurturing the memory of  the Shoah as an essential component in Israel’s victimhood (Amir 2012). Yablonka 
(cited by Macumber 2013) reflects that the Eichmann Trial led to a processing of  the Shoah information into a 
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new kind of  identity-based ‘knowing.’ It propelled an entire nation to undergo a process of  self-reckoning 
(Loshitzky 1997). 
Moreover, the Trial proceedings were used as a form of  narrative for the uniqueness of  the Holocaust, 
privatising its memory to officially become the Shoah, deeply and exclusively Jewish. The Shoah  would become 
a central component of  Jewish identity and a linchpin of  Jewish unity and solidarity. It would act as the 
unifying factor for the socially divided Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews; allowing Oriental Jews into the Israeliness 
and the monolithic collective memory which European Jews represented (Shohat 1988; Segev 1993; 
Oppenheimer 2010). It also became the ‘social glue’ that bonded Israeli-Jews and the world Jewry together 
(Bar-Tal et al. 2009a/b).  
THE SHOAH ETHOS  
It might have been easier for the Mossad to simply kill Eichmann in Argentina, but the psychological and 
political value of  the Trial was perhaps more important. It was a needed group therapy or a posthumous 
moral triumph for a society inundated with Shoah survivors (Cebulski 2007). In contrast to the Nuremberg 
Trial which took a human rights approach, Israel decided that the central focus of  their presentation should 
be the entirety of  the Shoah, not as narrated in documentary proof  but through victim testimonies (Levy & 
Sznaider 2006; Mertens 2005). They wanted a trial that emphatically highlighted the Jewish victimhood 
through the personal stories/narratives of  the victims. Those stories were legally irrelevant to Eichmann, but 
as the case for narrative, they were meant to reflect the subjective experience of  the survivors and therefore 
invoke emotional and psychological reactions. This also aimed to transform the world’s view of  the Shoah and 
Israel (Landsman 2012) 
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What started as individual narratives of  the Shoah memory soon became a crucial signifier for Israel’s distinct 
collectivity and, as a result, evolved into ethos, an epistemic foundation for hegemonic social consciousness 
(Bar-Tal 1998, 2000a, 2007, 2013).  
The core ethos that the new belief  paradigm on the Shoah established was (and still is) that Zionism was the 
only replacement for the galut and Israel the only safe haven for Jews. Today, this notion can be found almost 
in all types of  narrative (scholarship, media, arts, signs and symbols) in Israel and amongst many Jews abroad. 
Media seems to be leading the way. Following the shootings in Copenhagen in February 2015, Netanyahu 
echoed remarks he made after the Paris attacks on Charlie Hebdo in January that year, urging European Jews 
to emigrate to Israel, potentially to escape ‘anti-Semitic and murderous attacks’ (Beaumont 2015). The calls 
for European Jews to ‘come home’ was based on the assumption that Jews outside Eretz Yisrael (Land of  Israel) 
are still a galut community and will always be at risk, and that only Israel can guarantee their security and 
well-being.  
A similar message was also directed at America’s Jewry. In 2011, after criticism by many American Jews, the 
Israeli government withdrew a controversial ad campaign that was running in the US. The ad urged Israeli-
Jewish expatriates not to marry American Jews or raise their children in the United States, and implored 
them to return to Israel (Omega News 2011). The subtext was about the fragility of  Jewish existence and the 
maintenance of  Israeli Jewishness as the true Jewish identity. The advertisement features an Israeli-Jewish girl, 
Dafna, observing Israel’s Memorial Day, while her American boyfriend, Josh, looks on vacantly. “They will 
alway remain Israelis,” says the voice-over. “Their partners won’t understand what this means.” While 
Memorial Day is officially a commemoration of  ‘Israel’s fallen soldiers and victims of  terrorism,’ it includes 
in its entirety the grand narrative of  victimhood. So much so that the Israeli Ministry of  Defence, which 
records the ‘fallen Jewish soldiers,’ goes in its records as far back as the late 1800s when a 'Palestinian Jew’ 
was killed by other Palestinians in a robbery attempt. Although a non-political criminal offence, the accident 
was deemed part of  the Jewish struggle in Palestine long before the actual political clashes between Zionism 
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and the indigenous population took place (Bar-Tal 2013).  American Jews, Israel’s most prominent 27
supporters, are conceived in the advertisement as not Jewish enough since they do not literally share Israel’s 
Zionist-Jewish perception of  the Shoah memory, the eternal suffering and victimisation, or fully identify with 
the Israeli-Jewish worldview. Moving to America, the message implies, leads to the erosion of  Jewish 
consciousness (Kershner & Berger 2001). The concern is that American Jews will always be second-class 
American citizens and third-rate Jews.. To be an Israeli-Jew, a true Jew, is to be associated with trauma and 
victimisation and to make aliyah (literally: ascent, to immigrate) to Israel, because anywhere outside Israel is a 
galut (Rejwan 1999; Barnett 2016).   28
  
The post Eichmann Shoah memory also served to (and continues to do) confirm the established ethos about 
Israel being uniquely moral and innocent, emphasising the country’s positive self-image as being a ’targeted 
and vulnerable’ community. This in other words intensified the old siege mentality (Bar-Tal Bar-Tal & Antebi 
1992a/b). The Shoah gave this siege mentality a new, deeper meaning and a sense of  immediacy, especially as 
the Trial came at the height of  the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Nazi crimes were cast not in terms of  
international aggression, but exclusively as a crime against the Jewish people. In a way, it “disconnected Nazi 
criminality from the issue of  world order,” (Meierhenrich & Pendas 2017, p.224) and merged it into the 
continuum of  Jewish suffering (see: Benbassa 2010). At the time, Hannah Arendt (1963) insightfully observed 
that Israel would conduct the Trial for calculated political purposes. The new Israeli-Jewish generation would 
be readied to see certain things with a purpose in mind.  
What Arendt actually foresaw was that the post-Eichmann new (or modified) system of  ethos would take over 
the Israeli-Jewish society and be used in the reconstruction of  collective memory and the redefinition of  
Israel’s perception of  and response to the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict(s). It seems that Israel 
  In Righteous Victims (2001), Morris begins to attribute the killings of  the Jews to nationalistic circumstances only at the start of  the 27
the 20th century when Palestinian Arabs protested against the Jewish immigration to Palestine.
 Most recently in July 2019, Israeli education minister and orthodox rabbi, Rafi Peretz, described in a cabinet meeting the 28
integration and intermarriage of  Diaspora Jews, especially in North America as a ‘second Holocaust.’  Peretz’s comments received a 
storm of  criticism in Israel and abroad. See more:  [Pfeffer, A., Haaretz, 11 July 2019, Chernick, I. The Jerusalem Post, 11 July 2019]
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needed a new, more psychologically and politically fitting belief  system (ethos) to establish a “coherent and 
compressive systematic pattern of  knowledge” that would orient the behaviour of  society members, the 
structure and functioning of  that society, and guide its leaders’ decision-making process (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 
174-75). Initially, this ethos focused on the themes of  justness of  the Jewish goals and the victimisation of  the 
Jewish people. Both themes gave rise and were themselves enhanced by themes about positive self-image and 
identity. For this to work effectively, certain beliefs that aimed at delegitimising and demonising the opponent 
had to emerge. Almost immediately it became nearly a policy that the Arabs and Palestinians be depicted as 
hand in glove with the Nazis. For the new Shoah survivors and many others in the new state, the ‘Arabs’ were 
a continuation of  what they fled from in Europe. Bishara comments (2015), — and as it will be discussed in 
the next section — that these survivors suffered serious vertigo and thought of  the Palestinians as Nazis in 
kuffiyehs.    
NAZI ARABS    
During the Trial, rarely was there a mention of  Eichmann and other Nazi criminals without adding the 
Arab-Nazi dimension to it: first, by massive references to the presence of  Nazi scientists and advisors in 
Egypt, and second, by pointing out the ongoing connections between Arabs and Nazi leaders, and the ‘Nazi-
inspired’ Arab intentions to annihilate Israel. The most interesting was the continuous mentioning in the 
media of  the Mufti of  Jerusalem’s connection with the Nazi regime (Zertal 2000). Massad (2006, p. 132) 
observes that the Mufti “provided the Israelis with their best propaganda linking the Palestinians with the 
Nazis and European anti-Semitism.” The obsession with linking Palestinians to the Shoah also led the editors 
of  the Encyclopedia of  the Holocaust to give the Mufti a master role: “The article on the Mufti is more than twice 
as long as the articles on Goebbels and Goering, longer than the articles on Himmler and Heydrich 
combined, longer than the article on Eichmann — of  all the biographical articles, it is exceeded in length, 
but only slightly, by the entry for Hitler” (Novick 2000, p.158). Nowadays, at Yad Vashem the tour of  
remembrance in the museum is concluded by a wall dedicated to the Mufti’s connection with the Nazis. 
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Segev (1993, p.425) comments, “The visitor is left to conclude that there is much in common between the 
Nazis’ plan to destroy the Jews and the Arab enmity.” 
Perhaps that very belief  is what encouraged Netanyahu recently to frame the Mufti as the primary inciter 
behind the Final Solution (Rudoren 2015, Richards 2015). Haaretz (Shalev 2015b) described Netanyahu’s 
comments on the Mufti as ‘madness.’ However, as far as the conflict ethos is concerned, it might be argued 
that there is a systematic method involved, a build-up of  the storyline that he has been pushing since the start 
of  the recent eruption of  violence in late 2015 [referring to the stabbing Intifada]. First Netanyahu spoke of  
Abbas’ “Big Lie,” alluding to the term most identified with Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef  Goebbels; then 
he sent Minister Yuval Steinitz to compare Abbas’ incitement directly with Nazi agitation against the Jews, 
and then the Mufti-Hitler liaison story. And most recently he described the Palestinian opposition to 
settlements as ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Tobin 2016). According to i24 News (Oct. 2015), 53% of  Israeli-Jews 
disagreed with Netanyahu’s Mufti comments. The News, however, did not tell us how many of  those 
surveyed were ‘Israeli Arabs’ nor sounded any alarms about that fact that over a quarter of  those surveyed 
did, in fact, agree with Netanyahu — not by any means a tiny section of  the Israeli-Jewish society.   
Such analogies are convenient as they reduce the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a mere Palestinian hatred of  
Jews (see next chapter: terrorism as perception). Playing to a political culture so quick to associate Arabs and 
Palestinians with impending Auschwitz (Qureshi & Sells 2003). Palestinians and Arabs are motivated by 
nothing more than an irrational anti-Semitism, and that is why they refuse to accept Israel as a Jewish state in 
their midst. Commenting on the wave of  stabbings in 2015, Goldberg (2015b) wrote in The Atlantic that one 
of  the tragedies of  the settlement movement, a known reason behind Palestinian resentment, is that it 
obscures what might be the actual root cause of  the Middle East conflict: “the unwillingness of  many Muslim 
Palestinians to accept the notion that Jews are a people who are indigenous to the land Palestinians believe to 
be exclusively their own.” Goldberg concludes that the Palestinian youth are inevitably carrying on a 
tradition of  anti-Jewish sentiment, motivating them to stab anyone who is remotely Jewish. The occupation 
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and oppression are never mentioned. In a world that is opposed to both colonialism and anti-Semitism, Israel 
uses one in defence of  the other (Massad 2012).  
Nasser and Arafat were subjected to a similar narrative (Massad 2006). Nasser was depicted as the Arab 
Hitler, associated with Nazi type of  activity and ideology. His book Philosophy of  the Revolution was portrayed as 
the equivalent of  Hilter’s Main Kampf  (Sharvit & Halperin 2016). Given Egypt’s military and political 
influence at the time and Nasser’s anti-colonial ideology, nazifying Nasser might have been a convenient 
political hyperbole, a method of  demonisation. It was also part of  a global tendencies in the wake of  World 
War II to label ‘the enemy’ as a Nazi. The Daily Mail, in the wake of  the nationalisation of  the Suez Canal, 
for example, referred to Nasser as ‘Hitler of  the Nile’ (Alteras 1993). At the time, Eden compared Nasser to 
Hitler, and Winston Churchill remarked in a conversation with Eden, that he “never knew before that 
Munich was situated on the Nile” (Renshon 2007). Israel’s daily Ma’ariv justified the 1956 invasion of  Egypt 
by claiming that it prevented Nasser from becoming ‘Hitler of  the East.’  Meanwhile, Israel insisted, in 29
correspondences with foreign leaders, that the invasion was a form of  self-defence and invoked the Shoah 
memory as a time when no-one defended the Jews (Massad 2006). The Nazi rhetoric was also remobilised 
after the 1967 War. Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister at the time, referred to the conquered territories as 
the ‘Auschwitz lines.’ By defining the return to the pre-1967 borders as ‘something of  a memory of  
Auschwitz,’ he was evoking the temporal persistence of  the Shoah into the present, and indirectly labelling 
Israel’s enemies, Egypt especially, in Nazi terms (Perugini & Gordon 2015). Later, in the wake of  the 
Lebanon invasion, the Arab Nazism was brought up again by historian Bernard Lewis, who devoted an 
entire chapter in his short history of  anti-Semitism   to Arab Nazism (Finkelstein 2003). 30
Mainly due to geopolitics and the power structure, the Israeli Nazi narrative directed at the Palestinians is 
particularly questionable. This ‘tactic,’ while part of  Israel’s conflict ethos that aims to demonise the 
 For more information on the joint British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, see: [Aljazeera Feb. 29 2008] http://29
www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517304630655.html
 Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (1986)30
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opponent and preserve a positive self-image (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2017), is also — in the Palestinian case — a 
desire to displace the guilt of  perpetration upon the victim (see next section: displacement). Fisk (2006) recalls 
cynically how Ariel Sharon repeatedly called Arafat a ‘mass murderer’ — a term with genocidal inferences 
— at a time when Israeli jets were raining bombs on Beirut. Israeli PM Menachem Begin also called the PLO 
a ‘neo-Nazi organisation,’ and later, likened his decision to go after Arafat in Beirut to attacking "Hitler in his 
bunker” (Pfeffer 2014). 
Begin did more than build a simple analogy between the Lebanon War and the Shoah. He used the Shoah and 
related terms, like Hitler and Nazi, as both epistemological and moral instruments, what Ilan Peleg (2015) 
calls ‘analytical devices.’ In his reductionist symbolism, Begin viewed the world as full of  new Nazis ready to 
annihilate the Jewish people (Rowland & Frank 2002). That included the PLO which did not at any point 
qualify as an existential threat to Israel. Lang (1996) quotes Begin's justification to the Israeli cabinet on the 
eve of  the Israeli invasion of  Lebanon in June 1982: "The alternative is Treblinka, and we have decided there 
will be no more Treblinkas.” This frame of  mind may have led to the worst of  self-defence and security 
ethos, ‘if  we do not kill, we will cease to exist’ (Enns 2012). Avraham Burg (2008, p.24) argued that, “…a state 
that lives by the sword and worships its dead is bound to live in a constant state of  emergence, because 
everyone is a Nazi, everyone is an Arab, and the entire world is against us.”    
THE SHOAH ETHOS TODAY  
Since Begin much changed in the conflict and so did some of  Israel’s conflict ethos. Under the conditions and 
experiences of  the prolonged intractable conflict with the Palestinians the Shoah ethos has evolved to become 
ever more salient. Bar-Tal (2013) points out that ethos, similar to collective memory and to which it is 
inherently linked, is not stable and adapts to new conditions and situations. It changes when it ceases to 
reflect the reality of  society or becomes invalid (Oren & Bar-Tal 2014). Put different, like collective memory, 
ethos is reactive and reconstructable. It may represent a new set of  [shared] beliefs that emerge due to new 
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developments in the conflict, or be built upon existing ones. Either way, the sole purpose of  the conflict ethos 
is to provide a clear picture of  the conflict - its goals, conditions, and requirements (Bar-Tal 1998, 2000, 
2007, 2013).  
Nowadays, as the conflict reached an unprecedented deadlock, not only did the old shared beliefs evolve but 
new ones also emerged. To exemplify, Bar-Tal has long argued that societal beliefs about peace have been a 
significant part in Israel’s conflict ethos (e.g. 1998, 2007, 2013). But as the peace process failed (and this for 
Israeli-Jews was an unprecedented development), old beliefs like ‘Palestinians want to destroy the Jews' 
became more pronounced, and new beliefs like ‘there is no Palestinian partner’ were embraced. The old 
ethos facilitated and confirmed the new ethos, and vice versa. As far as the Shoah is concerned, this dynamic 
meant that as the conflict developed, the initial politically specific ethos that followed the Eichmann trial 
became indistinguishable from the collective socio-psychological infrastructure of  the conflict today. That 
made the Shoah a comprehensive force that further defined Israel’s identity as a victim identity (see: Kelman 
1999, 2001). Against this identity most other identities, especially that of  the Palestinians, are measured and 
evaluated, and through it the entirety of  the conflict is appraised. This, among other things, translated into a 
process of  social integration; that is, to be full members of  society, Israeli-Jews are expected to have at least a 
basic identification with the Shoah ethos (Oren & Bar-Tal 2014).  
 Jaspal and Yampolsky (2011) found in their study of  eleven Israeli-born Jewish students that the Shoah 
knowledge was perceived as an intrinsic part in being considered a real Israeli and to experience a sense of  
acceptance and inclusion in the Israeli-Jewish society. And, according to Cohen and Medovoy (2013), in 
Israeli high schools, three-quarters of  students and nearly all the teachers (96%) considered the Shoah to be a 
primary component of  their worldview. The Shoah is not an event to be studied per se; students are meant to 
feel an obligation to remember — to meet Judaism’s demands for zachor. In Oron’s study (1993, in: Klar et al. 
2013), most of  the respondents, college students, endorsed the statement that ‘all Jewish people must see 
themselves as Shoah victims.’ Whilst the study goes back to 1993, there are little indications that the Israeli-
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Jewish consciousness towards the Shoah is weakening, especially as the conflict has reached another level of  
intractability. Recently, 98.1% of  the respondents in a 2009 survey of  the Jewish–Israeli adult population 
(Arian 2012, in: ibid.) stated that remembering the Shoah was a guiding principle in their life; in fact, more 
important principle than other guiding principles such as ‘feeling part of  the Jewish people,’ ‘feeling part of  
Israeli society,’ ‘living in Israel’ or even ‘having a family.’  
Another study by Rinkevich-Pave (2008, in: Klar et al. 2013) looked at media as an indicator of  Israel’s 
identification with the Shoah belief  system. The study found that media’s repetitive reference to the Shoah and 
its variants has been essential in inculcating the conflict ethos, especially one related to collective victimhood 
and the justness of  the goals (see: e.g. Bar-Tal et al. 2009b; Vollhardt 2012; Schori-Eyal et al. 2014; Nour et al. 
2017). The study calculated how often the word Shoah and Shoah-inspired vocabulary appeared in a twelve-
month period (October 2007– September 2008) in Haaretz. The author compared this historical event with 
the number of  mentions of  the term Israeli–Arab conflict. ‘Shoah’ appeared 132 times, on average, every 
month, and ‘Israeli–Arab conflict’ appeared grosso modo the same number of  times (140 times being the 
monthly average).  
With the onset of  the Second Intifada, a study by Israeli-Jewish political scientist Uriel Abulof  showed that in 
the six years after 2001, the number of  articles in Haaretz focusing on the existential threats to the country 
increased by sixty-five percent (Blumenthal 2013).  The findings seem to support Bar-Tal’s claims (2007, 31
2013) that collective memory and ethos evolve in order to adapt to new conditions. The changes in the usage 
and intensity of  certain terms in the media and other sources of  narrative reflects this fact. When the media 
recalls repeatedly at periodic intervals the Jewish genocide, this ‘trauma rehearsal’ acts to ‘reset’ the strength of  
the otherwise decaying memory trace (Bower & Sivers 1998). Unlike direct exposure to a collective trauma, 
which may end when the acute phase of  the event is over, media exposure keeps the acute stressor active and 
alive in one’s mind (Holman et al. 2014). Even when the media approach to the Shoah is critical or trivialising, 
 244 mentions of  the Shoah and existential threats a year. 31
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it is still a form of  exposure to trauma. The Israeli satirical TV programme Ha-hamishia Ha-kamerit (The 
Chamber Quintet - 1992-97), for example, made several comical sketches about the Shoah ethos and memory. 
Despite their humorous nature, the sketches can also be viewed as a superimposition of  new memory agents 
over the traditional Shoah memory (Zandberg et al. 2012). While humorously critiqued the Shoah repertoire, 
the sketches like most media narratives helped further inculcate the Shoah’s presence in the collective psyche 
and consequently emphasised its salience in the conflict ethos. Not to mention, the relationship between the 
Shoah and its social representations is circular; there would not be a large media representation if  the Shoah 
narratives had not been salient to begin with.   
This salience is perhaps what led the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1989) to call Israel a Yad 
Vashem with an air force. Like many others but perhaps one of  the first, Friedman saw that the Shoah ethos 
over-imposed itself  on almost all facets of  Israel’s Jewish society. Not only was it an ideological/political 
instrument or an experiential element in cultural texts and artefacts like films and memoirs, it also made a 
strong presence even in the most mediocre of  social representations. To illustrate, in 2011 at a bus stop in Tel 
Aviv, an Israeli company, HighQ, specialised in preparing students for the matriculation exams, put up an 
advertising poster titled “Don’t leave us behind,” and “Education is our future” (see: fig. 1.2). Ostensibly, the 
poster is nothing uncommon and its message is mediocre. The text in the middle, however, apparently 
attributed to ten-year-old Maya, reads in Hebrew: “Yesterday, they said on the news that Israel has the most 
advanced missiles in the world, they said that our technological progress is the only reason we have not been 
thrown in the sea…I am scared, I do not know how to swim very well” (Maor 2011). The poster’s latent 
meaning is that education is purposed to prevent the annihilation of  the Jewish people.   
From a collective memory perspective, the poster draws the attention to the fear of  annihilation associated 
with the Shoah, and as ethos it emphasises the common themes around victimhood and justness of  the goals. 
The ‘technological advancement’ might also emphasise ethos themes like self-reliance and positive self-image 
(as an independent and capable group). The emphasis on threat is also a latent reference to security and 
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patriotism (see next chapter). As in Waltz (2008) and Lebanon (2009), the poster message takes the 
contradiction between military strength and victimhood with no scrutiny. Today, Israel has nuclear warheads, 
but the core conflict ethos is still around vulnerability and victimhood. In order to reconcile the ethos about 
victimhood with that of  military power, it is important to look at what can be described as ‘stubborn ethos’ 
— or what Bar-Tal terms the ‘freezing of  beliefs’ (2001, 2012). 
FROZEN BELIEFS  
Generally, the freezing of  beliefs implies a motivation to continue to hold certain beliefs as truthful, and a 
reluctance to search and process information that may refute them (Bar-Tal et al. 2012). In theory, such beliefs 
create a feeling of  security by providing society members with a sense of  readiness, control over their fate, 
solidarity, and act as an effective method of  mobilisation (Bar-Tal 2001). Instead of  providing a true sense of  
security, however, Israel’s growing military strength becomes a reminder of  the country’s vulnerability. 
‘Advanced missiles’ in this case serves to further freeze the ethos about victimhood and threat. It becomes 
nearly impossible — especially as the conflict continues and military prowess improves — for society 
members to reconsider their adherence to such ethos, which in turn obstructs any penetration of  any 
information that may facilitate development of  a peace process (Bar-Tal et al. 2012). Maya in the poster still 
hung on to same ethos that emerged as a response to Israel’s wars with the Arabs decades ago. At the time 
Israel marketed herself  as vulnerable and surrounded by millions of  antagonistic Arabs who plotted to 
annihilate the Jewish people. So, it was necessary to invest heavily in arms and education to deflect that 
possibility. The changes in the conflict brought about some changes in the societal beliefs. But some of  the old 
beliefs lingered on and in time became almost cultural components.   
To further illustrate, the 1960s alleged slogans about ‘throwing the Jews into the sea’ are still echoed today. 
The peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the recent rapprochement with several Arab countries do 
not seem to have unfrozen such beliefs. In 1989 prior to the initial peace talks in Madrid (1991), the late 
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Israeli PM Shamir described the Palestinian self-determination proposal as a more sophisticated version of  
the ‘Jews into the sea’ rhetoric (Handelzalts 2012). In 1996, following the Oslo Accords, Shamir stated that 
“The sea is the same sea, and the Arabs are the same Arabs” (Aronoff  2014). Upon Shamir’s death in 2012, 
Netanyahu eulogised him, saying, among other things, that although it is possible that Shamir's "statements 
about [Israel's] neighbours, about the distinction between the sea and the land ... unleashed a torrent of  
criticism at the time…today there are of  course many more people who understand that this man saw and 
understood basic and genuine things” (Handelzalts 2012).   
Frozen beliefs are particularly stable and tend to linger on even when the event that gave rise to them no 
longer existed. Shamir, as explained, could not see the Arabs in any other light but being genocidal, that 
despite the geopolitical changes and new flow of  information that made such belief  invalid. Nowadays, 
Palestinian 'suicide bombing’ seems to have achieved a special place in Israel’s list of  frozen beliefs. The wave 
of  suicide attacks during the Second Intifada (2000-2005) remains a buzzword in Israel’s ethos about 
victimhood and security  even though such attacks ceased completely around 2005 (the Guardian 2006).  32
On a personal self-reflexive note, at the Japanese-Israeli-Palestinian Student Conference (JIPSC) in 2015 the 
‘suicide bombing’ topic was brought up several times by the Israeli-Jewish participants. The Palestinian 
participants, myself  included, were initially astounded by what felt like an irrational clinging to a trauma that 
in comparison to what they did to us was only minor. ‘Suicide attack versus nuclear warheads,' a Palestinian 
participant remarked. Pointing out that suicide attacks ceased over a decade ago, I was met with a barrage of  
accusations of  being insensitive to Jewish suffering. My initial thought was, does the occupier even have the 
right to complain about being a victim of  the occupied?  
 In early 2002, PM Ariel Sharon explained that suicide bombings had necessitated the invasions of  Palestinian cities in the West 32
Bank (Operation Protective Shield) because these attacks posed an existential threat to Israel. He said, “This is a battle for survival of  
the Jewish people, for survival of  the sate of  Israel.” [see: Bishara 2013, pp.89-90]
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In hindsight, however, like the other Palestinian participants, I might have been frozen in Palestinian ethos. 
Our point of  departure was only through the occupier-occupied dynamic, where we viewed ourselves as the 
only righteous victims in the conflict. Being given (or accused of) agency — the ability to inflict harm, which 
goes beyond our ‘ideal victim’ status (see Chapter Two)—  was perhaps the most intimidating of  all. But to 
many of  us, it was almost unknown that a similar psychological process, although different in its specifics, was 
taking place on the other side.   
Using that reflexive thought as an analytical device, it might be proposed that perhaps for Israeli-Jews the 
frozen ethos on suicide bombings was a convenient way to maintain the continuum of  suffering as a moral 
and psychological buffer against the sins of  the occupation. ‘Bombarded’ with the negative image of  the 
occupation at the JIPSC by the Palestinian participants, the Israeli-Jewish participants saw their long-held 
ethos challenged. Their defensive strategy accordingly was to reluctantly admit Israel’s unfair policies but 
without compromising that ethos. Like in Waltz (2008) and Lebanon (2009), guilt was utilised as a means for 
redemption without actually having to bear responsibility for or act on it.  
Unable to deny Palestinian suffering or ‘unfreeze’ the ethos about Israel’s positive and victim self-image, the 
only way out was perhaps to add a sense of  hierarchy to victimhood. As if  to say, ‘you might be victims, but 
but we are righteous, more deserving victims.’ Ellis (2002) once remarked that admitting wrongs is only 
viewed within the reclaiming of  Jewish victimhood, so that Jews could retreat to the more comfortable sense 
of  Jewish innocence. A study by Pilecki and Hammack (2014) showed that by emphasising their own 
‘righteous’ victimisation, the Israeli-Jewish participants in the study — similar to ones at the  —  sought to 
reestablish their moral status outside the role of  the perpetrator. In the process, Palestinian victimhood was 
acknowledged, but Israel’s aggression against the Palestinians was constructed within the moral framework of  
self-defence, which is one of  Israel’s frozen beliefs. In other words, if  acknowledging the other’s victimhood is 
inescapable, it becomes critical to further freeze the ethos about one’s own victimhood — hence the victim 
hierarchy.   
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This victim hierarchy is evident in Fauda, Israel’s Netflix hit series (2015). Fauda (Arabic for ‘chaos’) was 
credited for being perhaps the first series to break new grounds for Israeli-Jewish audience. It shows 
Palestinian narrative in a new light and does not shy away from depicting the ‘average Palestinians’ as 
victims. But Fauda is overwhelmingly an Israeli-Jewish production and its views of  the conflict are somewhat 
symmetrical: IDF counter-terrorism units versus Palestinian terrorists. Ergo, the right and wrong are erased, 
the illegality of  the occupation is not mentioned (almost non-existent in Season 2), and the assassinations are 
only action-packed adventures modelled on the US spy thriller Homeland (2011). Fauda re-emphasises the all-
too-common Israeli narrative about the conflict being too complicated or a complicated ‘war zone,’ as 
described by Fauda creators. That serves to marginalise and silence narratives that offer, from Israel’s point of  
view, a threatening moral clarity (White 2018). It becomes easy from this perspective to present an ‘imagined 
symmetry,’ which makes both the occupier and the occupied victims, but with significant moral differences. 
The protagonist Doron, the lead Shabak operative, is a perfect embodiment of  Golda Meir’s visualisation of  
Israel’s victimisation. He is a victim because he has to kill for the state of  Israel - an ein breira (no choice) 
doctrine. The more he kills, the more victimised he becomes.  The same privilege is not granted to Walid El-33
Abed, the head of  Hamas’ military wing. The average Palestinian on the street is a victim as long as they stay 
‘good’ and not resist. The operatives of  the Israeli counter-terrorism units are flawed because of  their 
personal mishaps and human shortcomings, but Palestinians are flawed on the national level: they are 
vulnerable to intimidation and easily fall prey to collaboration. The space for empathy is only reserved to 
those Palestinians who are neither ‘terrorists’ nor ‘collaborators,’ as well as to the Palestinian wives, Nisrin 
and Sherin, who betrayed their ‘militant’ husbands. In the end, there is the Israeli-Jewish Aristotelian tragic 
hero-victim and then there is the lesser Palestinian victim. Both are victims, but one is more righteous than 
 Golda Meir said that Israeli-Jews were not going to “forgive the Arabs for forcing them to kill their sons [the Arabs]” [Yadid 2015]. 33
Meir’s reasoning also seems to imply that the more Palestinians the IDF kills, the more wronged and victimised Israel feels. This belief  
also entails a sense of  moral superiority, in fact, a ‘moral isolation’ in the aggressive, backward ‘Middle Eastern muck,’ as described by 
Ian Lustick (2008).  
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the other. Unlike Waltz, Fauda did not use the Shoah memory as a framework, it was nevertheless influenced by 
the ‘frozen’ conflict ethos in which the collective memory of  the Shoah has been the primary denominator.  
COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL ORIENTATIONS   
In addition to being a byproduct of  mainly the Shoah collective memory and is enhanced and perpetuated by 
the conflict ethos, victimhood is also an emotional orientation. In this study’s framework, collective memory 
and conflict ethos are the cognitive part of  the socio-psychological infrastructure which provides the 
narrative/stories that cause “…the arousal of  particular emotions” (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 214) and are themselves 
interactive with and reinforced by these emotions (ibid.). Bar-Tal (2007) sees that society provides the context, 
information, cues, models, and guidelines against which the emotions of  its members arise. And because 
these cultural frameworks are shared by society members and have influence on them, their emotional 
responses to them become a collective emotional orientation. The assumption is that each society is defined 
by a number of  particular emotions. Bar-Tal identified fear as Israel’s most dominant emotion (2001). The 
next chapter extensively discusses and builds on this notion, looking at fear as one of  the main drives in 
Israel’s victimhood narratives and, subsequently, a significant force behind Israel’s hyper security. This 
chapter, however, will briefly discuss the ‘softer’ emotions of  guilt and shame. This should provide some 
insight into the emotionality of  collective memory and ethos, and that will help better understand the role of  
fear in the next chapter. Emotions are rooted in appraisal, and guilt and shame have, among other things, the 
cognitive appraisal of  acknowledging one’s in-group responsibility for the victimisation of  the out-group (e.g. 
Lazarus 1991; Fridja et al. 2000; Keltner & Lerner 2001, 2010; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 
2011). Theoretically, this should lead to positive outcomes, namely, the rectification of  wrongdoing. But in 
Israel, guilt and shame seem to reinforce the negative perceptions of  collective memory and further freeze the 
conflict ethos. Guilt and shame are not as dominant or readily discernible as fear, but their subtle, indirect 
reverberations can be felt in some of  Israel’s behaviours. This chapter identifies four of  these behaviours: the 
fear of  normality, displacement of  guilt, past shame displacement, and identification with the aggressor.     
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Fear of Normality   
Israel has long used the international guilt about the Shoah as a basis for gathering support (Evron 1981). She, 
in other words, shaped her foreign policy in terms of  ‘narcissistic victimhood’ (Hage 2010) and used it as a 
signifier for the country’s legitimacy and policies. After the Eichmann Trial, Gold Meir confidently remarked: 
“Now, when everyone knows what they did to us, we can do anything we want and no one has the right to 
criticise us or tell us what to do.” Similarly, before the bombing of  Beirut Begin said the World War II 
countries had no right to criticise Israel since they did nothing when the Jews were exterminated (Eldar 
2012). This worldview has become part of  Israel’s diplomatic protocols so much so that nowadays every 
important non-Jewish visitor to the country is taken, as a matter of  course, to Yad Vashem and, sometimes, the 
‘Ghetto Fighters’ Kibbutz’ as part of  the ‘familiarisation process,’ aiming at making the visitor experience 
guilt (Evron 1981). Today, this is Israel’s perception of  normality.   
The early Zionists assumed that establishing a Jewish homeland was going to normalise the status of  the Jews 
and make Israel an equal member of  the international community within the framework of  the global 
economic and political system. This was the basis of  the ‘New Jew’, one who is independent and free and no 
longer living in the shambles of  past victimhood (see Chapter Four). But according to Ellis (2002), it seems 
that the old prophetic norms that grew up in situations of  powerlessness still apply in modern Israel. 
To break away from the past will mean that Israel acknowledges that the Jews today wield power and that 
makes Israel a regular nation with moral and legal responsibilities. Which also means that Israel will have to 
admit her guilt towards the Palestinians and act on it through a series of  political and financial remedies. But 
the fear of  being a normal nation runs deeper than that. At the very least, it will expose Israel’s to its negative 
self, to the terrifying prospect of  being a perpetrator which would fly in the face of  most things that the 
country holds dear about her identity. By admitting Palestinian victimisation, Israeli-Jews admit they had 
become a mirror image of  their worst nightmare (Pappé 2010). Marc Ellis (1990, pp.40-42) insightfully 
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explained that by “ending Auschwitz” — ending the Shoah memory as a guilt device — Jews will be 
compelled to ‘think the unthinkable’…that the future of  the Jewish people is “bound up in an essential 
solidarity with those whom we [Jews] have displaced, a solidarity with the Palestinian people.”   
This means that Israel will have to reach a new paradigm where the concept of  guilt is shifted away from the 
external world and then directed internally. However, it seems that the conflict ethos about victimhood is still 
solid in place to condition the Israeli-Jewish collective consciousness to avoid or minimise the responsibility of  
historical injustices towards the Palestinians (Ferguson & Branscombe 2014). To deflect any possibility of  guilt 
associated with the Palestinians, to avoid violating the ‘boundaries of  Auschwitz’ (Ellis 2002), Israel often 
resorted to guilt-neutralising mechanisms such as guilt displacement.  
Guilt Displacement  
In the Seventh Million (1993), Segev reports how the Shoah survivors were recruited to appear as ‘living 
witnesses’ before the students visiting the Death Camps in Poland. By being there, he suggests, the survivors 
helped materialise the existential fear of  contemporary Israel. The students are meant to witness Jews in a 
world without Jewish power. But in the absence of  physical Nazis, those students — in a classic case of  
psychological displacement (redirection of  — usually — aggression onto a powerless substitute target) — tend 
to transfer the blame of  the Jewish suffering to the discernible, easier to understand, physical enemy in the 
present time. Projecting some aspects of  the image of  the Nazi onto the Palestinians becomes an outlet for 
the suppressed psychic energy (Newman & Ralph 2002).   
The IDF also organises similar trips for thousands of  its officers. One of  the prime goals of  this project, titled 
‘Witnesses in Uniform,’ is to strengthen the sense of  commitment to Israel as a democratic state and to the 
Jewish people (Savir 2013). While it is common for most of  the world’s armies to familiarise their soldiers 
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with their country’s history, the emphasis on historical trauma in the IDF produces a misplaced transference 
of  aggression. Similar to the students who had to hate somebody since the Nazis did not physically exist 
anymore, the officers’ exposure to trauma and victimisation  becomes a facilitator for abuse in the Occupied 
Territories where many of  them serve.   
It is noteworthy that guilt displacement can also manifest as victim-blaming. Imhoff  and Banse (2009) showed 
that suffering can cause or amplify negative attitudes toward the victims. Reminders of  ongoing Jewish 
suffering after the Shoah facilitated implicit anti-Semitic resentment among Germans, allowing prejudice to 
serve as a strategy to distance oneself  from the in-group responsibility for historical wrongs. Similarly, by 
blaming Palestinian victimhood on Palestinians, Israel effectively projects its sense of  guilt onto her victims to 
protect herself  and, especially, to preserve her self-perceived victimisation. While “the Germans will never 
forgive the Jews for Auschwitz,” as put by Adorno (Falk 2008, p.169), Israeli-Jews, by the same logic, will 
never forgive Palestinians for Deir-Yassin.    34
   
Past Shame Displacement  
Shame, too, can lead to displacement. Shame, like guilt, is an emotion characterised by separation and 
distancing from the shame-inducing event (Evron 1981; Lickel et al. 2011). In the early days of  the state, for 
the ‘veteran generation’ that was raised on the heroic myths of  the Masada and Tel-Hai, it was shame at the 
Shoah, not the event, which choked the nation’s soul (see: Roy 2002; Rose 2011). The assumed ‘shameful’ 
passivity of  the Shoah victims taught many Israeli-Jews to redeem themselves by embracing aggressive security 
policies (see next chapter). Levy (2009) saw the dynamic of  shame-turned-aggression as detrimental to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He argued that instead of  consciously feeling the pain and vulnerability of  the 
Palestinians, Israeli-Jews, haunted by past shame, are hellbent on destroying anyone who reminds them of  it. 
 For more information on the massacre of  Deir Yassin, see: Hogan’s “The 1948 Massacre At Deir Yassin Revisited” (2001). Also see: 34
http://www.deiryassin.org/mas.html 
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Today what is being acted out is psychological attempts to eliminate Israel’s own feelings of  vulnerability and 
weakness. Intrinsic to trauma is the double-bind of  having to deny what cannot be forgotten. Palestinians are 
now paying the price of  Israel's shame through humiliation, their worst offence (Rose 2011) (see Chapter 
Seven). 
Like guilt, shame was shifted from the Shoah Jewish victims to the world as a whole, which was divided into 
perpetrators, Nazi collaborators, and bystanders (Dowty 2004). Perpetration in particular was broadened to 
include all the others: sympathisers, passive bystanders, or the Goyim in general, hostile in actuality or 
potentiality (Al-Messiri 1997) — a belief  that Leibowitz (1989) objected to, and criticised defining Jewish 
identity in terms of  the harm the Goyim caused the Jews. Usually, this belief, along with presenting the Jews as 
the Shoah exclusive victims, cuts the Jews off  from humanity and its laws (Evron 1981). Interestingly, the 
disconnection might cause certain Jews when in a position of  power to mistreat non-Jews, and sometimes — 
in a case of  identifying with the aggressor — to repeat or imitate some Nazi attitudes (ibid.).    
Identifying with the Aggressor  
As it was alluded to in Waltz, because of  the guilt and shame associated with the past trauma, victims may 
end up in a dissociative trance, resulting in a fragmentation of  the personality (Howell 2014) and then 
becoming a mirror image of  their former victimisers. Identifying with the aggressor leads to a compulsive 
repetition of  traumatic events, so much so that the victims become addicted to their victimisers (van der Kolk 
1989) and engage in activities that mimic those victimisers’ practices (Sout 2004; White 2010). Grosbard 
(2003) sees that Israel’s identification with certain Nazi policies (such as segregation and racist laws) and 
applying them to the Palestinians is a mechanism to suppress and divert the anger and bitterness associated 
with memory. Perhaps it is to prove to oneself  and possibly to the oppressor that one is worthy. This becomes 
a motivation to transform personal suffering into control and domination over others (Berman 2010), partly 
to have the freedom to anticipate and prevent further victimisation.  
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What makes the identification with the aggressor detrimental to the conflict is not only Israel’s depositing of  
unresolved traumas onto the Palestinians, but also Palestinians identifying with and depositing Israel’s 
aggression onto weaker subjects, themselves included. Such identification is evident among the Palestinian 
citizens of  Israel who vote for Zionist parties and the Palestinian collaborators who identify with the Zionist 
objectives. The problem has institutional dimensions as well. Some of  the practices of  the Palestinian 
Authority, for example, are modelled on Israel. When the PA replaced the IDF in some Palestinian cities in 
1994 following the Oslo Accords, there were abuses almost identical to ones exercised by the IDF. Torture 
methods in the PA prisons were by-the-book Israeli. Some of  the Palestinian security heads who were 
involved in torturing other Palestinians were former political detainees in Israel and themselves victims of  
torture. This is why the Palestinian security bodies were described by some as Israeli-Jews speaking Arabic 
(Al-Hadidi 2015). According to Volkan (2009), when oppression lasts long enough, it becomes internalised as 
a ‘shared external ego,’ and it does not disappear automatically when the oppression is somewhat lifted.   
On a self-reflexive note, for many of  us, afresh outside Israel’s direct control straight after Oslo, the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) — although warmly welcomed in the beginning — was perceived as a replacement 
for the IDF. Therefore, rebellious attitudes and disrespect for authority gained foothold in society. In 
hindsight, it felt that the occupation became a cultural value that we had to maintain. Even though I knew 
those new armed men on the streets of  Gaza were our people, the feelings of  dread and intimidation which 
the IDF soldiers had instilled into our psyche did not seem to phase away. Many of  us, kids, felt some pride 
challenging and teasing those Palestinian policemen like we did the Israeli soldiers. I may say that like Israel, 
we might have grown addicted to our oppressors and were afraid to embrace a new paradigm of  normality 
and, therefore, needed to compensate by projecting the ‘authoritarian object’ (Sebek 1996) upon the PA. It 
meant, among other things, to ensure a sense of  continuity in the perpetrator-victim dyad, a familiar and safe 
state of  mind and the only mode of  control or lack thereof  that we knew.   
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CONCLUSION  
In the novel See Under Love (1989), Grossman sums up the enduring power of  Israel’s collective memory. The 
first chapter tells us about Momik, a son of  Shoah survivors in Israel who never tell him about what really 
happened to them ‘over there’ by the ‘Nazi beast.’ The boy secretly grows a Nazi animal in the cellar. This 
beast is an imagined figure that he creates in order to have an enemy he can visualise and overcome. An 
important latent content in the novel is the pathology of  the boy who is haunted by the ghosts of  the past, 
which is revealed as a monstrous distortion in the process of  repression and denial. Living the Shoah 
vicariously and incomprehensibly through his parents, Momik, like Waltz’s protagonist, represents the 
collective powerful fixation on memory and the resulting ethos that leave little space for mourning and 
empathy in the post-Shoah Israel.  
By adhering to collective memory, the Jews are meant to remember the past victimisation in order to deflect any 
future victimisation. Fackenheim (1994) saw that for Jews to forget Hitler’s victims would be to grant him a 
‘posthumous victory.’ However, as Folman, Maoz, and Grossman tells us symbolically, it would be an even 
greater posthumous victory for Hitler when Jewish memory becomes the most defining factor in Israel’s 
worldview. It is not about forgetting, which Jews should not, but rather about drawing different conclusions 
and place the memory in the right historical and political context (Miller 2014).  
Today, collective memory seems to fuel hostility and paranoia. As Bar-Tal suggested (2007, 2013), collective 
memory justified the outbreak of  the conflict, preserved society’s positive self-image, demonised the opponent 
and perpetuated the in-group as the conflict victims. Because of  it, the Arabs were nazified, Israel's launched 
a preemptive attack against Arab countries in 1967, and Begin ordered the destruction of  the Iraqi nuclear 
plant in 1981 (see next chapter: preemptive warfare). Because of  collective memory, Israel had the exclusive 
moral right to inaugurate a nuclear weapon program (Blumenthal 2013) and, because of  it, the belief  that 
Jewish existence depended solely on military power became almost a secular religion. Most importantly, 
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collective memory shaped, or rather distorted, the ethos and emotional mindset regarding the conflict with 
the  Palestinians.   
Against the Palestinians, Israel has assumed a contradictory position of  victimhood and power. Not only has 
this led to and justified the aggressive policies against them, it also allowed Israel to approach negotiations 
with them as a bargaining match between equals (Golan 2014). In the process, the dichotomy of  victimhood 
and power saw the ‘equal Palestinian partner’ being constantly and conveniently shifted between being 
inferior and weak, and therefore not equal, and being an existential threat, which made Israel feel vulnerable 
and weak. Between a ‘partner’ who is willing to accept the superior occupier’s dictations or one who is not a 
‘true partner’ for peace when the demands of  justice are raised (see: Haaretz Editorial 2013; Maan News 
2017). 
In an ideal scenario, in order to reach a settlement with the Palestinians, Grosbard (2003) reflects, Israel needs 
to feel safe to move forward in the growing up process in order to recognise the needs of  others. In reality so 
far, trapped in the past, Israel remains incapable of  functioning as a normal nation. In the international 
community Israel is almost the personality-disordered member who sits in the group and everyone always 
picks on him, and everyone has to deal with him, and he think he is always right and innocent (ibid.). 
Richards (2017) sees such attitude in terms of  narcissistic disorder, where a person is absorbed in himself  and 
in his own grandiosity — probably as a defence against profound insecurity. In December 2016 when the UN 
unanimously condemned the Jewish settlements in the West Bank (UNSC 2334, 2006), Danon, Israel’s UN 
representative, immediately fell back on Jewish memory and ethos to condemn the resolution. He drew an 
unobstructed connection between Hanukkah when king Theo banished the Jews from the Temple in 
Jerusalem and the UN resolution on settlements.  The resolution was perceived as a denial of  the Jews’ right 35
to self-determination and a continuation of  centuries of  Jewish persecution. It also confirmed Israel’s 
negative identity (Kelman 1987, 1999), one that makes sense only when measured against others as potential 
  See full speech: https://youtu.be/hPxSx8qdpWA  [December 23 2016]  35
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aggressors. In this continuum of  suffering the occupation does not exist (or apply), and criticism directed at 
Israel is nothing but anti-Semitic antagonism from which Palestinians — the ones Israel persecutes — are not 
excluded. Any peace effort that does not part with such societal beliefs is probably doomed to fail. And, at the 
same time, peace offers that do not take into account Israel’s perceived victim identity, her approach to 
memory and remembering, the resulting ethos, and the emotions that steer it and are steered by it, may also 
lead nowhere. 
In the next chapter it will become apparent that Israel’s narratives of  victimhood do not end at the 
boundaries mentioned in this chapter. They become more complicated when it comes to the emotions and 
ethos about security. The argument is taken a step further by focusing on Israel’s perception and 
implementation of  what is termed ‘hyper security.’ Especially focusing on the collective emotional 
orientations of  fear, security is discussed and analysed as the most important physical manifestation of  Israel’s 
victimhood and one of  the most significant obstacles to settlement. This should provide a broader scope of  
understanding that will help answer the research question on the extent to which the narratives of  
victimhood contribute to the conflict intractability, and consequently the impasse in peacemaking.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
VICTIMHOOD IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT: 
The Case of  Israel’s ‘Hyper Security’ as an Outcome of  Israel’s 
Fear Orientations  
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OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter examined Israel’s victimhood through collective memory, conflict ethos, and, finally, 
collective emotional orientations. This chapter continues from where the last chapter ended. Using the same 
framework but with special focus on the emotional orientation of  fear, the attention now shifts to the what 
could be the most important yet understudied manifestation of  Israel’s victimhood: security. Building on the 
assumption that victimhood is a socio-psychological product and therefore subjective (e.g. Vallacher et al. 
2010; Coleman 2011a; Kelman 2007; Bar-Tal 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; Halperin & Shavit 2015; Bar-
Tal & Jacobson 1998; Bar-Tal & Rouhana 1998; Volkan 2001), this chapter examines security largely as a 
perception. Given Israel’s extreme security measures, security is here described as ‘hyper.’ Hyper security also 
points to the gap between security as a geo-political assessment and as a perception. 
First, the chapter highlights how the cognitive appraisal of  fear has shaped Israel’s fight-or-flight attitude to 
security and blurred the difference between security as a reality and as a perception, leading to and 
strengthening the defensive posture and the ghetto mentality. These issues are discussed with the conflict’s 
historical, psychohistorical, and political circumstances in mind. Second, the chapter examines the destructive 
outcome of  hyper security: first by looking at Israel’s preemptive warfare doctrine (using the Six-Day War 
and Iran as case studies), and second, by examining the country’s views on terrorism, especially Palestinian 
‘terrorism.’ The claims that Israel’s preemptive wars had been based solely on geo-political calculations are 
questioned and the labelling of  Palestinian dissidence as terrorism is argued against. Next, the chapter 
examines how security now defines the very concept of  patriotism among Israeli-Jews. The chapter concludes 
by highlighting how hyper security has affected Israel’s approach to settlement. 
Narrative sources in this chapter vary. Scholarship provides and consolidates the conceptual, political, and 
historical argument (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007; Keltner and Lerner 2010; Halperin et al. 2011; also: e.g. Shalit 
1995; Dowty 1999; Shlaim 2001; Ochs 2006; Sand 2009; Svirsky 2014; Del Sarto 2017; Lentin 2018). The 
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historical narratives are especially important in adding an experiential [psychohistorical] dimension to the 
understanding of  Israel’s security. The polarised historical narratives around the Six-Day War is a good 
example (e.g. Finkelstein 2003; Dershowitz 2003; Kurtulus 2007; Aaron 2007). Cultural texts and artefacts, 
which media, arts, signs and symbols represent provide a close outlook on the experience related to fear, 
security, and the overarching narratives of  collective victimhood. Media in particular is a primary source of  
narrative textuality in this chapter. Not only do news articles, reports, commentaries, opinions, and 
statements mark events/stories, they also reflect — implicitly or explicitly — society’s ethos and emotional 
orientations (e.g. Fein 1999; Shavit 2001b; Al-Sukkari 2002; Goldberg 2009; Rosen 2014; Fisk 2016; Karram 
2017; Fisher 2017; Maan News 2019). Visual media serves a similar function. The documentary Sheshet Ha-
Yamim (1967), for example, was made to celebrate Israel’s victory and heroism in the Six-Day War, but the 
analysis of  its latent content revealed it still emphasised the link between security and the Jewish collective 
memory. The documentary The Gatekeepers (2012) has a similar pattern except with a focus on Palestinian 
dissidence. Literary works also convey, though more intimately, the Israeli-Jewish experience regarding 
security (e.g. Shamir 1947; Appelfeld 1971; Chayut 2010; Peled 2016). Appelfeld’s The Hunt (1971), for 
example, communicates Jewish fear by creating a sense of  alienation between the story characters and the 
reader. The analysis of  latent content (categorical-content ) is influenced by the author’s positionality and the 
research question. Reflexivity in this chapter is presented along with the discussion on the mechabel narrative, 
and is deployed auto-ethnographically using personal experience.   
FIGHT-OR-FLIGHT RESPONSE  
Bar-Tal (1998, 2001, 2007, 2013) claims that collective emotional orientations are usually a response to and 
themselves influence the perception of  collective memory and the formation of  conflict ethos. He argues that 
societies involved in intractable conflict tend to be dominated by a number of  collective emotions that serve 
as coping mechanisms to the conflict challenges. In his article “How Fear Overrides Hope…” (2001), Bar-Tal 
notes that just as individuals may be characterised by one particular dominant emotion, so also societies may 
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develop collective emotional orientations, with an emphasis on one or more particular emotions. He argues 
that in Israel fear seems to be the dominant emotional orientation.  
Before becoming actionable security policies, fear should have cut deeply into the psychic fabric of  society to 
become a crucial part of  its culture (Bar-Tal 2001, also see: 2007, 2013). In Israel, this can be seen in most 
cultural texts and artefacts. The work of  Israeli novelist and Shoah survivor Aharon Appelfeld, for example, is 
one of  many that signify fear in the light of  the Jewish collective memory. Hinting at the major sights of  
suffering, Appelfeld conveys the psychological uneasiness of  the Jewish collective throughout history. In The 
Hunt (1971, translated by Le Lang 1989),  Appelfeld employs the element of  alienation to deliver this notion. 36
He keeps the place, time, and psychology of  the characters vague, coupled with an avoidance to assign even a 
shred of  feelings to the Jews in the story, in order to create a sense of  distance and alienation (Shiffman 2005). 
Through alienation Appelfeld expresses the persecution and fear that accompanied the Jews throughout 
history. Bar-Tal (2001) sees that ‘the hunt’ represents anti-Semitism, and like hunting it is a very old practice.   
Fear has triggered changes in Israel’s cognition and actions. These changes were originally tailored to help 
regulate the response tendencies to the threatening situation, allowing the collective to feel in control of  its 
fate and create a sense of  certainty (Lazarus & Folkman 1984; Lazarus 1991; Frijda et al. 2000; Bar-Tal 2001; 
Matthieu & Ivanoff  2006; Keltner & Lerner 2010; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011). But this 
often persisted beyond the emotion-eliciting situation (Lerner & Keltner 2007). Traditionally, the appraisal of  
fear leads to action tendencies such as avoidance and reduced willingness to take risks (distrust of  peace 
initiatives, as an example ) (Keltner & Lerner 2010; Halperin et al. 2011), but in Israel the cognitive appraisal 37
of  fear has also resulted in emotional and action tendencies in the form of  extreme security culture. This 
culture is hyper in its attention to threat cues, hyper in the selection and processing of  information, and above 
 A story of  young boy, Yankek, who while being rowed across the river by a fisherman, the two notice Jews on the riverbank. The 36
fisherman, teaches the boy how to hunt them. As he watches the Jews bleed, not only does Yankek realise how much he hated them, 
but also — secretly — knows he has the same blood.
 For example, Barak’s intransigence at Camp David was primarily justified on security grounds [Masalha 2000]37
140
all, hyper in its response to the perception of  danger. This is Israel’s ‘hyper security’ — an almost permanent 
fight-or-flight state.  
The assumption is that under ‘normal’ security measures  judicious and balanced concerns about danger are 
perfectly justified (Mueller & Lustick 2008). But with ‘hyper security,’ instead of  viewing threat with sober 
assessment, it is usually seen in existential terms. This process creates an extreme sensitivity to threat cues, 
severely narrowing attention to select classes of  stimuli that may or may not resemble the original cause of  
victimisation (i.e. chosen trauma and collective memory). It becomes an effective tool for mobilisation, 
depicting the country as locked in a permanent battle for survival with its Arab neighbours — that a major 
military defeat would mean annihilation  (Oren et al. 2015).  
In practical terms, this preoccupation with security became the pillar of  the state’s infrastructure, so much so 
it even created an interesting class of  democracy where the judicial system have become tied up to the 
country’s overall perception of  security. The Israeli Supreme Court, for example, made it almost a rule not to 
interfere with the military government when its actions were based on ‘security reasons’ (Aronson 1978).  
The lively and pluralistic Israeli media, especially the press, too has been subject to security views. The laws 
stipulate that any journalist working for Israeli media outlets must submit articles and all other items related 
to Israel’s security and foreign relations to the Israeli Military Censor before publication. Lately, this has been 
extended to include social media postings by journalists (Salhani 2018). In 2017, for instance, out of  83 books 
submitted to the military censor, 53 were partially redacted or edited (Ahronheim 2018). Media is a 
significant source of  narrative on security and by extension acts as a mirror to the country's a sense of  
collective victimhood. But occasionally it is not what Israeli media says about the conflict that reflects the 
country’s security culture, but rather what it does not say (or not allowed to say). 
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The government’s censorship on the media is also helped by the willingness of  many Israeli-Jews to practise a 
wide-range of  self-censorship. Bar-Tal (2017a) argues that the moment society members feel their individual 
or collective security threatened, the more they practice self-censorship. It may be that the readiness of  many 
Israeli-Jews for self-censorship is governed by their adherence to the conflict ethos (see: Bar-Tal 2000, 2007, 
2013). This would block whatever information that may contradict the validity of  Israel’s national security 
beliefs (Bar-Tal 2017a). Another factor in strengthening these beliefs is the fact that emotions can be 
contagious. Society members are likely to reinforce each other’s fear and the perception of  risk, which can 
also encourage them to  self-censor (Goodwin et al. 2005; Weinberg et al. 2012).  
The preoccupation with security can also be seen in Israel’s economic infrastructure. The country, for 
example, has burgeoned into a high tech epicentre built around cyber security and other cyber defence 
technologies (Suciu 2015). She is also one of  the world’s top powerhouses for manufacturing and developing 
military drones (O’Sullivan 2012; Sadot 2016). There is the additional fact that much of  the high-tech 
defence pioneers emerge from the heart of  the IDF. The army Military Intelligence Unit 8200 — comprised 
of  the best and brightest cybersecurity elite — is arguably the hub that offers veterans a fast track into the 
country’s tech and defence industry (Senor & Singer 2009; Tender 2015).   
HYPER SECURITY AS PERCEPTION  
The destructiveness of  Israel’s hyper security, nevertheless, lies in the blurred distinction between threat as a 
reality and as a perception. Fear gives rise to a relatively perceptual assessment of  threat, a process loosely 
labelled ‘national security’ and falsely portrayed as fully sober and rationally calculated. Security in this case 
becomes more about the underlying appraisal tendency to reduce the anxiety associated with uncertainty and 
low control over the possibility of  a threat and less with the actual threat (Keltner & Lerner 2010). Under 
such circumstances, security also becomes comprehensive; that is, regardless of  their proximity to threat, 
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most of  society members see fear (and insecurity) as “…just their obvious way of  existing in their world 
” (Svirsky 2014, p. 6). Their judgments and actions are largely determined by that.  
In a study conducted by Bar-Tal, Jacobson, and Freund (1995) to find out whether the feelings of  insecurity 
and other related reactions are influenced by the experience of  living in a settlement in the OT, or whether 
they are shaped by personal factors. The findings indicated that contrary to the common beliefs, living in the 
settlement did not in itself  affect the settlers’ feelings of  insecurity. There was no significant difference in the 
fear factor between the settlers and Israeli-Jews inside Israel. The study was conducted during the relatively 
calm period before the eruption of  the 2000 Intifada. However, long after the Intifada as the security situation 
dramatically improved, the support for settlements did not actually decrease. Those who believed that 
settlements helped security increased from 31% of  the population in 2013 to 42% in 2015 (Starr 2017).  
It might be a rule of  thumb that the escalation of  violence enhances fear and the feelings of  insecurity. But as 
the above poll showed, Palestinian violence may not be the only factor in those feelings. Because fear is 
associated with an appraisal of  low control and uncertainty (Halperin et al. 2011), settlements, in addition to 
being a strategic depth (Harel 2017), provided Israeli-Jews with a feeling of  control over their destiny and a 
sense of  self-reliance. In 2002, a video aired by Israeli media and was picked up and translated by the 
Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Manar TV (Al-Sukkari 2002) showed settlers from the Nablus area in the 
PT hysterically lamenting and screaming at then PM Ariel Sharon allegedly for failing to secure them. The 
fear on those settlers’ faces was very telling. This was triggered after Gilad Zar, a settlement security officer, 
was killed in a road ambush by Palestinian gunmen near Nablus.  Violence usually triggers high-level 38
anxieties, but the settlers hysteria could also be attributed to their sense of  having lost control over their 
security and by default their lives. Israel’s failure to protect them made those feelings worse. Their extreme 
fear may have also been coupled with a sense of  violation not only by the attackers, but also by what they saw 
 In March 2017, the Israeli Cabinet unanimously decided to begin the construction of  a new settlement in northern West Bank to 38
accommodate the Jewish settlers who were evacuated from the already evacuated outpost of  Amona. The settlement is expected to be 
named after Gilad Zar. [source: Abu-Ellaan, Madaar News 2017]
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as an unquestionable right to live in peace on an occupied land. Any opposition to this right was viewed as a 
violation of  their legitimacy and therefore any harsh security measures to quell this opposition was not only 
necessary but also righteous. Any harm or distress that occurred in the process of  ‘quelling’ became an 
affirmation of  Jewish victimhood. 
MENTAL GHETTO 
The settlers today see themselves as Sharon once saw them, as the avant-grade of  Zionism (Goldberg 2004). 
They are in many ways the physical and psychological extension of  the early twentieth-century’s first Jewish 
settler communities in Palestine, the Yishuv. Their emotional orientations, security beliefs, and views of  the 
local population are similar to those of  the Yishuv. The Yishuv believed they were pioneers and warriors and 
on the path to complete a struggle against anti-Semitic prejudice that goes back more than a thousand years 
(Turkel 2015). Their victimhood nationalism was an integral part of  the so-called Yishuv heroism — the 
righteous, eternal victim little David versus the Goliaths of  human history (Assmann & Conrad 2010).  
The Yishuvists formed their settler identity directly against the local population. Like today’s settlers, they saw 
the locals as something to fear and be separated from, so they erected psychological and physical barriers. 
They, Shlaim (2001, p. 570) explains “ …turned the Palestinians into aliens on their own soil.” For all its 
marginality, explains Shlomo Sand (2009, pp. 252-56), “…Zionism was part of  the last wave of  nationalist 
awakening in Europe” and “…borrowed many elements from the nationalism in which it was embedded.” 
The colonial outlook it inherited made it possible to establish the Yishuv culture as a culture of  the ‘whitened 
Jew’ set against the backward and dangerous indigenous population (Kayyali 1977; Gerber 2003; Samman 
2005; Mandour 2015). By creating this distinction and in contrast to the original Zionist goal to normalise 
the state of  the world’s Jewry (see previous chapter), the Yishuv Zionists recreated the ancient conditions as a 
‘beleaguered minority.’ They reestablished the feelings that survival of  the Jewish community meant being 
separate from the outside world (Dowty 1999). 
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It was Henry Kissinger who, many years ago, observed the irony of  this predicament: Intended to solve the 
‘Jewish problem’ by taking the Jews out of  the ghetto, Israel had instead become the largest ghetto in Jewish 
history (Fein 1991). What appeared like a triumph to begin with was short-lived for the "New Jew” who 
somehow brought the galut mentality along with him (Wein 2000). Kissinger had in mind not only Jewish 
vulnerability, but Jewish neurosis. This sentiment was also shared by former Israeli president Ezer Weizman, 
who called Israel’s fear a ‘ghetto mentality’ (Perlmutter & Frankel 1996). Yaron Ezrahi (in: Del Sarto 2017) 
pointed out more than two decades ago that “Jews who built their homes in the midst of  heavily populated 
Arab towns and villages, among Arabs enraged by the forced confiscation of  their lands, were able to 
preserve, and even reinforce, a well entrenched ghetto mentality by producing the conditions and feelings of  
being surrounded by hostile enemies.”  In an interview with Haaretz (Shavit 2004b), author Aharon 39
Appelfeld said: “We tried to escape from the fate of  a persecuted minority, but the fate of  a persecuted 
minority pursued us here, too.” Appelfeld implies that Israel has become the same exact image of  the ghetto 
that Zionism tried to escape. This theme exists in a large range of  cultural texts and artefacts. The Israeli TV 
drama Hu Halach b’Sadot (He Walked Through The Fields) (1967) is an example. It is an adaptation of  the 
1947 Moshe Shamir’s novel with the same title. It tells the story of  a pre-state sabra and Palmach  fighter, Uri, 40
who is in the midst of  a broken family and unstable community, and is torn between his love and the duty to 
his country. The protagonist suffers from alienation and searches for belongingness. Uri’s desire to rid himself  
of  the burden of  the galut (symbolised in the question of  belongingness and duty) cannot be redeemed even in 
Israel, or on the battlefield.  
Collectively, Israel became locked in feelings of  alienation from the region, its peoples and its cultures and an 
urge to escape (Lustick 2008), in a way regressing to the old patterns of  siege mentality (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 
1992a/b). Fencing, concrete walls, barbed wire, trenches and embankments, and heavy militarisation of  the 
country’s fault lines (Saddiki 2015) had been so normalised that security became a mindset more than a 
 Notice how Ezrahi uses the term ‘Arab’ to describe the Palestinians.39
 The elite fighting unit of  the Haganah, the pre-state Jewish terrorist organisation. 40
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preventative procedure. The ghetto mentality comprises not only an objective assessment of  Arab attitudes 
towards Israel, but also the national consciousness that derives reference from the broader historical 
predicaments of  the Jewish people (Mikaelian 2007). Eventually, this mentality turned into belligerence. The 
hyper preoccupation with security, in other words, was externalised, sometimes established as a form of  ethos, 
finding an outlet in an equally hyper military doctrine, namely preemptive warfare.  
Preemptive Warfare 
Responding to fear, people usually appraise whether an event is congruent or incongruent with their 
situation. They tend to consider causal attributions to the event, potential responses, and future consequences 
of  different causes of  action (e.g. Lazarus 1991; Keltner & Lerner 2010; Halperin et al. 2011). Bar-Tal (2001 - 
citing Elon [1971]) explains that the lingering Shoah collective memory made any Arab threats of  annihilation 
plausible. One way to counteract the fear of  annihilation, Shalit (1994) argued, was by extreme aggression. 
Under favourable conditions, aggression is a life force that enables the integration of  the basic fear of  
annihilation into the self  without being overwhelmed by it (ibid.). In Israel, the collective fear orientation 
(Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013) was compensated for by over-reliance on military strength. Israel Tal (2000, 
pp.121-122 ) maintained that amongst the major lessons that were learned from the 1948 experience was the 
importance of  “offensive as a basic strategy, reliance on assault power, and eventually the doctrine of  
preemptive attack and taking the fighting into enemy territory.” Shalit (1994) insightfully noted that under 
these circumstances military strength became aggression that actually evolved into the existential anxiety it 
was supposed to prevent and protect against. What materialised was, in fact, externalisation of  psychological 
drives projected onto any level or type of  threat. The capacity to assess the enemy’s hostility, intentions, or 
military strength thus diminished.  
In the early days, Israel was able to promote the idea of  ein breira war (war of  necessity) in her confrontations 
with the Arab states. But having signed a peace agreement with Egypt, invaded Lebanon three years later, 
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and then set out to fight an entire population in the first Intifada five years after that, she grew unable to 
market her case in the international arena as being exceptional or existential. The overall sense of  threat, 
nevertheless, remained almost the same, only the semantics changed. The ‘war of  necessity’ became the ‘war 
of  choice’ (Kurtulus 2007), yet still favoured initiating attacks and taking the fight to the enemy’s territory 
without seeing it in any other other light but ‘defensive.’ A war with preemptive dimensions (Mikaelian 2007).   
A preemptive attack is one that is launched based on the expectation that the adversary is about to attack. In 
most cases an imminent threat is thought of  in terms of  visible mobilisation of  armies, navies, and air forces 
(Krzeczunowicz 2005). If  the evidence is incontrovertible that the enemy is about to attack, striking first 
becomes an option. Slager (2012) sees that a preemptive attack should be subject to certain boundaries in 
order to prevent rampant violence and to be legitimate. This raises the question whether Israel’s preemptive 
wars were justified as a response to a truly eminent attack or they were an extension of  the fear-oriented and 
victimhood-based security perceptions. To answer the questions, the next section examines the 1967 Six-Day 
War and Israel’s attitude towards Iran.  
The Six-Day War   41
Mueller et al. (2007) claims that the Six-Day War was the ‘only unambiguous preemptive war in the last 
century.’ The authors assume that at that critical point of  Israel’s history nearly all acts of  aggression were 
defensive in nature. This is unsurprising considering that the politics of  that era regarding Israel was 
dominated by the emerging Shoah narratives, especially after the Eichmann Trial (see previous chapter). 
Western acceptance and mainstreaming of  Israel’s narrative of  the War may have partly been influenced by 
the sense of  guilt regarding the Jewish genocide. In the aftermath of  the World War II, the belief  that the 
Allies have fought a righteous war contributed, Kemp (2015) claims, to the determination to stand up to the 
political incorrectness of  the 1930s, which was believed to have triggered the conflict. The Shoah was 
 The Six-Day War is also known as the June War, the 67 (or) 1967 War, 1967 Arab–Israeli War, or the Third Arab–Israeli War.41
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considered to be a catastrophic result of  the conjunction of  destructive ideologies at that specific, critical 
point in history (Bell 2004, cited by ibid.). The sense of  guilt it impinged upon many Western governments 
drove them to support Israel militarily and economically (Olick 2003). Israel’s creation was seen as ‘victims’ 
justice’ and the country’s military doctrine and wars were legitimised accordingly.  
It may be suggested that such support was further consolidated by the Western negative perception of  Arab 
nationalism at the time. Egypt’s nationalisation of  the Suez Canal in 1956 was perhaps a critical factor.  It 42
was viewed as threatening to the British Empire’s oil shipping routes. The possibility of  blackmail by Egypt 
was exacerbated by the then growing depiction of  Nasser as a ‘mortal enemy’ and on occasions a Nazi (see 
previous chapter). Furthermore, the pan-Arab nationalism that the nationalisation provoked, according to 
The Economist (2006), may have completed the transformation of  the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into an Israeli-
Arab one, effectively, widening Israel’s circle of  potential enemies, and by default perpetuating the image of  
Israeli-Jewish vulnerability.  
  
Promoting the war as an existential threat to Israel also triggered an unprecedented wave of  solidarity by 
American Jews. Before 1967, those Jews did not identify passionately with Israel or Zionism. The Shoah was 
not seen as a primary subject of  many large-scale Jewish American organisations nor a core element in 
American Jewish identity (Navon 2015). The 1967 crisis changed that. American Jews responded with 
fundraising, activism, volunteering and general interest and support on a whole unprecedented scale (Navon 
2016). The Shoah reverberations that the war trigged ignited a value in Jewishness amongst the majority of  
Jewish Americans. As a young man, Alan Dershowitz remembers the Six-Day War as a factor that made 
Jewishness his most important value. He mentions the fear of  another Shoah as a determining factor. In the 
Case for Israel (2003), he implies that the perceived Arab invasion was intended to finish what Shoah had not 
fully achieved. “Israel defended itself  against a genocide war of  extermination,” Dershowitz writes (p.74).  
 For more information see: BBC On This Day, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/42
newsid_2701000/2701603.stm]
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After the war, the lesson for many American Jews was that Israel is existentially endangered and the world 
would not intervene to save the Jews — yet again (Weiss 2017b). Nowadays, many of  them embrace the 
Zionist worldview where anti-Semitism, which culminated in the Shoah, observes Finkelstein (1997), both 
justified the necessity of  Israel and accounted for all hostility directed at it: the Jewish State was the only 
safeguard against the next outbreak of  homicidal anti-Semitism and, conversely, homicidal anti-Semitism was 
behind every attack on, or even defensive manoeuvre against, the Jewish State.   
The Six-Day War as Perception   
Depicting Israel as being ‘vastly outnumbered’ and existentially threatened by Arab troops amassed and 
ready to attack made the preemptive attack not only justified but also righteous and legitimate (Nikles 2013). 
This has been the official narrative not only of  the state but also in scholarship and cultural texts and 
artefacts. Consider the IDF-commissioned film Sheshet ha-Yamim (the Six Days) (1968), which was made to 
celebrate Israel’s victory in 1967. In his critique of  the film, Ben-David (2009) observes that the film is by 
definition propaganda, but such films should not be seen as merely providing insight into the state’s ideology, 
but also as a reflection of  the general mode and experience in society. Sheshet ha-Yamim tells us that Israel 
attacked because Egypt closed the Straits of  Tiran, expelled the UN  observers from the demilitarised zone, 
and advanced forces into Sinai. Israel’s victory, we are told, was because the IDF fought fearlessly, motivated 
by a sense of  mission and willingness for self-sacrifice, understanding that “there was no choice.” Using 
footage, images, and commentaries, Israel in the film is depicted as helpless, vulnerable, and at the risk of  
annihilation. To enhance this sense, the narrator also repeatedly brings up the Arab-Nazi links, Arab anti-
Semitism, and the Shoah (see previous chapters: Nazi Arabs). The continuum of  suffering in the film is clear, 
unreservedly linking Jewish collective memory with the current situation.  
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Similarly, an audio documentary written and narrated by IDF general (and later Israel’s sixth president) 
Chaim Herzog (1968) opens up with the following: “For twenty years, the intransigence of  the Arab 
leadership had fomented blind hate on the part of  the Arab World toward Israel, a hate which called for the 
destruction of  Israel and the annihilation of  its inhabitant.” Before learning how the events of  the War 
unfolded, the listener is given a strong indication of  Israel’s war as a fight for survival. Throughout, the Arab 
‘hatred’ of  Israel is hardly elaborated on as a political issue. The impression is that the newly established state 
is hated and this is how Jewish history has always worked, a situation which Sherman (2014) cynically but in a 
rather self-lamenting fashion called the ‘mortal sin of  existence.’ 
To this day, this narrative continues almost unchallenged, not least in media and many scholarly works. In 
2017, on the 50th anniversary of  the War, the New York Times (Fisher 2017) gave this description: “This 
year marks half  a century since the Arab-Israeli war of  1967, in which Israel defied annihilation by its Arab 
neighbours.” This is the official story adopted by AIPAC, and the version of  history that Michael Oren (2003) 
in the Six Days of  War and Alan Dershowitz (2003) in The Case for Israel militantly defended, as well as the 
same line of  narrative Shavit (2014) promoted in My Promised Land.  
  
Recently, however, several scholars began to challenge this narrative (e.g. Finkelstein 2003; Kurtulus 2007; 
Aaron 2007). Kurtulus (2007) argued that evidence shows that despite the rough strategic parity between 
Israel and the Arab states in the mid-1960s, the latter’s quantitative superiority was compensated for by 
Israel’s qualitative superiority in the form of  modern fighter and attack planes, which were on high alert long 
before the war. The Israeli offensive weapons, like fighters and ground attack-aircrafts, were not vulnerable to 
an eventual attack by the neighbouring Arab states. Israeli airspace was also generally impenetrable for the 
mostly Soviet-made Arab aircrafts. By contrast, by December 1966, Israeli jet-fighters were penetrating 
Egyptian airspace up to the Suez Canal on daily basis and even had flown over Cairo on several occasions 
(ibid.).  
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Finkelstein (2003) argues, contrary to the common belief, Israel prior to the War was not passive. She 
repeatedly and often disproportionately attacked Arab neighbours. One year before the War, for instance, 
Israel carried out a comprehensive attack — perhaps the largest since the Suez invasion in 1956 — on the 
West Bank town of  Samu’a, killing 18 Jordanian soldiers and destroying over one-hundred homes. Some 
reports even discussed a decade-long Israeli plan to attack Egypt. A 2017 Israeli Channel 10 report by Alon 
Ben David which included interviews with pilots who participated in the War, and based on newly released 
military documents, revealed that between 1956 and 1967 the IAF pilots trained intensively on low-altitude 
and silent flying. The goal from day one was to cripple mainly Egypt’s potential to present any threat to 
Israel.   
Aaron (2007) shows in his painstakingly researched book, The Six Day War, that Israel’s intelligence, with the 
help of  the CIA and British intelligence, knew that the Arab nations were not militarily on par with Israel 
and the Arab anti-Israel rhetorics were merely an exaggerated bluster. The Mossad had high-level spies 
operating inside Cairo and Damascus and possessed an excellent knowledge of  what was going on on the 
other side of  the border. Avi (2012) shows that the army generals and many of  the decision makers did not 
feel that there was an existential danger to Israel, although they feared a high number of  casualties if  war 
broke out.  
Despite the clashes of  narratives between those who believe Israel fought a war for survival and those who 
refute that claim, the facts remain that striking first gave Israel ‘a wide leeway’ (Kretzmer 2013b). It gave her 
the advantage of  controlling the place and time of  battle and led to a sweeping victory which eventually 
provided the Jewish state with more land and the strategic depth she had long coveted. But the war also 
deepened the intractable conflict with the Arabs and Palestinians. The death anxiety related to an anticipated 
Shoah outweighed all other variables in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even though information showed that Egypt 
was not able or willing to attack Israel, Israel, possibly falling back on the Shoah memory, was not willing or 
able to gamble by living with the anxiety and fear of  a future Arab attack no matter how minuscule it was. 
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The fact that she was militarily superior did very little to soothe the feelings of  vulnerability. It seems that 
certain cognitive beliefs can become so reified, even in the face of  conflicting information (Renshon 2007) — 
this is what Bar-Tal (2001) describes as ‘freezing of  beliefs’ (see previous chapter).  
  
These beliefs have dangerously armed hyper security (and its implementations) with a profound sense of  
legitimacy. Legitimacy is governed by perceptions and in Israel’s case, this is a very critical factor. Many of  
Israel’s military operations were criticised by the international community and more often than not were 
deemed illegal. Israel, like many states, is not particularly concerned with legality when forming policies 
(Mueller et al. 2007). The aim is often the formation of  policies they believe will ensure the best interests of  
the state. Unlike most states, however, much of  Israel’s sense of  legitimacy regarding the country’s military 
and espionage activities was justified based on the historical events when the world stood silent when the Jews 
were led to their death. A clear implication of  that has been Israel’s frequent suspension and violation of  
international norms.  
When Israel bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear plant in 1981, for instance, Begin challenged the UN Security 
Council's unanimous condemnation of  the attack, saying: “There won't be another Holocaust in history…
never again, never again” (Shipler 1981). The attack would become known as the Begin Doctrine, one aimed 
at undermining any nuclear potentials of  countries hostile to Israel. Examples of  this worldview are found in 
numerous narrative textuality. Consider Raid on the Reactor (2006), a History Channel documentary directed by 
Steven Feld. It describes the attack on Iraq’s nuclear plant, aka Operation Opera, as the ‘mission that would 
determine the very fate of  Israel.’ The documentary, like Begin, legitimises the attack through the Shoah 
narrative. In the documentary, IAF pilot Lt. General Shafir says: “many of  us are grandsons and sons of  
people who’d been through the Holocaust…we’d been part of  a mission to prevent another Holocaust” [02:31]. 
“I felt I was flying for my grandfather who died in a Concentration Camp” [25:33].  
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In a zero-sum thinking (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013), Begin probably saw the world as divided into two camps, good 
and evil, implying that as the primary victims of  Nazi crimes, Israel was in the good camp and therefore her 
actions were justified on solid moral grounds. This would become a trend amongst almost all Israeli leader to 
see the world in absolute moral dichotomies, good and evil or right and wrong (Glad 1983). Like the Six-Day 
War, there was probably no or little evidence that Iraq was intending to attack Israel. Also like the Six-Day 
War, there was enough collective memory to make the perceptions about the Iraqi threat terribly real. 
Perhaps it was the fear of  the possibility of  Iraq’s having nuclear capabilities that triggered Israel’s fight-to-
flight mode, and once again, Israel’s fear had to be put under control by being acted out in the form of  a 
preemptive strike. Today, this thinking paradigm seems to continue with Iran.  
The Iranian Threat  
In 2012, a survey revealed that 77% of  Israeli-Jews believed that Iran represented an existential threat (Yair & 
Akbari 2014). At the time, Netanyahu said that Israel was not willing to accept “a world in which the 
Ayatollahs have atomic bombs” (Weinthal 2012). In 2015, the nuclear deal did very little to change this belief, 
“…even after the signing of  the nuclear agreement, Iran has not relinquished its aspiration to obtain nuclear 
weapons,” stated Netanyahu (Ahren 2016).  In 2017, as the Trump administration debated the nuclear deal, 43
the reference to Iran’s as an existential threat became louder. The same year, the Education Minister Naftali 
Bennet described Iran as “…the number one existential threat to the state of  Israel” (Kranish 2017). Israel 
fears a first strike should Iran acquires nuclear capabilities. Netanyahu also argued that even if  Iran does not 
 Under the statement of  intent Iran will reduce its installed enrichment centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,000, only 5,000 of  which will 43
be spinning. All of  them will be first-generation centrifuges: none of  its more advanced models can be used for at least 10 years, and 
R&D into more efficient designs will have to be based on a plan submitted to the IAEA. The heavy-water reactor at Arak will be 
redesigned and its original core will be removed and destroyed. No other heavy-water reactor will be built for 15 years. [source: The 
Economist 2015]  
** The Trump Administration on May 2018 withdrew from the deal, following the decision by an unprecedented tightening of  the 
economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic [Aljazeera English, May 8 2018]. In a step unfamiliar in international relations, the 
Administration also declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation [Aljazeera English, April 8 2019]. As of  
the time of  revising this chapter (July 2019), Iran has declared its intentions to abandon her obligations and gradually go back to 
enriching uranium if  the sanctions have not been lifted [Aljazeera English, July 23 2019]. 
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bomb Tel Aviv, “Iran’s militant proxies would be able to fire rockets and engage in other terror activities while 
enjoying a nuclear umbrella” (Goldberg 2009). 
Such security belief  is almost a common denominator among all Israeli leaders, including the seemingly 
‘dovish’ ones like Shimon Peres. Just one day before Israel’s general election, Peres ordered an attack on 
Lebanon.  His military action was a bid to win more votes to become the Prime Minister (Fisk 2016). He did 44
what Netanyahu had always done, winning Israeli-Jews through their fears and insecurities. Chances are, if  
he were the prime minister today, Peres’ position towards Iran would have been similar to Netanyahu’s. In 
fact, both the Peres and Netanyahu governments threatened Iran with preemptive attack in the mid 1990s 
(Porter 2015). One can only speculate that because Peres’ government was short-lived, Iran did not become 
one of  his known benchmarks. Answering the questions about the lessons he learned from the Jewish history, 
Goldberg in 2009 quotes Peres saying that: “If  we have to make a mistake of  overreaction or under-reaction, 
I think I prefer the overreaction.” Similarly, Ehud Barak, viewed as a moderate and a rationalist (Aronoff  
2014) and who repeatedly warned against Netanyahu’s reckless conduct undermining Israel’s security (see: 
Barak 2016), pushed for a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities when he served in the Netanyahu 
government (Caspit 2015; Linde 2016). 
Undoubtedly, the statements by Iranian leaders to ‘wipe Israel off  the map’ are troubling, but as it stands 
today, the likelihood of  an Iranian attack is much more ambiguous and without empirical accuracy (Nili 
2011). Iran will probably be happy in a world without Israel, but this sentiment does not reflect the Iranian 
intentions to actually ‘do it themselves’ (Slager 2012). The Iranian leadership may be theocratic, full of  
aggressive anti-Semitic rhetoric resembling that of  Hitler’s Reich, as remarked by Peter Beinart (2015), but 
given their history and their long war with Iraq in the 1980s, they are certainly not psychopathic or suicidal 
 On April 18, 1996, the IDF shelled a UN compound in Qana, Lebanon, killing over 100 civilians and wounding hundreds more. 44
Approximately 800 civilians had sought refuge in the compound while their villages became the stage of  a conflict between the IDF 
and Hezbollah. The massacre was part of  the IDF’s Operation “Grapes of  Wrath,” intended to pressure the Lebanese government to 
disarm Hezbollah. During the operation, the IDF bombed, strafed and shelled small towns and villages in southern Lebanon, forcing 
approximately 400,000 civilians to flee their homes. [see: Armstrong 2016; Abu-Shaqra 2017]
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(Fallows 2015). There is also the fact that Iran’s Jews are a prosperous community (Sengupta 2016). If  Iran 
were similar to Nazi Germany, as once described by US presidential candidate Mike Huckabee (Heller 2015), 
they would have probably started with their own Jews.  
Parsi (2017) claims that Israel’s allegations about Iran’s genocidal intent only began more than a decade after 
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. They occurred not due to change in Tehran’s rhetoric or views of  Israel, but 
rather due to the change in the regional scene. The collapse of  Iraq’s military power cleared the deck for Iran 
to be seen as an existential enemy. Similarly, Israeli Brigadier General Shlomo Brom stated, “Nothing special 
happened with Iran, but because Iraq was removed, Iran started to play a greater role in the threat 
perception of  Israel” (ibid., p.27). 
Cynically, in the post-Arab Spring it is becoming clear that Iran is more occupied with the Arabs than it is 
with Israel. Iranian intellectual, Sadiq Zeiba, attributes what he calls ‘Persian sense of  supremacy’ and 
‘hatred’ towards the Arabs to the 14-century-old trauma of  the Persian defeat by the Arabs at Al-Qadisiyya in 
636AD  (Al-Zahed 2011). Iranians do not have a ‘chosen trauma’ (see: Volkan  2001, 2004, 2006) against 45
the Jews, but against the Arabs, especially the Sunni Muslims amongst them. It may be even more intolerable 
for the Arabs especially in the Gulf  — none of  which with nuclear capabilities — to have a nuclear-armed 
Iran than it is for Israel. Iran repeatedly threatened Arab countries as it did Israel. After Saudi Arabia had 
initiated military actions in Yemen in April 2015, Iranian General Fairuz Abadi threatened to “wipe the 
Kingdom out of  existence” (Sputnik Arabic 2016). A sentiment reminiscent of  Ahmadinejad’s threats to ‘wipe 
Israel off  the map’ (Charbonneau 2012). 
 Al-Qadisiyya was a decisive battle between the Arab Muslim army and the Sassanid Persian army during the first period of  Muslim 45
expansion. The Arab army, although smaller, prevailed.  
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The Iranian Threat as Perception 
The Atlantic’s  own Jeffrey Goldberg (2015a) said: “If, in the post-Shoah world, a group of  people express a 
desire to hurt Jews, it is, for safety’s sake, best to believe them.” Goldberg is probably building on the idea that 
collective memory is an intrinsic signifier in Israel’s security reasoning, and this might blur the difference 
between threat as a perception and as a true geo-political possibility. Either way, the fear is real. Fear and 
anxiety are normal adaptive reactions to threatening situations, and identifications of  these situations (or 
stimuli) activates cognitive, psychological, and behavioural processes that foster survival (Bar-Tal 2001; 
Halperin et al. 2001; Dibbets et al. 2015). However, when collective memory becomes a critical part in the 
identification of  threat cues, these processes become over-activated and no longer adaptive (Dibbets et al. 
2015). Subsequently, as highly anxious individuals, many Israeli-Jews — leaders included — grow ever more 
inclined to selectively search for and absorb information that confirms the validity of  their fears about Iran 
and ignore the information that does not (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001; 2013).  
This results in reinforcement and maintenance of  the fear orientations (ibid.), substantiating the feelings of  
collective victimhood and further validating experience as a reliable memory agent. Netanyahu probably 
needs/ed the anti-Semites in Tehran in order to justify and rationalise Israel’s fear and to consolidate her own 
positive image and moral superiority. With such thinking, many Israeli-Jews may fail to see that the enemy is 
perhaps ‘like us,’ and not necessarily ‘pure evil’ hellbent on annihilating the Jewish State. Iran is maybe 
provocative and militarily threatening, but she is also, perhaps, a needed ‘new enemy’ that may keep Israeli-
Jewish views of  a hostile, Amalek-ruled world intact. After all, the views of  Israel as a vulnerable oasis 
surrounded by enemies long preceded the emergence of  Iran as an existential threat. Up until late 1980s, 
Israel saw in Iran a potential future ally against the Arab World. It was Rabin in 1993 who broke away from 
this view and began the construction of  Iran as a threat (Porter 2015). After Rabin, the Netanyahu 
government did not feel that Iran represented an existential threat. Uzi Arad, then the head of  the Mossad, 
advised Netanyahu that Iran’s missile programme was never directed at Israel but had emerged in the 
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crucible of  the war with Iraq (ibid.). In retrospect, the security needs at the time were different, and Israel was 
more engaged with her traditional enemies. As those threats receded, Israel required a new enemy. Iran 
basically replaced Iraq as Iraq replaced Egypt a decade earlier. In Israel’s ethnically divided society, the need 
for an enemy outside of  one's group also helps create internal cohesion (Moses 1995). This cohesion is 
proportionate to the threat; the more security is challenged by the out-group, the more society becomes 
internally united (Landau et al. 2012; also see: Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013). Volkan (1995, p.243) explains: “…
As long as the enemy group is kept at least at a psychological distance, it gives us aid and comfort, enhancing 
our cohesion and making comparisons with ourselves gratifying.”  
In sum, investing militarily and logistically in the Iran problem may be a sound preventative security 
measure, but banking on collective memory as the major tangible evidence to explain Iran’s behaviours may 
not be a wise course of  action. Given Israel’s history — this often led to further escalation and paradoxically 
compromised the very purpose of  ‘security’ that the Jewish state claims to have been seeking. It repeatedly 
reproduced a psychology characterised by hyper-vigilance of  the haunted (Dowty 1999). The next section 
discusses how Israel’s perception of  security is not only limited to inter-state disputes, but also came to define 
the very concept of  terrorism.  
HYPER SECURITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR  
Terrorism and Security   
Since her inception, Israel dealt with a large number of  Palestinian attacks, from the cross-border Fedayeen 
raids to the suicide bombings in the post-Oslo era and during the second Intifada, and most recently, the 
rockets from the Gaza Strip. The common belief  now is that those attacks, especially the suicide attacks, were 
a factor in tightening Israel’s security policies and turning them into winning cards in Israel’s general 
elections (see: Bar-Tal 2001, 2017). It was suggested that the suicide attacks in the early 1990s, for example, 
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were behind Netanyahu’s victory in the 1996 general election. The same reason contributed in the beginning 
of  the second Intifada to the election of  Ariel Sharon (Newman 1997; Del Sarto 2006). In the latest 2018 
general election, security concerns over Iran, Syria and the growing Palestinian military strength in Gaza 
kept Netanyahu in power, hence becoming the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history (Keinon 
2019). Netanyahu, like all Israeli PMs, knew that Israel would ultimately vote on security (Pollard 2015). His 
political campaign reflected specifically that. He marketed himself  as protector of  Israel’s security, which he 
declared, goes beyond politics in the midst of  the battle of  Israel’s survival (Kershner 2018). The corruption 
charges against him and his family did not seem to sway many voters away from him (Maan News, March 
2019). 
The final analysis for many Israeli-Jews was that Palestinian ‘terror’, especially suicide attacks, had killed the 
peace process and continues to represent a serious threat to the state of  Israel. Another dimension to that is 
that not only did those attack deepen the sense of  insecurity, but also violated the Israeli-Jewish ethos about 
peace. Ethos about peace serves to maintain the in-group’s positive self-image, the justness of  their goals, and 
proves their status as the victims in the conflict (Bar-Tal 2000, 2007, 2013). The loss of  peace — usually 
promoted as being the ultimate Jewish objective — is multi-levelled and far-reaching and therefore existential. 
It proves that the Palestinians are not interested in settlement and the societal beliefs over their ‘sinister 
intentions’ become a nonnegotiable fact. Any ‘concessions,’ in this light, are viewed as an extreme risk, 
probably bordering on the existential  (Schulz 2004).   
From this angle, Israeli-Jews do not differ from other peoples in voting for security when the personal and 
collective wellbeing is perceived at risk. In this context, Netanyahu, described by the Jerusalem Post as ‘Mr. 
Security’ (Hoffman  2017) — or any other Israeli PM — is not very different from America’s Trump or 
Egypt’s Sisi in the way they employed fear for political purposes. Also from this angle, Israel’s counter-
terrorism approach may not appear different from most of  other sovereign states. Like other states, Israel 
utilises her epistemological power to freely distinguish between state violence, calling it ‘security’ or 
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‘preserving the status quo,’ and that of  the non-state actors, often unequal in power and influence (Gordon 
1999). 
Terrorism as Perception  
Unlike most sovereign states, however, Israels’s views of  terrorism do not start and end with the traditional 
geo-political assessment. The ghetto mentality that characterises hyper security also determines how Israel 
interprets Palestinian dissidence. When the Yishuv planted the seeds of  modern Israel’s hyper security, they 
also planted an equally hyper definition to the acts of  violence directed at them from the local population. In 
Traces of  Racial Exception (2018), Lentin defines Israeli settler-colonialism as a combination of  white supremacy 
(typical of  European colonialism) and Jewish supremacy. It is different from European colonialism only in 
terms of  not involving a ‘mother-country’ to go back to, but rather a more deadly notion of  a ‘mother-
country’ to create and settle in. Lentin’s thesis, it may be suggested, helps explain some of  the roots of  
modern Israel’s understanding of  terrorism.  
First, the white supremacist worldview allowed Zionism to see the native resistance to Jewish emigration 
almost in the same fashion as European settlers saw Native Americans. Historian Peter Silver (in: Lender 
2016, p.109) explained how the attacks by native Americans on settler communities imbued them with a 
sense of  victimhood and resentments against the indigenous population. That matured into aggressive 
measures and eventually into a racist conception of  the native Americans as subhumans. To the Zionist 
settlers, Palestinian opposition was not legitimate not least because Palestinians were seen in Orientalist 
terms, lacking sufficient mental and political capacity to be more deserving of  the land than the more 
advanced, educated, and, above all, victimised European Jews.  
Second, unlike conventional colonialism, the ‘mother-country to create and settle in’ induced in the settlers a 
profound sense of  legitimacy. The Yishuvists saw their emigration to Palestine as a return to their ancestral 
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land and therefore a legitimate right. This belief  is not confined to historical Palestine, but increasingly 
becoming about the lands occupied in 1967 as well. A recent survey by the Peace Index, published by The 
Israeli Democracy Institute (2017; Maltz 2017) found that close to 62% of  Israeli-Jews are either “sure” or 
“think” that Israel’s control of  the West Bank should not be described as ‘occupation.’ Opposition to that 
right was perhaps viewed as an attack on Jews qua Jews. The Yishuv collective memory of  European anti-
Semitism coupled with the Biblical zachor made them hyper sensitive to any form of  opposition. It was 
perceived as a violation to their right to be safe, ironically, in a situation that they themselves instigated (see 
previous section: settlers’ insecurity).  
Today, the phrase ‘Palestinian terrorism’ conjures up most Palestinian dissidence, violent or otherwise. The 
difference now, however, is that Israel can ‘legally’ define terrorism and the identity of  those who qualify as 
terrorists, which for the simple reason of  being against the occupation, most Palestinians may be perceived as 
potential ‘terrorists.’ Amongst many Israeli-Jews this idea is very salient, the word mechabel (Hebrew for 
‘terrorist,’ literally: saboteur) has become almost synonymous to the word Palestinian or Arab. In The General’s 
Son (2016, p. 70), Mike Peled explains that “…like most Israelis, [he] learned the term Fedayeen, infiltrators 
and terrorists long before [he] knew they were Palestinians.” In his memoirs The Girl who Stole my Holocaust 
(2010), Chayut reflects that he and his fellow soldiers all though that the word ‘Shaheed’ (martyr) — referring 
to Ramallah's Shaheed Street where their armoured vehicles stationed — meant ‘terrorist.’ In their mind, a 
killed Palestinian possibly meant he/she was a ‘terrorist.’ I call this phenomenon ‘the mechabel narrative.’  
In the Israeli documentary The Gatekeepers (2012), the mechabel narrative seems to steer the dialogue. In the 
film, six Shabak former directors come together to speak about their experience fighting Palestinian ‘terror.’ 
The film has been cheered for being brutally honest. The interviewees, each in his own way, criticised the 
morality, tactics, and lack of  strategy of  the Shabak operations. Some bluntly noted that the Palestinian issue 
eventually became a security issue. Bendor (Shabak director 1981-86) [12:50], for instance, said that as 
Palestinian ‘terrorism’ increased, “… [we] eventually forgot about the Palestinian problem.” The film, 
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however, hardly highlights the narrative behind the Shabak practices. Rather, in its own way, it seems to 
substantiate the mechabel narrative. 
The first thing to notice is the ease with which the term mechabel is used. Granted the film does not seek to 
provide epistemological explanations to terrorism, but like other forms of  narrative textuality, it provides an 
insight into the general mode and experience of  society. The film uses footage and images to add dramatic 
effects to the speakers’ words. We mostly see random footage/images of  seemingly primitive Palestinians in 
rundown towns and villages, young men staring confusingly or angrily at the camera, or being inspected or 
escorted blind-folded by the IDF. Regardless of  what is being said, The visual representations substantiate the 
mechabel narrative, not least in the manner of  emphasising the parity between Israel, civilised and defensive, 
and the Palestinians, backward and mindlessly violent.   
In the film, the Shabak former directors grapple with the moral implications of  their actions and admit that 
their security tactics proved to be a strategic failure (also see: Bergman 2018).  The concerns, however, are 46
expressed post factum, after the situation was over. This sterilises the criticism, makes it seem obsolete and 
irrelevant, and prevents any application of  critical insights to other problematic situations (Benziman 2013) 
which Israel’s idea of  security has created. Here also, not only does the mechabel narrative create disassociation 
and separation between the Shabak directors and their actions, it also legitimises their actions before the 
Israeli-Jewish public, whose majority sees in Palestinians nothing but potential mechabelim (terrorists).   
On a personal note, this narrative, I noticed, was always present in all the discussions I had with Israeli-Jews 
— most of  whom were highly educated. At the JIPSC in 2015, mechabel and other related words were thrown 
around nonchalantly by the Israeli-Jewish participants to describe any Palestinian actions they disapproved of. 
As far as I remember, it was perhaps one of  the most frustrating parts in the discussion. The mechabel 
 Ronen Bergman explores in his book Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of  Israel's Targeted Assassinations, how Israel security apparatus 46
has been extremely effective at picking up Israel’s enemies. What initially started as tactical success, however, eventually become a 
strategic failure. As an example, Bergman shows how Israel’s assassination of  Hamas’ spiritual leader sheikh Ahmed Yassin did in fact 
strengthen the links between the Palestinian movement and Iran. 
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narrative was so intense, in fact, it both angered and frustrated the Palestinian participants. Cynically, I 
wondered if  they saw us anything other than a pair of  eyes peeking through a mask and brandishing an 
AK-47, like we saw them as nothing but an oppressive military figures. To many of  us, especially as for some 
it was the first face-to-face discussion with ‘the enemy,’ it felt like a level of  entitlement we never experienced 
before. There was also the occasional patronising tone by some of  the Jewish participants, which we saw as 
their inability to transcend the power relations. At times, as one of  the Jewish participants raised his voice, I 
could not help but see in him an image of  a soldier at a checkpoint shouting orders. Maybe it was not his 
intention, maybe it is our hyper sensitivity to such power relations. In hindsight, perhaps a built-in sense of  
power superiority was what made the accusations of  ‘terrorism’ a sufficiently believable narrative on their 
part. This may explain why officially the concept of  self-defence against ‘terrorism,’ Del Sarto (2006) 
maintains, is used unreservedly against the very people Israel controls. Bishara (2017) argues that by 
enthusiastically bludgeoning her enemies with the label of  “terrorism,” Israel hopes to obscure its true role as 
an occupying power, supporting the division of  the world into “terrorist” and “anti-terrorist” camps.   
It may be further argued that Israel’s security bodies may have been handling modern threats with the same 
‘vigilance of  the haunted’ mentality (Dowty 1999) that prevailed amongst the Yishuvists.. With such mentality, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became part of  the history of  Jewish suffering (see previous chapter). Ochs 
(2006) describes this as ‘allusive victimhood’ that deflects the culpability and context of  the present, 
attributing it to experiences and legacies of  the past.” Palestinian dissidence, in other words, was detached 
from the occupier-occupied causality and historical context, redefining any rejection of  the occupier’s policies 
as an act of  terror. Deploying the Yamam, one of  Israel’s elite counter-terrorism units, to suppress peaceful 
Palestinian protests in Jerusalem recently (Karram 2017),  is just one example of  how Israel perceives 47
Palestinian dissidence. For Israel, “…it is not the occupation that creates terror but terror that prolongs the 
occupation,” explains Halevi (2018, p.14). Finkelstein (2005) notes that this rationale dictates that resolving 
 After two IDF soldiers had been killed inside the Old City of  Jerusalem, Israel installed electronic gates at the entrances of  the Al-47
Aqsa Mosque. The Israeli measures enraged Palestinian Muslims and Christians who refused to pass through these gates for nearly 
two weeks and instead prayed outside as a form of  protest. The situation escalated to clashes with the Israeli police. Due to protests 
and international pressure, the gates were removed. 
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the Israeli-Palestinian conflict begins by ending the Arab ‘irrational hostility’ towards the Jews, not by ending 
the occupation that caused the hostility in the first place.  
Moreover, because Israel’s perception of  Palestinian dissidence ignores the power relations, it sometimes leads 
to narratives of  ‘equal accountability’ which in turn leads to narratives of  ‘equal justice’ between the occupier 
and the occupied. Amos Oz, for instance, framed the conflict as “…a clash between total justice and total 
justice.”  Oz presents himself  as a voice of  reason willing to look beyond the conflict stereotypes and aspires 
for Zionism and Palestinian nationalism to see the equal validity of  their conflicting claims (Ramraz-Raʼukh 
1989). However, the claim for equal justices is problematic; its philosophical root has the connotation of  a 
natural catastrophe (Khoury 2012). It also implies that Israeli-Jews and Palestinians should be held equally 
accountable in a largely asymmetrical conflict characterised by settler-colonial dimensions. 
Relieving Israel of  any type of  accountability, Netanyahu in his book Durable Peace (2000) argues extensively 
against what he terms ‘ the Palestinian Centrality.’ The general impression in his argument is that it is not 
Israel’s policies that ignite extremism and ‘terrorism,' but rather the built-in internal and historical dynamics 
of  the region. Some of  Netanyahu’s argument is rooted in the belief  that the disapproval of  Israel’s policies 
stems from the hatred of  Jews and Israel being the default mode in the region (see: Shapira 2006).     
Likewise, Israel’s foreign ministry’s website (2002) describes the relationship between Palestinian ‘terrorism’ 
and the occupation as ‘historically flawed.’ It explains that ‘Arab’ and Palestinian terrorism existed long 
before the Six-Day War when Israel ‘took control’ of  Gaza and the West Bank. The website also mentions 
that “…deplorable violence can be traced back to the beginning of  the renewed Jewish settlement of  the 
Land of  Israel over a century ago.” As it stands, this is the narrative that characterised the pre-state Yishuv 
and by definition the state of  Israel today. That is to say, colonising Palestine was a reconquest of  Eretz Yisrael 
and therefore Palestinian opposition, even in response to repressive policies, is irrelevant in the grand scheme 
of  Jewish right to be free from anti-Semitism and victimhood. With Jewish collective memory in mind, 
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Palestinian opposition is also a violation to the Jewish right to exist — thus nothing but irrational anti-
Semitism.   
The Israeli foreign ministry applied this argument almost to all of  Israel’s encounters with the Palestinians, 
especially during Israel’s three Gaza onslaughts between 2009 and 2014. During Operation Pillar of  Defence 
in 2012, the ministry (2012) repeatedly emphasised the concept of  self-defence against ‘Palestinian terrorist 
organisations.’ During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, self-defence was invoked on every occasions, in 
most cases over the footage of  dead Palestinian civilians and flattened neighbourhoods. At the height of  the 
onslaught, the Jerusalem Post (Rosen 2014) claimed that Hamas’s Charter, public statements and actions all 
provide a textbook case for self-defence, implying a war with existential dimensions. The JP does not explain 
how Hamas in reality could jeopardise Israel’s existence. The newspaper, nevertheless, exhibits a classic case 
in the Israeli-Jewish thinking where the difference between a mere rhetoric against Israel and actually having 
the ability to ‘destroy the Jewish State and its people’ is fuzzy (see previous section: Israel’s position toward 
Iran). In the most recent major confrontations in November 2018, Israel bombed the Hamas-affiliated Al-
Aqsa TV station on charges of  ‘terrorist incitement.’ Four months later Netanyahu declared the same station 
a ‘terrorist organisation’ (Maan News, March 2019). It is not clear how or on what basis a media institution 
can be a ‘terrorist organisation’ nor what kind of  security measures, after the stations had been bombed 
repeatedly, can be taken against it. Described by Palestinians as ‘a joke,’ the decision, for the reasons 
explained above, is part of  the same mechabel narrative that allows any Palestinian act of  dissidence to be 
readily labelled a terrorist act.   
Additionally, the mechabel narrative has grown so rooted in the Israeli-Jewish psyche that it removed the once 
existed yet subtly admitted difference between the acts of  dissidence inside the OT and those inside Israel. To 
many in Israel, Palestinian attacks on settlers or military personnel inside the OT are no longer seen different 
from a suicide attack in a cafe in Tel-Aviv. They are both attacks on Jewish legitimacy and both should be met 
with harsh measures. Consider, for instance, a recent survey published by the Israeli Peace Index (Ya’ar & 
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Hermann 2017) which showed that 70% of  the Jewish public supported the death penalty to Palestinian 
‘terrorists’ involved in the death of  civilians. This may be fathomable in a conflict situation, but the survey 
also showed that a majority of  66% supported the penalty against Palestinians accused of  killing soldiers. It 
basically says that Israeli-Jews perceive any Palestinian act of  resistance even if  fully protected by 
international law as a criminal act, one that deserves the death penalty.   
It may also be suggested that Palestinian dissidence — like the Iranian threat — may have been the answer, 
the justification many Israeli-Jews wanted in order to rationalise and validate what otherwise be considered 
an unbearable existential fear. To blame own insecurity on the others may provide Israeli-Jews with a needed 
relief  that distrusting the peace process, at least as a tangible and realistic possibility, is not only justified but 
rather the natural thing to do given Israel’s exceptional place amongst the nations. It is what Cohen (2009) 
refers to as the ‘the perpetual state of  exceptionalism’ whose source resides in what he terms, ‘the 
annihilation psychosis.’ Ochs (2006) shows how during the course of  the Second Intifada which in the early 
years witnessed a high number of  suicide bombings, Israeli-Jews gave meaning to their experience through 
the allusive memories of  the Shoah. Generally, for many Israeli-Jews, there is a little need to embrace new 
security measures, less strict or less hyper, since in effect the old threat of  annihilation has merely shape-
shifted, regardless of  whether this new threat is tangibly superior, equal or inferior. To embrace the Shoah as a 
source memory, or a ‘chosen trauma’ (see: e.g. Volkan  2001, 2004, 2006) makes all the events from different 
time periods and regimes mesh together into a single menace of  politicide (Nili 2011). 
HYPER SECURITY AND PATRIOTISM  
Fear is important not only because it steers many of  Israel’s belligerent policies, but also because it carries 
with it an enormous sense of  urgency that often redefines community’s sense of  belonging and one’s 
identification with own country.   
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In one of  his early works Bar-Tal (1993; also see: Bar-Tal & Staub 1997) describes patriotism as a cognitive-
motivational response reflected in beliefs and emotions. It gives meaning to the group membership, belonging 
and identification in the society in which they reside. In his more recent socio-psychological framework (2007, 
2013), Bar-Tal places patriotism as one of  the eight themes of  societal beliefs that comprise the conflict ethos. 
He mainly links patriotism to the societal beliefs about solidarity and unity, assigning a positive value to 
patriotic feelings. In his discussion of  fear and hope (2001), Bar-Tal highlights the proportionate relationship 
between patriotism and threat; explaining that when a conflict escalates so do patriotic feelings. In 2009, for 
instance, a survey conducted by the University of  Tel-Aviv few days after the first Gaza onslaught showed 
that 88% of  Israeli-Jews considered themselves patriotic and proud to be Israeli (Ynet News 2009). In its 
fundamental form patriotism is genuine; it is about the attachment to a certain geographical place and the 
provision of  a basic foundation for the nation’s life (ibid.; Bar-Tal & Staub 1997) This attachment, which 
reflects motivational forces and is associated with positive evaluation and emotion, is expressed in beliefs 
connoting contents of  love, loyalty, pride or care (Bar-Tal 1993, p. 48).  
Bar-Tal (1993) however warns that patriotism may bring about negative consequences if  certain contents are 
added to it. It maybe suggested, accordingly, that while it shares the general positive features of  other forms 
of  patriotism, the negative content of  Israel’s patriotism lies in its being tightly tied to hyper security. Drawing 
heavily from the collective memory of  victimisation, hyper security created a situation where the fear 
orientations became mixed with the positive patriotic feelings. This has resulted in fear — as the stronger 
emotion in the mix — becoming a constant factor in how Israeli-Jews relate to Israel as a home. Fear, in other 
words, came to define the notion of  ‘Israeli patriotism.’ Arad & Alon (2006) argue, Israeli-Jews have grown to 
base much of  their emotional attachment to the country, or at least the idea of  a Jewish homeland, on the 
grounds of  perceived threat.  
The above may also be attributed to the tendency of  many Jews to identify Zionism with patriotism. This 
means that nationalism and patriotism, the ideological worldview of  one’s country and the love for that 
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country, are perceived as one. In identifying with the Zionist narratives where Jews are perceived as dwelling 
alone and fighting enormous odds, it is likely that the average Israeli-Jew would not separate the love of  the 
country from perceiving it under threat. The commitment to the Zionist ideals, Israeli professor of  business 
Bernard Avishai explains, produces a feeling of  attachment to the land just enough to render most Israeli-
Jews oblivious to the fact that someone else has been living on the land for the last 1500 years (Morgan 2017). 
This is a type of  patriotism that feeds from an ideological siege mentality and causes society to remain on a 
constant high alert (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a/b; Bar-Tal 2007). It leads to hyper mobilisation, one that 
would facilitate the collective’s support for a possible preemptive strike against Iran and further substantiates 
the mechabel narrative as an integral part of  the conflict ethos.  
CONCLUSION  
Bar-Tal (2001) hypothesised that fear represented Israel’s most dominant emotional orientation. Building on 
this notion, this chapter explained that mainly because of  the collective memory of  victimisation and based 
on the current conflict, fear contributed significantly to Israel’s perception, design, and implementation of  
security. Its outcome mostly manifested in the country’s preemptive attacks, understanding of  terrorism, and 
definition of  patriotism. Despite the changes in regional security, many Israeli-Jews still persist in maintaining 
that Israel’s security environment is not malleable — that the regional hostility is so pervasive and extreme as 
to preclude any ability to materially alter the nation’s circumstances through either military or diplomatic 
means (Nili 2011). This resulted in the production of  societal beliefs regarding the country’s boundless right 
of  self-defence, relying primarily on the notion of  legitimacy rather than legality. This legitimacy springs from 
personal and subjective worldviews almost unique to the Jewish experience, ones that only a small minority in 
the international community seem to share. In 2004, for example, Israel invoked Article 51 of  the UN 
Charter to justify the segregation wall as a legitimate form of  self-defence. The International Court of  Justice 
dismissed the argument as it ‘had no relevance’ in an occupier-occupied situation (Leas 2012). Israel took the 
verdict as yet another sign of  the UN animosity to her right to exist.  
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Because of  the fear of  another Shoah; that is, the fear of  being victimised again, Israel’s security has become 
as hyper and intense as the collective memory that has formed the grounds for it. A fight-or-flight mode 
emerged that endowed Israel with the perception of  a right to preemptively attack Egypt, Syria, and Jordan 
in 1967 and invade Lebanon in 1982. It was a critical part in the legitimisation of  Jewish settlements and 
land confiscation, the annexation of  the Golan Heights, the attack on Iraq’s reactor in 1981, and the 
bombing of  Syria’s potential nuclear facility in 2007.  It also provided Israel with the moral and political 48
grounding to consider launching a preemptive strike against Iran.  
But because much of  Israel’s security is influenced by the country’s collective emotional state, it did not 
provide the country with a sense of  safety. Rather paradoxically, it created more insecurity and as a result 
more belligerence. The territorial expansions that resulted from the 67 War, the first Lebanon War, and the 
settlement activities did very little to cure Israel’s siege mentality. Only a few in Israel sobered up to this fact. 
Yosef  Sider’s film Beaufort (2007), for instance, shows this predicament in a rather symbolic way. The film 
shows us the last days of  the IDF’s Beaufort outpost in Southern Lebanon in early 2000. The soldiers are 
sleepless, anxious, and on high alert. The post looks like a concrete maze of  underground corridors — 
claustrophobic and depressing. Because they cannot see the enemy, the soldiers do not understand what they 
are protecting or from whom. The Beaufort outpost reinforces the Israeli national and ideological order 
(Yosef  2011), and one of  the film’s latent meanings is that Israel invaded Lebanon, as she did Egypt and 
Syria, to create a new security order there, but gradually found out that territorial expansion does not liberate 
one from the sense of  siege. In many respects, Ben-David (2009) observes, the visual images in the film 
constitute a frightened and depressed version of  the Masada myth. 
The most controversial of  all is that hyper security formalised the occupier as the victim in a severely 
asymmetrical conflict. Because of  that, Israel perhaps felt justified — and motivated — to normalise most 
Palestinian acts of  dissidence as mindless terrorism directed at Jews qua Jews. Palestinians in this context can 
 After nearly a decade of  silence Israel admitted responsibility for the strike on a potential Syrian nuclear programme in 2007 [see: 48
Ahronheim 2018; also see: Follath & Stark 2009; Makovsky 2012]
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commit ‘diplomatic terror,’ like the PA joining UN bodies and treaties, ‘popular struggle terror,’ which 
includes all forms of  physical resistance from rock throwing to armed attacks; ‘BDS terror,’ which seeks to 
pressure Israel’s to end the occupation; and then there’s ‘literary terror,’ writing about the Palestinian struggle 
is nothing but an attack on Jewish legitimacy (see: Bisharat 2019).  
With such anxious mentality, every action usually triggers disproportionate reactions — Palestinian stone 
throwers are met with live bullets and rockets with air bombardment and collective punishment. Those 
reactions are rationalised on the ground of  ‘teaching the enemy a lesson’ or ‘acting as a strong deterrent.’ 
This mentality has fuelled some of  Israel’s most controversial security measures like the assassination policy, 
or what Israel calls ‘targeted killing.’ Assassinations were used extensively against Palestinian and non-
Palestinian activists, militants, politicians, and intellectuals. Bergman (2018) maintains that Israel assassinated 
more people than any Western country since World War II.  The Israeli intelligence agencies successfully 49
eliminated a large number of  the Palestinian key figures. The tactical successes, however, yielded much 
strategic failure (ibid.). The killings created more security challenges than it had resolved. They, among other 
things, showed that Israel’s hyper security was effective only momentarily. It also — repeatedly — showed 
that hyper security has been perhaps more concerned with overcoming the anxiety related to the fear of  
annihilation than the actual possibility of  annihilation. Cohen (2015) explains that Israel’s actions have never 
been about security — at least not in the narrow sense of  security from the local population and 
neighbouring states. The security that Israel has always been about is an existential security, a somatic 
conviction that if  Jews do not control their own state, they will unfailingly face a new genocide. In this 
context, it is probably not far-fetched to visualise a group of  Mossad agents taking an oath to ha-shoah l‘olam lo 
‘oud (the Shoah, never again!) before setting off  on a mission. Their fear, anger, and vengeance are directed at 
what they see as a Nazi replacement, and in the absence of  real Nazis, everyone else who presents a threat to 
the state of  Israel may be seen as one (see previous chapter).   
 Notice how Bergman sees Israel as part of  the Western world, despite the country’s continuous attempts to establish a native 49
identity to itself  in the region. 
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Importantly, hyper security is a reflection of  how the combination of  power and victimhood can be disruptive 
to settlement. Without understanding the intricacies of  Israel’s collective memory, it is frustrating, if  not 
infuriating, perhaps for the majority of  Palestinians that Israeli-Jews cannot see the contradictions in their 
worldview and practices. Photos that recently emerged on social media give a glimpse of  such contradictions. 
In the photos (fig 1.3) appear a group of  IDF soldiers standing solemnly as the sirens of  yom ha-shoah 
(Holocaust Remembrance Day) sounded. The soldiers were actually in the middle of  demolishing Palestinian 
residential tents in Susyia, Hebron, but had to stop briefly to pay homage to the Shoah victims. When the 
sirens stopped, the troops resumed the demolition ([unknown author] May 2019). Responding to the photos, 
activists asked: do they [Israeli-Jews] see the irony? The answer to this question is not as straightforward or as 
simply incriminating as many of  us would like it to be. In After Israel (2014), Svirsky raises similar concerns 
and rhetorically wondered, why despite all the incriminating archival evidence, statistical indicators and new 
understanding of  power relations, the perpetrators’ minds still manage to accommodate every piece of  
information detailing their participation in the production of  oppression? He speculates that even though 
some Israeli-Jews are concerned, society in general seems to have successfully inoculated itself  against the 
moral and political reflection; thus owing its existence to Israel’s acts of  oppression on the ground. Drawing 
from Bar-Tal’s thoughts on the freezing of  beliefs (2001), it might be feasible to assume that people erect 
mental, emotional, and discursive walls to protect themselves from having to own up to their guilt and to live 
in peace with the misery they cause. As long as this belief  system persists and the state of  fear and with it the 
uncompromising state of  militaristic security is maintained, and as long as the reliance on reductionist 
versions of  history continues, only short-term sedatives to the present-day challenges will be the answer. The 
likely outcome is further intractability.  
In the next chapter, continuing to draw on collective memory, ethos, and emotional orientations, the study 
argues that similar contradictions and controversies also plague the Palestinian narratives of  victimhood, and 
they too contribute to the impasse in peacemaking.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
VICTIMHOOD IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:  
The Case of  Palestine in Relation to Collective Memory, Conflict 
Ethos, and Collective Emotional Orientations  
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OVERVIEW 
Israel’s victimhood was discussed over the past two chapters. The first chapter focused on Israel’s collective 
memory and conflict ethos, and then on some of  the emotional manifestations of  that collective memory. 
The next one expanded the discussion on emotional orientations, focusing on fear as a primary dynamic in 
Israel’s security policies. In this chapter the focus shifts to Palestinian victimhood but continues to be guided 
by Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological infrastructure of  collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional 
orientations.   
As an Israeli-Jew, Bar-Tal provides an excellent insight into Israel’s socio-psychological infrastructure(s). His 
closeness to the subject, however, means that his views, especially regarding the Palestinians, may be subject 
to the researcher positionality. This manifests in two ways: first, Bar-Tal seems to deal with both peoples’ 
victimhood narratives as equally valid despite the severe power asymmetry, which he admits exist but never 
discusses at length (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013, 2014; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). Second, like most Israeli-Jewish 
scholars, he takes the question of  Israel’s legitimacy in the wake of  the 1948 war without much scrutiny. His 
interest in Palestinian narrative is largely confined to the post 1967 era.   
Nevertheless, Bar-Tal’s framework remains robust, flexible and broad enough to provide the grounding for 
common understanding of  Palestinian victimhood. The fact that the socio-psychological foundations are 
similar for both Israeli-Jews and Palestinians makes the framework implementation in some instances 
straightforward (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). The chapter does not merely build on those similarities but also seek to 
discuss what makes Palestinian victimhood different. It focuses on the socio-psychological aspects specific to 
Palestinians such as memoricide, humiliation, and resistance.  
The chapter starts off  by discussing the Palestinian collective memory, arguing that while Israel’s memory 
draws strength from the Shoah and therefore the fear of  genocide, Palestinian memory is largely centred on 
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the fear of  memoricide (see: Pappé 2006). The continuous occupation makes the preservation of  memory a 
daily existential struggle and accordingly a continuous source of  victimisation. One result of  that is the 
Palestinian tendency to put the Nakba against the Shoah in order to discredit Israel’s narratives and emphasise 
Palestinian victimhood. Next, the chapter turns to the dominant emotional orientations amongst Palestinians. 
While fear is the dominant emotion in Israel (see: Bar-Tal 2001), humiliation is what most defines 
Palestinians’ emotional state. The discussion of  humiliation leads to the discussion of  Israel’s comprehensive 
occupation and the resulting Palestinian societal beliefs about self-esteem, dignity, honour, and revenge. 
Focusing on the conflict ethos next, it is argued that as Israeli-Jews coped with conflict with ethos about the 
Shoah and the development of  hyper security measures, Palestinians responded to humiliation by focusing on 
the development and glorification of  ethos about muqawama (resistance) and isteshhad (self-sacrifice). In 
conclusion, it is argued that some of  the Palestinian victimhood manifestations may have contributed to the 
impasse in settlement.    
Narrative sources in this chapter vary. A rather extensive source is scholarship. Having studied much of  the 
scholarly literature, the theme of  victimhood and its manifestations seem to have a major presence in that 
literature. Scholarship provides much of  the conceptual, theoretical, philosophical, historical, and socio-
political context/background to the studied phenomenon. Reading beyond the conceptual and theoretical, 
the content may also reveal the authors’ belief  orientations and social context (e.g. Said 1992; Pappé 2006; 
Bar-Tal 2007; Halperin et al. 2010; Ra’ad 2010; Toukan 2013; Jabr 2016). Cultural texts and artefacts, which 
media, arts, signs and symbols deliver can perhaps tell us more about society than trying to analyse what we 
think reality is conceptually or theoretically (Benziman 2011). News articles, opinions, commentaries, and 
statements, for instance, mark certain events and highlight the modes/experiences in the Palestinian society 
(e.g. Fayyad 2011; Wadia 2017; Yediouth Ahronoth 2018). Novels, art, short stories, poetry, and memoirs 
convey the intimate aspects of  the Palestinian experience of  victimhood (e.g. Kanafani 1969; Darwish 1973; 
Khoury 1998; Al-Asadi 1999; Amiry 2005; Natour 2009; Haddad 2019). By looking at its latent meaning 
units, Kanafani’s Men in the Sun (1963), for example, reveals the emotional orientations of  shame and 
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humiliation and the sense of  disorientation that dominated the Nakba generation. Khoury’s Bab al Sham 
(1998) captures such dynamic through critiquing the concepts of  heroism. Visual media in the form of  films, 
such as Paradise Now (2009) and Omar (2010) convey the Palestinian experience of  humiliation, pursuit of  
masculinity and reveal the complexities and contradictions of  the Palestinian ethos about muqawama. 
Reflexivity — in the form of  personal stories (deployed using the auto-ethnographic ‘I’ or through the 
collective ‘we’) — is used as a supplementary narrative source that further communicates the Palestinian 
experience/story. In addition to the latent content, reflexivity functions as another analytical tool.   
COLLECTIVE MEMORY  
My Grandfather’s Village    
Cutting through Israel bound for to the West Bank. My grandfather, Israel’s safe choice as the ‘trip 
chaperone,’ asked the Palestinian driver to stop near my grandfather’s old village which happened to be on 
the way. Excited, I joined in the request and immediately began to summon all the magical stories of  that 
paradise village. In the middle of  nowhere, surrounded by open fields, the driver hesitantly pulled over and 
my grandfather immediately disembarked and walked into a nearby field. All I can see was old ruins, random 
lines of  cacti, sporadic citrus and olive trees, and an out-of-place power transformer. Dragging me deeper 
into the field and looking increasingly disorientated, my grandfather asked if  I could help find his father’s 
grave and the ruins of  his old house. As time passed fruitlessly, frustrated and seemingly tired, my grandfather 
collapsed on a small rock and began to weep. Uncomfortable and unsure what to do, I convinced him to halt 
the search. Then, strangely feeling like intruders, we rushed back to the taxi before the Israeli authorities 
arrived. 
Where I grew up men are taught not to cry: it is unmasculine, a weakness and, above all, one is always 
reminded, “fighters do not cry.” But when they do, my grandfather would tell us, it is because ‘the weight on 
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one’s shoulders was heavier than mountains.’ It would take me a few years to feel the weight of  those 
proverbial mountains. I often wondered how harrowing it must have been for my grandfather to wait and 
wait only to discover that there is no longer a door to the old key that he had anxiously guarded for decades. 
Up until his death, my grandfather continued to speak of  that paradise village, of  his Palestine. As if  what he 
saw on that summer day was only a fleeting thought. His memories were perhaps more real than the physical 
ruins of  what used to be his village. 
My grandfather was not unique in his sentiment, he, as Ghalayini says (2019), was like every other 
Palestinian: a nomad travelling across a landscape of  memory. Like all others, his memory was premised on 
three main motifs: praise of  the lost, lamentation of  the present, and depiction of  an imagined return (Matar 
2010). He carried his village in his heart, like an internal compass where ‘north’ is always Palestine (Ghalayini 
2019). Lamenting our lives today, he wanted us to pass down the compass and continue to be the memory 
nomads. Because if  we did not, we would lose our most powerful proof  of  being. The longer we clung to the 
memory the closer we felt we become to the day of  return. As if  memory was a purpose in itself, as Kanafani 
(1981) said: “…even though we know tomorrow will be no better, we remain here on the shore eagerly 50
awaiting the boat that will not come.” Same as my grandfather who chose to ignore the seemingly new power 
transformer and the Hebrew signs in and around his village, one must disregard that we have been mentally 
and physically erased and replaced. As though to force ourselves to feel that our current state— and theirs — 
is only temporary. We continue to see the ruins of  our long-lost villages and towns across the concrete walls, 
fences, barbed wires, and borders, and that keeps reminding us that the Nakba never came to an end. As 
painful as it might sound, a continuous Nakba nevertheless proves that history is yet to come to a halt and can 
still be reversed. The spaces that Israel now occupies are the same ones to which we organically attach our 
memory and on which much of  the meaning of  our existence relies. We are still there in spirit, goes the 
 Ghassan Kanafani was a renowned Palestinian author, assassinated by the Mossad in 1972. 50
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comforting thought.  Some of  those spaces, however, are more haunting than others and they do portray the 51
complexity and irony of  Palestinian collective memory.   
Today, in a tragic irony, the Israeli museum commemorating the Shoah victims, Yad Vashem, sits on top of  a hill 
overlooking the village of  Deir-Yassin, the symbol of  Palestinian catastrophe. There are no markers, placards 
or memorials, and no mention from tour guides in the museum regarding what their visitors see from where 
they stand (Toukan 2013). This is not a case of  absence of  remembering or ignorance, but a certain kind(s) of  
active forgetting that is selective and misleading (Douglas 2007, cited by Ram 2009). One that makes the 
Jewish memory a means to conceal the hierarchies and constellations of  power and deny perpetration (see: 
Svirsky 2014), as well as to justify and protect the prevailing social order (Even-Tuzur 2016). Toukan (2013) 
points out that a distinct feature of  such forgetting is its banality. In The Ethnic Cleansing of  Palestine (2006, 
p.231), Pappé calls the phenomenon memoricide, an erasure of  one people from history in order to write that 
of  another people’s over it. Because of  memoricide, Palestinians’ struggle for memory is not confined to the 
commemoration of  the Nakba and its reverberations under the occupation, it is also a struggle against the 
attempts on Palestinian capacity to remember and be remembered.    
The Fear of Being Forgotten  
Bar-Tal (2013) suggests that Israeli-Jews and Palestinians use both popular and official memory in support of  
their narratives. Popular memory refers to “the narratives of  collective memories held by society members in 
their repertoire” (p. 138) and official memory is usually delivered through formal channels. He points out that 
in Israel’s case the two types of  collective memories can correspond or be in divergence but are always in 
continuous interaction and communication. In the Palestinian case, both are closely entwined with popular 
memory being more dominant. This can be attributed to the state of  disorientation of  the Nakba generation 
 Said reminds us that Palestine is a state of  ‘consciousness,’ a representation of  ‘a vast collective feeling of  injustice [which] 51
continues to hang over our lives with undiminished weight’ [Turner 2003, cited by Lentin 2008, p.173]. 
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and due to the lack of  official Palestinian bodies that could compete with the Israel’s institutional and archival 
power. That resulted in much of  the collective memory being transmitted trans-generationally using oral 
channels (Abdul-Jawwad 2005). Assmann (1995) calls this ‘communicative memory.’ It may also be called 
autobiographical memory. After all, despite the increasing institutionalisation of  memory since the early 
1990s, the Palestinian collective emotional orientations and much of  the conflict ethos are still intimately tied 
to oral transmission of  vivid ‘firsthand’ information about the Nakba and similar events (ibid.). That said, not 
only did that oral transmission make Palestinian memory vulnerable to Israel’s state narratives, striving to 
withstand its ferocity, but also to the test of  time.   
It is perhaps feasible in this light to assume that unlike Israel’s collective memory which was premised on the 
fear of  physical annihilation (Bar-Tal 2001), much of  Palestinian memory was premised on the fear of  being 
forgotten. This is an existential fear in its own right and serves certain socio-psychological functions same as 
Israel’s collective memory (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). Sonia Nimr (2008) explains, Palestinian collective 
memory is the only link to the past of  a lost homeland, it is passed down with as many details as possible to 
protect younger Palestinians from alienation and insecurity, and to ensure that they receive at least part of  
their inheritance of  the land. Nimr found that Palestinians in refugee camps especially outside Palestine seem 
to have more detailed, vivid recollections of  the past, while people who remained in their villages and towns 
and were not subjected to radical exile, tended to remember fewer details. Put differently, the more victimised 
Palestinians felt, the more existential their collective memory became. This is particularly apparent in the fact 
that the residents of  refugee camps appear more keen on preserving many of  their habits, costumes, customs, 
folk stories and songs, and cuisine than those who remained in their towns and villages (ibid.). It is also seen in 
the simple daily communications such as asking someone where they are from. Many Palestinian refugees 
and their progeny today would answer by saying they are from, say,  Jaffa, Majdal, Haifa, Akko, and other 
places in what became Israel.    
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As children in Al-Shati refugee camp in Gaza, we often referred back to our grandparent’s villages or towns 
whenever that question was posed. Ironically, that was also used as an ‘internal’ negative identity (see: 
Kelman 1987, 1999) vis-à-vis other non-refugee Palestinians, namely the native Gazans. Their 
Palestinianism, as it were, was not as profound and well-earned as ours. As Israeli-Jews used victimhood to 
tell themselves apart from non-Israeli Jews as the ‘true Jews’ (see Chapter Five), we, too, saw in our refugee 
status, our label of  victimhood, a core characteristic of  being the ‘true Palestinians’ who are spiritually 
superior to other non-refugee Palestinians. Being the second generation of  refugees born and raised in Gaza, 
we rarely spoke of  Gaza as our home. In practice, it was, but perhaps being the memory nomads that our 
grandparents wanted us to be, we were encouraged to look at Gaza as only a transitional phase. Like all other 
refugees, we preserved our village habits and customs, and sometimes — sustaining a sense of  continuity —
some of  us even hung on to old intra-village or inter-clan grudges and stereotypes. Simply put, we created a 
parallel Palestine in the camp, one that would — at least temporarily — prevent us from succumbing to 
memoricide. After all, as Said in The Question of  Palestine (1992) points out, Palestine today exists as an idea, a 
political and human experience, and an act of  sustained popular will. As if  to say (or prove) that so long as 
Palestine is remembered, it will continue to exist (Abunimah, in: Hammer 2005). 
The fear of  being forgotten always defined most of  Palestinian cultural scene, in literary and artistic 
narratives. Several Palestinian poets, novelists, and artists saw in themselves the guardians of  memory. Think 
of  Al-Ali’s cartoon character Handhala as the witness over Palestinian victimhood, of  the Palestinian film 
makers whose films were intricately tied to the Palestinians’ displacement and the desire to return to Palestine 
(Alawadhi 2013), or of  the Palestinian poets who romanticised and simplified the past in order to maintain it. 
Almost all of  them acted out their fear of  being forgotten, as a people and as a cause.  
The ‘idyll’ poems of  Saud Al-Asadi, for example, preserve memory through a romanticised and nostalgic yet 
very reductionist approach to history. He speaks through the shepherd, the olive trees, and the open skies. 
Like most Palestinian poets, the land is his inspiration. Al-Asadi establishes Palestinian legitimacy through 
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building a continuum with the idyllic past, one that preceded Zionism. But reconstructing the past as a 
‘paradise lost’ is also an escape from the burden of  the memory of  the defeated, today’s occupation and 
hardships, and the immense sense of  desperation. In one of  his colloquial poems (1999) he says: I wish you and 
I would return, truly return - to that land…even if  we’re stripped of  our clothing and starved.  
Palestinian cinema conveys a similar message, although more critically. It is often tied to Palestinian sense of  
displacement and the burning desire to return to the pre-1948 Palestine. It must be therefore understood 
specifically in this context: not as a luxury pursuit or as a medium to address philosophical questions, but as a 
means of  survival, to stand against invisibility and to make the invisible visible (Alawadhi 2013). Elia 
Suleiman’s film The Time That Remains (2009) takes us on journey with a Palestinian refugee who returns to 
Palestine to live what is left of  his life there. In the film Palestinian history is portrayed  through the memories 
of  the Director’s family over three phases of  Palestine since the Nakba. In a rather dark yet cynical fashion, 
Suleiman shows us a contradictory, existentially puzzling homeland where the nostalgic memory does not 
match reality. The film highlights the notion that the transient state of  complete mobility gave Palestinians a 
[romantic] feeling that the only state of  permanency is the one of  anticipation of  the return to the homeland 
and with it re-immersion in the individual and collective time (Sanbar 1997, in: Gertz & Khleifi 2008).  
In Returning to Haifa (1969), Kanafani combines nostalgia with the sobriety and complexity of  the present. 
The novella describes the journey of  a Palestinian couple who after the 1967 War return to their hometown 
Haifa to look for their child, Khaldoun, whom they lost during the 1948 exodus. They find that their old 
home is now occupied by a European Jewish family — Shoah survivors. It turns out that their lost son was 
found and raised by this family. He was raised Jewish and now serves in the IDF. Kanafani focuses on the 
sense of  guilt and helplessness that overtook the Nakba generation. He subtly condemns the situation, but in 
this condemnation there remains a sense of  longing, anger, frustration, and, above all, an unbearable burden 
that Palestinians have to come to terms with. Like my grandfather who was lost for words and felt out of  
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place at the sight of  his old village, Kanafani tells us that the couple were overwhelmed with silence upon 
seeing Haifa again, they felt out of  place in a place that remained familiar. The sense of  alienation was 
disheartening, the mother who spent the past twenty years echoing the name of  her lost son is now crushed 
by reality. The son is no longer theirs and neither are the house, the land, or the landscape. Like every 
Palestinian refugee, the couple were left with only memories and these memories acted as a proof  for their 
very existence, as a means to fight off  being forgotten. Now all they need to do is keep talking about that 
long-gone place in order to achieve a sense of  continuity — as though what happened never happened.   
This is the very notion that Natour (2009) conveys through his character Fadwa in the short story Safar ala 
Safar (Travel and More Travel). Lamenting her old house in Bisan (now Hebrewised to Beit Jann) Fadwa says 
(p. 169): “ I’ve cried over my house a lot, but what use is crying? Sometimes it seems to me as if  the house 
continues to hurt us only to make us let go of  it. It’s tired of  me bringing its memory back. It’s very painful to 
bring back the memory of  a place. But it’s the only way to prove your loyalty to it. Yes, precious house, I’m 
going to continue inflicting pain on you. I’m going to talk and talk.”  
In remembering and being remembered we hope for liberation and decolonisation both physically and 
psychologically. Edward Said once said that to write truthfully about the Nakba is not merely to practise 
professional historiography; it is also a profoundly moral act of  redemption (Masalha 2012). The problem 
with this redemption, however, is that it clashes with another redemption. Many Jews see Israel as an act of  
redemption and usually ignore or are unaware of  the impact this redemption has had on Palestinian 
existence. They fail or fear to acknowledge that Palestinian redemption means that Israel acknowledges the 
suffering she inflicted upon the Palestinians. In keeping with Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological argument (2000, 
2007, 2013), it may be suggested that as a coping mechanism collective memory is formed in such a way that 
it provides a black-and-white picture of  the conflict; it presents a simplistic justification for the eruption of  the 
conflict, maintains the in-group’s positive self-image and, above all, portrays the in-group as the conflict’s 
victim. This helps explain the Israeli-Jewish need to erase, suppress, or simply ignore Palestinian history, and 
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also explains the need to create victim hierarchies where the Shoah is the only measure of  worthiness of  the 
Other’s suffering. For the mainstream Israeli-Jews, Palestinian catastrophe is not a real event with objective, 
universal implications but as an event that is only viewed as a catastrophe from the narrow Palestinian 
perspective, part of  ‘their’ story (Stav 2012). The Nakba, if  ever mentioned, is appropriated within the Israeli-
Jewish story. It is diminished and turned into an internal event of  Jewish history, an extension of  the process 
of  Jewish redemption (ibid.). In other words, the Nakba is only small part in the much larger catastrophe of  
the Jewish genocide (Thomas 2015).  
Because of  that, many Palestinians see in the Shoah a formidable threat to the credence of  their memory 
narratives and a distraction from their claims and demands for justice. To withstand and counteract the 
‘Shoah super victimhood,’ those Palestinians, knowingly or unknowingly, and perhaps reactively and 
impulsively, developed societal beliefs aimed at disregarding, dismissing, or outright denying the Shoah. This is 
elaborated on below. 
Our Collective Memory Versus Theirs  
Palestinian popular and official memories are constructed around the notion of  Israel as a foreign colonial 
power. For the majority, it is maybe impossible to view Israel outside the parameter of  their own subjugation. 
This resulted in a zero-sum depiction of  Israel, one that does not allow the Jewish victimhood narratives, 
especially the Shoah, into Palestinian lives. As mentioned earlier, a primary reason for that is the socio-
psychological need to protect the collective memory from memoricide. Dissimilar to Israel’s collective 
memory, however, the Palestinian one is characterised by a sense of  urgency mainly because of  the 
continuous aftereffects of  the Nakba in Palestinian society and due to the fact that Palestinians bear no 
responsibility for the Shoah. There is no need nor desire, goes the majority’s ethos, to accommodate the 
occupier’s historical trauma. When the Shoah is brought up, nevertheless, the Palestinian public discourse goes 
on the defence. It does not usually attempt to silence or erase the Shoah history, although sometimes some of  
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it borders on denial. Instead, it focuses on the political implications of  the Jewish immigration to Palestine 
and how upon the establishment of  the state of  Israel, the Shoah became the instrument of  legitimacy. 
Sometimes, one can get a sense of  the average Palestinian’s mood (or rather uneasiness) about the Shoah by 
looking at the Palestinian media narratives about the subject, whether as press releases or statements by 
politicians and key figures.   
In August 2009, it was revealed in the Gaza Strip that the UNRWA planned to include in the eighth-grade 
curriculum run in its schools in the Strip a section on the Shoah and Jewish history in World War II. Although 
the UNRWA eventually denied, this did not stop the media from repeatedly circulating the news or the angry 
responses of  Palestinian key figures and organisations from pouring into the UNRWA’s headquarters in Gaza. 
In a letter to the UNRWA, The Popular Committee for Gaza Refugees described the Shoah as “the Zionist 
manufactured and exaggerated lie which was popularised by the Zionist-controlled Western media.” The 
Committee added “the human rights curriculum should focus on the Nakba and the continuous Zionist 
crimes against the Palestinian people.” The Palestinian Education Ministry responded by saying that 
Palestinians will study the Shoah when Israeli-Jews study the Nakba. Hamas-affiliated daily Falastin 
acknowledged “Hitler’s crimes against the Jewish people,” but added: “The Zionists have committed heinous 
crimes against the Palestinian people” (MEMRI 2009; Al-Hayat Al-Jadida 2009; Najjar 2009; The 
Independent 2009). Two years later the same issue came back when the UNRWA renewed the plans to 
include the Shoah in the human rights curriculum in the Palestinian refugee camps in the PT and Jordan. 
Expectedly, the Palestinian reaction was not welcoming. While the PA issued no comments, Hamas and other 
Palestinian factions criticised the decision and vowed to stop it. Ibrahim Radwan, a Hamas spokesman, 
described the UNRWA plans as an "uncrossable red line," accusing the organisation of  “attempting to make 
Palestinians sympathise with their oppressors” (Fayyad 2011).   
In the above instances, the Palestinian ambivalence about the Shoah was partly influenced by the Palestinian 
self-perception as victims of  the victims — recognising, but not acknowledging that the Jews were once 
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victims. For the average Palestinian, it may be hard to see that those in the powerful Merkava tanks were at 
some point nearly annihilated. Some recognise the Shoah to shame Israel as a victim turned victimiser, 
emphasising the tragic irony of  being oppressed by those who suffered from multiple forms of  persecution. 
What matters is the practical consequences of  the Israeli-Jewish victimhood for the conflict, the large-range 
of  daily hardships of  living under the occupation. 
The ambivalence could also be attributed to the insufficient or ideologically motivated knowledge of  the 
Shoah amongst Palestinian scholars. This is maybe related to the Arab anti-Zionist stance which defines the 
Shoah primarily in terms of  the Zionist instrumentalisation of  the Jewish genocide. Rosenfeld (2011) argues 
that because of  this linkage between the Shoah and Israel, the media in Arab countries are so intent on erasing 
the Shoah or exposing its history as a myth. The Zionist as conspiratorial, manipulative, and/or ill-intentioned 
foreigner is still a familiar theme in many Arabic narratives: films, TV, or books. The Egyptian TV espionage 
thriller Alzeibaq (2017), for example — although somewhat balanced — still depicts the Zionists as inherently 
manipulative, and the Arabic version of  the Protocols of  the Elders of  Zion remains a popular choice for readers 
interested in Israel or the conflict (see: Al-Messiri 2003). It is not surprising then that the things associated 
with Israel’s claims of  legitimacy are looked at with suspicion, the Shoah included. This also explains why 
Arabic scholarship is lacking when it comes to the psychological aspects of  the “conflict.” Looking up the 
‘psychological dimension of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Google Arabic, for instance, yields results 
regarding the ‘morale/psychological’ warfare of  Israel and the Palestinians, Israeli-Jewish psyche in response 
to suicide bombing, post-traumatic stress disorder amongst Palestinian children, suffering of  Palestinian 
prisoners, and, occasionally, Israel’s ‘siege mentality.’ The majority of  these results that fall within the 
psychological framework are confined to clinical psychology or psychiatry.  
Additionally, the Arab public’s views of  Shoah is substantiated, or perhaps justified, by the fact that the Arabs 
and Palestinians have nothing to do with the Nazi genocide of  European Jews. The Shoah is only relevant in 
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Arab/Palestinian history inasmuch as it played a key role in the production of  the Nakba. Otherwise, the 
Shoah would bear no more relevance for the Arabs than it bears for the South-East Asians (Achcar et al. 2014).  
The fact remains however that the Shoah represents a serious challenge to presenting the Palestinian 
victimhood narratives to the world. How can one compete against the ‘super-victim’ of  the most appalling 
genocide in modern history? Margalit (in: Alexander 2017, p. 96) comments cynically: “Against the weapon 
of  the Holocaust, the Palestinian are amateurs…As soon as operation ‘Holocaust Memory’ is put into high 
gear, the Palestinians cannot compete.” Edward Said (Said & Hitchens 1988, p.06) explains that, among 
other things, the Shoah “…was a uniquely powerful narratives with which to garner support, and the 
Palestinians had no equivalent.”  
By downplaying or denying the Shoah Palestinians seek to strip Israel of  the virtue of  innocence that usually 
comes with victimhood and to demolish Zionism’s moral-historical basis. This is also accompanied by the 
Palestinians’ attempts to reconcile the helplessness of  the Jews during the Shoah and Israel’s victory over the 
Arabs only three years later in 1948 (Litvak & Webman 2003). On several levels, the Palestinian position 
toward the Shoah seems emotionally driven and is far less structured or institutionalised than Israel’s denial of  
the Nakba, mainly because Palestinians are not responsible for the Jewish genocide, while Israel actively denies 
an act of  ethnic cleansing she herself  carried out. Both parties, nevertheless, negate each other’s suffering to 
preserve one’s own. This perception is largely framed because accepting the narrative of  the other side is seen 
as undermining one’s own national story, which is founded on notions of  moral superiority and ultimate 
suffering (Bar-Tal et al. 2009b; Thomas 2015).  
This was evident in the uproar against the Palestinian university students’ trip to Auschwitz in 2014. Professor 
Muhammad Dajjani of  Al-Quds University, the trip organiser, emphasised that by visiting Auschwitz 
Palestinians learn where Israeli-Jews come from and, accordingly, understand how to engage them. Fearing 
backlash, Al-Quds University disowned the students and Dajjani resigned shortly afterwards. Some of  
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Dajjani’s critics accused him of  "trying to brainwash Palestinian youth" (Booth 2014; Ghert-Zand 2015). The 
criticism directed at Dajjani reflected the Palestinian psychological block against bestowing the virtue or 
morality upon some aspects of  Jewish history, which many people by virtue of  Israel’s ‘Jewish identity’ 
associate to Israel and Zionism. In his defence, Dajjani told the Guardian (Black 2014): “When we look at the 
Shoah we impose it on our own suffering…We see Nazi towers and we think of  Israeli guard towers and 
barbed wires.”  Dajjani — it seems — understood the Palestinian need to maintain an ‘ideal victim’ status. 
This is one of  our coping mechanisms that acts to protect and insulate our narrative from psychological 
damage. Only through such victimhood does our harsh reality make sense.  
It is specifically this harsh reality that makes our identification with the Jewish genocide an ambivalent 
endeavour. Haunted by the daily hardships under the occupation, the Shoah is usually of  little importance in 
the lives of  many Palestinians. But once invoked in certain political contexts we feel it is somehow directed 
aggressively against us, attempting to confiscate and replace our ‘well-earned’ suffering. The Shoah puts us on 
the defence and we respond with denial, suppression, projection, and justification. Although the average 
individuals amongst us do not know a great deal about the Shoah, not much beyond the fact that ‘Hitler killed 
the Jews,’ they are still capable of  feeling the Jewish history filtered through our experiences, which in almost 
all scenarios is existentially unsettling for our  dearly held collective memory.  
Wrapped up in our own trauma, we feel that readily accepting the Jewish genocide as a manifestation of  
Jewish and, by default, Israeli-Jewish victimhood, we risk losing our posture as the underdog. Like the Jews 
who selectively filter the information of  Arab media to confirm their vulnerability and victimisation (see: Bar-
Tal & Halperin 2013; Bar-Tal 2013), many of  us filter the information regarding the Shoah only within the 
context of  the Israeli-Palestinian “conflict,” making the Jewish genocide a political instrument (and it surely is 
in certain situations) that only legitimises the occupation and jeopardises our very legitimacy as the victims of  
the conflict. This is largely why some of  us celebrate key figures like Roger Garaudy when they deny the 
Shoah, or when Norman Finkelstein (2003), as one of  them, exposes the political agendas in the ‘Holocaust 
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industry.’ This proves to us, that we are right; not only are we victims of  the oppressive Israeli governments, 
but also victims of  being threatened in our own victimhood.  
Lebanese author Hazem Saghiya (1997, cited by Litvak & Webman 2003, 2008) argued that the Palestinians 
of  today were jealous of  the Jews who became the ‘ideal victims’ and of  their profitable tragedy. The notion 
is correct, however, the details are lacking. The Jealousy is existentially based, hardly detached from our 
desperate need for the world to recognise our suffering. Maybe, as Mahmoud Darwish (Yeshurun 1996) once 
remarked, Palestinians are famous because of  the world’s interest in the Jewish problem, in the Shoah. But 
because of  this fame, we were lost in the grim details of  the Jewish genocide. We, as Said reflects (1986), have 
no Shoah to protect us with the world’s compassion. We feel that as victims we are entitled for sympathetic 
recognition and by default the world must understand why we lash out violently against Israel. In the 
1960/70s, the Popular Front for the Liberation of  Palestine (PFLP) hijacked civilian airliners to ‘make the 
world aware of  the Palestinian suffering’ (see: Irving 2012; Eshtiyeh 2011), and today underage Palestinians, 
boys and girls, wield knives against armed Israeli soldiers and civilians partly for the same reason.  
Impaired by our biased information processing, we struggle to look beyond the armed-to-the-teeth Israeli 
soldier to see the bigger picture. We fear that by accepting their story we endanger our own. Some of  us feel a 
sense of  super-legitimacy by over-delegitimising our enemy. In reality, however, for Palestinians to feel 
comfortable with acknowledging the Shoah does not change the occupied-occupier asymmetrical relationship, 
neither does it endorse Israel’s right to act out her traumas. It is not a statement of  guilt, as it is case with 
Israel’s relation with the Nakba. Instead, it is about transcending the unconscious fear into the more rational, 
calculated realm of  hope and understanding (see: Bar-Tal 2001). It is not about simple identification that 
seeks to blur the distance between the ‘I’ and the ‘other’. But rather, a type of  engagement that is built on 
weak identification — the difference between empathy and full identification (Goldberg 2016). If  anything, 
downplaying the Shoah weakens the legitimacy of  the Palestinian struggle. 
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Our collective memory may explain the ambivalence about the Shoah. But, unlike the Shoah, it is not only a 
memory perpetuated by the Death Camps in Poland or in the rituals and museums around the world, or 
requires triggers to be felt or remembered. It is an ongoing experience in every aspect of  Palestinian lives. It is 
the force behind today’s shataat (diaspora) for the Palestinians in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. It bears multiple 
meanings for many Palestinians in the OT, the double irony of  being a refugee under occupation. And, it 
represents a forbidden struggle for identity and equality for the Palestinian citizens of  Israel. And for all, it is 
a lack of  control over one’s present and future. It is seen in the dynamics of  active subjugation and continues 
to be felt in the myriad forms of  daily humiliation. The next section discusses humiliation as a primary 
emotional orientation in the Palestinian victimhood narratives.  
 COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL ORIENTATIONS  
In his framework (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2013), Bar-Tal discusses certain emotional orientations in intractable 
conflict such as fear, anger, hatred, shame, and guilt. Some are discussed in details, others are glossed over. He 
(2001) pays special attention to the emotion of  fear, marking it the most dominant in Israel’s Jewish society 
(see previous chapter). Bar-Tal’s focus on fear can also be understood in terms of  the author’s being part of  
the Israeli-Jewish collective. He conceptualises what he might have experienced first-hand or vicariously in that 
collective. Bar-Tal’s thoughts on emotions can provide a guide to understanding the Palestinian emotional 
state. But because a Palestinian author has a different experience to Bar-Tal's, the focus may change. This 
author acknowledges that all the emotions discussed above by Bar-Tal exist in the Palestinian society, some as 
profoundly. But because of  the hierarchy of  power, which Bar-Tal did not sufficiently discuss or perhaps 
experience, and reinforced by a collective memory tainted by defeat and loss, an experience almost opposite 
to that of  Israel, it is suggested that humiliation is perhaps the most dominant collective emotional 
orientation among Palestinians. It represents a significant dynamic in the Palestinian victim self-identity. It 
can be as simple as lack of  control over freedom of  movement or as complex as being a source of  society-
wide emasculation possibly leading to an endless and destructive pursue of  dignity and self-worth.  
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Counting the Calories  
  
The Israeli advocacy group Gisha, which aims to protect the rights of  Palestinian residents, waged a long 
court battle to release a document, in which it was revealed that Israel calculated the calorie needs for Gaza's 
population. The aim was to keep Gaza residents from malnutrition at a time when Israel was tightening its 
restrictions on the movement of  people and goods in and out of  the Strip, including food products and raw 
materials. The document states that Health Ministry officials were involved in drafting it (Hass 2012; the 
Guardian Oct. 2012; Cole 2012; Cook 2012). The average worked out to be 2,279 calories per person per 
day, which could be supplied by 1,836 grams of  food, or 2,575.5 tons of  food for the entire population of  
Gaza (Hass 2012).  
Major Guy Inbar, an Israeli military spokesman, said the calculation, based on a person's average 
requirement of  calories a day, was meant to identify warning signs to help avoid a humanitarian crisis, and 
that it was never used to restrict the flow of  food (The Guardian Oct. 2012). As it stands, the calorie count is 
more or less in line with the World Health Organisation’s guidelines (see: WHO et al. 2004). However, the 
policy was advised and implemented by the very party that deliberately created the emergency situation in 
Gaza, and that effectively controls both the territory and its population (Hass 2012). It is the almost absolute 
control over Palestinian lives, or what Halper (2000) calls ‘Israel’s matrix of  control,’ that is of  concern here. 
Behind the calorie count stands a systematic attack on dignity. It transcends the ‘pragmatic' need of  the 
occupier and extends into crushing Palestinian very psychological existence.  
Humiliation does not necessarily involve violence or direct coercion. It can be inflicted passively through 
means of  control and deprivation. Palestinian human rights lawyer Raji Sourani pointed out that the 
occupation and the absolute closure is an ongoing attack on the human dignity, emphasising that it is a 
systematic degradation, humiliation, isolation and fragmentation of  the Palestinian people (Chomsky 2012, 
2013). Jabr (2016) observes that the omnipresent acts of  humiliation against Palestinians are not simply 
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collateral byproducts of  the occupation, but its core policy. They mean to undermine every facet of  
Palestinian identity, especially those aspects of  identity that are a source of  pride for the emerging intellectual 
and moral development of  a Palestinian nation. 
Goldman and Coleman (2005) explain that humiliation as a broad concept is generally thought to occur in 
relationship of  unequal power in which the humiliator has control over the victim. The mere show of  power 
and the inability to counter-act by the weaker party could be seen as humiliation. In Our Harsh Logic (2012) — 
a book that contains testimonies by IDF soldiers who served in the OT — Israeli organisation ‘Breaking the 
Silence’ explains that there is a large disparity between the declared purpose of  military activities in 
Palestinian territories and what actually happens on the ground. The testimonies show how the IDF is 
primarily purposed to ‘demonstrate presence’ or a show of  power that, according to some soldiers, is 
unconnected to the tactical, military, or security needs.  
The occupation provided Israel with a convenient system of  control that allowed her to hold on to the 
territory itself  without extending political rights to its inhabitants (Kretzmer 2013a). The post-Oslo 
agreements as well made it possible for Israel to leave the Palestinian residential centres but maintain full 
control over what went in or out. This meant that the costly and physically involved boots on the ground 
were replaced by the morally and emotionally detached remote-control occupation (Bellal 2015). It also 
meant that the systematic attack on dignity was further removed from much of  its guilt-producing 
mechanism, which some of  the face-to-face interactions provided.  
Humiliation of  Palestinians is also justified through ideological convictions. There is still a general feeling 
amongst many Israeli-Jews that Jews have exclusive rights over all the territories. The territories are 
‘liberated,’ not occupied. Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, made that abundantly clear when he 
waved the Hebrew Bible at the Security Council, calling it the ‘land deed’ for the entirety of  Eretz Yisrael 
(Jerusalem Post Staff  2019a). There is also a group who see that the occupation is well justified for security 
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and existential reasons. Magal et al. (2013, p.174) point out that “The view of  the OT has a determinative 
influence on the Israeli-Jewish approach to the Palestinians and the so-called peace process.” It is not 
surprising then that Israeli-Jewish leaders and the public do not easily support a complete withdrawal from 
the OT or dismantlement of  settlements. The answer would often be ‘managing’ the occupation, not ending 
it — a method, among others, to maintain the occupation without guilt or accountability.   
Managing the occupation also aims to normalise and morally justify it — and with it its abusive policies like 
humiliation. The concept of  ‘occupation’ is negative and is characterised by violence and wrongdoing, and 
also involves a large degree of  empathy towards the occupied and a negative image of  the occupier. These 
facts challenge the ethos about positive self-image related to democracy, equality, and the IDF as the world’s 
most moral army. It also shatters the self-perception of  being the victim in the conflict (Halperin et al. 2010).   
In this light, it is plausible to assume that since many soldiers are ideologically or socially conditioned to 
accept the grand Zionist narrative, the IDF behaviours in the OT are reflected accordingly. Palestinians are 
not only a potential threat, but also without the right to exist in these territories. Most of  the Nakba-
generation Palestinian refugees remember the time when they were driven out of  their homes only to be 
labelled ‘infiltrators’ if  they tried to re-enter their towns or villages (Kishawi 2015). The Prevention of  
Infiltration Law of  1959 meant that Palestinians were transformed from natives into invaders and Jews from 
invaders into rightful owners. Since Palestinians are trespassers on Eretz Yisrael, the rationale goes, it is dutiful 
to subjugate and humiliate them. Otherwise, if  Palestinians were given plenty of  rope, the tables might be 
turned. If  you do not ‘push down’ as in the literal meaning of  ‘humiliation’  (Lindner 2001a, 2001b), the 
Israeli-Jewish logic goes, you will be pushed down yourself.   
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Humiliate or be Humiliated  
It may also be suggested that when Israeli-Jews humiliate Palestinians, they do so not only to keep the 
proverbial table unturned, but also because they despise the Palestinian weakness which reminds them of  
their own. The shameful weakness of  the Shoah meant that Israel needed to compensate by showing the 
Palestinians who is in charge. Paradoxically, by projecting the collective memory in the form of  repressive 
policies, the outcome that is meant to be avoided is exactly what is produced. Israel primarily seeds hatred 
and radicalisation into the Palestinian collective (as do Palestinian attacks to the Israeli-Jewish public). It 
stands to reason that humiliating others can be seen as a way of  dealing with one’s own shame (Varvin 2005) 
— which raises the question whether Israel is capable of  living without the power of  humiliation, without the 
occupation. After all, the occupation provides the country with a psychological cushion, a venting outlet for 
the past.    
  
There is also the fact that the IDF soldiers on the personal level may become desensitised to what they call 
‘daily routine’ in the OT. Disturbing Palestinian lives through abuse and humiliation becomes a matter of  
doing one’s job, following orders, a precaution to circumvent ‘potential terrorists,’ or outright indifference 
(see: Our Harsh Logic 2012). In his memoir The Girl who Stole my Holocaust (2010) Chayut describes how, despite 
their best intentions, most of  the soldiers on the checkpoints eventually grew apathetic and turned into 
automatons who could not see the Palestinians as human beings. “Crowds passing me day in and day out, I 
did not see humans - or at least not humans equal to myself  or the people now sitting around me,” he 
reflexively explains (p. 232). The systematic policy of  humiliation is at a core a psychological conditioning 
aimed at diminishing the soldiers’ emotional responsiveness to negative or aversive stimulus after repeated 
exposure to it (McTeague et al. 2010). In clinical psychology ‘desensitisation’ is a process primarily used to 
assist individuals to overcome certain disorders such as phobias and anxieties. For the IDF, the positive goal 
of  such process is utilised for negative ends. Soldiers are conditioned through constant negative exposures to 
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unlearn empathy for the sake of  propagating positive political outcome regardless of  the psychological 
collateral damage to either the IDF troops or the Palestinians.  
Needless to say that the comprehensive form of  occupation is in itself  an act of  humiliation. Embedded in its 
core are coercion and subjugation, which entail a negation of  autonomy, and that creates collective feelings 
of  humiliation and shame (Gilligan 2003). On the group level, humiliation is experienced as a tense collective 
pain of  having dignity and self-respect devalued or depressed; an experience which is intensified in 
intractable conflicts because humiliation is often made public (Snodgrass & Lamb 2013). Capturing this 
notion, Nehauser (in: Kaufmann et al. 2011) elaborates that certain forms of  humiliation cannot be 
adequately understood without accepting the idea that dignity of  the collective can be violated as well as the 
dignity of  an individual. There is also the fact that the humiliation of  certain individuals violate the dignity 
of  the group. When the IDF tanks besieged Arafat inside al Muqata’a (headquarters) in Ramallah in 2004, 
many Palestinians felt that the attack on Arafat’s person was an attack on the collective Palestinian dignity. 
Palestinians were reminded once again of  their vulnerability vis-à-vis Israel’s military might. The whole 
military operation was a ‘degradation ceremony’ (Torres et al. 2010) reminiscent of  the PLO eviction from 
Lebanon in 1982 and before that the 1970 Black September clashes between the Jordanian authorities and 
the PLO. The attack on Arafat represented a deep violation of  Palestinian cultural values, not least because 
the kethiyaar (dignitary reference to Arafat: ‘the old man’), a highly respectable figure in the traditional Arab 
culture, had his moustache trimmed.  It was a direct attack on Palestinian masculinity and honour, which 52
represent much of  the psychological life force of  muqawama, the core conflict ethos and on which much of  
Palestinian sense of  dignity relies.  
 In some Arab cultures, especially in the Levant (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Jordan), a moustache was considered a macho 52
symbol of  manly dignity.  
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The Enemy Within  
Lacey (2011) described Palestinian victimhood as less of  a scar and more of  a scab. It is continually worried 
and picked at, and never heals. Living under the occupation keeps fuelling the trauma and with it the feelings 
of  humiliation. The continuous experience of  humiliation is pathogenic, it diseases society from within, 
disrupting its normal functioning and changing the psychological make-up of  its members.  
Jabr (2016) explains that the emotions of  a humiliated person do not stop further humiliation from occurring, 
quite the contrary. Many humiliated persons become attuned to the feelings and expectations of  the 
perpetrator and vigilantly avoid recognising their own rage. There may be impulses to identify with the 
perpetrator and to justify the humiliation of  others who proudly resist it. We see these dynamics in 
Palestinians who justify the humiliation of  those who dare to resist the occupier. We see them in those who 
blame others who complain about humiliation, claiming that these victims are merely vulnerable or weak 
personalities — as if  the experience of  humiliation had taken place only in their heads rather than in reality. 
We also see them in the Palestinians who force themselves into apathy to cope with the lack of  normality. 
Suad Amiry in Sharon and my Mother-in-Law (2005) reflects rather cynically on how when the soldiers “grabbed 
a thirteen or fourteen-year-old boy and dragged him into a small barricaded room especially installed 
therefore for ‘troublesome Palestinians,’” She and the others waiting at the checkpoint quickly “forgot about 
the boy and got back to business: bargaining with the carriage boy about the fifteen shekels he had asked 
for" (p. 186). Amiry’s cynicism casts serious lights on the contradictions that humiliation has inflicted upon 
the Palestinian collective. One aspect is the contradiction between the strong societal beliefs about the need to 
help others —sometimes bordering on the absurd meddling as in many Arab societies — and the 
circumstantial need to remain neutral for personal safety and dignity. That created a personality split; that is, 
either one intervenes and possibly gets harmed and humiliated or pretends to be apathetic in order to avoid 
harm, but still feels ashamed and humiliated.   
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Palestinian author, Basem Ra’ad (2010) talks about how bearing the brunt of  the occupation in Jerusalem has 
created sadistic predispositions amongst male Palestinian children. In the chapter titled ‘Cats in Jerusalem,’ 
Ra’ad observes that there seems to be a noticeable cruelty towards cats by male children. He hypothesises 
that the treatment of  cats is indicative of  a brutalised community. The behaviour of  the occupier toward the 
occupied is a source of  humiliation, where most of  the adults in the Old City grudgingly accept as a matter 
of  necessity for the sake of  survival. They are aware of  the Zionist grand design to empty Jerusalem of  its 
Palestinian population, so they tend to swallow the humiliation in order to remain. The children do not 
understand such intricacies, but internalise their parents anxieties.   
Generally, this phenomenon could also be understood in developmental terms. Children often identify with 
their parents to some extent, even if  to differing degrees. The process of  identification is more accomplished 
with respect to the parent of  the same sex (Gilligan 2003). In the Palestinian society, a patriarchal 
environment primarily governed by family values and honour, it is perhaps unsettling for children, especially 
male children, when their fathers — traditionally the ‘protectors’ — are not fully able to keep them safe. 
Most children, at least in early childhood, idealise their parents and take them as their role model of  an ideal 
person upon whom to model oneself  (ibid.). When the father fails to live up to his child’s ideals, identification 
and idealisation may be internalised in the form of  disappointment and resentment. Such feelings are 
externalised as aggressive behaviours. Children do not usually have a rounded understanding of  the politics 
of  the occupation. However, they are capable of  feeling the consequences through, first, their parents and, 
second, the daily encounters with the Israeli authorities. Reactions manifest as a misdirected aggression, in 
this case against cats.   
The fact that the male children are the chief  culprit in the cat abuse raises crucial questions about male 
identity and humiliation. It, in other words, brings to attention the role of  gender in the formulation and 
maintenance of  the Palestinian collective emotional orientations and, subsequently, conflict ethos. Despite the 
growing belief  that humiliation is perhaps the single most underestimated force in international relations 
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(Friedman 2003), Bar-Tal’s framework, although conceptually all-encompassing, does not provide a clear 
picture on the relationship between humiliation as an emotional orientation and victimhood. It is even silent 
on the role of  gender in that. To expand the framework, it is suggested that while humiliation is a critical 
factor in Palestinian victimhood, it may be better studied with the gender role in mind to further understand 
its impact in the Palestinian society. Below, some of  its aspects are discussed.    
Gendered Humiliation  
Abusing the Jerusalem cats and the national anger over Arafat’s siege are perhaps two sides of  the same coin, 
namely gendered humiliation. Palestine is a patriarchal society, and because of  the so-called ‘clan-ism,’ it is 
perhaps more patriarchal than some other Arab societies on the Mediterranean (Ahmed 2013). Palestinian 
society expects men to align with gendered norms of  hegemonic masculinity, one conceivably dominated by 
a number of  practical expectations such as provision, protection, and modelling (Shumka et al. 2017). But the 
performance of  these three quintessentially masculine acts is often challenged and undermined by Israel’s 
occupation (Gokani et al. 2015). Hawari (2004) explains that the overall context of  Palestinian masculinity is 
one of  political subjugation and coercion. This has added yet another layer of  victimhood to Palestinian 
existence and increased intractability.   
The crisis of  Palestinian masculinity can be discerned in almost all types of  narratives around Palestinian 
victimhood, whether ones that emphasise the Palestinian tragedy or others that glorify muqawama (resistance). 
Consider for example Kanafani’s famous novella Men in the Sun (1963). Kanafani tells us about three 
Palestinian men who leave Palestine after the Nakba to look for a better life in Kuwait. In Iraq they meet a 
Palestinian tank-truck driver (Abu Khaizaran) whom they pay to smuggle them inside his tank to Kuwait. 
From the outset, we know that Abu Khaizaran lost his manhood in an explosion during the 1948 war. On the 
border with Kuwait, busy entertaining the border guards with his colourful yet made up sexual adventure in 
Basra, the three men inside the tank die from heat and lack of  oxygen. Kanafani tells us that they did not 
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even knock on the tank wall for help. While much can be said about the the three men’s victimhood and 
emasculated fear, the character of  Abu Khaizaran, a castrate-turned-weasel smuggler, remains the primary 
symbol of  lost Palestinian masculinity after the Nakba. As if  to say that the loss of  manhood (physically and 
symbolically) meant the loss of  purpose, sensibility and sense of  belonging, which also resulted in crushing 
humiliation and loss of  honour (Hussaini & Safri 2016). 
In Palestinian society, the role of  masculinity is also made more prominent against the notion of  femininity. 
Analysing the latent content not only in Kanafani’s work but also in much of  Palestinian literary narrative, 
arts, slogans, and even speeches, we find that Palestine (or the land) is often portrayed as a female. For 
example, in Naji Al-Ali’s cartoon, Handhala’s mother symbolises Palestine. In Mahmoud Darwish’s poetry 
Palestine is often portrayed as his female lover, or the mother he yearns for. Darwish says: “My land isn’t my 
suitcase, neither am I a passenger, I’m a lover and the land is my lady” (1977). Also, in speeches, media, and oral 
narratives the loss of  Palestine is usually referred to as ightesaab (rape). The Palestinian Authority on its 
website, for instance, laments the ‘rape of  Palestine’ (Amireh 2003). This implies and requires an active role 
on part of  the masculine man to protect that woman [Palestine] whose honour was violated by Zionism.  
This conceptualisation of  masculinity exists also in language. Most of  the Arabic vocabulary related to 
Palestinian and/or patriotic/revolutionary values are feminine: e.g. thawra (revolution), Intifada (uprising), 
muqawama (resistance), shahada (martyrdom), and  huriyya (freedom). Also, as a grammatical rule, the Arabic 
verb is conjugated from the masculine form. Aleasa (1996) explains that Arabic views man as the 
measurement from which the feminine gender is derived. This implies that thawra or muqawama are passive 
words unless they are put into actions by a masculine doing. In practice, this means that the role of  
protection, especially of  women, and the acts of  muqawama are viewed as essential parts of  the Palestinian 
hegemonic masculine standards. Failure to meet these standards, due to lack of  power and control vis-à-vis 
the occupation, is extremely emasculating.  
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On a personal reflexive note, during the first Intifada my father worked in Tel-Aviv and my mother was left 
alone to look after us, three children at the time. Occasionally, we had late-night visits by the IDF who would 
come into our house, then send us outside as they searched and, on one occasion, ransacked some household 
items. My distressed and terrified mother would tell my father once home of  what happened. He would 
either downplay the situation or remain silent, only nodding in sympathy. In hindsight, I often wonder what 
my father felt being unable to protect his wife and children. Myself  a product of  that society and now a father 
and a husband, I can speculate that the silence was helplessness and perhaps humiliation. Knowing my 
father, it was also deep resentment and anger. He would not express it, it was simply unmanly. Even if  he did, 
I doubt he had much to say or offer. He probably chose to be ambiguous rather than making promises of  
protection that he most certainly was not able to fulfil. That was a risk of  demasculinisation he was not 
willing to take. Judging by the vividness and importance of  certain memories, it is possible that this dutiful 
and urgent sense of  ‘female protection’ was perhaps induced into us, the family male members. Of  all the 
memories of  the IDF abuses, it is maybe the ones that involved female family members that resonated the 
most with me. Looking back, the day the soldiers dragged my aunt by the hair out of  her house after she had 
challenged them is possibly the day when the conflict became personal.   
In these almost daily occurrences in the Occupied Territories — and like my aunt’s husband who helplessly 
watched as his wife went face down into the sand — men are humiliated and rendered helpless. The 
husband/father/brother/son in such situation loses his role as a protector, making him equal to the ones he is 
expected to protect. Naaman (2006) observes that Palestinian men interpret the humiliation as feminisation. 
They are questioned, searched, ordered around, and in general have little control over their agency. Since 
they associate lack of  power with the feminine position, they feel doubly humiliated. The characteristic of  
masculinity, goes the general belief, is attributed to the perpetrator and femininity to the victim (Sivakumaran 
2007). Ironically and perhaps tragically, Palestinian masculinity is opposed and further crushed by the more 
superior and well-established Zionist masculine identity. The IDF is the ultimate rite of  passage for many 
Israeli-Jews for manhood— something of  a second bar-mitzvah. But because it is defined by control and brute 
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force, it is also fragile and has to be demonstrated repeatedly and emphatically through abuse and systematic 
humiliation ‘to show who is boss.’ When Palestinian teenage girl and activist Ahed Tamimi slapped an IDF 
soldier in 2017, the army institution was outraged (see: Levy & Levac 2018; Kershner 2018). Not only 
because a Palestinian dared to challenge the IDF; worse, a Palestinian girl did that. Ahed was detained for 
eight months in a military prison and the slapped soldier — in an attempt to reinstate his dignity — was 
repeatedly commended for self-restrain or portrayed as a victim of  the young girl.    
A macro outlook at Palestinian society reveals that humiliation is nondiscriminatory; it is directed at everyone 
from the carriage boy in Suad Amiry’s diaries (2005) to the academics such as herself, to the most privileged 
such as the PA president himself. The reaction to such living therefore varies. It manifests in cases of  domestic 
abuse where women are doubly victimised by both the occupation and their occupation-emasculated 
husbands (see: Holt 2003), and in the repressed and misplaced means of  venting to the violent and defiant 
posture: from the Palestinian workers in Israel who sought an outlet in paid sex to those who embraced 
muqawama. 
  
On a self-reflexive note, in the camp we occasionally heard stories of  Palestinian workers in Israel turning to 
sex workers. In a conservative, somewhat religious society, extra-marital sex was condemned. Yet, some of  the 
younger workers felt no shame in bragging about their sexual adventures — at least amongst their peers. 
Interestingly, while prostitution in Israel was dominated by immigrants from the ex Soviet Union since the 
1990s (Miller 2012), for those ‘clients’ in the camp ‘scoring’ with knowingly Jewish sex workers was 
particularly a reason for gloating. This behaviour cannot be severed from the dyad of  victimhood and 
gendered humiliation. In addition to living under the occupation, those workers had to go through a series of  
daily humiliations upon entering Israel for work: from extreme security checks to being squeezed like sardines 
for hours in long and narrow corridors. Among other things, they perhaps saw in the Jewish sex workers an 
affordable way to get back at Israel. Hearing them brag, it often sounded like a victorious conquest. Indeed, 
for those humiliated men the act of  physical penetration seemed like a compensation for the feelings of  
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feminisation where they are the object of  [psychological] penetration. It stands to reason to assume that sex 
was used as a means to retrieve masculinity and honour. For those men, the need to fulfil the society’s 
hegemonic masculinity was perhaps so strong that it created a moral and religious duality. That is, extra-
marital sex is haram (forbidden), but can be forgiven — or hypocritically ignored — if  it cured the injured 
self/ego.   
For the average Palestinian, nevertheless, humiliation is repurposed in a more dignified way, namely through 
the ethos of  muqawama. Kanafani believed that muqawama would transform the humiliated refugee into a 
people and should redeem the emasculated Palestinian man (Amireh 2003). After lamenting the victimised 
yet passive Palestinians who died in the tank in Men in the Sun (1963), Kanafani, as if  shaking off  the burden 
of  defeat and dispossession, presents to us the victimised yet defiant Palestinian in All That’s Left to You (1966). 
The novella coincided with the rise of  the PLO and armed resistance, so as a narrative it reflected the 
experience and mode of  many Palestinians at the time. It tells us the story of  a broken family after the Nakba: 
the mother is displaced to Jordan and her children to Gaza. The daughter, Merriam, becomes pregnant out-
of-wedlock and the son, Zachariah, sets out on an arduous journey to find his mother and to run away from 
his sister’s shame. The sister symbolises the ‘raped’ Palestine and the mother is the honourable Palestine 
Zachariah seeks to fight for and retrieve. There is the humiliation, but there is also the will to fight against it.  
This is the very dynamic that triggered the transformation from jeel al Nakba (the Nakba generation) to jeel al 
tahrir (the liberation generation) (see: Matar and Harb 2013). The muted humiliation and unsettling sense of  
helplessness that followed the Nakba was broken by the first post-Nakba generation.  Similar to the period of  53
silence that followed the Shoah, and like a case of  childhood abuse, the first decade after the Nakba was 
characterised by a collective, self-induced psychogenic amnesia. Not in the sense of  having forgotten 
Palestine, but more of  an adaptive strategy to cope with the feelings of  loss (see: Freyd 1994). Practically as 
 Partly owing to the significant increase in the numbers of  educated Palestinians, thanks to the efforts of  the UNRWA (Khalidi 53
2006). 
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well, surviving the hardships in the host countries was prioritised over ruminating over a lost homeland. 
Organising armed resistance against Israel would have been difficult not least because at the time Palestinians 
lacked the means to carry out attacks on Israel and because they had to answer to the governments of  the 
host countries who wanted to avoid Israeli reprisals on their soil.  
In his magnum opus Bab al Shams (Gate of  the Sun) (1998), Lebanese novelist Elias Khoury captures the 
transformation in the Palestinian revolutionary course. Different to Kanafani who depicted the Palestinian 
experience of  his time, Khoury has had the luxury of  retrospection. Bab al Shams as a result came out both a 
tragic anecdote and a disillusioned exploration. Khoury constructs the plot using several yet connected 
melodramatic stories to reflect the complexities of  Palestinian everyday life at multiple points since the Nakba. 
He introduces a narrative of  experience through literature, rather than slip into a clichéd political 
sloganeering. Instead of  spending much time tackling the Palestinian experience from a historical perspective, 
which the novel makes relatively clear, Khoury chooses to focus on the burden of  memory. He introduces the 
reader to the narrative of  the defeated and their shattered sense of  identity. The main story of  the novel is 
that of  Yunis Al-Asadi. Khoury tells us that after the Nakba Yunis frequently snuck back into Palestine from 
Lebanon to see his wife Nahila. They usually met in a cave named bab al shams. He left her pregnant after 
every visit. The latent meaning is that part of  Yunis’s resistance was the continuity of  his offspring in 
Palestine. His love story with Nahila symbolises the organic connection to the land. To most, Yunis was a 
hero, but he now lies helpless in a coma in a run-down hospital in a refugee camp in Lebanon, and is looked 
after by a doctor, who is not in actual fact a doctor. Khoury here maps the inner conflict about trauma and 
identity, and is particularly concerned with the Palestinian fear of  being forgotten. Through Yunis’s love story, 
the reader is introduced to an image of  people who struggle to remain a people even though they have been 
separated by exile, ethnic cleansing, several borders and fortifications. Like most stories about Palestine, Bab al 
Shams is about loss and the futile attempts to reverse the course of  history. But the most interesting and 
perhaps unorthodox aspect of  the novel is the re-examination of  the concepts of  heroism and muqawama. 
Through the mostly helpless and dreamy characters of  the novel, the reader is familiarised with the self-
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contradictory dichotomy of  heroism and loss, showing how Palestinians have become trapped in a trauma 
that compels them to endlessly substantiate the victimhood narrative in order to justify the shame of  loss and 
give boost to resistance. Khoury implies that the obdurate production and reproduction of  collective memory 
and with it the constant quest for a lost homeland is perhaps - partly - a narcissistic search for a lost dignity 
and national masculinity, and an escape from collective humiliation. Carrying on with this insight and 
supported by Bar-Tal’s framework, the next section discusses how the several dynamics of  Palestinian 
collective memory and the feelings of  humiliation made the ethos about muqawama particularly salient in both 
the inner societal workings and the overall perception of  the conflict.  
ETHOS ABOUT MUQAWAMA    
From a cognitive appraisal perspective (Fridja et al. 2000; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011), 
humiliation is generally believed to evoke avoidance and acceptance reactions, such as the inclination to 
suppress rebellious tendencies. In their study of  Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, Ginges and Atran 
(2008) framed the tendency towards inaction as an inertia effect. We saw that in the Palestinians who criticised 
other Palestinians for challenging the occupation and in the workers who found comfort in paid sex. That 
said, this study concurs with the views of  Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin (2015) who claimed that because 
humiliation is unjust, it also relates to anger. The injustice appraisal is an important variable that links 
humiliation to anger, because a core appraisal theme underlining anger is injustice (ibid.). In practice, 
Palestinians developed certain ethos to regulate this anger and reutilise it to alleviate or circumvent the 
negative impact of  humiliation. As extensively discussed in the previous chapters (2, 5, & 6), ethos provides 
epistemic foundations for society. It supplies the in-group with orientation, direction, and meaning (e.g. Bar-
Tal 2007, 2013). Israel’s ethos developed partly to serve as socio-psychological repertoire to counteract the 
country’s existential fears (ibid., 2001). While Palestinians share similar fears (and needs — varying in 
complexity, urgency, and prominence), their ethos developed mainly in light of  and in response to the 
asymmetrical power relations with Israel; therefore central to this ethos is the notion of  physical and symbolic 
201
resistance — muqawama. The ethos of  muqawama, in other words, aims to ‘correct’ the unbalanced 
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. After all, humiliation is made salient through the hierarchy 
of  power, and only through ‘resisting’ can this hierarchy be overcome, or at least reduced. For Palestinians in 
general, the ethos of  muqawama is seen as reactive to Israel’s aggression and ultimately geared toward 
liberation. But at its core lies the burning desire to redeem Palestinian honour and masculinity. With that in 
mind, the assumption in this study is that the ethos of  muqawama gives orientation, purpose, and meaning to 
Palestinians in the conflict in three different ways: a) as a glorified rebellion against the social and political 
infrastructure, and an insulation against national shortcomings and future uncertainties; b) as an outlet for 
anger and a means for validation, often through acts of  revenge; and c) as a noble goal achieved through 
martyrdom and self-sacrifice.  
Glorification of  Muqawama  
The cat abusing children of  Jerusalem had grown up since Ra’ad wrote his book (2010) and with them the 
sense of  shame. Like jeel al tahrir (liberation generation) before them, they rebelled against their parents, and 
the helplessness and daily humiliations they sensed through them eventually materialised into aggression and 
disorganised acts of  revenge against Israel. This was evident in the so-called ‘Knives Intifada,’ or ‘Wave of  
Terror’ as Israel described it, in the late 2015 into 2016. The Intifada was dominated by young Palestinians 
who were born after Oslo and experienced Israel’s brutality firsthand as children in the Second Intifada 
(2000-05). Many of  them went on stabbing sprees against the IDF and Israeli-Jewish civilians, and many lost 
their lives in the process. Labelled as muqawama, the attacks were random and the attackers were not known 
for being politically affiliated. They all, however, shared the desperation, hopelessness and absence of  
autonomy which further fuelled their feelings of  humiliation and loss of  dignity. 
Whilst the declared intention was to take revenge against the occupation, to put into actions the ethos of  
muqawama, the Knives Intifada was one of  those events in Palestinians history which showed that some of  the 
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rage was perhaps internally directed. Not only on the micro family level, but also on the macro level that the 
Palestinian political system in general and the Palestinian Authority in particular represented. Most 
Palestinians have become disillusioned with the PA, and because of  its shortcomings  and security liaison with 
Israel, it is viewed as ‘misrepresenting the Palestinian national interests' (Hever 2013). As it stands, in modern 
Palestinian history, there had never been a Palestinian leadership more willing to achieve some sort of  
independent state as the current leadership headed by Mahmoud Abbas. Abukhater (2017) accurately 
describes the Palestinian general mood when he says that despite every sign of  non-cooperation, 
intransigence, and continued violations of  agreements and international law by the Israeli governments, the 
‘myth’ of  the peace process survived, thanks to the efforts of  the PA. It is, after all, the main reason it exists. 
Like the helpless father figure, the PA adds rather than alleviates the sense of  humiliation. Lacking autonomy 
and being an authority under occupation makes it appear like a servant to the oppressor. The concept of  
‘servant’ in some Arab cultures is often derogatory and suggests coercion and humiliation. 
Closely related to the above is the fact that the political and social system that the PA has grown to represent 
accentuates the Palestinian general struggle with own shortcomings and nationalistic failures. Karma Nabulsi 
(2013, in: Johnson & Shehadeh [eds.] 2013, p. 188) points out that almost “…every institution or overarching 
structure that once united Palestinians has now crumbled and been swept away. The gulf  between Gaza and 
the West Bank, between Hamas and Fatah, between Palestinians inside Palestine and the millions of  refugees 
outside it now seem unbridgeable. This situation is aggravated by Palestinians being trapped into a historical 
moment that, as far as the world is concerned, belongs to the past. No one cares any longer for talks of  
liberation: in fact, people flinch at the sound of  it. It is unfashionable, embarrassing, and reactionary to speak 
of  revolution today. Many Palestinians are aware of  that, but they remain stubbornly, almost wilfully, 
anchored in that moment of  history (ibid.). This is a complex situation that requires a delicate adjustment to 
the conflict ethos in such a way that it meets today’s demands without compromising the accepted goals and 
worldview that sprang out of  that ‘revolutionary moment.’ To willingly admit that the Palestinians goals have 
not been met partly because of  Palestinian deficiencies contradicts, at the very least, the ethos about the 
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positive self-image and the notion of  being the ‘ideal victims’ in the conflict. By extension, it casts a doubtful 
light on the beliefs and methods of  muqawama. Bar-Tal (2013) observed such dynamic among Israeli-Jews; 
many of  them were conditioned to block any flow of  information that challenged Israel’s established ethos 
about the self  and the conflict (see Chapter Five). Likewise, to maintain the ideal victim status and justify the 
ethos about muqawama, many Palestinians tend to block the information that signals Palestinian responsibility 
for some of  the Palestinian failures. As a result, it has become almost a culture, today and in retrospect, to 
blame almost every problem in the Palestinian society on Israel. It is distracting and requires very little 
scrutiny to be accepted as part of  the societal beliefs (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2013).  
In several surveys where Israel wasn’t listed as a possible culprit; Palestinians assigned blame to their 
government and key figures and parties, or to society as a whole. But when Israel was offered as an option, 
more Palestinians passed responsibility to Israel than opted for any other answer (Polisar 2015). Israel’s 
comprehensive occupation indeed restricts Palestinian livelihood, but it is not totally omnipresent. The Paris 
Agreement of  1994, for instance, which broadly sets the financial and economic dynamics of  the Palestinian 
Authority in relation to Israel, allows Israel to have a nearly full control over the Palestinian economy 
(Palestinian Return Centre 2012). It may be convenient in this light to blame the occupation for all the 
ailments in the Palestinian economy. But sometimes the PA’s economic policies and various degrees of  
structural corruption are, too, blamed on Israel. 
Being the ‘professional sufferers’ as Volkan (2013a, p.61) describes us, our glorification of  the ethos of  
muqawama helps us fulfil some of  our psychological needs for security, but in the process it also exposes us to 
the fragility of  our existence. Not only are we in a constant fear of  being forgotten and our collective memory 
being obliterated from history, we also struggle to keep sense of  the present. To most Palestinians, we stand 
against enormous odds. We live in a constant fear and anxiety of  tomorrow because very little can we do to 
control what tomorrow might bring. This breeds an anxious anticipation for the worse, a fight-or-flight daily 
living. When we laugh hard, we apprehensively wonder what might come next to spoil the moment. Leading 
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a life of  this sort inhibits the cognitive ability to view the future in a brighter colour.  You see this mindset not 
only in the daily interactions but also in almost all types narratives. There is always fear and uneasy 
uncertainty about tomorrow. Darwish, for instance, communicates this fear in his poem “We Fear for 
dreams” (1993), saying that we [Palestinians] are afraid of  dreams and for dreams. Another Palestinian poet 
(and writer), Taha Ali (2005), manifests how Palestinian fear of  the future has become almost a second nature 
and a way of  life. He writes: Fear which accompanies me like my pen, lives with me, surprises me like an earthquake, haunts 
me, but I don’t know what it is.  
Fiction, too, has in most cases a similar tone. Rarely do we find stories with an optimistic views of  the future. 
In Palestine 100+ (2019), a collection of  short stories taking place a hundred years from the Nakba, Basma 
Ghalayini (ed.) remarks that Palestinian authors usually write about the past, and often through the hardships 
of  the present. It is perhaps for this reason the genre of  science fiction has never been particularly popular 
amongst them. It is a luxury most Palestinians feel they cannot afford to embrace. The few attempts to 
visualise the future typically assumed a dystopian outlook. In Haddad’s short story Song of  the Birds (in: 
Ghalayini 2019 [ed.]), we learn about Aya’s memories of  her brother Ziad who committed suicide in the year 
prior. Ziad visits Aya in her dreams to tell her that he killed himself  to escape the prison of  collective 
memory. She tells him that Palestine was liberated and justice was realised. In the end, in a terrifying 
revelation, Ziad tells Aya that her reality was not real; Palestinians were made to live in a computer simulated 
reality. The memories about liberation and everything else in Palestinian existence were mere algorithm. In 
that future, Israel extended her control even over Palestinian subconsciousness. Ziad killed himself  to be real, 
to escape the memory of  victimhood only to wake up (literally) to a more draconian reality. In the story and 
others there are multiple signs of  a collective mindset characterised by severe pessimism, one designed to 
cushion the fall should we have high expectations in a very fragile and paranoid environment.   
On the ground, this is evident in the Palestinian highly paranoid views of  Israel’s intentions and behaviours. 
Many of  us are convinced that the entire peace process is a ruse. When Arafat came back from Camp David 
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in 2000, he was received as a hero simply because many of  us viewed Israel’s process of  negotiations as a big 
game that we were forced into with our hands tied behind our backs. Many felt that Arafat may have actually 
managed to reinstate some of  the Palestinian masculinity and honour  — which Oslo had shattered — 
simply by voicing some ‘NOs’ to Barak and Clinton. Arafat's ‘symbolic victory’ was a viewed as a 
continuation and implementation of  the ethos of  muqawama in the sense that he, first, transcended the severe 
power asymmetry and, second, withstood the enormous pressure and intimidations that came with it. The 
Second Intifada that soon followed saw that revived dignity and the rejuvenation of  collective victimhood fuel 
resistance. But as Israel’s brutality escalated, humiliation increased and the need to reinstate dignity turned 
into a series of  violent acts of  revenge. The ethos of  muqawama then shifted slightly from the broad prospects 
of  liberation to the goals of  hurting Israel. 
I Revenge, Therefore I Am  
Humiliation leads to feelings of  weakness and inferiority and that leads to what Gilligan (2003) calls ‘the 
death of  self.’ The self, a vulnerable psychological construct, becomes more tormenting than the physical 
death of  the body. Fighting this vulnerability is what may save the humiliated person from the death of  the 
self. A person who was humiliated as a child, and then encounters humiliating situations in adulthood, may 
become obsessed with humiliation and the plan to remedy it, usually by revenge (Lindner 2001). Varvin 
(2005) sees that revenge is usually designed to ‘protect’ the group’s integrity and honour. 
Nowadays, it seems that for many Palestinians, especially the younger generation who experienced acts of  
humiliation by Israel tend to prioritise vengeance over peace. Their narratives and ethos about muqawama are 
often unsophisticated; anger seems to be the dominant active emotion and violence the outlet. Following a 
wave of  attacks by young Palestinians in 2018, a Yedioth Ahronoth’s investigative report (Mar. 2018) 
speculated that the young attackers lacked political sophistication; they were not attacking Israel with orders 
from Hamas or the Islamic Jihad or because they felt offended by Trump’s naming Jerusalem Israel's capital, 
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or even because of  social media incitements. Many of  them, the report quoting officials in the Shabak, made 
the decision to attack upon seeing the IDF, with no or little planning. The report added that the attacks were 
acts of  revenge resulting from frustration, hopelessness, and extreme rage. Targeting the Palestinian ‘terror 
infrastructure’ or leadership, accordingly, was not going to alleviate those young Palestinians’ hatred to Israel 
or change their views that the peace process was a fiasco. According to Lindner (2001), individuals who are 
highly stressed and threatened as a result of  exposure to war are less likely to support diplomatic negotiation 
and peace. The occupation is viewed by the majority as a continuous warfare on identity and very existence. 
Exposure to such intensive stimuli produces high levels of  psychological stress and threat perceptions, which 
in turn may lead to distrust in peace.  
Palestinians cannot beat Israel’s systematic attack on dignity by deploying systematic counter-humiliation 
measures. They cannot, for instance, blindfold or strip Israeli soldiers at checkpoints. Muqawama by definition 
is subject to the balance of  power, and is therefore dependent on opportunities. Whilst Israel can retaliate at 
will, Palestinians for the most part resort to what can be best described as a ‘sting technique’ to strike back at 
Israel. This means an attack can take place only when circumstances allow, and in most cases the physical 
effect on Israel is minimal. Palestinians gamble on achieving a psychological impact on Israel’s morale that 
may outweigh the physical damage that the attack had caused. The ‘sting technique’ is not meant to 
completely undo the harm caused by humiliation given the current power hierarchy. Its essential goal is to 
establish ‘a balance of  suffering' (Frija 1994, cited by ibid.) — or, ‘a balance of  fear’ —  and through that a 
semblance of  dignity. This balance is often emphasised by one’s ability to hurt Israel — and against all odds. 
After all, muqawama is about restoring dignity by challenging the superior power.   
That said, there are signs that the emphasis on one’s ability to cause suffering to Israel also reflects an 
external narcissistic desire for recognition and validation (Crow et al. 2018). Many Palestinians take pride in 
being acknowledged in Israeli media as the ones who hurt Israel. If  Israel’s news networks lament a certain 
Palestinian attack, then this means we have hurt them and the act of  muqawama was a success. As children, we 
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learned Hebrew terms such as harogim (wounded) fago’im (dead) from the Israeli media. When we gathered 
around the TV to watch Israel’s media coverage of  a Palestinian attack, it was those particular words that we 
looked for. What stood out was not only the satisfaction of  revenge, but also the pride that our enormous ‘feat 
of  heroism’ has been recognised by our formidable enemy. This is particularly true because in Palestinian 
popular culture — much of  which has been shaped by the ‘culture of  conflict’ (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; 
Bar-Tal 2013) — Israel’s capabilities have been exaggerated and even mythologised. The conflict-supporting 
narratives have permeated all strata of  the social structure and allowed for such exaggerations to take root 
and be seen as culturally valid (ibid.). There is, for instance, a common Palestinian proverb that goes: “when a 
Jew dies.” It is a reference to rarity, and can be used in numerous social situations. But it stems from a societal 
belief  that Israel is very powerful and the chances of  an Israeli-Jew being killed in a Palestinian attack are 
extremely rare. On one hand, this is a confirmation of  Palestinian helpless victimhood against Israel’s 
military might, and on the other, an exaggeration of  the achievements of  muqawama. This — once again — 
reflects the Palestinian tendency to adjust the conflict ethos about muqawama in a way that emphasises and 
glorifies Palestinian agency, but without compromising the overarching societal belief  of  being the ‘ideal 
victim’ in the conflict.  54
Seeking validation from Israel points toward a deep psychological crisis in the Palestinian self-identity vis-à-vis 
Israel. If  Israeli-Jews discuss what we did, they by default discuss us — which makes us present, if  not 
important. We draw self-validation from what we assume as Israeli-Jewish acknowledgement of  our presence 
and agency — often misinterpreted as validation of  our independent identity. This is unsurprising given that 
much of  the Palestinian struggle is about being remembered as a people. In a way, this dynamic is similar to 
Israel’s constant pursue of  Palestinian validation of  Israel as a ‘Jewish state.’ Rogers (1959, in: Schimel et al. 
2001) suggested that people whose acceptance from others depends on meeting others’ ‘conditions of  worth’ 
 In Chapter Five (pp. 125-26) it was noted that at the JIPSC, Palestinians were offended when Israeli-Jewish participants brought up 54
the issue of  suicide bombing. It was speculated that Palestinians felt that giving them agency — the ability to inflict harm — clashed 
with their self-image as the ideal victims. This happened mainly because ‘agency’ came as an accusation rather than a confirmation 
from the Israeli-Jewish participants. In the case of  muqawama, agency is glorified as long as it does not clash with the Palestinian 
victimhood narratives. 
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may experience reality ‘secondhand,’ feel valuable only to the extent that they are living up to such standards, 
and are prone to defensiveness. Consider this, in a survey conducted by the Jerusalem Media and 
Communications Centre JMCC in 1999, the majority of  the Palestinian participants rated Israel as 
‘intelligent.’ This was balanced out by giving Israel a high score in both violence and dishonesty (Polisar 
2015). Admitting that Israel is a ‘clever enemy’ raises the par for the type of  ‘validation’ Israel my deliver 
regarding Palestinian successes. A qualified opinion, as it were.  
Furthermore, consider the documentary Gaza War: An Israeli Perspective, which was produced by Al-Jazeera in 
September 2015. It focused on the war from the point of  view of  Israel’s military leaders and soldiers. The 
speakers admitted Israel’s failures throughout the war and the IDF’s ‘surprise’ at Palestinian fighting skills and 
tactics. The film was immediately picked up by many Palestinian media outlets as a testimony of  the 
‘resistance outstanding performance’ during the war. There is something to be said about that. But this study 
is more concerned with the psychological need for acknowledgement, even in the negative sense, to prove 
that we, Palestinians, can impose our existence against Israel’s will, yet feel a boost of  ego if  Israel 
acknowledges what we, even slightly, aim(ed) to achieve. When the capable and clever yet brutal and violent 
enemy says we are good, even if  not admirably, they feed our narcissistic self-image. We utilise their narratives 
to give credence to our muqawama narratives.  
To view it from a different but relevant angle, it may also be argued that this need of  validation falls within 
what Noha Mellor (2009) describes as the masculinisation of  war discourse. Whilst Mellor’s context is the 
media coverage of  the Iraq war and even though the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a war (at least not in 
the traditional sense), the conceptualisation of  masculinity as a discourse still applies. Mellor explains that in 
some Arabic newspapers the role and effectiveness of  Iraqi resistance to the US presence was emphasised, 
using words like ‘fierce battles’ and ‘defend,’ which gave the impression that it was a fight between foes of  
equal power. In those papers, the narrative of  ‘fighting against superior power’ was also present. Here, 
nationalist masculinity is presented in two ways: strength and the ability to withstand enormous odds. 
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Withstanding enormous odds probably scores higher on the muqawama scale as it stresses both victimhood 
and bravery. The Palestinian ethos of  muqawama are delivered in a similar fashion — with the addition that 
the Palestinian search of  Israel’s validation is also a search for affirmation of  Palestinian masculinity, which, 
too, is geared toward resolving the humiliated self  or — as in Gilligan’s reflection (2003) — to ‘revive the 
dead self.’   
Ethos of Muqawama and Self-Sacrifice  
   
Bar-Tal (2007) notes that during intractable conflicts, collective life is marked by continuous confrontation 
that requires mobilisation and sacrifice of  the society members. Certain adaptation strategies are required to 
fulfil the physical and psychological needs of  society members. Muqawama as noted earlier is one of  the 
adaptation mechanisms which fulfils some of  psychological needs of  the Palestinian collective. Mainly due to 
the power hierarchy, it is typically discernible in the dialectical relationship between humiliation and revenge. 
With the interaction between the two, however, a third manifestation of  victimhood appears: shahada or 
isteshhad (martyrdom), otherwise known as self-sacrifice.  It is the psychological readiness to suffer and 55
sacrifice one’s life for a cause (Bélanger et al. 2014). Most Palestinians can identify with the self-sacrificing 
figure, the shaheed (martyr).  Insomuch that the notion of  shahada (martyrdom) has made normal, non-56
sacrificial, non-political death a less dignified end of  life. In this study the concepts of  martyrdom and self-
sacrifice are seen as ‘functionally equivalent’ (ibid.) and are used interchangeably. Though, it is important to 
point out that in the Palestinian context martyrdom is a broad term that includes both passive and active 
types of  dying. By passive it means being killed without being involved in political activities or dying due to 
procedural issues related to Israel, such as cancer patients who die in Palestinian hospitals after they have 
been denied permission to be treated in Israeli hospitals. The focus in this section is on the active form of  self-
sacrifice as part of  the societal beliefs about muqawama.    
 Isteshhad and shahada  are used interchangeably, except shahada also means ‘testimony’ or ‘bearing witness.’55
 Shaheed or shahid  (martyr) in Arabic literally means ‘someone who bears witness [before God]to the injustice he/she had suffered. 56
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In a society characterised by abnormal and anxious existence, it is almost necessary to add an element of  
meaningful heroism to death. Dying is associated with struggle, especially political struggle and by definition 
with the occupation. Shaheed is an individual who through physical death seeks to beat the psychological death 
of  the self. The death of  the physical body may provide the victim with control over own life and strip the 
oppressor of  the means of  abuse. Therefore, defying death or eliminating the fear of  it through martyrdom is 
a way to overcome humiliation and re-establish an honourable self-esteem (Salama 2015). Furthermore, 
shaheed represents the victim’s absolute moral superiority. The number of  martyrs, suggests Danneskiold-
Samsoe (2014), bolsters the value of  moral economy of  victimhood, as it reflects the extent of  suffering and 
human losses, which may attract attention and recognition. Looking at the cases of  four bereaved families, 
Palestinian journalist Maha Wadia (2017) sees that Palestinian media narratives have become over-occupied 
with the stories of  the dead. As soon as a Palestinian is killed, Palestinian journalists flock to the victim’s home 
and shower the grief-stricken family, rather insensitively, with questions about sacrifice and the message they 
would like to convey to Israel. Wadia explains that Palestinian media knows what resonates well with the 
audience, they know that death scores very high on the scale of  collective victimhood and the sense of  heroic 
sacrifice, or more heroically: self-sacrifice. The higher the death toll, the more validated the narrative 
becomes. Because of  what shaheed represents, however, the few stories that do not fall within the overall 
narrative are rarely written about or filmed. Wadia wonders why the media did not, for instance, write about 
the bereaved mother who shouted at the journalists: “damn you…and damn Palestine, I want my son back!”  
The societal beliefs about martyrdom are perhaps motivated more by themes about the justness of  the goals, 
and less by themes about the delegitimisation of  opponent, positive self-image, security, patriotism, unity, and 
peace (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). Justness of  the goals provides a justification based on sacred values and 
‘moral mandates’ (Skitka & Houston 2001) that help to keep the collective mobilised. Society members thus 
are expected to adhere to these goals stubbornly and try to achieve them even with violence (Bar-Tal 2013). 
Israeli-Jews and Palestinians are not drastically different in this regard. But as Bar-Tal (2013, p. 175) claims, 
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“…ethos reflects the society members’ accumulated and continuous experiences in conflict.” This practically 
means that certain ethos themes are case/context specific. What makes Palestinian goals particularly different 
from Israel’s is that they almost completely fall under the concept of  ‘supreme goals.’ Citing Skitka (2002), 
Bar-Tal (2013) sees that self-determination, equality, freedom and justice are supreme goals. These define 
almost every aspect of  Palestinian existence, and are emphasised in light of  three key narratives: Nakba, a 
history of  defeat and loss; occupation, present-day weakness and aggression; and pessimism, hopelessness and 
existential fear of  the future. Combined, they represent an unceasing and profound sense of  collective 
victimhood, of  which humiliation is a significant factor. This results in an urgency for a solution — for a way 
out, which is achieved either through the muqawama sting techniques or, if  not possible, through the ultimate 
exit of  martyrdom. In other words, if  the goals are of  supreme, existential value and the available means of  
resistance are marginally effective given the existing power hierarchy, then what is required is a special kind 
of  measure: martyrdom, or in extreme cases, self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice here assumes a proactive role in the 
form of  isteshhadi (self-sacrificer, e.g. suicide bomber), someone who actively and meticulously anticipates and 
plans a version of  victory through their physical death.    
During the second Intifada, helpless and overwhelmed by Israel’s military power, Palestinians resorted to 
‘suicide bombings.’ Self-sacrifice was weaponised and the unequivocally sinful nature of  ‘suicide’ was justified 
through the concept of  ‘glorious martyrdom.’ Religious interpretations played a significant part in that. The 
obvious central goal of  suicide attacks was to harm others assumed to be inimical to the goals of  the cause 
(Bélanger et al. 2014). That included almost every Israeli-Jewish adult. As the attacks resulted in civilian 
casualties, Palestinian ‘self-sacrifice’ was framed as terrorism mainly by countries in the West. The 
motivational underpinning of  political self-sacrifice was traditionally attributed to individual characteristics, 
situational circumstances (socio-economic and political factors), or psychopathological reasons (ibid.). In 
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addition to attributing Palestinian suicide bombings to the religious, ideological, or socioeconomic factors,  57
Israel also interpreted them in terms of  mindless hatred of  Jews (see previous chapter: the mechabel narrative).  
With that said, self-sacrifice in the form of  suicide attacks remains an extreme, if  not a destructive, 
manifestation of  the dichotomy of  victimhood and muqawama. As it stands, a Palestinian suicide bomber’s 
mission cannot only be understood as punitive to those inimical to the goals of  the cause, or analysed solely 
on political or socio-economical basis, it should also be viewed as a reformative measure, same as the other 
aspects of  muqawama. By punishing the enemy, one regains control and in the process reforms the shattered 
self-esteem, sharaf  (honour), and masculinity. The absence of  these values represents the symbolically dead 
self  (Gilligan 2003), which isteshhad seeks to revive. Isteshhadi Muhammad Al-Ghoul, for example, who blew 
himself  up in a bus carrying Jewish settlers in Jerusalem in 2002, wrote in his will: “It is glorious to turn my 
bones into fragments, not because we love to kill, but because we want to live.” (Banat 2010). He saw in death 
a means to reform a flawed situation. It was both an escape and a noble path to a dignified life.   
A similar notion can be found in several forms of  narrative: media, fiction, signs and symbols. In visual 
media, the film Paradise Now (2005) tells us the story of  two friends from Nablus, Khaled and Said who decide 
to join the resistance and become suicide bombers. Khaled, an Isteshhadi-to-be sees that Palestinians under the 
occupation are already dead and only physical death can bring salvation. The second Isteshhadi-to-be, Said, 
represents the dilemma of  humiliation and dignity. Like Zachariah in Kanafani’s All That’s Left to You (1966) 
who tried to wash away his sister’s shame with muqawama, Said believed that dying as a shaheed would restore 
his family’s sharaf which was stained after his father was killed years earlier over charges of  collaboration. A 
similar idea is present in Omar (2013), another Palestinian film that tells the story of  a Palestinian muqawem 
(freedom fighter) who is coerced to collaborate with the Shabak to protect his and his girlfriend’s sharaf. 
Shooting his Israeli recruiter in the end is shown as a way to cleanse his soul even if  that meant his physical 
 Berrebi (2007), nonetheless, finds that Palestinian suicide bombers have substantially higher education and better economic 57
backgrounds than average Palestinians. It seems the higher the level of  education the acuter one’s awareness of  own victimisation.
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death. The film also emphasises the masculinisation of  muqawama and the feminisation of  humiliation; that is, 
Omar's job is to protect ‘his woman’ and in the process protect the female collectivity that is the notion of  
Palestine.  
Importantly, Omar also shows that the notion of  isteshhadi is a fluid one. It is not always a description of  a 
premeditated self-sacrifice, as someone strapped with an explosive belt ready to die. Rather, it can also mean 
an anticipation and acceptance of  the high likelihood of  death in the process of  resisting. Given the steep 
asymmetrical power relations, many Palestinian attacks often lead to the death of  the attacker. Therefore, 
most attacks regardless of  the method are essentially isteshhadi operations. This, among other things, gave rise 
to the notion of  ‘living Shaheed.’ The term has religious connotations and is used by almost all resistance 
groups in the region.  But because the odds for Palestinians are notably high, the term has become an 58
essential part of  the ‘culture of  conflict’ (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; Bar-Tal 2009). The tradition requires that 
a muqawama activist (muqawem) write or video-record his/her will in case or in anticipation of  death. The will 
usually highlights the muqawem’s reasons for getting involved in the fight. More often than not, these reasons 
act as a mirror for society’s conflict ethos and dominant emotional orientations. The will is usually initiated or 
concluded/signed with the muqawem referring to him/herself  as the living shaheed. It usually goes as follows: 
“…your brother/sister [name], the living shaheed.”  The ‘tradition’ is so rooted — one might say ‘fashionable’ 
— that it found its way even among many non-affiliated teenagers, who took to social media as a modern 
alternative to wills to declare their desire to die as shaheeds for the cause. As one among many, seventeen-year-
old Qutaiba Zahran from Tulkarem  posted his desire for shahada on Facebook. Mere minutes later, he was 59
lying in a pool of  blood having attempted to stab a solider on Za’atara checkpoint in Nablus (Wattan News, 
Aug. 2017).  
 The term originates in Islamic theology and has been used by both Sunni and Shia Muslims: Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the 58
Lebanese Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, the Iraqi Hashd Al-Sha’abi, the Syrian Free Army, and others.
 City in northern West Bank. 59
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The ‘living shaheed’ notion in the ethos of  muqawama may be understood as endowing isteshhad with a 
transcendental power, one assumed superior to Israel’s military prowess. This is evident in the Shaheed burial 
rituals. Kissing and caressing the shaheed’s face may not only be a mere ritualistic farewell, it is also a show of  
defiance. By treating the shaheed’s body as a living body, Palestinians perhaps try to prove to themselves and 
Israel that the struggle is never abolished by death. When Israel released Qutaiba’s body (after nearly a 
month), Avichay Adraee, the IDF’s Arabic spokesman, tweeted that ‘..today we make Qutaiba’s family 
weep.” The family responded with a selfie showing their son’s body surrounded by the male family members 
[across three generations] expressionless or slightly smiling (Wattan News, Sept. 2017). Whilst a controversial 
message of  defiance, the selfie emphasised the element of  continuity in the concept of isteshhad and with it the 
perpetuation of  a righteous struggle.  
Qutaiba’s family manifested a Palestinian experience so profound that it has become part of  almost all types 
of  narrative textuality. Not only in sophisticated social representations such as films and novels, but also in the 
particularly emotional cultural expressions like slogans and revolutionary songs. It is common in Palestinian 
demonstrations or funeral processions, for example, for the crowds to shout the slogan: “To Al-Quds 
(Jerusalem) we shall go, martyrs in the millions.” In Hamas’ demonstration, these slogans acquire a religious 
undertone, where the demonstrators shout: “Our best wishes is to die for the sake of  God.” To the Islamists, 
there is almost no separation between the political act of  muqawama and being a religious duty under the label 
of  Jihad. Thus, to die for the noble and righteous cause of  liberation is also to die for God. Either way, the 
sloganeering emphasises isteshhad as the highest value in muqawama and the means of  defiant continuity of  the 
Palestinian collective. This sentiment is also quite common in the revolutionary songs. One song, for example, 
goes (2015): 
Oh mother, sing and rejoice! Your son is a hero, he never died.  
Tell my father and siblings, never shed tears.  
215
The latent content here is that isteshhad is a glorified mission and instead of  grieving, the shaheed should be 
celebrated as a hero. Looking at death as only another plane of  existence, the song, like the slogans and 
Qutaiba’s family, emphasises the element of  continuity in the struggle.   
That said, despite the social and psychological comfort they provide, the societal beliefs about muqawama and 
with it the notions of  self-sacrifice and martyrdom have a dark side which, like the internalisation of  
humiliation, can burden society from within.    
The Struggle Within  
Ethos in general provides the collective with positive orientations and views about the conflict and the self. 
But this process also entails certain negative attitudes toward the out-group. It seems that the more positive 
the in-group’s collective self-image is, especially as victims, the more negative the perception of  the rival 
becomes (e.g. Bar-Tal 2013). Hence the claim that a defining component of  conflict is ‘negative 
identity’ (Kelman 1987, 1999) (see Chapter Two). One of  the assumptions in this study is that the negative 
reverberations of  the conflict ethos whilst normally directed at the out-group, can have a negative impact 
internally. As in the overall ethos of  muqawama, the notion of  isteshhad provides orientation and purpose, and 
acts as a coping mechanism against the enormous odds of  the conflict. This is viewed as generally positive to 
the in-group. But having been constructed as a cultural belief  in itself, isteshhad has a negative side which 
psychologically drains the Palestinian collective from within. It might even be said that the societal beliefs 
about isteshhad have done to Palestinians as much psychological damage as did the notion of  ‘lachrymose 
history’ to Israeli-Jews. 
  
On a personal note, as a young man in Gaza, I marched in several funeral processions for people I knew or in 
solidarity with others I did not. Observing the funeral dynamics, four themes seemed prominent. The first 
theme was victimhood, usually the backdrop and the overarching umbrella of  the three other themes. The 
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second was the calls for revenge. The third was the glorification of  isteshhad, and it took a celebratory nature. 
The fourth theme was grief. The first two themes are perhaps dominant in all forms of  muqawama. The 
dilemma, however, occurs in the contradictions between the third and the fourth themes. This is where the 
split-personality of  the Palestinian collective can best be discerned.  
As we marched the shaheed to his/her final resting place, people and children as young as ten competed to 
take part in carrying the coffin. At the front, sometimes there were armed men who fired in the air in 
defiance. At the back, occasionally there were women, including the shaheed’s mother, sounding zaghareet.  60
The rest of  people shouted slogans for Palestine and vowed for revenge. Ironically, these ‘rituals’ are more or 
less present in a traditional Palestinian zaffeh (wedding march/procession). The shaheed is replaced with a 
groom, family and friends compete to carry him on their shoulders. At the front walks the father, sometimes 
surrounded by armed men who would shoot in the air in jubilation. At the back, women sounded zaghareet.   
Darwish captured such moment in his poem “Praise to a Thing that Never Came” (1973). He wrote: This is 
the endless wedding, on the endless stage, in an endless night, this is the Palestinian wedding where only through martyrdom and 
displacement lovers can meet and embrace. Darwish uses ‘wedding’ as an allegory for the Palestinian struggle. In this 
struggle death is a defiant continuation and through death [in the struggle] life can be created and the 
homeland salvaged. Darwish’s words channel out much of  the Palestinian consciousness without needing to 
indulge in psychological analyses.  
As a coping mechanism, the psychological barriers between sorrow and joy, between death and life are 
suspended. One might argue that establishing a sense of  ‘eternal continuation’ between life and death — 
partly influenced by religious beliefs  about the prospect of  an afterlife — serves to suppress grief  and provide 
a sense of  comfort. However, as the conflict continued, our coping mechanisms regarding death became 
 Singular is zarghrouta, best described in English as “Ululation”. It is a form of  a long, wavering, high-pitched vocal sound 60
representing trills of  joy.  It is produced by emitting a high pitched loud voice accompanied by a rapid back and forth movement of  
the tongue.
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increasingly normalised as a collective state of  mind, something of  a culture. So much so that Palestinian 
poet Wafa’a Rabai’a once wondered whether the Palestinian glorification of  martyrdom was a destiny or 
simply a choice (Ouf  2014), whether the daily casualties forced us to transform grief  into a proud culture so 
we can survive. It may be suggested that we are not different from our oppressors in this respect. To draw 
again on Falk’s psychoanalysis of  the Jewish collective (1993, 1996, 2004), we, like many Jews, may have lost 
our ability to mourn our losses properly. Not only because of  collective memory as is the case for Jews, but 
also because of  the harsh present — which in many ways is a repetitive shadow of  our collective memory.  
While not completely hegemonic, in the semi-festive rituals of  shaheed burial, in trying to eliminate the 
boundaries between life and death, many bereaved families became trapped between their pride and sense of  
defiance and their instincts as grieving parents and siblings. We saw that in the fathers who praised their 
heroic sons/daughters but dipped into severe depression immediately after, and in the mothers who could not 
reconcile their social role as the ‘producers of  heroes’ and their inability to cope with the death of  a child. 
Pressed between the occupation and what might be viewed as radical coping techniques, Palestine is now a 
psychologically fatigued collective. Nearly 40% of  Palestinians suffer from clinical depression and anxiety, 
making it the highest percentage in the world. In Gaza the problem is particularly acute (Afana et al. 2004; 
Hoyle 2017). This is indeed a closed vicious bubble with little there is to burst it. Muqawama might be a most 
needed ethos that orients society, provides it with meaning and strength and acts as a reformative measure, 
but it is also a destructive force when it becomes an end in itself. Because of  that, Palestinian society today has 
to bear the brunt of  the occupation and the contradictions it created to cope with that occupation.  
CONCLUSION  
Guided by Bar-Tal’s views on collective memory, emotional orientations, and conflict ethos (e.g. Bar-Tal 
2001, 2007, 2013), and using several narrative sources and narrative analysis, as well as supported by this 
author’s insider observations and self-reflexivity, three motifs appeared: 1) Palestinians collective memory is 
largely based on the fear of  memoricide; 2) humiliation dominates as a collective emotional orientation, and 
218
in response to humiliation; 3) muqawama seems to occupy a central position as a conflict ethos. Together, the 
three motifs shape much of  the Palestinian victim identity, which defines most aspects of  Palestinian day-to-
day living.  
The majority of  Palestinians alive today were born under Israel’s occupation and continue to live as memory 
nomads as did their grandparents. These facts act as filters though which many Palestinians perceive and 
experience reality. Because of  that and despite the glorification of  the ethos of  muqawama, there are signs that 
many Palestinians have become trapped in the status quo, so much so that they cannot effectively visualise 
what life without Israel’s control could or should be like. The absence of  a frame of  reference has been 
detrimental to any risk-taking necessary to settle the conflict. What eventually materialised was a set of  beliefs 
that served as blockers to any information that may challenge the Palestinian worldview (Bar-Tal 2001, 2013). 
If  the information reveals that our worldview is incompatible with facts or invalid, most Palestinians - same as 
Israeli-Jews - would construe a situation or reconstruct the facts, rather than modify their worldview (Mack 
2003). There seems to be a tendency to keep the status quo unchecked, not only because victimhood has 
political benefits, but also because it is a familiar environment that justifies our situation. In a way, Israel’s 
control helps us come to terms with the guilt and shame associated with our collective memory, and gives 
grounds for our current shortcomings and the inability thus far to reach our supreme goals of  self-
determination and freedom. Because of  that, our right to resist has perhaps transcended its intended goal as 
an instrument for liberation and became an open-ended purpose in itself. In the process, we became immune 
to self-reflection, and our the ability to see contradictions in our victimhood narratives has diminished.   
Depending on victimhood to rationalise and cope with the conflict has also locked us in an almost permanent 
negative identity mode (Kelman 1987, 1999) against Israel. Because modern Palestinian identity is about a 
hundred years old (see: Khalidi 1997), it has always been connected to Zionism. We have now grown reliant 
on Israel as a negative reflection of  ourselves, as a measure for self-validation, and above all, we might have 
become addicted to Israel's ability to inflict pain. To remove this pain means to compromise our self-
219
perception as the ideal victims (see: Christie 1986) and what we celebrate the most, namely the Palestinian 
ability to endure pain (see: Joffe 2015). That came to define our perception and approach to the possibility of  
settlement with Israel. In the peace talks with Israel, for example, Peleg (2015) talked about the Palestinian 
‘overpowering demands for justice’ which, to him, ‘cocooned’ the Israeli-Jewish team in a defensive mode. 
Our negotiators, Like the rest of  us, assumed that pain and suffering were a way to provoke the Other to 
redefine their relation (Kovacevic 2011). By overwhelming the opponent with ‘the outcome’ of  their own 
wrongdoings, it was possible — some of  us believed — to narrow the power gap and reduce the humiliation 
of  weakness that the occupation has inflicted upon us. Ultimately, suffering needs an audience — and there is 
no better audience than the one who inflicted it in the first place. This is the ‘demonstrative feature’  (Reik 
1941, cited by Rathbone 2001) that indicates a masochistic behaviour.  
Despite the fact that political realism may provide some solution in the form of  a one-state or two-state, it will 
always be socio-psychologically lacking as long as most of  the core beliefs about the conflict are in a ‘frozen 
state’ (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001). As it stands, much of  Palestinians victimhood narratives have become a mindset, 
thus it is unlikely that removing the current physical causes of  victimisation or settling the clash in the geo-
political interests will necessarily lead to immediate psychological salvation. Not least because we may remain 
trapped in our collective memory where Israel continues to be viewed as a de facto foreign entity on 
Palestinian land. Our emotional orientations and the conflict ethos might continue to respond to and reflect 
that conviction. This is coupled with the assumption that as long as Israel continues to live ‘by the sword’ as 
Netanyahu says (Ravid 2015), Palestinians will continue to view any peace attempts with Israel, as Kanafani 
puts it, like “the kind of  conversation between the sword and the neck” (Carleton 1970).   
  
It remains the enduring conviction in this study however that despite the grim prospects of  peacemaking at 
the moment, the road to settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict begins with being receptive to cognitive 
dissonance (see: Festinger 1957) and willing to challenge the existing narratives. Though they may appear as 
the first mile of  the thousand mile journey, attempts to reexamine and revise the dominant societal beliefs 
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CHALLENGING VICTIMHOOD AS A DRIVING FORCE IN 
INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:  
The Case of  Counter-Narratives  
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OVERVIEW 
Guided by Bar-Tal’s thoughts on collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations, the 
previous three chapters examined the impact of  the narratives of  victimhood and their multiple 
manifestations on intractability and settlement. The fundamental thesis was that as far as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is concerned, many aspects of  Israel’s victimhood have little credibility. It was also found 
that certain aspects of  Palestinian victimhood required further scrutiny. The two victimhood narratives to 
varying degrees contributed to the impasse in peacemaking. To avoid potential binaries mainly in the 
discussion on Israel — owing perhaps to this author’s positionality — this chapter seeks to focus on the 
exceptions to the rule, namely the counter-narratives to what otherwise be deemed a hegemonic narrative.  
In the first section, the chapter examines Israel’s counter-narratives, starting with the scholarly work of  
Israel’s New Historians. After that the focus shifts to the social and peace movements/activism such as Neve 
Shalom, Shalom Achshav, and Zochrot (remembrance). Next, the chapter looks at the individual counter-
narrativists, that includes but not limited to film maker Samuel Maoz and musician Gilad Atzmon. This is 
followed by a critique of  Israel’s counter-narratives in the light of  collective memory and conflict ethos. In the 
second section, the chapter examines the circumstances that hindered the emergence and development of  
Palestinian counter-narratives and also explains why the critique of  Palestinian victimhood in this study can 
be a form of  counter-narrative.   
COUNTER-NARRATIVES IN ISRAEL  
Background  
Previously, it was explained that collective memory has been the primary culprit in mainstreaming the 
victimhood narratives in Israel today. Greilsammer (2012) argues that these narratives were not only accepted 
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as accurate representation of  history during the first forty years, incorporated in the school system, 
disseminated in the media and youth movements, but were also considered a ‘sacred tale’ that no one dared 
to question.  
It is argued that the 1973 Yom Kippur war which left the Jewish public in shock led to accusing the 
government of  lies and deception as they did not anticipate the Egyptian and Syrian attacks. The 
disillusionment with the political institutions and army opened the door to questioning the country’s accepted 
‘fundamental truths’ (ibid., also see: Shlaim 2001). That grew intenser during the 1982 invasion of  Lebanon. 
Some Israeli-Jews saw in the atrocities committed by the IDF — especially as the Sabra and Shatila massacre 
came to light — a reason to question the ‘accepted narratives’ about the morality of  the IDF in 1948, and 
with it Israel’s collective victimhood orthodoxies. Additionally, by the end of  the 1980s Israel was no longer a 
third-world country or existentially threatened; the IDF was the strongest army in the Middle East and the 
economy was booming (ibid.). That created extra social mobility and more relaxed attitudes to unorthodox 
ideas. The period also saw the declassifications of  some of  the archival materials from the 1948 war (Abu 
Sha’ar 2010). In such environment a small group of  Israeli-Jewish academics and intellectuals, typically from 
the left, emerged. The new movement would later be called “the New Historians” (ha historyonim ha chadashim) 
(see: Levine 1996; Pappé 1997; Rashed et al. 2014). 
The New Historians  
Blomeley (2005) remarks that the intellectual and moral impetus of  the New Historians rests on the following 
assumption: if  Zionism can be maintained to be an ideology born of  humanism and liberal values then its 
history is just and its future in its present form assured, yet if  Zionism is unmasked as a colonial movement, 
then its past, present and future must somehow be reconciled (see Chapter Four). This is momentous because 
Zionism is not a mere set of  ideas, it is a hegemonic order that constitutes a ‘common sense’ moral universe 
and a system of  privileges for most Israeli-Jews and many Jews worldview. As in any society, this hegemonic 
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order is supported, defended, and disseminated by state apparatuses, of  both civil and repressive institutions, 
as well as by non-state groups (Turner 2015). In practice this means that excavating Zionism — which goes 
well beyond the mere critique of  the state policies, politics, or measures — can represent a challenge to the 
very soul of  the nation and would put the counter-narrativists on a collision course with the full force of  the 
existing social order.  
Harkabi’s book Israel’s Fateful Hour in 1986 (English translation came out in 1989) was one of  the early 
attempts to question Israel’s established system. In the book Harkabi launched a blistering attack on the 
expansionist policies of  the Begin and Shamir governments. He advocated negotiations with the PLO to 
establish an independent Palestinian state. Harkabi’s book represented what may be called a practical 
solution through self-critique and, by directly deconstructing Israel’s system and policies, he indirectly shed 
lights of  doubt on the core societal beliefs, much of  which revolved around the group’s victimisation. Harkabi 
nevertheless did not thoroughly examine Israel’s foundations or Zionism’s political and philosophical 
infrastructure. This could be due to the socio-political situation at the time of  writing the book not being fully 
ripe for radical paradigm shifts, and/or because Harkabi did not perceive his group victimisation as 
personally relevant or consciously identified with the dominant interpretations regarding collective memory 
(see: Vollhardt 2012). Harkabi was a realist with good knowledge of  Arabic and Arab culture, so there is the 
possibility that he was mainly concerned with the geo-political side of  the conflict.  
Simha Flapan’s book the Birth of  Israel: Myths and Realities (1987) was perhaps the first academic exercise to 
challenge the traditionalist views of  Israel’s history where Israel was portrayed as a vulnerable small country 
surrounded by millions of  aggressive Arabs. Flapan discussed seven fundamental myths surrounding the 
establishment of  the State. He debunked the claims that the Zionists accepted the UN partition plan of  1947 
and the Arabs rejected it, that the Arab armies set out to annihilated the Jews, that Israel was vulnerable, and, 
most importantly, that the ‘War of  Independence’ was a war of  self-defence. He repeatedly argued that the 
1948 war was an aggression and ethnic cleansing. In effect, Flapan’s work was an unapologetic excavation of  
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the almost sacred tenets of  Zionism and by extension the held beliefs about Israel’s victimisation in the 
conflict. That makes the book perhaps the first actual spark that ignited the emergence of  the New Historians 
movement as we know it today. The movement would be headed by Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, and Avi 
Shlaim, each with his special revisionist take on history.  
It was Benny Morris, however, who coined the term ‘New Historians.’ In his painstakingly researched book 
The Birth of  the Palestinian Refugee Problem (1988 [2004 reprint]), Morris argued that the Palestinian exodus was 
largely due to military attacks, fear of  attacks, and expulsions. The author, however, denies there were 
centralised expulsion policy or systematic plans for transfer. Despite the bone-chilling detailed accounts of  the 
Nakba, Morris comes to a surprising conclusion that the Palestinians were ‘victims’ of  war and not by design 
or premeditated effort. This conclusion was reiterated later in an interview titled “Survival of  the Fittest” 
with Haaretz (Shavit 2004 — also refer to chapter 4). He commented that the ethnic cleansing of  Palestine 
was a necessity in order for a Jewish state to be established. Morris added: “ I don't think that the expulsions 
of  1948 were war crimes. You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. You have to dirty your hands.” In 
a fashion reminiscent of  Begin, Shamir, and Netanyahu, Morris also said: “A society that aims to kill you 
forces you to destroy it. When the choice is between destroying or being destroyed, it's better to destroy.” 
Morris may have critiqued the core myths of  Zionism, but ultimately failed to detach himself  from the 
Zionist grand-narrative and collective memory. Sayegh (2005) said that Morris’s book reads like a scholarly 
work, but it coldly glosses over the war crimes of  1948 as though they were mere statistics. To Sayegh, 
Morris’s scholarship was detached from his morality. 
Ilan Pappé goes a lot further than Morris in criticising Israel’s historical ethos (Blomeley 2005). In The Making 
of  the Arab/Israeli Conflict (1992, in: Blomeley 2005) he challenged several of  Israel’s founding myths, looking at 
the Zionist collusion with King Abdullah of  Transjordan to prevent the establishment of  an Arab state in 
Palestine and Israel’s intransigence at many peace offers by Arab states before and during 1948.  In an article 
in 1997 Pappé (1997) presented a counter-narrative regarding even the Israeli terminology about the war of  
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1948. He explained that the terminology was carefully constructed in order to “confer upon Zionism the 
equivalent status of  a third world liberation movement.” The Palestinians are missing from the story, and this 
can be found implicitly in the terms used for the 1948 war: azma’ut (independence) from the British, and 
shihrur (liberation) from the galut. In his later book the Ethnic Cleansing of  Palestine (2006),  Pappé expanded the 
argument from earlier years, mainly challenging Morris’ conclusions and emphasised the existence of  Planet 
Dalet (Hebrew for ‘D’). It was a master plan for the expulsion of  as many Palestinians as possible. In the book, 
Pappé dismantled Zionism as a settler-colonial movement and by extension raised a few serious questions 
about his country’s claims of  victimhood. In a later work with Hilal (2010) he employed his historical 
revisionism to directly critique Israel’s victimhood narratives.  
Shlaim’s earliest contribution to the revisionist history debate was a book titled Collusion Across the Jordan (1988 
— book review: Sheffer 1990). In it he revealed that the early Zionists, with the blessings of  the British, 
colluded with the Hashemite rulers of  Jordan to divide Palestine. The book, among other things, debunked 
the official story that the Arabs were all determined to destroy Israel. Shlaim’s more recent book The Iron Wall 
(2001) is a continued effort in new historiography. From the outset (p. xii) Shlaim declares that his aim is to 
offer a revisionist interpretation of  Israel's policy towards the Arab world during the fifty years following the 
achievement of  statehood. The book challenges the dominant orthodoxies about Israel being a vulnerable 
country against the Arab armies. He questions whether the Arab armies really represented a David versus 
Goliath scenario in 1948. To Shlaim, the portrayal of  Israel facing enormous odds is nothing but a 
nationalistic heroic-moralist narrative. The Zionist militias, Shlaim claims, were larger in number and 
significantly better equipped than the attacking Arab armies combined.   
It is now believed that Israel’s new historiography made a significant headway on the societal level, peaking in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Shlaim (2004) argues that the new history presented a shift toward more 
moderate attitudes in the political arena, boosted awareness of  the complex historical roots of  the conflict, 
and increased sympathy for the suffering of  the Palestinians. Self-righteousness and habitual blaming of  the 
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Palestinians for their own misfortunes began to give way to a better understanding for the part played by 
Israel in causing the conflict and more constructive attempts to heal the wound of  this conflict. These 
attempts manifested in a variety of  progressive social groups/movements and individual activism with the 
mission to challenge the state narratives and societal beliefs, and to promote mutual dialogue, peace 
negotiations, a two-state solution, and Palestinian human rights.   
SOCIAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES  
According to Turner (2015), opposition to hegemonic orders comes from social movements from below, not 
[through] an outright, violent assault on the established order, but [through] a gradual process of  
disarticulation and re-articulation. The author resembles the process to a war of  attrition in the redoubts and 
trenches of  civil society, and describes it as “…a battle of  ideas, a struggle to win further supporters to the 
cause of  change: it is an active and dynamic process of  creating and extending opposition” (p. 554). The fact 
remains that the challenge to the hegemonic narrative varies in its goals and convictions and therefore the 
counter-narrativists differ in their missions and worldview(s). Counter-narrativists come in two forms, a) 
group efforts: organisations and movements like the Parents Circle, Zochrot, Neve Shalom, and Shalom Achshav, 
and b) individual efforts: largely through personal activism as in the case of  filmmaker Samuel Maoz and 
musician Gilad Atzmon. While there are no organisations that officially focus on examining Israel’s 
victimhood narratives; it remains the enduring conviction in this thesis that the act of  challenging the 
dominant societal beliefs, from whichever angle and for whatever purpose, ultimately casts light on the 
controversies surrounding Israel’s victim self-image.  
  
Group Efforts  
Founded in 1996, the Parents Circle - Families Forum (PC-FF) is a grassroots organisation for the bereaved 
families on both sides of  the conflict. Its primary goal is to challenge the mainstream narratives in Israel and 
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Palestine by creating empathy through recognising mutual suffering. The organisation also introduces the 
participants to the narratives of  the Other with the aim of  achieving mutual understanding and the hope for 
future reconciliation. By creating a common narrative through mutual suffering, the organisation also aims to 
reduce the monopoly over victimhood claims. It seems that the group has a bottom-up trajectory, in the sense 
that it starts off  by looking at the outcome of  the conflict and then builds bridges from there. It begins with 
emotions and moves up to ethos and possibly collective memory - somewhat similar to a group therapy. 
A different organisation, Zochrot has an opposite trajectory. Zochrot is an Israeli non-profit organisation 
dedicated to the promotion of  the Nakba to Israeli-Jews. The organisation is less than two decades in age and 
is unique in its daring approach to Israel’s collective memory. Whilst PC-FF aims to challenge the 
mainstream through emotional bonding, Zochrot starts from the top by challenging Israel’s official and popular 
collective memory by putting it against the Nakba narratives. Zochrot organises trips to the ruins of  Palestinian 
villages in Israel and document testimonies from Palestinian refugees and Israeli-Jewish war veterans who 
fought in the 1948 war.  
Zochrot shares its views with possibly a more radical counter-narrative organisation, Israel’s own BDS group 
— Boycott From Within (BFW). BFW was founded by Israeli-Jews to offer solidarity and support from within 
Israel for the Palestinian BDS. The organisation is more recent than Zochrot but was established as a response 
to the same circumstances that emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep 
disillusionment with the Oslo peace paradigm of  a two-state solution and the decline of  mainstream Israel’s 
peace organisations (Turner 2015). While Zochrot assumes an educational role towards the Jewish public, BFW 
— following the same strategy as BDS — focuses on external constituencies to exercise pressure on Israel. 
Zochrot and BFW locate the origins of  the conflict in the nature of  Zionism as a settler-colonial movement, 
the creation of  Israel and the Nakba. Hence they suggest that a process of  de-Zionisation and decolonisation 
is needed to end the conflict (ibid.). Such effort, especially by Zochrot, helps raise questions about Israel’s ethos 
about victimhood. It also challenges the rooted ethos about the justness of  the Zionist cause and goals and 
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the demonisation of  the Palestinians by providing a causal context to the conflict. It gives meanings and 
reasons to Palestinian grievances, and through that disrupts the flow of  Israel’s master-narrative.  
Disruption of  narrative is also an effective method for mutual co-existence. For reasons related to historical 
anti-Semitism, the official Zionist narrative sees the Jews as ‘the people who dwell alone,’ establishing anxious 
perception of  the goyim, especially the Arabs and Palestinians, and hindering co-existence (Ravid 2015 — also 
see Chapters 5 & 6). Neve Shalom (Oasis of  Peace) was perhaps one of  the projects that sought to disrupt that 
narrative. The idea was to establish a socially and culturally harmonious community of  both Israeli-Jews and 
Palestinians (mainly from inside Israel) (Montville 1998). Despite the various challenges it faced, the village 
today has a population just shy of  three-hundred people, roughy half  of  which are Jews and the other half  
are mostly Palestinians with Israeli citizenships ([Israel] Central Bureau of  Statistics 2018). Even though Neve 
Shalom started in the late 1960s, the emergence of  new historiography and the change in the political climate 
that preceded and followed the peace process in the early 1990s gave it a significant boost both in 
effectiveness and population.  
During (and because of) the peace talks between Egypt and Israel in 1978, an Israeli organisation named 
Shalom Achshav (Peace Now) came out. Enraged by the Lebanon War four years later especially in the wake of  
the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Shalom Achshav organised the largest mass protest in Israel’s history at the 
time calling for an investigation into the massacre and demanding the resignation of  the then Minister of  
Defence Ariel Sharon. The organisation was particularly active during the first Intifada and the Oslo 
negotiations between Israel and the PLO. Today, it is the largest and most important liberal ‘peace 
movement’ in Israel. It promotes a two-state solution and campaigns against the occupation and settlement 
activities (see website: https://peacenow.org.il/en).  
Other peace groups such as Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc) and New Israel Fund emerged in the 1990s and were 
similar in goals and agendas (although smaller in size) to Shalom Achshav. Along with Shalom Achshav, these 
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groups did not produce counter-narrative in the full sense of  the word. They initially used activism to 
promote the acceptance of  the Palestinian existence as an independent identity, and used that as a vehicle for 
mutual understanding and later peace talks. During the first Intifada, for example, Shalom Achshav lobbied 
intensively for mainstreaming the recognition of  the PLO as the one and only representative of  the 
Palestinian people (Fleischmann 2016).  
The eruption of  violence that mainly started in the first Intifada and reached unprecedented levels in the 
second Intifada brought to light the extent of  the IDF’s human rights violations in the Occupied Territories. 
Several human rights groups like B'tselem and the Israeli Committee Against House Demolition (ICAHD) 
spearheaded the efforts in exposing these violations to the Israeli-Jewish public and the world. Through 
documents, news articles, videos, reports, statistics, and photos, these organisations shook Israel’s Jewish 
collective to the core by showing them the conquering power of  the State they have long viewed as 
vulnerable and victimised.  
Today’s most significant anti-occupation group comes from within the IDF itself. Breaking the Silence 
(www.breakingthesilence.org.il) is an nonprofit organisation established in 2004, and is composed of  veteran 
combatants who have served in the Occupied Territories since the start of  the second Intifada, and have taken 
it upon themselves to expose the public to the reality of  everyday life under Israel’s occupation. The 
organisation collects soldiers’ testimonies, holds lectures and meetings, and publishes print materials and 
visual media with the aim to raise public awareness (also see: Chayut 2010; Our Harsh Logic 2012; Peled 2016). 
On a basic level, the veterans’ testimonies disrupt the dominant narrative built around the ‘morality of  the 
IDF,’ which is a critical part of  Israel’s positive ethos about the self  and the conflict. They also raise questions 
about Israel’s victimhood narratives. Same as the majority of  Israel’s peace and human rights groups, 
however, Breaking the Silence is a mission-driven organisation; which means it focuses on the present-day 
violations and does not incorporate collective memory or historical debates in its advocacy policies.   
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Individual Efforts  
The counter-narrative does not end with group activism. Since the New Historian’s work became known, 
several Israeli-Jewish individuals, using their technical and professional skills, set on challenging Israel’s 
dominant narratives. Much of  their work was delivered through popular culture channels, such as films and 
music. Chapter Five, for example, discussed extensively Folman’s Waltz with Bashir (2008) as a counter-account 
to Israel’s official narrative of  the Lebanon War and a challenge to the dominant victimhood narrative. Waltz 
is one of  several visual media narratives in the past few decades to deal with the notion of  Israel’s collective 
memory and the accepted ethos about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Chapter Five also discussed Samuel Maoz’s film Lebanon (2009) which criticised Israel’s self-perception of  
being a beleaguered community. At the time, the film was deemed controversial, but most recently, Maoz 
stirred a yet larger controversy with the release of  his new film Foxtrot (2018). The film is a metaphorical 
triptych that highlights the complexities and absurdities of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The film cynically 
calls the attention to the social bubble of  Israel’s average civilians. It also depicts the banality of  prejudice, 
boredom, and utter absurdity of  the soldiers on the front line — mainly in the Occupied Territories. Maoz in 
the film questions Israel’s self-image as a liberal, multi-cultural, and democratic society. With the intentional 
absence of  Palestinians in the film, he criticises what might be considered a self-induced collective denial. 
Like Waltz, Foxtrot holds the mirror up to Israel’s society. Having suffered from PTSD following his tour in 
Lebanon, Maoz wanted to tell the story not only to individuals who suffered a similar fate or lost loved one in 
the war, but to a country that — to him — lacks the means of  processing her collective memory and decades 
of  conflict (Einav 2019). Perhaps expectedly as with most narratives that challenge the state’s official 
narrative, the film became the target of  severe criticism. Israel’s Culture Minister decried the film calling it 
‘disgraceful’ and ‘intolerable,’ adding that the state “will not fund films the smear the name of  Israel” (Spiro 
2017).  
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A recent documentary film titled Advocate (2019) received a similar barrage of  anger and criticism. The 
documentary tells the personal history of  renowned Israeli-Jewish lawyer Lea Tsemel. Tsemel made a life-
long career representing Palestinians in Israeli courts and being a staunch critic of  the occupation and a 
devoted campaigner for Palestinian human rights. Tsemel’s dedication to the Palestinian cause made her a 
pariah in her society. The documentary came as a daring attempt to stand up to the country’s increasingly 
right-wing establishment. As did with Foxtrot, Minister Regev attacked the film calling it ‘annoying and 
infuriating.’ She added: “no movie special effects [referring to the documentary’s semi-animated nature] can 
mask” the work Tsemel is doing “against the State of  Israel and those living it” (Jerusalem Post Staff  2019b).   
In another attempt to counter-narrate the conflict,  Jazz musician (and author) Gilad Atzmon used music as a 
means for resistance. According to Abi-Ezzi (2015, p. 94) “…Atzmon’s music challenges Zionism and its 
inherent ideology which is premised on creating an exclusively Jewish state for Jewish people.” Like Maoz, 
serving in Lebanon during the war was a turning a point for Atzmon. In “Primacy of  the Ear” (2010), 
Atzmon describes his shock when he visited the IDF’s South Lebanon’s internment camp Ansar. For the first 
time, he explains, he felt the full force of  being the perpetrator. Walking around the camp and looking at the 
detainees, he — like the hero in Waltz — came face to face with the Jewish collective memory. He could not 
shake off  the feeling that the internment camp was a concentration camp and he was a ‘Nazi.’ That was his 
most significant revelation; he reflects (p. 73): “This was enough for me. I realised my affair with the Israeli 
State and with Zionism was over.” Upon returning to Israel he set out on a journey of  relearning Israel’s 
history and the Palestinian Nakba. That substantiated his disillusionment with the system and the country’s 
established narratives. He has since moved to the UK and renounced his Israeli citizenship. In Abi-Ezzi’s 
view (2015), although most of  Atzmon’s music does not include lyrics, his anti-Zionism struggle can be 
discerned in some aspects of  his music, such as the band or album names or in the fashion through which he 
peppers his live performances. Additionally, by merging Arabic-Palestinian with Israeli-Jewish music, 
Atzmon’s  music challenges the dominant conflict resolution trends in the conflict (ibid.).   
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In the recent years, there have also been several academic works that challenged Israel’s master-narrative. 
Shlomo Sand’s The Invention of  the Jewish People (2009) is perhaps one of  the most cited works on the subject. 
While this is generally a work in historiography that draws heavily on the new history and post-Zionist posits, 
Sand is not considered in the same league with Israel’s New Historians since his book did not vigorously seek 
to excavate the underlining structures of  Zionism (see: e.g. Zertal 2000, 2005; Zerubavel 1992, 1995) and its 
recent history as did historians like Morris (1988) or Shlaim (2001). But — as put in Sand’s own words — the 
book is ‘a synthesis of  counter-narrative.’ It discusses the contradiction between the common understanding 
of  Jewish history and the actual history of  Jews as a people and a religious group. By deconstructing the 
notion of  Jewish peoplehood, Sand raises an array of  questions about Israeli and Jewish identity, the 
lachrymose depiction of  history and, although indirectly, Israel’s collective memory and self-image as the 
historical victim.  
Sand’s books has a political tone, but perhaps politics is what makes his historical account interesting. It 
reflects the process of  disillusionment — and resentment — an intellectual may go through in his own society 
and provides an idea of  the socio- and psycho-political dynamics in that society. Picking up on this notion and 
rejecting Sand’s account, Penslar (2012) argues that the most notorious critiques of  Israel come from 
intellectuals who do not offer, as did New Historians like Morris or Shlaim, an archive-based, carefully 
documented counter-narrative of  Israel’s political and military history, but rather a polemical attack against 
the very concept of  Jewish peoplehood. 
Perhaps one of  the most known and possibly most hated counter-narrativists in Israel today is Haaretz’s own 
Gideon Levy. Levy sees him as a ‘patriotic Israeli’ by being the voice of  morality. He mainly seeks to bring to 
the public minds the horrors of  Israel’s occupation (Round 2010). He frequently — directly or indirectly — 
casts doubtful lights on Israel’s victim self-image (e,g. Levy 2013).  
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Of  a similar calibre is Amira Hass. She reported from the OT for years and became one of  the prominent 
Israeli-Jewish defenders of  Palestinian human rights. Israel’s brutality against the Palestinians in the first 
Intifada was her turning point. Her book Drinking the Sea at Gaza (1999) in particular presented chilling 
accounts unfamiliar to the majority of  Israel’s Jews about the humiliation and occupation in the OT. The 
book re-humanises Palestinians and paints a grim picture of  the post-Oslo outcome and discourse. By 
examining Palestinian lives in Gaza, Hass perhaps gave early warnings for the second Intifada which erupted a 
year after the book was published. In a clear challenge to the dominant mechabel narrative (see Chapter 6), she 
defended Palestinian stone-throwers’ right to resist the occupation (Hass 2013) and most recently she 
described Israel as an apartheid state similar to apartheid South Africa (Cohen 2019). She supports a 
binational state for all.  
Discussing Israeli-Jewish counter-narratives would not be adequate without a brief  mention of  Uri Avnery. 
Avnery’s life was one of  radical changes; from a decorated war hero in the 1948 war to being the first Israeli-
Jew to meet with Arafat during the siege of  Beirut in 1982 (Fisk 2018). He was the founder of  Gush Shalom 
(see above) and, modelled on Israel’s peace movements, he opposed settlement, the occupation and was 
amongst very few Israeli-Jews who called the Israeli government to ‘talk with Hamas.’ In his obituary of  
Avnery, Robert Fisk (2018) described him as ‘one of  the few Middle Eastern heroes,’ someone who dedicated 
a life time for peace and suffered much for campaigning for Palestinian rights and a two-state solution.   
There are several other counter-narrativists whose viewpoints on Israel were used throughout this work (e.g. 
Burg 2008, 2014; Lentin 2010; Chayut 2010; Peled 2016). Discussing all the available counter-narratives, 
however, remains well beyond the scope of  this work. Focusing on the aforementioned cases, it is suggested 
that Israel’s counter-narratives are not without weaknesses. With the study’s conceptual framework in mind 
(Bar-Tal 2007, 2013), some of  these weaknesses are discussed below.    
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CRITIQUE OF ISRAEL’S SELF-CRITIQUE  
This study shares Greilsammer’s views (2012) that indeed new historiography has had a serious impact upon 
Israel’s political thinking. Before their publications most Israeli-Jews were absolutely unready to acknowledge 
Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinian Nakba, let alone acknowledge the existence of  such a thing as a 
Palestinian people. The publications pumped fresh blood into the nascent peace activism at the time. It also 
prompted larger acceptance for a two-state solution. Only four years after Morris’s published his book, Rabin 
and Arafat were on the verge of  signing the Oslo Accords (Greilsammer 2012). The wider acceptance of  
counter-narratives in the wake of  Oslo could be credited for influencing Ehud Barak’s policies on education. 
In 1999, Barak’s Minister of  Education Yossi Sarid decided to include some of  the New Historian’s narrative 
into the country’s high school textbooks (Ezrahi 2000).  
The question remains whether the trajectory of  counter-narrative has kept direction and momentum or 
veered off  and dwindled — and to what effect. Despite its relative success, Israel’s counter-narratives have 
serious limitations. These limitations are both external and internal. The external limitations are due to the 
struggle between the counter-narrativists and the state power. The internal limitations are due to conscious 
and/or unconscious ideological tendencies primarily related to the Zionist understanding and 
reinterpretation of  collective memory, as well as to the present-day conflict ethos and its concomitant 
emotional orientations.   
External Limitations  
It has virtually become something of  a majority vote that in the past decade Israel has increasingly become 
right-wing (Sarid 2011). The liberal values believed to have given boost to counter-narratives are now 
weakening. Consider, for example, the series of  controversial laws in the past two decades. According to 
Adalah, the Arab Minority Rights Centre in Israel (2017), there are 65 laws that discriminate directly or 
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indirectly against Palestinian citizens of  Israel and the OT. Half  of  these laws were passed since 2000 only. In 
2011 The Nakba Law was passed; it authorises the Finance Minister to reduce funds to institutions if  they 
hold an activity that rejects the existence of  Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” or commemorates 
“Israel’s Independence Day or the day on which the state was established as a day of  mourning” (Adalah 
2011). In 2018, the Knesset voted to uphold the ‘Jewish Nation-State Law.’ The law makes the right to the 
land exclusive to Jews, encourages settlements as a right, and downgrades Arabic — spoken by 20% of  the 
population  — to a ‘special status’ language (Berger 2018; Horovitz 2018; Lis & Landau 2018; Hoffman 61
2018).   
These laws are in effect an attack on both the revisionist views of  Israel’s collective memory and the very 
notion of  Palestinian collective memory. Coupled with and perhaps encouraged by the impasse in the so-
called peace process, the State has been attempting to reverse or curb the counter-narrative progress that was 
made since the late 1980s. So far, the picture appears grim. Today, the Israeli left, the core source of  counter-
narrative, is becoming a pariah group (Hari 2010). ‘Leftist’ and ‘peacenik’ are now widely used as dismissive 
slurs against an ever-embattled section of  society who are increasingly on the fringe and perceived as traitors 
(Holmes 2019). In the Jerusalem Post’s own words (Harris & Lazimi 2016), the New Israel Fund’s index for 
online violence in 2012 and 2014 found that the left-wing is the most hated group in Israel’s cyberspace. The 
Peace Index survey in 2016 (Ya’ar & Hermann) found that the public continue to hold attitudes that favour 
the current right-wing government. 48% of  Israeli-Jews did not believe leftists were loyal to the country.  62
Most recently, another survey by the Peace Index (Ya’ar & Hermann Dec. 2018) found that while 54% of  
Israeli Jews were strongly or moderately in favour of  negotiations with the PA, nearly 75% were pessimistic 
 See: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/IsraelExperience/Culture/Pages/Arabic-in-Israel--an-official-language-and-a-cultural-bridge-18-61
December-2016.aspx
 A survey conducted by Israel’s daily Yisrael Hayom, found that 59% of  Jewish Israeli youths call themselves right-wing. Twenty-three 62
percent self-define as centrist, while only 13 percent are left-wing. [see: Sales 2016b]. Also, In a poll commissioned by the same 
newspaper and conducted on 11th and 12th grade high school students exclusively from the Jewish sector, showed that nearly 60% of  
those questioned described themselves as being politically right-wing, with 23% saying that they were centrists and only 13% saying 
they were left-wing. An overwhelming majority, 82%, said that they believed there was “no chance” or “barely a chance” for peace 
deal with the Palestinians. [see: Sommer 2016]
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about the prospect of  peace. Effectively, this means that the support for the left is at a historic low, and that 
peace has almost disappeared from the Israeli-Jewish public discourse (Holmes 2019).  
Furthermore, the State’s grip on the activities of  the peace movement has grown increasingly tighter and the 
attempts to stifle any further challenge to the country’s collective memory is becoming almost a state policy. 
In 2011, for instance, Netanyahu’s Education Minister Gideon Sa’ar disallowed meetings set up by PC-FF 
within the school system for cases that involved the relatives of  Palestinians he described as terrorists who had 
been killed in the conflict. Resorting to the narratives of  victimhood the minister said: “Drawing a 
comparison between bereaved Israeli families and Palestinian families is inconceivable, as such discussions 
legitimise acts of  terrorism” (Trabelsi-Hadad 2011).  
In an extensive Haaretz investigative report (Shezaf  2019) it was revealed that the Israeli Defence Ministry’s 
secretive security department (Malmab) have been scouring Israel’s archives and removing historic 
documents regarding the Nakba and the 1948 war. The report asserts that beginning in the early 2000s 
Malmab began removing historical documentation illegally and with no authority, and at least in some cases 
has sealed documents that had previously been cleared for publication by the military censor and extended 
the confidentiality seal on others for more years. Some of  the documents that were placed in vaults had 
already been published. Asked about the point of  removing documents that have already been published, 
Yehiel Horev, former Malmab director for two decades, explained that the objective is to undermine the 
credibility of  studies about the history of  the refugee problem. This practically means that the New 
Historians’ allegation cannot be backed up with the original documents and would therefore be disproved 
and refuted. This could be considered a counter-counter-narrative that better fits the goals, purposes, and 
ideologies of  the ever growing right-wing. The outcome of  counter-narratives under such circumstances will 
either be frozen or, worse, reversed. Palestinian collective memory will be further assaulted, the conflict ethos 
will be further consolidated, and above all, the feelings of  existential fear will be further enhanced. Under 
such circumstances, the collective victim self-image will only be further perpetuated. 
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Internal Limitations  
  
Since day one, counter-narratives were confined to small fringes within the Israeli-Jewish society. Svirsky 
(2010, pp. 6-7) maintains that there have been Israeli-Jews who at times reflected on their Zionist beliefs. 
Others are truly aware of  the oppressive character of  their beliefs and their practices, yet they embrace them 
as their preferred way of  existing. Only a small minority opt to exit the Israeli-Jewish collective way of  life. 
This small minority is what makes up today’s counter-narrativists, groups and individuals. There is, however, 
weaknesses in their approach.  
The weakness exists mainly in their take on collective memory. It is true that the New Historians made 
breakthroughs in that regard, but the social movements and organisations that capitalised on their findings 
for political purposes, such as peace activism and anti-occupation campaigning, did so in a conscious or 
unconscious selective manner.   
Looking at Bar-Tal hypotheses (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2013, 2014; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b), we find that whilst he 
discusses elaborately the socio-psychological repercussions of  Israel’s collective memory, his discussion of  
Palestinian collective memory is limited. This could probably be justified on three bases: a) Bar-Tal is an 
Israeli-Jew, b) Palestinian socio-psychological literature is scarce or underdeveloped, and c) Bar-Tal does not 
speak Arabic. But as they stand, these bases do not satisfactorily explain Bar-Tal’s tendency to focus most of  
his analysis of  the Palestinian collective memory and ethos on the post-1967 period. He would, for example, 
examine Israel’s conflict ethos in relation to the Palestinians through the lenses of  the ‘illegal occupation’ and 
the daily violation of  human rights in the lands occupied in 1967. Like Morris who made headlines regarding 
the Palestinian refugee problem without consulting a single Palestinian or Arabic source or dialogue (Masalha 
1999), Bar-Tal built his framework without much consulting the Palestinian worldview that sees, among other 
things, that the occupation began with the Nakba in 1948 and that the 1967 occupation was a mere 
completion of  the Zionist settler-colonial project. In Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological analysis, the Israeli-Jewish 
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collective memory was substantiated during the events of  1948. Israeli-Jews’ sense of  nationhood sprung 
from the memory of  their initial fight for survival against insurmountable odds, and the perpetual struggle for 
survival ever since (Blomeley 2005). Palestinian collective memory on the other hand may have sprung out of  
the notion of  military occupation, which to most Israeli-Jews, began in 1967.   
This has been the approach of  the majority of  Israel’s peace movements and human rights organisations. 
Palestinian collective memory to them begins and ends with the injustice that began with the 1967 
occupation. Their activism framework — for procedural, ideological, or political reasons — is dependent on 
the status quo. It does not reach far back into Palestinian history as is the case for most Israeli-Jewish 
historical narratives. The acknowledgement of  Palestinian suffering in this case is legitimised through half-
history narratives, one that does not directly clash with Israel’s master-narrative. Neve Shalom, Shalom Achshav, 
Gush Shalom, Breaking the Silence, or IP-CC as well as the individual efforts through films and documentaries 
mostly deal with the Palestinian ‘what is’ and rarely with ‘what was.’ They challenge the occupation, promote 
Palestinian human rights, and more importantly seek to deconstruct or alleviate the conflict ethos built 
around the 1967-occupation. But rarely do they excavate Zionism’s roots as most New Historians did or 
question Israel’s legitimacy or lack thereof. In practice, most of  these organisations aim to achieve settlement 
through the same practices and are legitimised by the same Zionist ideology that was mobilised in the 
creation of  the state of  Israel in the first place (Turner 2015). One practical outcome is that the ethos closely 
related to Israels’ collective memory such as the group’s historical victimhood and the justness of  the cause 
and goals may go unchecked.    
Of  all the counter-narrative groups, Zochrot stands out as the one that commemorates the Palestinian 
collective memory of  the Nakba in Hebrew vis-à-vis Israel’s official and popular collective memory. But like 
the others, it is not without flaws. Lentin (2010) raises important questions with regard to Zochrot practices. 
She seems to think (pp. 139-140) that “perpetrators using victim testimonies goes beyond historical accuracy.” 
“Refracting Palestinian refugee testimonies through the voices of  members of  the colonising collectivity, often 
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in mediated or attenuated format so to make them palatable to a hostile Israeli-Jewish public, runs the risk of  
perpetuating their victimhood, and separating the Nakba past from present Palestinian reality.”  There is also 
the risk that presenting Palestinian memory by members of  the colonising collectivity may turn into a 
classical orientalist situation in which the victims are incapable of  representing themselves. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Israel’s counter-narrativists could benefit greatly from a parallel Palestinian 
counter-narrative. That would help narrow the narrative gap between Israel and the Palestinians. But the 
Palestinian near-absent counter-narrative represents an additional weakness to Israel’s counter-narrativists’ 
approach.  
 PALESTINIAN COUNTER-NARRATIVES 
Whilst there have been organised and non-organised waves of  counter-narratives in Israel, this study suggests 
that Palestinian counter-narrative is still in its infancy and yet to achieve what can be considered an influential 
role. The search for revisionist literature on or around the Palestinian master-narrative written by Palestinians 
has yielded very limited results. They were either revisions of  the revolutionary thoughts in the past or 
critiques of  the factional performances and muqawama in the present (e.g. Said 2001; Sayegh 2002; Hilal 
2003).  
There are/were plausible reasons behind the lack of  a serious Palestinian revisionist movement. The social, 
political, and economic circumstances of  the Palestinians are radically different from those in Israel. These 
circumstances hindered the emergence of  effective tendencies for self-skepticism, self-referentiality, 
epistemological relativism, and pluralism — all are characteristics usually associated with the liberal and post-
modern thinking which had facilitated the emergence of  Israel’s counter-narratives. Below some of  the 
obstacles to Palestinian counter-narrative are discussed.  
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Obstacles 
Socially, Palestine is a relatively conservative society and subject to patriarchal standards (see previous 
chapter). The margin of  social flexibility that would facilitate some free flow of  thoughts is therefore 
restricted. This is coupled by the fact that, dissimilar to Israel’s ethnic diversity, Palestinian society is largely 
ethnically hegemonic. This seems to create a high level of  conformism among society members and 
subsequently increase resistance to new thinking paradigms.     
Politically, most Palestinians are dispossessed, stateless, and forever threatened by physical and psychological 
oblivion. Their lives are determined by a military occupation and much of  their resources are employed for 
national survival. Engagement in serious intra-society counter-narratives is maybe seen as a sort of  
intellectual luxury.  
Additionally, a healthy economic infrastructure gives boost to the emergence of  new ideas. This is not the 
case in the Palestinian territories. Dissimilar to Israel’s booming economy, Palestinian socioeconomic 
indicators show a near breaking point. One of  three Palestinians is unemployed, the average is nearly 50% in 
Gaza, and the poverty level has reached 53% in 2018 (UNCTAD 2019). The economic deterioration coupled 
with a complex social and political situation also put many restrictions on the Palestinian civil society 
institutions. Although the situation of  these institutions is better than in several Middle Eastern countries, it is 
still significantly worse than Israel’s civil society in terms of  funding, freedom, experience, prevalence, and 
effectiveness (see: Alashqar 2018). Palestinian civil society institutions mainly promote liberal values and 
human rights such as women’s rights and gender equality. But with their limited economic resources, political 
power, and social influence, it is hard to imagine they can effectively implement their policies or disseminate 
their beliefs.  
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It is also difficult for counter-narratives to emerge when there are tight restrictions on the freedom of  
expression. In the OT, freedom of  expression has increasingly fell victim to what Soloway (2018) calls ‘trinity 
of  oppression’: Israel’s draconian physical and cyber censorship of  Palestinian social media activities, press, 
and publications; the PA’s monitoring of  press in the West Bank; and Hamas’s intolerance of  opposite views 
in Gaza.   
There are also methodological and academic obstacles. Palestinian scholar Saleh Abdul-Jawwad (2005; also 
see: Ghanem [ed.] 2009), argues that apart from the almost hegemonic belief  that we are the victims and 
they are the victimisers, Palestinian narratives about the Nakba are sporadic. He maintains that what makes 
the emergence of  Palestinian revisionist historiography particularly difficult is that Palestinians have three 
narratives of  the Nakba: The ‘official narrative’ of  Hajj Amin Al-Husseini (see Chapter 5); the narrative of  
the Palestinian middle class and is represented by scholars like Aref  Al-Aref  and Walid Khalidi (e.g. Khalidi 
1997, 2006); and the oral narrative which exists amongst the majority of  Palestinians. Nahhas (in: Ghanem 
[ed.] Dec. 2009) sees that Palestinian scholars have become dependent on Israel’s new historiography to 
prove the legitimacy of  Palestinian narrative. In her views, Palestinians are better equipped to narrate their 
own history depending, for example, on the wealth of  information such as oral memory which was never 
available to scholars like Benny Morris. 
The lack of  bona fide Palestinian counter-narratives can also be ascribed to the rise of  religious nationalism. 
The rise of  Israel’s right-wing religious Zionism has been detrimental to the development and dissemination 
of  Israel’s counter-narratives. Religious Zionism interprets the establishment of  Israel as an act of  
redemption from God for the Jewish people and the Palestinians as intruders in Eretz Yisrael. This means they 
reconstruct history solely through the messianic lenses of  the old-testament, the Talmud, and the ancient 
rabbinic teachings (Don-Yehiya 2014). Likewise, in the recent decades, almost parallel to the rise of  Israel’s 
religious right-wing, Palestinian political discourse moved towards Islamisation. With the rising power of  
Hamas, the second largest Palestinian party [after Arafat’s Fatah], the Islamised discourse provided an almost 
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comprehensive framework for the conflict. In her examination of  the role of  the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
Islamisation of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mellor (2017) explains that the Islamic discourse provided a 
new narrative to reshape and reframe the perception of  the conflict as being religious rather than political in 
nature. As an offshoot of  the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has placed the Palestinian narrative within the 
broader narrative of  Islamic history and appropriated religious texts from the Quran to redefine the struggle 
with Zionism as a sacred struggle, or Jihad. To them, as the case for the Brotherhood, Zionism is an extension 
of  the crusades, Western colonialism, and the conspiratorial attacks on Muslims. Citing Litvak (1998), Mellor 
(2017) shows that Hamas, for instance, compared the Palestinians to the early Meccan Muslims who had to 
migrate to Medina with the Prophet because of  their religious beliefs. The Nakba in this case became 
comparable to hejra (the Prophet’s migration), giving it a sense of  messianism. Similar to the Jews who saw in 
the Shoah a test for the Jewish people by God, the Islamists saw the 1948 exodus as a punishment for Muslim 
sins. Liberation in this case became a redemption.  
The near-absence of  Palestinian counter-narratives can also be imputed to education. In theory, the 
distinctive Palestinian approach to education could establish the basis for a healthy and daring counter-
narrative. Palestinians lead the Arab Middle East on key educational indicators such as literacy among adults 
and youths, and are a role model for number of  years in school and literacy rates among women. As a matter 
of  fact, the Palestinians’ educational achievements are on par with developed countries and are better than 
developing countries in Africa, Asia, and South America (UIS [UNESCO Institute for Statistics] 2018).    
In practice, however, Palestinian education has been limited by the political and socio-economic factors 
discussed above. Like everything else in Palestinian life, education has been mostly geared towards national 
survival more than it has toward self-development. On a brief  personal note, as children we were taught both 
at home and school that education was our ultimate weapon against Israel. The school system was rigid, 
largely rote-based, but it was also strictly purpose oriented. The fact that most of  the schools during the first 
Intifada were run but he UNRWA (many still are) made them a manifestation of  the Palestinian refugee 
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problem and victimhood, and by default education was seen as a means of  muqawama. Education is so 
embedded in the collective societal beliefs that it has turned into a culture. I can remember many of  my peers 
being dragged to school by their illiterate grandparents, who despite their illiteracy were well engrossed in the 
culture that valued education above all. They, too, saw it as a means for survival.  
Palestinian focus on education, however, failed to train students to self-critique. It may even have consolidated 
the oral narratives as official collective memory. Before the PA, Palestinians students in Gaza studied 
Egyptian curriculums and in the West Bank schools used Jordanian ones. For political reasons, those 
curriculums did not contain much on Palestinian history. In Gaza, we learned a lot more about the Pharaohs 
than we did about the Canaanites or the Phoenicians, and more about Nasser’s fight against Zionism than we 
did about the PLO. Our everyday, and uncensored, access to Palestinian history was mainly through the oral 
accounts of  the Nakba generation, our grandparents in particular. The scholarly works on the topic, typically 
conducted by Palestinian intellectuals and historians abroad and by the PLO study centres, were banned in 
the Occupied Territories.  
With the arrival of  the Palestinian Authority in the wake of  Oslo in 1993, all-Palestinian curriculums were 
introduced. Special focus was placed on Palestinian history and geography. Palestine’s geography for instance 
was introduced without Israel in mind, it focused on the entirety of  historical Palestine. These curriculums 
aimed to consolidate the Palestinian master-narrative as well as formalise and intellectualise Palestinian oral 
memory. It also aimed to fuel the nationalist awareness and with it, it seems, heighten the sense of  collective 
victimhood. With the impasse in the peace process, the growing desperation in the late 1990s, the constant 
political and economics embargo, and the eruption of  the second Intifada in 2000, it was perhaps a form of  
luxury for the majority of  Palestinian scholars to engage in serious efforts to examine and critique the 
Palestinian master-narrative, let alone raise the issue in school textbooks. The majority were over-occupied 
with withstanding and refuting Israel’s narrative, and so were the textbooks.   
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The Palestinian version of  counter-narrative today can be seen in sporadic critiques of  the status quo, 
Palestinian human rights reports, self-reflexive accounts in memoirs or novels (see previous chapter), 
discussions of  the value and effectiveness of  muqawama, and also in cross-faction vitriol. Not much, to my 
knowledge, has been written about the validity or lack thereof  of  Palestinian collective memory, let alone 
about the ‘idealism’ of  Palestinian victimhood. Below, recalling the argument in the previous chapter, it is 
explained how this work represents a form of  partial counter-narrative.   
This Work  
The previous chapter in particular capitalised on the limitations in Bar-Tal’s assumptions regarding the 
Palestinian case, but used his conceptual framework as a guide. The critique of  Palestinian society focused on 
some of  the manifestations of  victimhood that were seen as inconsistent with the ‘ideal victim’ mentality. This 
critique is considered a partial departure from the mainstream and therefore a form of  counter-narrative. It 
can be summarised in four main points:  
- Contrary to the common belief, Palestinian collective memory is not only a means of  historical legitimacy 
vis-à-vis Israel or a chosen trauma (e.g. Volkan 2006) in the traditional or Israeli-Jewish sense, it also 
represents a profound anxiety about the physical and psychological memoricide, about the fear of  being 
forgotten. As far as Palestinians are concerned, the problem with this claim is that it might portray the 
Palestinian national identity as fragile; and that collides with the established ethos about the justness of  the 
cause/goals, positive self-image, and the delegitimisation of  the opponent’s identity and victimhood (see: 
Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). It also challenges the societal beliefs about the [historical] deep-rootedness of  this 
identity. The fragility however neither confirms nor negates the deep-rootedness of  Palestinian identity; 
rather, it simply signifies the enormous odds it has withstood. In other words, it reflects the severe power 
asymmetry in the conflict.  
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- The ostensibly uncompromising societal beliefs about collective memory have hindered Palestinian 
openness to Israel’s collective memory, especially the Shoah. The previous chapter challenged the 
Palestinian ambivalence about the Shoah and highlighted its psycho-political impact upon Palestinian 
collective memory and the overall Palestinian appraisal of  the conflict. The vitriol to Dajjani’s visit to 
Auschwitz and the UNRWA’s intention to include the Jewish genocide in Palestinian textbooks revealed the 
rigidity of  Palestinian master-narrative and the risks of  challenging it.  
- By viewing humiliation as the critical, most important emotional manifestations of  the Palestinian 
victimhood narratives, the study may have challenged the patriarchal values around masculinity, honour, 
and pride. Bringing up humiliation — as unapologetically as it was presented in the previous chapter — 
was an attempt to bring to light one of  the least talked about, if  not most silenced, manifestations of  
victimhood that govern much of  Palestinian reactions, behaviours, and impulses. Other Palestinian figures, 
too, saw in this phenomenon a serious negative impact upon Palestinian society. Although not counter-
narratives in the full sense of  the word, films like Paradise Now (2005) and Omar (2013), and fiction such as 
Men in the Sun (1963) and All That’s Left to You (1966) were amongst the very few attempts to bring 
humiliation to the forefront of  Palestinian debate. They effectively challenged the deep-rooted societal 
beliefs about honour and heroism. 
- Given the social and political sanctity of  the ethos of  muqawama, critiquing some of  its aspects was perhaps 
the most sensitive part in the examination of  Palestinian victimhood. It was not a traditional attempt to 
revise the tactics, goals, and methods of  the Palestinian resistance or the performance of  the PLO, Fatah, 
or Hamas as it has been the case with many other works (e.g. Said 2001; Sayegh 2002, Hilal 2003); rather, 
the chapter attempted to excavate some of  its underlining socio-psychological factors. Depicting 
Palestinian muqawama first and foremost as an instrument for self-esteem and honour, or as momentary 
bursts of  anger and revenge, runs the risk of  appearing as portraying the overarching goal of  liberation as 
marginal. This might also be viewed as doubting the effectiveness, let alone the nobility and purpose 
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oriented-ness of  the entirety of  the Palestinian national liberation project. What makes the critique of  
muqawama controversial is that muqawama has become an intrinsic part of  Palestinian culture. Stirring a 
debate about it means raising questions about the culture itself. Additionally, appraising the element of  
isteshhad purely through socio-psychological or sociological lenses presents an unacceptable challenge to the 
nearly and perhaps increasingly hegemonic religious ethos associated with the ‘divine reward’ and 
‘spiritual continuation’ of  the shaheed. To some, this might be considered an encroachment upon society’s 
collective moral values. 
CONCLUSION  
Starting with the New Historians and ending with the peace movements, Israel’s counter-narrativists set a 
precedence in bringing to the Israeli-Jewish public the plight of  Palestinians and Israel’s responsibility for the 
Nakba. Israel’s counter-narratives challenged the almost hegemonic belief  about the Israeli-Jewish 
victimhood. Despite their positive impact upon the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel-Jewish counter-
narrativists remain a small group of  mainly leftist intellectuals and activists. Their work, though not without 
flaws, continues to create cracks in Israel’s master-narrative. But with the rise of  Israel’s right-wing to power 
and what seems to be an emerging counter-counter-narrative, the future seems uncertain.   
Across the fence, Palestinian counter-narratives are almost absent. Despite few individual attempts, society 
remains resistant to different thinking paradigms regarding the conflict. The occupation has created a broad 
array of  obstacles to the emergence and maintenance of  a Palestinian counter-narrative. Objective reasons 
such as the islamisation of  the Palestinian narrative, the complexity and variety of  the Nakba related 
narratives, and the purpose-oriented educational system also contributed to the problem. Palestinians still see 
themselves as the ideal victims and any attempts to raise the slightest of  doubt about it is usually met with 
aggressive resistance. This was seen in the Palestinian approach to the Shoah and also in the culture of  
muqawama.  
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Partially a form of  counter-narrative, this work through the lenses of  collective memory, emotional 
orientations, and conflict ethos, put several aspects of  Palestinian victimhood under scrutiny.  





The study asked to what extent do the narratives of  victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hinder 
settlement. Answering the question proved to be a convoluted and multi-angled process, and generated a few 
more questions than initially anticipated. The answer required starting at the very top by looking at 
victimhood within the context of  intractable conflict. Generally, intractable conflicts share certain attractors 
that make them hard to resolve (Coleman 2003; Vallacher et al. 2010). But depending on the historical 
background and political circumstances, some attractors may dominate in some conflicts but are considered 
secondary in others. The assumption was that since victimhood narratives emerge in a conflict environment, 
they should follow a similar trajectory to the conflict in which they emerge. This particular assumption 
brought to the forefront questions about the manifestations of  victimhood and the most salient of  them in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Considering the available literature on intractable conflict (e.g. Northrup 1989; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998; 
Bar-Tal & Rouhana 1998; Kriesberg 2005; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; Vallacher et al. 2010; Bar-Tal 2013; 
Halperin & Shavit 2015), it was suggested that the narratives of  victimhood represented a socio-psychological 
attractor that surpassed the commonly accepted geo-political ones (see: Coleman 2003; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). 
That is not to deny the tangible, geo-political events that initiated the feelings of  victimisation, but rather to 
focus on victimhood as a mindset or an experience-based dynamic (Bouchat et a. 2017). A few scholars saw 
the potential of  framing intractable conflicts in socio-psychological terms, and that substantiated victimhood 
as a socio-psychological product. Even though most of  these scholars’ approach to victimhood was indirect, 
limited or vague, it still allowed victimhood — although in a limited capacity — to be viewed as one of  the 
forces that determined the conflict flow. Kelman (e.g. 1987, 1999) viewed victimhood in terms of  negative 
identity, hence emphasising victimhood as an in-group’s positive signifier against the out-group. Volkan (e.g. 
2001, 2004, 2013a) saw victimhood through the concept of  ‘chosen trauma,' discussing the transferability of  
trauma across generations and alluding to the power of  collective memory in the formation of  the present 
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conflict. Bar-Tal developed an encompassing and versatile socio-psychological framework, introducing the 
three concepts of  collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations as defining factors 
in the study and analysis of  intractable conflict. Together, these provided a broad socio-psychological 
infrastructure which greatly benefited the study of  victimhood and its multiple manifestations (e.g. 2001, 
2007, 2013, 2014; also: Bar-Tal et al. 2009a; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b).  
Largely due to unwonted historical circumstances, victimhood has become one of  the most dominant socio-
psychological forces in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Also, because the conflict is multi-levelled and 
changing, and especially because Israeli-Jews and Palestinians experience and respond to the conflict 
differently, it was expected that the two parties’ victimhood narratives would not be identical. That called 
attention to the ways in which victimhood in the conflict manifested, and which aspects of  it were particularly 
salient. To understand the manifestations of  victimhood, it was important to look separately and in details at 
how Israeli-Jews and Palestinians defined and appraised their victim identities amongst themselves and in 
relations to each other. One goal was to find out how the victimhood narratives of  both peoples came to be 
and where their worldview(s) converged and diverged.   
Examined against the backdrop of  collective memory, ethos, and emotions, as well as in relation to the 
concept of  ‘chosen trauma,’ it became clear that Israel’s victimhood was perceived by many Israeli-Jews as 
having a transhistorical character. The conflict with the Palestinians, as a result, was seen as part of  the 
Jewish continuum of  suffering. This effectively meant that the conflict was partly removed from its political 
and geo-political context. Israel’s victimhood narratives manifested in such a way to reflect that worldview. 
On account of  collective memory, especially the Shoah, Israel’s sense of  collective victimhood manifested as 
aggressive ethos glorifying militarism, or emotional orientations primarily characterised by fear, particularly 
the fear of  annihilation or a second Shoah. Fear materialised as extreme security policies which were 
indiscriminately and rather disproportionately applied to all aspects of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was 
therefore proposed that as far as the Palestinians were concerned, many of  Israel’s victimhood claims were 
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misplaced and occasionally invalid. Not least because the depositing of  Israel’s traumatic past onto the 
Palestinians and the over-vigilant military and security measures against them was partly steered by 
perceptions rather than reality.  
The examination of  Palestinian victimhood revealed that certain aspects of  Palestinian victimhood, such as 
the belief  that Palestinians are the ideal victims and Israel is to be blamed for absolutely everything in 
Palestinian lives, were questionable. Because of  the power hierarchy, nevertheless, certain Palestinian 
victimhood manifestations grew more salient than others. Whilst Israel’s victimhood was characterised by 
melancholic views of  the past and fear of  the future, Palestinians were locked in a romantic nostalgia for a 
lost homeland in a past that preceded Israel’s existence. Collective memory as a result became about the fear 
of  and struggle against memoricide. This, among other things, resulted in victimhood manifesting as 
collective feelings of  humiliation, and the unceasing attempts to overturn such feelings through muqawama 
came to play a critical part in the formation and dissemination of  the conflict ethos.   
Each in their own way, the Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian victimhood narratives locked the conflict parties in a 
set of  societal beliefs, perceptions and misconceptions about the self, the opponent, and the conflict as a 
whole. Together, the two victimhood narratives clashed and negated each other, creating an overarching 
socio-psychological reality to represent what otherwise be considered a geo-political conflict with defined 
boundaries and concerns. This resulted in the conflict becoming increasingly intractable and the prospects of  
settlements growing more difficult to achieve. But the general conviction remains that given the power 
asymmetry, the occupier-occupied relations, and because of  the fundamental psychohistorical dynamics in 
Israel’s collective memory, it was perhaps plausible to suggest that Israel’s victimhood claims contributed far 
more to that intractability than did the Palestinians.  
  
From the outset, the research question, the subject-matter, and the author’s positionality helped shape the 
study’s overall approach and the choice of  methodology. Narrative research was perhaps the most suitable 
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method for the purpose. Narrative in this study included all types of  textuality that directly or indirectly 
reflected experience or experiential ‘stories.’ This broadened the range of  narrative sources significantly and 
with it the levels of  analysis. Academic journals, stories, news, documentaries, films, novels, political 
statements, and other forms of  narrative were analysed by looking at their latent content and against the 
backdrop of  their historical, political, or psychohistorical backgrounds. Taking into account this author’s 
closeness to the topic, it was also important to engage in self-reflexive processes as another source of  narrative 
and an additional mode of  analysis. 
  
DISCUSSION    
This study was influenced by the fundamental Palestinian convictions that the occupation is a fact, Zionism is 
a form of  settler-colonialism, and Israel is a foreign oppressor. These convictions however do not deny that 
the feelings of  victimisation — no matter how debatable — are valid for the said victims. The study 
acknowledges that for some Israeli-Jews the existence of  the occupation is debatable and the Occupied 
Territories are deemed ‘disputed’ territories (MFA 2003, 2015). It also acknowledges that for the majority of  
Israeli-Jews and many non-Israeli Jews worldwide, Zionism is a political movement for Jewish emancipation 
and Israel is the physical outcome of  that emancipation. The discussions and findings reflected these 
convictions.   
Israel’s Victimhood  
The overarching premise was that Israel is the product of  Jewish history and the Shoah. This, as it was 
explained, received a fair amount of  attention from scholars and authors, and from several angles (e.g. 
Zerubavel 1991; Falk 1993; Zertal 2005; Bar-Tal 2013). Bar-Tal’s thoughts on collective memory were 
particularly important (2001, 2007, 2013). This study aimed to capitalise on the existing literature but with 
special focus on what was deemed a transcendental relationship between Israel’s collective memory and the 
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myriads of  manifestations of  Israel’s victimhood claims. This was referred to as the ‘continuum of  suffering,' 
and it highlighted the assumptions about the unbroken link between the ancient Jewish history, the Shoah, and 
today’s conflict. It was argued that while the Shoah represented the core example of  a chosen trauma (e.g. 
Volkan 2001, 2004), it might have been inaccurate to see it as the only factor in the formulation of  Israel’s 
collective memory. The Shoah would not have had its current powerful effect had it not been for the long 
tradition of  Jewish zachor, dwelling on remembering ‘the ancient feeling of  insecurity’ (see: Gratch 2015).  
It was also found that collective memory endowed Israel’s modern enemies with a transhistorical character. 
The siege mentality from the Jewish past was applied to the current conflict (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992 a/b), 
and certain ethos themes were readapted and new ones produced to meet today’s challenges. Chapter Five 
showed that in the early years of  the State, the Arabs were Nazified and the Palestinians were (and still are) 
persistently depicted as the new Amalek set on destroying the Jewish people. It was suggested that this 
psychohistorical dynamic was one of  the factors that made Israel’s victim self-image and identity particularly 
unique.  
One of  the interesting points that the examination of  Israel’s victimhood revealed was the tendency of  many 
Israeli-Jews to use victimhood as a measure of  ‘true Jewishness.’ From a socio-psychological perspective, this 
was found to be in line with Kelman’s thoughts on negative identity (e.g. 1999) and Bar-Tal’s thoughts on the 
ethos themes of  positive self-image, patriotism, and unity (2007, 2013). It was also found to be consistent with 
Volkan’s thoughts on chosen trauma (e.g. 2001, 2004), considering that for many in Israel the Shoah historical 
trauma has been an essential definer for the country’s Jewish identity and against which other identities were 
appraised. The study showed that many Israeli-Jews denigrated American Jews for not being ‘Jewish enough’ 
because they did not identify with Israel’s standards of  suffering or saw in the victim identity a comprehensive 
or exclusive Jewish identity. This revealed a prospect of  Israel’s victimhood rarely studied: the struggle 
between Israeli-ness and Jewishness with victimhood as a definer.  
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The initial impression was that a transcendental collective memory froze the Israeli-Jewish society in rigid 
beliefs that may have prevented many Israeli-Jews from seeing the Palestinians in a different light separate 
from the lachrymose perception of  Jewish history.  
The ‘frozen beliefs’ (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2013) manifested in a variety of  emotional orientations. The fear of  
normality appeared as a common manifestation; it blocked the potential of  realising the initial Zionist goal to 
make Israel into a normal nation with normal responsibilities and subject to international accountabilities. As 
it stands now, the ‘frozen beliefs’ about the past seem to have placed Israel in an almost permanent aggressive 
defensive posture, one that has justified and normalised the violations of  international laws. It was also found 
that the guilt associated with Israel’s practices, ironically to overcome another guilt related to a passive history, 
was alleviated and justified by depositing it upon the Palestinians. This was referred to as ‘guilt 
displacement.’ Another argument was that the past shame was, too, displaced and therefore translated into 
aggressive policies. Today’s Israel may have been aggressive to Palestinians partly because they reminded her 
of  a Jewish collective memory largely characterised by weakness. It was further suggested that acting out the 
past traumas had caused Israel to embrace some aspects of  the role of  the Jewish people’s previous 
oppressors, mainly the Nazis. Drawing on the scholarship in psychoanalysis, the phenomenon was attributed 
to the victim’s unconscious desire to identify with their victimiser. The argument also applied to the 
Palestinians’ relationship with Israel.  
Drawing on Bar-Tal’s conceptualisation of  fear (2001) and aided by the literature on cognitive appraisal (e.g. 
Keltner & Lerner 2001; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011), the study sought to advance the 
knowledge on the relationship between Israel’s fear and her understanding and implementation of  security. It 
was argued that what was termed ‘hyper security’ had been the most discernible and most felt manifestations 
of  Israel’s victimhood.   
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Even though it has been long established that security can sometimes be based on beliefs, much of  the 
scholarly discussion still dealt with Israel’s security as an independent geopolitical dynamic of  the conflict. 
Only few writers analysed Israel’s security from a psycho-political perspective (some even theorised that 
security was an expression of  Israel’s existential fear (see: e.g. Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998b)). However, not 
many, if  any, examined victimhood as a direct motivator behind Israel’s security beliefs. This was seen as a 
gap in knowledge and addressed accordingly.   
It was further suggested that contrary to the common belief, Israel’s hyper security was not a direct result of  
the country’s establishment in 1948. Its roots could not be separated from the overall conceptualisation of  the 
Jewish collective memory. By examining the pre-State period, it was found that the practices and mindset of  
the Yishuv culture may have planted the seed for Israel’s modern security mentality. What motivated the Yishuv 
to surround themselves with fortifications and feel victimised by the indigenous population continues to define 
the inner workings of  today’s security policies, although in a more sophisticated manner. 
Measuring Israel’s hyper security with reference to Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological hypothesis on emotions 
(2001, 2013) and against the geo-political situation, the study came to question the validity of  much of  
Israel’s security claims, let alone practices. As a manifestation of  victimhood, it was argued that Israel’s hyper 
security fell into the gap between calculated geopolitics and mere perceptions. That led to destructive policies 
that may have hindered the prospect of  peace. Three byproducts of  hyper security were introduced: 
preemptive warfare; war on terror; and the concept of  patriotism. The study challenged Israel’s claims that 
preemptive warfare was based on bona fide geopolitical considerations. By looking at the 1967 war and the 
Iranian threat, it was proposed that fear was the primary culprit. Much, in other words, was based on 
perceptions, not actual physical threats. Expanding this notion further, it was found that Israel’s developed 
and normalised a unique definition of  terrorism mainly to frame Palestinian dissidence as illegitimate. That 
was called ‘the mechabel narrative.’ The sense of  legitimacy regarding preemptive warfare and terrorism 
redefined many Israeli-Jews’ sense of  belongingness to the country. Patriotism, it appeared, has transformed 
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from being a term to describe the love for one’s country to a term describing one’s attachment to that country 
based on perceiving it under threatened.  
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Key Points  
• Israel’s collective memory and chosen trauma(s) provide historical explanations to today’s conflict, and today’s 
conflict confirms the ethos about Jewish victimhood that dominated collective memory. 
• Israel’s victimhood narratives are a significant measure around which many societal beliefs are constructed, and 
against which other identities are appraised.  
• The relationship between Jewish history and the present conflict is viewed as a ‘continuum of  suffering,’ and 
Palestinians as an extension of  the Jewish people’s ancient enemies.  
• Because collective memory is used to justify the conflict and the conflict is rationalised in relation to the past, 
Israel has grown unable to mourn her historical losses and traumas.   
• The inability to mourn the past deepens the sense of  collective victimhood and substantiates the conflict ethos.  
• Memory and ethos influence and are themselves influenced by certain emotional orientations in Israel’s society. 
• Emotional orientations are seen in the fear of  normality, guilt, shame, and identification with the aggressor. 
• The most dominant of  these emotions is fear.  
• Fear is closely connected to collective memory and is a primary drive in Israel’s hyper security. 
• Hyper security represents the gap between geo-politics and perceptions, and is the most important and most 
destructive physical manifestations of  victimhood. 
• Hyper security legitimises preemptive warfare, produces unique views of  terrorism, and redefines patriotism. 
Results: Israel’s victimhood narratives add to intractability and hinder settlement. 
Palestinian Victimhood  
Three main themes emerged in the Palestinian victimhood narratives: collective memory as a means to resist 
memoricide; humiliation as the overarching emotional orientation; and muqawama as the most prominent 
conflict ethos. The overall impression is that the three themes emerged largely in response to the 
asymmetrical power relationship with Israel.  
Bar-Tal’s thoughts on Israel’s collective memory provided good guidance for the examination of  Palestinian 
collective memory (2007, 2013). But these thoughts were found to be limited as they viewed Israeli-Jewish 
and Palestinian memories almost on an equal footing. This study found that the power asymmetry between 
Israel and the Palestinians foisted fundamental differences both in terms of  the nature of  collective memory 
and the fashion in which it was perceived, manifested, and disseminated. Palestinian collective memory was 
found to be particularly fragile against Israel’s master-narrative. For reasons mainly related to its large 
dependency on oral history and the present-day occupation, the preservation of  this memory became an 
existential struggle in itself. The overall impression was that Palestinian collective memory surpassed its 
traditional historical role as a chosen trauma (e.g. Volkan 2006) or an identity extension to become a 
representation of  the ever-growing fear of  being forgotten as a people. The process of  remembering, 
therefore, became a process of  victimisation. In a way, Palestinian memory turned into a proof  of  being and 
Palestinians accordingly into memory nomads.  
  
It was also found that in order to preserve Palestinian memory and keep it resolutely aligned with the ‘ideal 
victim’ narratives, ethos about the delegitimisation of  the opponent’s memory were cemented. The Shoah was 
placed against the Nakba and that led to ambivalence toward the former, ranging from indifference to 
outright denial. At the core of  this ambivalence, as Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish reflects, lied a 
‘contest’ over who was the greater victim (Helit 2012; see also: Noor et al. 2012). Signs showed that any 
counter-narratives looking at the Shoah as a bona fide Jewish grievance were met with fierce resistance. That, 
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among other things, proved that for the most part Palestinian society is more concerned with maintaining the 
ideal victim status than exploring the prospects of  settlement that would require revising the victim self-
image.  
The repercussions of  collective memory and the present-day occupation came to define the Palestinian 
collective emotional orientations. Dissimilar to the scholars who focused on fear and anger in intractable 
conflict to explain the Palestinian collective emotional state (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2013; Halperin et al. 2011), 
this study identified humiliation as the most dominant emotion amongst Palestinians. Painting much of  the 
Palestinian emotional state in terms of  humiliations may have posed a challenge to the existing societal beliefs 
about honour, pride, and masculinity, as well as the accepted ethos about muqawama.  
It was found that humiliation is triggered chiefly by Israel’s control, and that Israel’s control was not a mere 
security measure, but also a method for Israeli-Jews to avoid being humiliated themselves. Jewish collective 
memory is key in the development and implementation of  this rationale. Practically, for Israeli-Jews this 
meant managing the occupation and maintaining the status quo. As an afterthought, it may be suggested that 
there is perhaps a link between control and the preservation of  Israel’s victim self-image. Israel’s control of  
Palestinians provided control over the Palestinian narrative and that enfeebled its effect on the legitimacy of  
Israel’s victim claims. By silencing different events, Israel has managed to construct history in such a way to 
allow collective amnesia that erased the Palestinian counter-narrative (Thomas 2015). It is also an illustration 
of  the complex relation between truth and politics where the powerful often controls how the story should 
unfold, and to what end. Arendt (1961, p. 231) explains that, “…The chances of  factual truth surviving the 
onslaught of  power are very slim indeed…”  Similarly, in the Wretched of  the Earth (1967, p.51), Fanon says: “It 
is the settler who makes history and he is conscious of  making it.” 
One of  the important contributions to knowledge was the discussion (and expansion) of  the adverse effects of  
humiliation on the Palestinian collective. Initially, and concurring with other scholars (e.g. Varvin 2005; 
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Coleman and Goldman 2005; Jabr 2016), humiliation was found to be a constant signifier of  Palestinian 
victimhood. Further research revealed that rarely was humiliation examined, especially by Palestinians, as a 
comprehensive behavioural dynamic in the conflict. Humiliation imposed a variety of  (often negative) coping 
mechanisms, which over the course of  the conflict has scarred the very fabric of  society. This was referred to 
as ‘the enemy within.’ In keeping with Bar-Tal’s thoughts on the normalisation and routinisation of  conflict 
(2013), it was suggested that some Palestinians in their attempts to deflect the heavy-handed impact of  
humiliation resorted to normalising and routinising the situation either through self-denial or by trying to 
suppress anyone who dared challenge the status quo . Others were found to displace their frustration and lack 
of  autonomy onto others, like the children of  Jerusalem who sought self-esteem in the abuse of  cats. On the 
whole, that led to the assumption that since humiliation was a dominant emotion, then pursuing its antithesis 
in the form of  self-esteem, honour, or dignity became a purpose. This pursuit produced various — sometimes 
misdirected — remedial practices. 
Adding another level of  analysis, part of  the argument was that the effect of  humiliation was amplified due to 
the patriarchal nature of  Palestinian society. In this society, masculine values around honour and dignity are 
most glorified. Stifling the expression or practice of  these values is in a way an assault on Palestinian 
masculinity. This was called ‘gendered humiliation.’   
Generally, much of  the conflict ethos themes between Israel and the Palestinians are similar. Think for 
example of  ethos themes such as the justness of  one’s goals, positive self-image, or the delegitimisation of  the 
opponent (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). It was however suggested that ethos can also be case specific and 
circumstantially bound (see Chapter Two). Because of  the dominance of  the feelings of  humiliation, the 
Palestinian ethos themes developed to reflect that fact. While Israeli-Jews hid their shame of  past humiliation 
behind ethos about military strength and the IDF morality, humiliation for Palestinians gave rise to ethos 
about muqawama, one purposefully designed to boost self-image and pride. Challenging the common beliefs, it 
was argued that muqawama was/is not in its basic form directed at national liberation; rather, it was purposed 
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as a powerful tool to reinstate and preserve Palestinian masculinity and honour. The pattern of  anger and 
retaliatory destructive responses were seen as reflections of  that purpose (Aquino & Byron 2002). In the heat 
of  the moment, the liberation of  Palestine might not be most visible or conscious goal for a fighter set out to 
attack Israeli troops. This is why it was argued that the conflict could sometimes be personal and is fought for 
personal reasons.    
Rarely a topic of  discussion amongst Palestinians, the study argued that the dichotomy of  victimhood and 
muqawama created serious contradictions in Palestinians society and led to a society-wide psychological 
fatigue. The nearly hegemonic adherence to both the conflict ethos and collective memory set a specific 
ideological trajectory for most researchers and intellectuals to follow, restricting in the process the prospect of  
constructive and daring internal reflections. The fluid notions of  isteshhad and self-sacrifice stood out as 
particularly critical in the way Palestinians appraised the conflict and resisted the occupation. It was 
suggested that for some, resisting became an end in itself, locking society in a closed cycle of  narcissism and 
masochism. This was evident in how Palestinians valued Israel’s validation of  Palestinian ability to hurt 
Israel, but simultaneously glorified the ability to endure the pain she inflicted. That revealed a pattern 
somewhat similar to Israel’s warrior-victim identity; that is, we aspire to be strong, but at the same time we 
embrace the weakness that the ‘ideal victim’ status entails. It was also explained why the physical death 
through shahada represented a revival of  the ‘dead self ’ which humiliation created. As one example, it seemed 
that through the ritualistic and occasionally celebratory nature of  shaheeds’ funerals, Palestinians created a 
powerful parallel reality where the perceived spiritual continuation acted as a triumphant posture against 
Israel and heightened the sense of  moral superiority associated with being a victim. These dynamics can be 
seen as part of  the belief  mechanisms that a society develops to cope with and rationalise the conflict (Bar-Tal 
2001, 2007, 2013). For Palestinians, the odds are enormous, and perhaps expectedly, so are the ethos set to 
defeat them.  
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 FINAL WORDS  
Since Oslo, there have been several major clashes, significant land grabs, numerous failed agreements, several 
West Bank incursions, and three destructive Gaza onslaughts. As a result, the final conclusion among many 
Palestinians nowadays is that the two-state solution is officially dead. With all that, the feelings of  
victimisation have become more rooted. As I conclude this study, the thirteen-year-old blockade is turning 
Gaza into an uninhabitable land (see: UNTAD 2015). Gazans have been marching every Friday since March 
2018 to the Gaza border with Israel trying to break the blockade. Many died and thousands were injured and 
yet, so far, the protests do not seem to lose momentum. Recently, youngsters started sending incendiary kites 
into Israel with the message “We shall not suffer alone.” In a surreal fashion, however, the protests are slowly 
263
Key Points 
• Palestinian collective memory is largely premised on the fear of  being forgotten.  
• The struggle to maintain the memory is existential and the process of  remembering is victimising.  
• Palestinians views of  the conflict are filtered through the ‘ideal victim’ self-image. 
• Such self-image sometimes serves to insulate Palestinians against own shortcomings and failures.  
• While the emotion of  fear defines Israel, humiliation most defines Palestinian lives.  
• Humiliation is mostly a destructive force that breeds negative coping mechanisms among Palestinians.   
• Humiliation may have locked Palestinian struggle in an endless pursuit of  dignity and national masculinity. 
• This pursuit gave rise to overcompensation, mostly evident in the ethos about muqawama.  
• Muqawama may not be entirely focused on the final goal of  liberation, it is also used as a means to vent anger and 
frustration, and in the process re-instate Palestinian self-esteem.  
• The ethos about muqawama created contradictions which led to a society-wide psychological fatigue.  
Results: Palestinian victimhood narratives add to intractability and hinder settlement.  
taking on some of  the habitual muqawama approaches, once again making this new form of  resistance a goal 
in itself. It appears that the protesters are perhaps heading for yet another masochistic episode of  Palestinian 
history, where suffering is routinised and normalised. I hear repeatedly from many young protesters, “I am 
going to the border to be a shaheed (martyr).” Only this way they can be both victims and heroes. This comes 
at a time in Palestinian history where Palestinians are bearing the brunt of  both the occupation which is 
becoming yet harsher and tighter and the internal Palestinian division, which is freezing Palestinian society in 
a state of  domestic despair and painful feelings of  nationalistic shame. Much faster and more than ever, the 
layers of  victimhood are building up and getting thicker and more complex.  
Across the fence, Israel, with President Trump’s unconditional support, has been acceleratingly expanding 
the settlements, confiscating Palestinian funds, raiding Palestinian residential areas, passing racist laws, upping 
the segregation measures against the Palestinian citizens of  Israel, and most recently pushing the US to cut 
funds to the UNRWA. The pretext is always security. However, as Israel’s measures get harsher, the feeling of  
victimisation and the concomitant sense of  entitlement grows yet stronger amongst many Israeli-Jews. The 
response to minor threats, as a result, has become yet more excessive. Palestinian stone-throwers, for example, 
are now treated as ‘terrorists’ and as stipulated in an overwhelmingly supported bill, stone-throwing is 
punishable by up to 20 years in prison (Reuters 2015). Hyper security is becoming more hyper; more walls 
and fences are being erected on the borders with Jordan, Lebanon, and Gaza (Wootliff  2016). In what seems 
like a vigorous revival of  the Begin Doctrine, hyper security has been justifying Israel's bombing of  the heart 
of  Syria and areas in Iraq to curb, as they say, the Iranian threat in the region. Once again, we are faced by 
the chicken-or-egg question, which comes first, peace or security?   
Most of  the above developments happened only in the past few years. This shows how convoluted and 
unpredictable the nature of  the conflict is, and, as a result, how complex the examination of  victimhood has 
been. Painting a clear picture of  Israel’s and Palestinian victimhood narratives beyond the visible geo-political 
conflict dynamics revealed that the issue of  victimhood is yet to receive the attention it deserves. 
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Consequently, much of  scholarship on the subject was found to be limited or underdeveloped. Like other 
studies, this study could only tackle certain aspects of  the conflict and was not by any means comprehensive.  
As discussed in the introduction chapter, because of  the logistical and political obstacles, mostly secondary 
sources were used. Interviews or archival materials that could have enriched the study further were not easily 
or at all accessible. The study was also prone to the limitations normally associated with qualitative and 
narrative research. The usage of  some statistical representations, trying to identify with the Other’s position, 
and engaging in self-reflexive critique meant, among other things, to keep the researcher positionality and the 
study’s credibility and reliability in check. This seemingly unavoidable limitation could be further alleviated in 
future studies with the employment of  more statistical data, interviews, and field work. Palestinian 
victimhood in particular was found to lack sufficient statistical data. 
In contrast to the scholarship on Israel’s collective memory, the scholarship on Palestinian collective memory 
was found to lack certain psychohistorical perspectives. Several scholars placed Israel’s collective memory 
within the wider context of  ancient Jewish history and that helped provide it with a psychohistorical 
perspective (e.g. Zerubavel 1991; Falk 1993; Zertal 2005). Future researchers could place Palestinian 
collective memory within the wider Arab/Muslim historical context. For many Arabs, the collapse of  what 
was perceived as a prosperous civilisation still evokes nostalgia and resonates as a collective feeling of  
humiliation and victimhood. In this context, Palestinian victimhood may not only be about the humiliation 
of  a ‘paradise lost,’  it can also be about Andalusia lost.  
Initially in this study, the role of  fear in Israel’s security was partly examined from a cognitive appraisal 
perspective. The argument was that fear leads to behaviours such as the avoidance of  factors causing the fear, 
and this can turn into aggressive behaviours towards these factors (Rosler 2013; also see: Bar-Tal 2001; 
Halperin et al. 2011). This was viewed as closely related to Israel’s collective memory. But as an afterthought, 
there might be other factors that can heighten the fear generated by collective memory. At the Jerusalem Post 
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Conference in New York, which I attended in 2017, Danny Halutz, former IDF Chief  of  Staff, emphatically 
warned that in any future attack on Lebanon, “[Israel] will destroy Lebanon.” Halutz’s threat was not new. 
But what caught my attention was the long round of  applause and enthusiastic cheering  that followed. Given 
that most of  the audience were American Jews who did not physically experience the conflict, I began to 
wonder about their reasons for such as an aggressive posture beside the identification with Israel and 
Zionism. One of  the thoughts was whether the aggressiveness was also connected to the human fear of  
mortality (see: Becker 1973), and if  that actually enhanced the negative reverberations of  collective memory 
— and vice versa. This thought was inspired by the Terror Management Theory (Greenberg et al. 1986), 
which stipulates that when mortality is made salient, people tend to intensify aspects of  their worldview and 
bolster their self-esteem (ibid., Greenberg & Arndt 2012). They learn to ‘manage’ the potentially paralysing 
terror resulting from the awareness of  mortality (Solomon 2009). This probably what Amos Oz (1983) meant 
when he said, quoting a right-wing Israeli-Jew, “Better a living Judeo-Nazi than a dead saint.” The human 
tendency to fear mortality is natural, but there could be an overlooked correlation between it and how a 
society views and identifies with collective memory. The works of  Becker (1973) and Greenberg et al. (1986) 
are well established and could add a whole new psychological dimension that would enrich the studies on 
traumatic memory and, by extension, victimhood. 
Religion is perhaps one of  the most defining factors in the conflict. In this study there were several references 
to the Biblical zachor and Jewish religious rituals/holidays, as well as to Palestinian religious understanding of  
isteshhad. But these references were minor. The role of  religion was not expanded on because a reasonable 
discussion would have surpassed the study’s capacity and diffused its focus. Still, it will be interesting for 
future researchers to examine the role of  religion in the formation and maintenance of  victimhood 
narratives. The role of  the Bible and the Quran, for instance, in justifying the conflict and perpetuating the 
victim identity remains an undiscovered area.   
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The very recent changes in Israel could also be incorporated in future studies. As of  late 2019, Israel is 
heading for the third election in one year for the first time, Netanyahu is so far Israel’s longest serving PM 
and facing serious corruption charges, and most importantly, Israel is more than ever polarised and divided. 
There are signs that populism and identity politics are taking hold. This is coupled with a growing tendency 
to define Israeliness, Zionism, and patriotism in ethnic, secular, or religious terms. Traditionally, the Shoah 
acted as a unifying factor amongst Israel’s Mizrachi and Ashkenazi Jews, but the formation of  new divisive 
identities (emphasising plural) within an already ethnically divided society may signal upcoming changes. It is 
hard to tell for sure how this will unfold, but what is certain is that the narratives of  victimhood will change. 
But how and to what extent? That remains for future researchers to consider. 
I would like to conclude by saying that because the conflict kept on changing shape, it was tricky staying up-
to-date and precise. Sometimes, the periods of  calm forced me to slightly revise my initial impressions and 
assumptions, but only to be brought back into the loop as another wave of  escalation struck. I started writing 
this study only two years after the Gaza onslaught in 2014. Emotions then might have been running high. But 
I have had sufficient time since to look back and reflect. This work allowed me, or rather pushed me, to step 
outside the circle and try to fathom what actually happened in 2014 and how things led to such a 
catastrophic development. From the outset, I constantly shifted between looking outwardly at the conflict 
history and present and inwardly into my personal experience. While that provided a better understanding of  
the Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian experiences, it was nevertheless a struggle against the re-traumatisation that 
came with the constant reminder that the conflict has been building up ever since I knew what it was. There 
was also the struggle against the emotional influence of  memory on how I saw or approached this study. 
Occasionally, I felt that I, too, was a memory nomad like the rest of  the society that I sought to critique. What 
I saw as an out-of-the-circle vantage point gave me perhaps a clearer perspective on the conflict than many 
Palestinians inside the circle in Palestine. But this did not completely sever the umbilical cord with the 
collective. As I journeyed through this study I could not help but sometimes feel that I was carrying Palestine 
as a burden on my shoulders. Not only from an academic perspective, but also because it was not clear 
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whether that burden was caused by the Palestinian need to be visible, to make a stance by writing about 
Palestine, to fulfil a moral obligation to a homeland, to preserve and pass on an inheritance, or simply 
because it was only a habit to cling on to the conflict. On the positive side, the burden made me hyper aware 
of  my positionality as a researcher. But, on the negative side, having learnt more about the dark sides of  
victimhood in conflict, pessimism about the conflict future gradually set in. This is was made possible partly 
because pessimism is one of  those emotional characteristics that I have acquired by being part of  the 
Palestinian collective. But in the Palestinian case, I came to realise, pessimism was also a powerful tool for 
survival. Only this way can one be immune to the likelihood, or rather certainty, of  further future setbacks. 
After all, the conflict has proved elusive and repeatedly showed that any glimpse of  hope soon turned into yet 
another element for fear, hatred, polarisation, and desperation. Despite all of  that, this study was written not 
only to understand and explain, but also because of  some faint hope that it will add to the understanding of  
the power of  beliefs and perceptions in the conflict. The examination of  victimhood was not a conflict 
resolution endeavour. But one of  its implications, I hoped, was to add another dimension to the existing 
socio-psychological approaches to conflict resolution. Even with the illusive facade of  manageability or 
normality, the conflict remains unsustainable, and will continue to deteriorate. My main hope that someday, 
no matter how far away that might seem, we will all run out of  fuel. This is not a hope for an idealistic, 
perhaps naive visualisation of  peace, but rather a hope that more of  us will realise that neither Palestinians 
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VISUAL APPENDIX  
——————————————————————————————————————— 
(fig. 1.1) Handhala 
Naji Al-Ali was a Palestinian political cartoonist, born 
in 1938 in Palestine and assassinated in London in 
1987.  Al-Ali said Handhala was born as a ten-year-old 
and will remain as such until Palestinians have 
returned to Palestine. The laws of  nature did not 
apply to him, exactly like the loss of  a homeland.  
 
 
fig. 1.2) An Educational Ad Captures 
Israel’s Culture of  Fear (Moar 2011) 
“Don’t leave us behind,” 
 “Education is our future”    
“Yesterday, they said on the news that Israel has the 
most advanced missiles in the world, they said that our 
technological progress is the only reason we have not 
been thrown in the sea…I am scared, I do not know 
how to swim very well.” 
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“Cogito ergo sum” 
“Dreaming return…” 
(fig. 1.3) IDF Troops Commemorating 
Yom Ha-shoah as they demolished 
residential tents in Susyia, Hebron - 
May 2019  
Photos recently emerged on social media showing  a 
group of  IDF soldiers standing solemnly as the sirens 
of  yom ha-shoah (Shoah Remembrance Day) sounded. 
The soldiers were in fact in the middle of  demolishing 
Palestinian residential tents in Susyia, Hebron but had 
to stop briefly to pay homage to the Shoah victims. 
When the sirens stopped, the troops resumed the 
demolition. 
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